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LE'I'rER OF SUBMITTAL
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, October 29, 1986.
Hon. THOMASP. O'NEILL, Jr.,
The Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
D_R MR. SPEAKEn:
By direction of the Committee on Science and Technology, I
hereby submit the Committee's investigative report on the Chal-
lenger accident. The report was approved by the Committee on Oc-
tober 7, 1986. The report was carried out under the direction of the
Ranking Majority Member, Robert A. Roe, who chaired the hear-
ings and instructed the Committee staff assigned to the investiga-
tion.
Sincerely,
Dos FUQUA, Chairman.
Enclosure.
(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
U.S. House OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
Washington, DC, October 29, 198a.
To Robert A. Roe, Ranking Majority Member, Committee on Science
and Technology.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:
I am forwarding this investigative report on the Challenger Acci-
dent prepared at your request.
On your instructions, the staff has carefully reviewed the infor-
mation made available to the Committee and prepared the neces-
sary findings and recommendations. The task was enormous and
has been done in a careful and painstaking manner. I am especial-
ly grateful to all the staff which is listed on the inside cover of the
report for their professional and thorough application to this im-
portant report. We worked in a collegial manner and on a com-
pletely bipartisan basis. I particularly want to thank the three
group leaders, Ron Williams, Terry Dawson and Harriet Smith
who headed up the respective subgroups for the Accident, the Tech-
nical, and the Management Issues.
Sincerely,
ROBERT C. KETCHAM, General Counsel.
(v)
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Mr. FuQuA, from the Committee on Science and Technology,
submitted the following
REPORT
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 28, at 11:39 a.m., the Space Shuttle Challenger and
its crew suffered a tragic accident during launch. That same day
the House of Representatives adopted H. Res. 361 which expressed
the profound sorrow of the House for the tragedy and offered con-
dolences to the families of the Challenger crew members.
During consideration of the resolution Chairman Fuqua informed
the full House of Representatives that, in conformance with its
oversight responsibilities, the Committee on Science and Technolo-
gy would conduct a comprehensive investigation into the cause of
this accident.
This report is the result of the Committee's inquiry. It contains
the best efforts of the Committee to review the work of the Presi-
dential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
(hereafter referred to as the Rogers Commission) and the work of
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in in-
vestigating the causes of the accident, and reviewing the recom-
mendations to resume safe flight.
In addition to reviewing the five volumes of the Rogers Commis-
sion Report, the Committee also had direct on-line access to the
entire Rogers Commission data base, which included full-text and
document retrieval capability. 1
The findings and recommendations contained in this report are
the product of the Committee's own extensive hearing record,
Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volumes I-
V, Washington, D.C., June 6, 1986. (Hereafter referred to as Rogers Commission Report.)
(1)
which includesmaterialssubmitted forthe record,staffinvestiga-
tions,interviews,and trips.
Itshouldbe Understoodthat the roleof thisCommittee isdiffer-
ent from thatof the four-month Rogers Commission. The Commit-
tee,which authorizedthe funds and reviewed the lengthydevelop-
ment processwhich ledtothe successfulShuttleprogram, has a re-
sponsibilityto insure that the tragicaccident,and those events
thatled up toit,are understoodand assimilatedintoalllevelsand
activitiesof NASA so that safe manned space flightcan be re-
sumed.
In carrying out its annual authorizing responsibilities, the Com-
mittee endorses the programs and activities of NASA, and func-
tions as a key player in the legislative activities of our federal
system. As part of the fulfillment of this role, the Committee has
reviewed the report of the Rogers Commission, called upon numer-
ous witnesses, and utilized many members of its staff to prepare
and review the material that has produced this report.
The Committee has been most fortunate in its work due to the
diligent and thorough investigation undertaken by the Rogers Com-
mission and the NASA investigation panels that supported the
Commission. The Commission's exhaustive efforts to achieve com-
pleteness as it came to grips with a very complex technical and
management system are very commendable, and will serve as a
model for future Presidential Commissions.
The Committee wishes to express its appreciation for the assist-
ance of the House Administration Committee, the Rogers Commis-
sion staff, and the Justice Department's Office of Litigation Sup-
port, Civil Division. Each of these groups was very cooperative and
helpful in providing the access to, and equipment for, the Challeng-
er accident data base needed by the Committee to do its work. In
addition, the Committee very much appreciates the assistance of
NASA personnel who responded to numerous requests for briefings
and documents during the course of the investigation.
II.CONCLUSIONS
In execution of its oversight responsibilities,the Committee on
Science and Technology has conducted a thorough investigation of
the Challenger accident. Although the Committee's concern and
evaluation in this report are related specificallyto the safe and ef-
fectivefunctioning of NASA's Space Shuttle program, itshould be
understood that our larger objective and greater responsibilityare
to insure that NASA, as the Nation's civilianspace agency, main-
tains organizational and programmatic excellence across the board.
What we as a Committee, NASA as an agency, and the Nation as
a whole, also must realizeis that the lessons learned by the Chal-
lenger accident are universally applicable, not just for NASA but
for governments, and for society. We hope that this report will
serve this much larger purpose.
The Committee's investigation included: ten formal hearings in-
volving 60 witnesses; an extensive review of the report of the
Rogers Commission along with itsvoluminous supporting appendi-
ces and related reports by the investigation panels at NASA, as
well as numerous briefings and interviews with NASA officials,
contractor personnel, outside experts, and other interested parties.
From the outset, the focus of the Committee's investigation has
been on understanding each of the following:
What was the cause, or causes, of the Challenger acci-
dent?
Are there other inherent hardware or management-re-
lated deficiencies that could cause additional accidents in
the future?
What must be done to correct all of these problems so
that the Space Shuttle can be safely returned to flight
status?
The Committee found that NASA's drive to achieve a launch
schedule of 24 flights per year created pressure throughout the
agency that directly contributed to unsafe launch operations. The
Committee believes that the pressure to push for an unrealistic
number of flights continues to exist in some sectors of NASA and
jeopardizes the promotion of a "safety first" attitude throughout
the Shuttle program.
The Committee, the Congress, and the Administration have
played a contributing role in creating this pressure. Congressional
and Administration policy and posture indicated that a reliable
flight schedule with internationally competitive flight costs was a
near-term objective.
Pressures within NASA to attempt to evolve from an R&D
agency into a quasicompetitive business operation caused a realign-
ment of priorities in the direction of productivity at the cost of
safety.
(3)
NASA management and the Congress must remember the les-
sons learned from the Challenger accident and never again set un-
reasonable goals which stress the system beyond its safe function-
ing.
The Committee commends the work of the Rogers Commission
and its supporting panels at NASA. Their investigation and the re-
ports that document their efforts are very broad in scope and ex-
ceptionally detailed considering the time that was available to ac-
complish their task.
As a rule, the Committee agrees with the findings reached by the
Rogers Commission. However, there are areas where the Commit-
tee either disagrees with a Rogers Commission finding or with the
relative importance that the Rogers Commission attached to that
finding.
Like the Rogers Commission, the Committee concluded that the
Challenger accident was caused by a failure in the aft field joint on
the right-hand Solid Rocket Motor. Additionally, we agree with the
Rogers Commission that this tragic accident was not caused by the
Orbiter, the Space Shuttle Main Engines, the External Tank, the
onboard payloads, the ground support equipment, or the other ele-
ments of the Solid Rocket Boosters. We also agree that the failure
of the joint was due to a faulty design, and that neither NASA nor
Thiokol fully understood the operation of the joint prior to the acci-
dent. Further, the joint test and certification programs were inad-
equate, and neither NASA nor Thiokol responded adequately to
available warning signs that the joint design was defective.
In concurrence with the Rogers Commission, the Committee con-
firms that the safety, reliability, and quality assurance programs
within NASA were grossly inadequate, but in addition recommends
that NASA review its risk management activities to define a com-
plete risk management program. The Committee also agrees that a
thorough review must be conducted on all Criticality 1 and 1R
items and hazard analyses; a study should be conducted on how to
provide Space Shuttle crews with a means of escape during con-
trolled gliding flight; and NASA's Shuttle management structure,
safety organization, communications procedures, and maintenance
policies should be carefully scrutinized and improved.
In other areas, the Committee reached somewhat different con-
clusions than the Rogers Commission:
The Rogers Commission concluded that NASA's decision-
making process was flawed. The Committee does agree
that the Marshall Space Flight Center should have passed
along to higher management levels the temperature con-
cerns that Thiokol engineers raised the night before the
launch of Mission 51-L. However, the Committee feels that
the underlying problem which led to the Challenger acci-
dent was not poor communication or inadequate proce-
dures as implied by the Rogers Commission conclusion. 1
Rather, the fundamental problem was poor technical deci-
sion-making over a period of several years by top NASA
For the purpose of this report, a procedure is a formal set of instructions designed to guide
and assist in the performance of a technical or management function.
and contractor personnel, who failed to act decisively to
solve the increasingly serious anomalies in the Solid
Rocket Booster joints.
Information on the flaws in the joint design and on the
problems encountered in missions prior to 51-L was widely
available and had been presented to all levelsof Shuttle
management. Despite the presence of significantamounts
of information and the occurrence of at least one detailed
briefing at Headquarters on the difficultieswith the O-
rings, the NASA and Thiokol technical managers failed to
understand or fully accept the seriousness of the problem.
There was no sense of urgency on their part to correct the
design flaws in the SRB. No one suggested grounding the
fleet, nor did NASA embark on a concerted effort to
remedy the deficiencies in O-ring performance. Rather,
NASA chose to continue to fly with a flawed design and to
follow a measured, 27-month, corrective program.
The Committee has more concerns than those expressed
by the Rogers Commission about the relative safety of the
Space Shuttle Main Engine. We are impressed by the so-
phistication and performance of the Main Engine, but are
concerned that it may have inadequate safety margins to
ensure continued safe operation. The Committee is also
concerned by the presence of persistent operating prob-
lems with the engine (e.g., cracked turbine blades and de-
fective hydraulic actuators and temperature sensors), and
believes that NASA should give serious consideration to
not allowing the Main Engine to be operated (except in
emergency situations) at a thrust level greater than the
standard 104 percent. On the other hand, should NASA de-
termine that a higher engine thrust setting is needed for
programmatic reasons, the Committee believes that the
space agency should take whatever actions are required to
ensure that adequate operating margins are present to
maintain safety.
The Committee has gone beyond the Rogers Commission
in recommending a new system specification to overcome
the inadequacies of the landing gear, tire, wheel, brake
and nose wheel steering systems. The Committee also con-
cluded that orbiter landings appear to be high risk even
under ideal conditions, which seldom occur.
The Rogers Commission stated that "there appears to be
a departure from the philosophy of the 1960s and 1970s re-
lating to the use of astronauts in management positions. ''2
In contrast, after taking testimony from several former
and current astronauts, the Committee could find no evi_
dence that astronauts are denied the opportunity to enter
management if they so choose. On the other hand, prior to
the STS 51-L accident, astronauts were not encouraged to
enter management.
Rogers Commission Report,Volume I,p.199.
In still other areas, the Committee has raised concerns that do
not appear to have been addressed sufficiently by the Rogers Com-
mission. We are concerned that:
There are numerous other recurrent hardware problems
that are either not fully understood by NASA or have not
been corrected.
The existinginternalcommunication system isdissemi-
nating too much information,oftenwith littleor no dis-
criminationinitsimportance.Accordingly,recipientshave
difficulty"separatingthe wheat from the chaff."
Existingcontractincentivesused by NASA do not ade-
quately addressor promote safetyand qualityconcerns--
most emphasis isplacedon meeting costand schedulere-
quirements.
NASA doesnot yet understand how or why the deficien-
ciesin SolidRocket Motor testingand certificationwent
undetected in spiteof the very comprehensive processes
and proceduresused by the agency to conduct and oversee
these activities.The Committee isconcerned thatwithout
such an understanding,NASA willnot be able to protect
againsta similarbreakdown in itssystem of checks and
balancesin the future.
The Committee has concernsregardingthe safetyofthe
Filament Wound Case SolidRocket Boosternow under de-
velopment by NASA, and recommends that the agency
considermoving the heaviestSpace Shuttlepayloadsto ex-
pendable launch vehiclesso that there willbe no need to
use Filament Wound Case Boosters.
The Committee isnot assuredthat NASA has adequate
technicaland scientificexpertiseto conduct the Space
Shuttleprogram properly.NASA has sufferedstaffingre-
ductionsin key areasover severalyears.Moreover, itloses
a significantnumber of technical/scientificpersonneldue
to an imbalance between the government salaryschedule
and thatofthe privatesector.The salarystructurealsoin-
hibitsNASA's abilityto recruittop technicaltalentto re-
place itslosses.The recordisnot sufficiento warrant a
formalfindingon thismatter.However, the Committee in-
tends to conduct an in-depth review of NASA technical
abilityin the next Congress.
On July 14,1986,NASA submitted to the Presidenta reporton
what actionsthe space agency plans to take in responseto the rec-
ommendations ofthe Rogers Commission.sThe Committee believes
thatthe planscontainedin thisreportare a stepin the rightdirec-
tion.When fullyimplemented, theseplans shouldsubstantiallyim-
prove the safetyofS_ace Shuttleflightoperations.The Committee
alsoendorses NASA s decisionto move the proposed date for the
next Space Shuttlelaunch beyond June 1987.This isa realisticand
responsibledecisionthat has removed some unnecessarypressure
s NASA, "Report to the President:Actions to Implement the Recommendations of the Presi-
dential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident," July 14, 1986,(Hereafterre-
ferredtoas NASA Response toRogers Commission.)
from the government and contractor personnel who must ensure
that all hardware will be in readiness to reinstitute safe flight op-
erations.
Throughout the remainder of this report, the Committee address-
es dozens of specific issues that relate to the Challenger accident.
The Committee makes many recommendations for actions to be
taken on the part of NASA to correct the problems that we have
identified. The Committee directs NASA to report back to us by
February 15, 1987, on how it is responding to each recommendation
contained in this report.
In closing, the Committee would like to state that it continues to
believe in and remains committed to a vigorous civilian space pro-
gram. The Committee also continues to believe that the Space
Shuttle is a critically important element of that program. The
Committee's purpose, as NASA's primary overseer in the House,
must be to monitor, understand, and help correct where necessary
the patterns in NASA which lead to weakened and ineffective oper-
ation.
We are at a watershed in NASA's history and the Nation's space
program. NASA's 28-year existence represents its infancy. We
must use the knowledge and experience from this time to insure a
strong future for NASA and the U.S. space program throughout
the 21st century.
This Committee has long been proud of the many awe-inspiring
achievements of NASA and understands the importance of NASA's
programs to the future well-being of this country. We as a Commit-
tee have perhaps exhibited the human inclination to accept the
successful completion of a flight or event as an indication of the
overall strength of all aspects of its planning and execution. Per-
haps it is arrogant to dissect and interrogate relentlessly projects
and programs that bring home repeated A's for achievement and
accomplishment. However, all of us--NASA, the Committee, the
Congress and the Nation--have learned from the Challenger trage-
dy that it is wisdom to do so, and it is a reflection of respect for the
human fallibility that we all possess.
We have no doubt that through the hard work and dedication of
the men and women at NASA and its supporting contractors, the
Space Shuttle will be safely returned to flight status--and will
once again continue to impress people around the world with its
many important accomplishments.
As has been said many times since the January 28th tragedy,
space flight is a high risk undertaking. The Committee accepts this
fact and applauds those men and women who, in spite of this risk,
have chosen manned space flight as a career. Though we grieve at
the loss of the Challenger crew, we do not believe that their sacri-
fice was in vain. They would not want us to stop reaching into the
unknown. Instead, they would want us to learn from our mistakes,
correct any problems that have been identified, and then once
again reach out to expand the boundaries of our experience in
living and working in outer space.

III. COMPILATION OF ISSUES, FINDINGS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
This compilation is taken from the body of the report. In order to
facilitate the reader's ability to refer to specific sections within the
report, the outline in the following compilation corresponds to the
Table of Contents and the body of this report:
V. THE ACCIDENT
Discussion Only
A. INTRODUCTION
B. SOLID ROCKET MOTORS
1. History
Issue
Was there sufficient time to correct the problems with the Solid
Rocket Motor?
Findings
1. Problems with the joints which connect the Solid Rocket
Motor casings were recognized for many years. While attempts
were made to correct these problems, the measures taken were in-
sufficient to provide a reliable joint.
2. The joint seal problem was recognized by engineers in both
NASA and Morton Thiokol in sufficient time to have been correct-
ed by redesigning and manufacturing new joints before the acci-
dent on January 28, 1986. Meeting flight schedules and cutting cost
were given a higher priority than flight safety.
2. Summary of Casing Joint Design
Issue
Why did the aft field joint between the steel containers that hold
the Solid Rocket Motor propellant fail to contain the burning gases
of the propellant during lift-off and flight operations?
Findings
1. The design of the field joint was unsatisfactory and could not
reliably contain the burning propellant gases under the range of
operating conditions to be expected during the lift-off and flight
phases.
2. The O-ring materials and putty used in the design of the joint
were unsatisfactory as used on the Shuttle, particularly during the
winter months. Furthermore, neither NASA nor its contractor,
Morton Thiokol, can adequately control the quality or consistency
of these kinds of materials, which are made from recipes known
(9)
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only by the manufacturer and which can be changed without certi-
fication and approval.
Recommendations
1. NASA should write and issue a new and more accurate per-
formance specification which would cover the full range of thermal
and structural requirements for the Solid Rocket Motors, with an
adequate factor of safety for unusually low temperatures.
2. The Committee concurs with the Rogers Commission Report
Recommendations on new joint design, but believes it is more ap-
propriate to be more explicit in identifying the weaknesses in the
joint design that need correction.
3. The field joints of the Solid Rocket Motors should be rede-
signed to account for the following features while providing a sig-
nificant factor of safety:
a. Movement in the joint,
b. Proper spacing between tang and clevis,
c. Seals made to withstand high and low temperatures under
all dynamic thermal and structural loadings,
d. Adequate sealing without the use of putty,
e. Protection against insulation debonding and propellant
cracking.
3. Testing and Certification
Discussion Only
4. Manufacturing
Discussion Only
5. Stacking Operations
Issue
Was there any damage to the casing joints or contamination that
occurred during the stacking operations when the Shuttle was as-
sembled in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) that could have
contributed to the failure?
Finding
There was no evidence of joint contamination, fracture or other
damage from foreign objects or due to casing ovality that contribut-
ed to the joint failure. Although certain problems occurred during
stacking and the procedures were violated once, there was no evi-
dence that these events contributed to the Flight 51-L accident.
6. Summary of Launch Operations
Issue 1
How was the decision to launch STS 51-L arrived at and why
was it wrong?
Findings
1. The Flight Readiness Review for STS 51-L was conducted in
accordance with established procedure.
2. The decision to launch STS 51-L was based on a faulty engi-
neering analysis of the SRM field joint seal behavior.
11
3. Compoundingthis erroneous analysis were serious ongoing
weaknesses in the Shuttle Safety, Reliability and Quality Assur-
ance Program which had failed to exercise control over the prob-
lem tracking systems, had not critiqued the engineering analysis
advanced as an explanation of the SRM seal problem, and did not
provide the independent perspective required by senior NASA
managers at Flight Readiness Reviews.
4. The initial response of Marshall managers to the attempts of
Thiokol engineers to raise the issue of temperature effects on the
SRM seals caused Thiokol management to discount proper techni-
cal concerns and engineering judgment in their recommendation to
launch.
5. The Director of Marshall's Shuttle Projects Office may have
violated NASA's Flight Readiness Review policy directive by failing
to report the results of the January 27th teleconference to the As-
sociate Administrator for Space Flight.
6. The decision of the STS Program Manager to launch despite
the uncertainty represented by ice on the Fixed Service Structure
was not a prudent effort to mitigate avoidable risks to the Shuttle.
7. The Launch Director failed to place safety paramount in eval-
uating the launch readiness of STS 51-L.
8. No launch should have been permitted until ice was cleared
from the platform leading to the pad escape system.
9. Ice Team personnel and Rockwell contractors properly con-
veyed their inability to predict the post-ignition behavior of ice.
10. Post-flight analysis indicates that ice did not exhibit the be-
havior predicted by analysis, and that ice traversed a distance suf-
ficient to strike the Shuttle during liftoff.
11. Failure to enforce a clear requirement for definite readiness
statements contributed to failures in communication between
NASA and its contractors during launch preparations.
Issue 2
Should firing room personnel be allowed to waive launch commit
criteria or equipment redlines during a launch countdown without
a well-developed technical reason for doing so?
Finding
NASA's management waived its own launch commit criteria on
January 28, 1986, without a valid technical reason for doing so.
7. Retrieval, Transportation and Refurbishment
Issue
Were the motor casings used on STS 51-L damaged as a result of
the retrieval, transportation and refurbishment operations follow-
ing previous launches?
Finding
There was no evidence of damage to the casings or joint due to
prior use or preparation for reuse.
12
C. EXTERNAL TANK
Issue
The External Tank was obviously involved in the accident. Was
that involvement a cause or an effect?
Fi'ndings
1. The Committee adopts the "Finding" of the Rogers Commis-
sion that: "A review of the External Tank's construction records,
acceptance testing, pre-launch and flight data and recovered hard-
ware, does not support anything relating to the External Tank
which caused or contributed to the cause of the accident."
2. The External Tank ruptured under the forces of a failed Solid
Rocket Booster motor. These forces were far outside of any possible
design considerations that could have been applied to the External
Tank.
D. CREW SURVIVAL
Issue
Was the accident of STS 51-L on January 28, 1986, survivable?
Finding
In the case of the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger and
her crew on January 28, 1986, the Committee is convinced that the
accident was not survivable.
E. SABOTAGE
Issue
Could the accident have been caused by sabotage, terrorism, or
foreign covert action?
Finding
The Committee is convinced that there is no evidence to support
sabotage, terrorism or foreign covert action in the loss of the Chal-
lenger.
F. ADDITIONAL AVENUES OF INVESTIGATION
Issue
Could the accident have been caused by some failure other than
failure of the joint between the casings?
Finding
As of September 15, 1986, the Committee has not found any cred-
ible evidence to support any cause of the Challenger accident, other
than the failure of the aft casings joint in the right-hand Solid
Rocket Booster. Nor has there been any substantial evidence of a
secondary or parallel failure on Flight 51-L.
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VI. DISCUSSION OF CRITICAL ISSUES
A. TECHNICAL ISSUES
1. Hardware Development and Production
a. Problems in Hardware Certification
Issue 1
Have all elements of Space Shuttle flight hardware been ade-
quately certified?
Findings
1. The overall design and certification processes prescribed by
NASA for each major element of Space Shuttle flight hardware are
very comprehensive.
2. Prior to the STS 51-L accident, in spite of the comprehensive
nature of NASA's prescribed design and certification processes, in-
sufficient testing had been conducted to permit an adequate under-
standing by either Morton-Thiokol or NASA regarding the actual
functioning of the Solid Rocket Motor joint. Also, the Solid Rocket
Motor had not been adequately certified to meet the natural and
induced environmental conditions that are stated in NASA's design
standards. The issue of whether or not standards were adequate is
discussed in Section VII.
3. The deficiencies in Solid Rocket Motor testing and certifica-
tion persisted in spite of many reviews of the program by panels of
experts: (1) within the manufacturer; (2) within NASA; and (3) from
independent, outside groups.
4. These deficiencies in testing and certification of one major ele-
ment of the Space Shuttle system raise the possibility that other
elements of flight hardware (or other sub-elements of the Solid
Rocket Motor) could have similar deficiences.
5. If NASA is unable to explain why the deficiences in Solid
Rocket Motor testing and certification went undetected by the ex-
isting comprehensive set of processes and procedures, the agency
will not be able to protect against a similar breakdown in its
system of checks and balances in the future.
Recommendations
1. NASA should devote more attention to determining why the
deficiencies in Solid Rocket Motor testing and certification went
undetected, so that appropriate action can be taken to uncover
latent problems in existing hardware and to prevent similar prob-
lems in future development programs.
2. NASA and its contractors should thoroughly reassess the ade-
quacy of all the testing and certification that has been conducted to
date on each element of Space Shuttle flight hardware. Where defi-
ciencies are found, they must be corrected.
Issue 2
Does the Space Shuttle Main Engine have adequate operating
margins, and is the "fleet leader" concept adequate to ensure safe
operation?
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Findings
1. The Space Shuttle Main Engine is an impressive, technologi-
cal achievement. However, it also is one of the higher risk ele-
ments of the Space Shuttle system. Anomalous component perform-
ance or premature engine shutdown could prove catastrophic to the
Space Shuttle and its crew.
2. Some NASA officials familiar with the Space Shuttle Main
Engine believe that it should be operated at a throttle setting of
109 percent only in an emergency; others believe the engine could
be safely operated at 109 percent on a routine basis.
3. It is widely accepted that the Space Shuttle Main Engine
would be safer if its operating margins (for temperature, pressure,
operating time, etc.) were increased.
4. The Committee agrees with the sense of Dr. Feynman's con-
cerns with respect to NASA's current "fleet leader" concept for
certifying Space Shuttle Main Engine components, such as high
pressure turbopumps, for flight.
5. On a case by case basis, NASA regularly violates its own certi-
fication requirements by permitting individual engine components
to be used for flight even though they have accumulated an operat-
ing time in excess of 50 percent of the two fleet leaders (i.e., in vio-
lation of the "2X" rule).
Recommendations
1. NASA should continue its active development program for the
Space Shuttle Main Engine. The program should be focused more
on increasing operating margins.
2. Because of the safety concerns raised by some knowledgeable
officials, NASA should give serious consideration to restricting use
of the 109 percent engine throttle setting to emergency situations
only. If NASA decides that it needs to use the 109 percent throttle
setting for other than emergency situations, the space agency
should take whatever actions are required to ensure that adequate
margins are present to maintain safety.
3. NASA should closely scrutinize each of the concerns raised by
Dr. Feynman regarding the agency's "fleet leader" concept for cer-
tifying Space Shuttle Main Engine components. The agency should
also closely reassess its practice of selectively violating its "2X"
rule for some Main Engine flight hardware elements.
b. Recurrent Hardware Problems
Issue
What resolutions of inadequacies revealed in the landing gear,
tires, wheels, brakes, and nose wheel steering of the landing and
deceleration system are required?
Findings
1. The Orbiter landing gear, tires, wheels, brakes, and nose
wheel steering, as a system, is experimental, designed to criteria
outside any other experience, and uses unique combinations of ma-
terials. The original design performance specifications for speed
and landing weights are routinely exceeded. The original design
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did not considerasymmetricalbraking for crosswind steeringas
thenormalcase,althoughit hasbecomestandardpractice.Stresses
whichwerenot taken into accountin the designhavesurfacedin
asyet a verysmallrealworldsample.
2. As a consequence,Orbiter landingsappearhigh risk even
underideal conditions, which seldom occur. Exceptional procedural
and skill demands are placed upon the pilots to nurse the brakes
and tires through every landing. Landing rules have had increas-
ing constraints imposed that hamper operational flexibility and
usefulness of the Orbiter.
3. Brake and tire damage have been evident since early on in
the program. The Rogers Commission seems very correct in finding
the current landing gear system unacceptable. Resolution of land-
ing gear system problems can no longer be put off.
Recommendations
The Committee recommends that NASA:
1. Assemble all of the fragmented studies, analyses, and conclu-
sions on landing gear problems and integrate them into one engi-
neering description of the system as it is now intended to be used.
This should include consideration of the basic strength of the struts
themselves and their attachments.
2. Write a new system specification and match the proposed
design improvements to an acceptable reliability and certification
specification.
3. Design a test and certification program adequate to meet cri-
teria to fly and to continue well into future operations until under-
standing and confidence in the landing gear system is attained.
4. In anticipation of requirements for a new brake specification,
accelerate a program to provide:
Increased brake mass and/or heat sink,
Substantial increase in energy absorption,
Evaluation which weighs the experimental nature of the pro-
posed 65 million foot pound carbon brake and its impact on the
system against the penalty of weight of known materials (e.g.
steel) for operational confidence.
5. Write updated subsystem specifications to upgrade the landing
gear system to acceptable levels of performance to respond to the
Rogers Commission's recommendations.
Issue 2
What actions should be taken relative to other recurrent prob-
lems with flight hardware?
Finding
There have been many instances of in-flight anomalies and fail-
ures of other elements of Space Shuttle hardware, some involving
mission critical pieces of equipment. Some of these past problems
have been corrected while others have not.
Recommendation
NASA should ensure that before reinstituting Space Shuttle
flight operations, it fully understands and has corrected all in-
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stances of serious in-flight anomalous behavior or failures involv-
ing mission critical pieces of flight hardware.
c. Other Engineering Concerns
Issue
What action should be taken relative to other engineering con-
cerns regarding critical elements of Space Shuttle flight hardware?
Finding
In recent years, serious engineering concerns have been raised
regarding the safety of some elements of Space Shuttle flight hard-
ware, such as the 17 inch flapper valve and the heat exchanger
feeding the liquid oxygen tank.
Recommendations
1. NASA should ensure that, as a part of its current review of
Space Shuttle safety, it identifies, thoroughly evaluates, and then
takes appropriate action on all serious engineering concerns raised
regarding mission critical elements of Space Shuttle flight hard-
ware.
2. NASA should give special attention to both the cost and risks
of using Filament Wound Case Solid Rocket Boosters for very
heavy Space Shuttle payloads versus the cost and programmatic
impacts of simply transferring those payloads to expendable launch
vehicles.
d. Desirable Tests Not Yet Approved
Issue 1
Is the current ground test program for the SSME adequate to
provide a complete understanding of the engine's operating charac-
teristics and safety margins?
Findings
1. The Committee supports the Findings and Conclusions of the
Development and Production Team concerning the SSME, particu-
larly the concern that "Hardware availability and the potential of
damage to hardware and facilities resulting from tests malfunc-
tions have constrained . . . [full margin] . . . testing during the
ground test program."
2. The Committee shares Dr. Feynman's concern that there has
been a slow shift toward decreasing safety in the SSME program.
3. There is not a sufficient understanding of SSME blade cracks
and fractures.
Recommendations
1. The Committee concurs with the Development and Production
Team conclusion that overtesting, limits testing, and malfunction-
testing in the SSME program should be re-emphasized to demon-
strate full engine capability.
2. NASA should prepare and submit to the Committee a cost-
benefit analysis of testing a SSME to destruction including: (a) uti-
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lizing additional SSME test stands; (b) utilizingadditional hard-
ware for the ground test program; and (c)the value of such a test.
3. A vigorous study of fracture behavior should be conducted to
minimize the hazard of cracked SSME blades and to increase the
reliabilityand safety margin of blades. New blades and/or new
policiesfor duration of blade use should be incorporated prior to
the next Shuttle launch.
Issue 2
Is the leak/combustion threat of the External Tank's hydrogen
pressure valve a hazard warranting testing?
Findings
1. The Committee supports the Rogers Commission concern re-
garding the hazard posed by the liquid hydrogen vent and relief
valve.
2. The Committee supports the intent of the ET prime contrac-
tor, Martin Marietta, to pursue outdoor wind tunnel testing to
eliminate the liquid hydrogen vent/relief valve hazard.
Recommendation
NASA, in conjunction with the appropriate contractor, should
consider designing and conducting an ET liquid hydrogen leak/
burn test to determine if corrective actions should be taken prior to
the next Shuttle flight.
Issue 3
Does the present Range Safety System (RSS) on the External
Tank present an unreasonable risk?
Finding
There is substantial controversy over the relative benefits and
risks of the present RSS on the External Tank.
Recommendation
The Committee believes the Administrator should prepare and
submit to the Committee a comprehensive review of RSS require-
ments.
e. Production/Refurbishment Issues
Issue 1
Should 100 percent X-ray inspection of the propellant and insula-
tion for the Solid Rocket Motors (SRM) be resumed?
Findings
1. Previous X-ray inspection led to only one SRM being rejected
for Shuttle use.
2. There is no non-destructive inspection method which can
guarantee a defect-free SRM. X-ray inspection cannot detect "kiss-
ing" voids in which the SRM insulation is touching the SRM steel
casing but is not bonded to it. Debonded insulation at the end of an
SRM segment could provide burning propellant gases with a path
to the SRM steel casing and could result in loss of vehicle and
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crew.X-ray inspectioncandetectpropellant cracks and large voids
which if undetected could also result in a catastrophic situation.
3. Although there is no guarantee that X-ray inspection has been
a particularly effective method of detecting propellant and insula-
tion SRM flaws, it remains one of the best available methods to
monitor the SRM manufacturing process.
Recommendations
1. NASA should consider reinstating full X-ray inspection of the
propellant and insulation for all motors used on succeeding flights
until new, more accurate inspection methods can be developed and
implemented and there is unquestionable confidence in the SRM
production process.
2. NASA, in conjunction with the appropriate contractors,
should investigate the development of new, more accurate inspec-
tion techniques which can detect "kissing" voids and other poten-
tial defects that cannot be detected by X-ray inspection.
Issue 2
Are all production and other activities involving Criticality 1 and
1R hardware at prime and secondary contractor facilities labeled
as "critical" processes?
Findings
1. Critical processes are formally identified and controlled by
NASA. All processes are classified and controlled by the contrac-
tor's Process Change Control Board.
2. The O-ring used in the case joint is criticalto the sealing in-
tegrityof the joint,yet itis not designated as a "critical"process
by either the Parker Seal Co. or Hydrapack, the manufacturer and
supplier respectively.This raises the possibilitythat other Critical-
ity I and IR hardware components are also not appropriately des-
ignated by their manufacturer as "critical"processes.
Recommendations
1. NASA should require the manufacture of critical items, such
as the O-rings, to be designated "critical" processes. Contractors
should formally notify their employees involved in critical manu-
facturing processes of the serious nature of particular production
processes.
2. NASA should conduct a thorough review to ensure that all
manufacturing processes involving Criticality 1 and 1R hardware
components of prime and secondary contractors are appropriately
designated "critical" processes.
Issue 3
Do O-ring repairs compromise safety?
Finding
The Committee supports the Development and Production Team
Finding and Conclusion that the "limit of five repair join.ts per O-
ring is an arbitrary ntm_ber" and that "repair of inclusmns and
voids in the rubber . . . appears to be an area of potential prob-
lem."
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Recommendation
NASA should review its O-ring repair policy and contractor
repair practices in terms of their effects on O-ring performance and
safety. Such review should be completed prior to the resumption of
Shuttle flights if, as anticipated, the new SRB joint design uses O-
rings.
Issue
What impact does growth of SRM case size have upon booster
and Shuttle performance and safety?
Finding
The Committee concurs with the Development and Production
Team Finding that "Remeasurement of two used SRM case seg-
ments indicated both tang and clevis sealing surfaces have in-
creased in diameter beyond the anticipated design limits."
Recommendation
NASA and the appropriate contractor should resolve through
analysis and testing prior to the next Shuttle flight the cause of
SRM case size growth and its impact upon booster and Shuttle per-
formance, reliability of refurbished SRM case segments, and safety.
f. Review of NASA's Redesign/Recertification Plan
Issue
Is NASA's SRM redesign and hardware recertification plan a
viable and realistic one which will result in a safer, more reliable
Space Transportation System?
Findings
1. NASA's SRM redesign plan is a step in the right direction.
Moving the proposed launch date beyond June 1987 is a responsible
and realistic decision. The membership of the SRM Redesign Team
is representative of qualified individuals in and outside of NASA.
With the expert assistance of the specially appointed National Re-
search Council (NRC) Independent Oversight Group, the new SRM
design should be a significantly safer and more reliable Shuttle ele-
ment.
2. NASA's current hardware recertification plan is also a step in
the right direction. The use of independent review contractors dis-
tinguishes this recertification plan from earlier reviews. However,
given the failure of previous reviews to discover the deficient SRB
joint certification, the Committee is concerned there is still the pos-
sibility that the recertification effort may not reveal other certifica-
tion deficiencies, if indeed they exist. The plan also raises concern
about the qualifications of independent reviewers to evaluate cer-
tain elements given the uniqueness of particular Shuttle compo-
nents.
3. The joint was never fully tested as a separate element of the
SRM. The various forces that act on the joint during stacking,
launch, and flight are difficult, if not impossible, to duplicate in a
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testof the joint under allconditionsthat could be experienced
during launchand flight.
4. Itisunclearwhat functionthe new SafetyOfficewillperform
inthe redesignofthe SRB fieldjointand other criticalelements of
the Shuttle,aswellas NASA's recertificationplan.
Recommendations
I.The Committee recognizesthe national need to return the
Shuttleto flightstatusas soon as reasonablypossible.As noted in
NASA's July 14, 1986,reportto the President,safetywilldeter-
mine the launch schedule.However, NASA should considerthe
proposed launch date of early1988 as a flexibleone which should
be slippedfurtherifnecessary.The Shuttleshouldnot be launched
again untilNASA can assure that safetycriteriahave been met.
2.In establishinga testprogram to certifythe new SolidRocket
Motor design,NASA should considerthe feasibilityofincludingin
combination and in the proper sequence allof the thermal and
structuralloads expected to be experiencedby the SolidRocket
Motor duringignition,lift-off,and flight.
3.The independentreviewcontractorsparticipatingin the hard-
ware recertificationplan shouldutilizesufficientspecifictechnical
expertiseto insureadequate recertificationf allelements of the
STS.
4.The Committee requeststhat the new Officeof Safety,Reli-
abilityand QualityAssurance conduct an independent assessment
of the SRB fieldjointredesignefforts.In addition,the new office
should alsobe integrallyinvolved in reviewingall other critical
component redesigneffortsand NASA's recertificationplan.
2. Operations
a. Shuttle Processing Issues
Issue
In 1983, NASA consolidated fifteen separate contracts and
awarded a single Shuttle Processing Contract (SPC) encompassing
all ground processing related to launch and landing of the Space
Shuttle. There are two issues associated with this contract: (1) How
should is the concept of a unified SPC; and (2) How well has the
SPC contractor actually performed? A related issue is the quality
of essential logistical support, especially spare parts, provided to
the contractor by NASA.
Findings
1. Performance under the SPC has improved since the inception
of the contract. However, up to the time of the Challenger accident,
contractor performance continued to be plagued by excessive over-
time, persistent failures to follow prescribed work procedures, and
inadequate logistical support from NASA.
2. High overtime rates have hampered SPC performance. Over-
time rates had increased significantly during the six months prior
to the Challenger launch, to the point that critical personnel were
working weeks of consecutive workdays and multiple strings of 11
and 12-hour days. Fatigue resulting from work patterns of this sort
can constitute a threat to safety. In fact, worker fatigue was a con-
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tributing factor in a mission-threatening incident on Flight 61-C,
the mission immediately prior to the January 28 Challenger
launch.
3. There are numerous documented cases where contractor em-
ployees failed to comply with guidelines for carrying out assigned
duties, including specific "Operations and Maintenance Instruc-
tions" (OMIs). Such failures contributed to both of the major mis-
haps in 1985 involving Shuttle processing--namely, the November
8, 1985, "handling ring" episode which led to significant damage to
a Solid Rocket Motor segment slated for use on STS 51-L, and the
March 8, 1985, "payload bay access platform" episode which led to
significant damage to bay payload bay door. Failure to follow an
OMI also led to improper (and mission-threatening) handling of the
hydrogen disconnect valve during the 51-L launch operations. All
of these incidents show a lack of discipline, both with respect to fol-
lowing prescribed procedures and with respect to reporting viola-
tions of these procedures.
4. At the time of the Challenger accident, the lack of spare parts
caused a degree of cannibalization (i.e., the removal of a part from
one Orbiter to satisfy a need for a spare part on another Orbiter),
which was the highest in the history of the Shuttle program and
which was a threat to flight schedule and flight safety. Excessive
cannibalization leads to multiple installations, retesting, added doc-
umentation, delayed access to parts, and increased damage poten-
tial. As a result, cannibalization contributes directly to excessive
overtime.
5. There is no clear evidence whether or not greater involvement
of the development contractors would improve Shuttle operations.
Recommendations
1. Because of the serious quality and safety concerns surround-
ing the contract, NASA should conduct a careful review of Shuttle
processing, the SPC contract, and the relationship of flight hard-
ware contractors and report its findings, recommendations, and
proposed contract modifications to the Committee. NASA's reexam-
ination should include a comparison of efficiency and safety under
the SPC versus efficiency and safety during pre-1983 Shuttle proc-
essing operations, which heavily involved the development contrac-
tors.
2. NASA should examine the issues of spares availability and
cannibalization and provide the Congress with a management and
budgetary plan for correcting previous logistical problems.
3. NASA should stop routine cannibalization and develop gnilde-
lines (including appropriate control and review procedures and
roles for the SR&QA office) governing permissible cannibalization.
4. The Committee recommends that NASA provide its re-invig-
orated safety office with the authority to enforce scheduling that
leads to safe overtime rates.
b. Pressures on Shuttle Operations
Issue
Was NASA under pressure to fly more flights? How did this
pressure originate? Will it recur?
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Findings
1. The Congress and the Executive Branch jointly developed the
policy that the Space Shuttle should, in a reliable fashion and at
an internationally competitive cost, provide for most of the Free
World'sspace launch needs.By and large,both Branches failedto
appreciatethe impact thatthispolicywas having on the operation-
alsafetyofthe system.
2. NASA was under internaland externalpressureto buildits
Shuttle flight rate to 24 per year, primarily to reduce costs per
flight, but also to demonstrate and achieve routine access to space.
NASA has never achieved its planned flight rate.
Recommendations
1. NASA must not attempt to achieve a flight rate beyond that
which (1) can be supported by the budget and staff resources avail-
able; and (2) is consistent with the technical maturity of the Shut-
tle and the flexibility desired and needed in scheduling payloads.
Management should ensure efficient use of resources but should
not impose a flight rate on the system.
2. Once operation of the Space Shuttle resumes, the Committee
should maintain a close and continuous oversight of Shuttle flight
rate, planning, and operations. The Committee should ensure both
that flight rate flows logically from the resources provided and that
flight safety is not compromised beyond acceptable limits.
c. Impact of Pressures on Shuttle Operations
Issue
Did operating pressures adversely affect the safety of the Shuttle
program?
Findings
1. The pressure on NASA to achieve planned flight rates was so
pervasive that it undoubtedly adversely affected attitudes regard-
ing safety.
2. The pressure to achieve planned flight rates was compressing
mission preparation as earlier missions were delayed due to unfore-
seen problems. Had the accident not occurred there would soon
have been a collision between planned launch dates and mission
preparation needs which could not have been met by overtime, can-
nibalization, or other undesirable practices. Operating pressures
were causing an increase in unsafe practices.
3. The schedule of payloads planned to fly on the Shuttle (the
manifest) was frequently changed. Each change rippled through
the NASA Shuttle organization and through the manifest and, es-
pecially if made shortly before launch, would increase the demands
on personnel and resources in order to achieve the planned flight
rate.
4. The Space Shuttle has not yet reached a level of maturity
which could be called operational as that term is used in either the
airline industry or the military. Each Shuttle flight is fundamen-
tally unique, and requires unique preparations. Therefore, small
changes in a mission can cause significant perturbations of mission
planning and crew training.
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Recommendations
1. The new Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability and
Quality Assurance must assure that any pressures to increase the
Shuttle flight rate do not adversely influence mission preparation.
The Associate Administrator must have the authority not only to
stop a particular flight, e.g., at a Flight Readiness Review, but to
stop the whole mission planning process if necessary.
2. Where appropriate, NASA should take steps to make the mis-
sion planning process standard and routine to reduce the time and
resources needed to plan a mission. Before requesting more re-
sources for the existing mission planning process (manpower, facili-
ties, equipment), NASA should identify ways to improve the proc-
ess.
d. Other Safety Issues
Issue 1
What is the criticality of landing safety associated with pro-
grammed and abort landing sites and their local characteristics?
F_ndings
1. The Committee finds that many of the normal and abort land-
ing safety problems will be alleviated when the Rogers Commis-
sion's and the Committee's (Section VI. A. 1. b., this report) recom-
mendations to upgrade the landing gear system are implemented.
When the landing gear system is understood, straightforward cal-
culations and operational rules will determine acceptable runway
dimensions and conditions.
2. The Committee found no reason to fault NASA's current pro-
cedure on launch constraints based upon operational judgment and
conservative rules on local conditions at planned abort and landing
sites. However, since an obvious finding is that the Orbiter is a de-
velopmental system, it is axiomatic that unanticipated "dicey" cir-
cumstances will arise.
3. It was found that for the least landing gear system stress,
runway preference is Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB) (concrete),
KSC, and Rogers Dry Lake (EAFB "lake bed") in that order. No
reason was found to invalidate the KSC runway design. The rea-
sons for the "dry" course surface still prevail over concern about
wear on tires designed for one landing. Additional constraints at
KSC because of lesser lateral stabilized overrun area may be
needed to bring its safety to the level of the EAFB runway.
4. The NASA Landing Safety Team's proposal to provide stand-
ard landing aids and arresting barriers at all sites and their em-
phasis on runway surface characteristics for repetitive tire use
takes on a new dimension that is in addition to the Rogers Com-
mission's recommendations.
5. Weather, by far, is the most significant factor governing oper-
ational decisions, Orbiter damage, and landing safety. The con-
straint is simply that acceptable weather must be forecast with
confidence within the time frame needed. Ultra-conservative rules
prevail because of the predictable unpredictability of Cape weather.
New and innovative local weather analysis and forecasting re-
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searchis a high priority. The African Coast and southwestern
United States sites enjoy more stable and predictable weather.
Recommendations
The first priority to achieve an acceptable degree of landing
safety and to have a sensible base to work from for improvement is
to implement the recommendations of the Rogers Commission and
the Committee on the landing gear system improvements to attain
an operational capability. Then:
Instrument the system, and schedule all landings at Edwards
runway for systematic concurrent testing until the landing
gear system is understood.
Write a clean sheet set of rules based on results.
Determine the risk of accident with the B-747 Shuttle Carri-
er Aircraft (SCA) and its impact upon the Shuttle program.
Extend every reasonable effort to assure a mission planning
process to minimize the need for abort site landings.
Reevaluate and determine the degree of risk acceptable at
abort site landings and bring abort site capability up to meet
that risk level.
Expand astronaut matched team flight landing practice to
cover all known exigencies. Propose additional training craft if
necessary.
Join in a venture with NOAA to invent new technology and
techniques to learn new ways to understand the dynamics of
Cape Kennedy weather phenomena to supplant current inad-
equacy to forecast two hours ahead.
Issue 2
Has adequate provision been made for crew safety in case of in-
flight emergencies? That is, has adequate provision been given to
launch abort options and crew escape options?
Findings
1. Crew escape options were considered when the Shuttle was
originally designed and the basic situation has not changed. Many
initially attractive options do not significantly reduce risk to the
crew either because they may not reduce exposure to the principal
hazards or because they add risks of their own.
2. A crew escape system for use in controlled gliding flight might
be feasible and worthwhile.
3. Crew escape during the ascent phase appears infeasible.
4. Launch abort during SRB burn appears impossible but it may
be possible to decrease risk to the crew after SRB separation, pri-
marily through mission design.
Recommendation
NASA should continue to respond to the recommendations of the
Rogers Commission regarding (i) crew escape during controlled
gliding flight and (ii) increasing the possibility, of successful emer-
gency runway landings. NASA should reexamine all crew survival
options and report to the Committee on itsfindings.
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B. MANAGEMENT ISSUES
1. Technical Management
a. Risk Management Issues
Issue
Is there a coordinated and effective risk management program in
the NSTS?
Findings
1. NASA does not explicitly use a centralized program that co-
ordinates all the factors that encompass an adequate risk manage-
ment program.
2. As a result of the accident, NASA is reexamining the Failure
Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEA) and Hazard Analyses (HA) to
reassess risks associated with the designs of Shuttle subsystems.
3. NASA's lack of statistical data on the performance of certain
components will limit the usefulness of sound engineering judg-
ment in much the same way as it limits the usefulness of probabi-
listic risk assessment.
Recommendations
1. NASA should develop and provide to the Committee a descrip-
tion of an overall risk management program as it relates to the
Space Shuttle. This effort should include a determination of wheth-
er or not a more centralized coordination of a risk management
program and issuance of direct risk management guidance direc-
tives are needed.
2. NASA should review analytical methods utilized in the per-
formance of risk assessment, including statistical analyses, trend
analyses and probabilistic risk assessment methodologies to deter-
mine their applicability to the NSTS program. Assistance from the
National Academy of Sciences, or other appropriate organizations
with expertise in these matters, may be required to adequately per-
form this review.
3. NASA should review its certification testing to ensure that all
critical items are adequately tested. Data obtained from these tests
should be used when appropriate in conducting a formal risk as-
sessment.
b. Launch Decision Process
Issue 1
Is the process for establishing launch constraints and dealing
with them effective?
Findings
1. There is no clear understanding or agreement among the vari-
ous levels of NASA management as to what constitutes a launch
constraint or the process for imposing and waiving constraints.
2. Launch constraints were often waived after developing a ra-
tionale for accepting the problem rather than correcting the prob-
lem; moreover, this rationale was not always based on sound engi-
neering or scientific principles.
64-420 0 - 86 - 2
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Recommendations
1. NASA should establish rigorous procedures for identifying and
documenting launch constraints. The individual(s) responsible for
implementing this procedure should be clearly identified, and well
defined and understood criteria for waiving them should be estab-
lished.
2. NASA should exercise extreme caution in waiving launch con-
straints before correcting the problem that led to the launch con-
straint. The rationale should be based on rigorous scientific/engi-
neering analyses or tests and should be understood and accepted by
the program manager.
Issue 2
Are the Launch Commit Criteria procedures adequate to ensure
the safety of the mission?
F/rulings
1. The procedure used for developing launch commit criteria is
systematic and thorough; however, violations of the criteria do not
necessarily mean "no go". Therefore, NASA sometimes has relied
on engineering judgments made during the terminal countdown in
determining whether to launch.
2. Launch commit criteria were sometimes waived without ade-
quate engineering analysis or understanding of the technical rea-
sons for establishing the criteria.
Recommendations
1. NASA should review the launch commit criteria procedures,
especially those for dealing with violations, to lessen the reliance
on engineering judgments under stress.
2. When situations arise where "real time" judgments are un-
avoidable, NASA should adopt a more conservative approach to
waiving previously established criteria. In no case should a crite-
rion be waived without a thorough understanding of the rationale
for the establishment of the criterion.
Issue 3
Are launch readiness review procedures and communications
adequate?
Finding
The Committee finds that the review procedures and communica-
tions used to assure flight readiness were systematic, thorough, and
comprehensive and provided ample opportunity for surfacing hard-
ware problems prior to flight. Level I FRI_ are usually recorded
(audio); however, there is often no record made of other key pre-
launch meetings.
Recommendation
NASA should make every reasonable effort to record meetings
where key decisions might be made; in particular, all formal Flight
Readiness Reviews, including the L-1 and the Mission Manage-
ment Team meeting should be recorded, where feasible by video.
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Issue
Was the failure to inform the Level I or Level II Program Man-
agers of the Teleconference involving NASA and Morton Thiokol
on the eve of the launch a factor in the decision to launch?
Findings
1. The Committee finds that Marshall management used poor
judgment in not informing the NSTS Program Manager or the
Level I Manager of the events that took place the night before the
launch, specifically the stated concerns of the Thiokol engineers.
However, the Committee finds no evidence to support a suggestion
that the outcome would have been any different had they been
told.
2. The Committee finds the efforts of Thiokol engineers to post-
pone the launch commendable; however, Thiokol had numerous op-
portunities throughout the normal flight readiness process follow-
ing flight 51-C in January 1985 to have the new minimum temper-
ature criteria established.
Issue 5
Do the principal contractors have an appropriate role in the
launch decision making process?
Finding
The principal contractors have an active role throughout the de-
cision making process right up to the launch; however, the lack of
a firm requirement for their concurrence at the time of launch
does partially relieve them of responsibility for mission success.
Recommendation
Principal contractors should be required to make a clear, unam-
bigous statement concerning launch readiness just prior to launch.
Issue 6
Are astronauts adequately represented in the decision making
process?
Finding
The astronauts believe they currently have the opportunity to
make inputs into the process and are reluctant to assume a greater
responsibility for the decision to launch.
c. Technical Expertise of Personnel
Issue
Does NASA have an adequate level of in-house technical exper-
tise to manage the Shuttle Program properly?
Findings
1. During the last decade NASA has had significant decreases in
manpower. A disproportionate reduction may have occurred in the
safety, reliabilityand quality assurance staff at NASA headquar-
ters and at the Marshall Space Flight Center. Additionally during
the period preceding the Challenger accident, the Office of Space
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Flight also suffered a decline in staff.The decreases may have lim-
ited the abilityof those officesto perform their review functions.
2. The information presented to NASA headquarters on August
19, 1985 was sufficientto require immediate and concentrated ef-
fortsto remedy the joint design flaws.The fact that NASA did not
take stronger action to solve this problem indicates that its top
technical staffdid not fullyaccept or understand the seriousness of
the joint problem.
Recommendations
1. NASA should review the numbers and qualifications of key
staff in technical and management positions and should consider
additional training and recruitment of individuals to further the
quality and safety of NASA's missions.
2. The Committee should maintain on-going oversight of this
analysis and conduct an in-depth examination upon the conclusion
of NASA's review.
d. Change Control Process
Issue 1
Has the pressure to maintain operational flight rates and sched-
ules for the Shuttle compromised the hardware Change Control
Process?
Findings
1. When NASA declared the Space Shuttle to be an operational
system, additional pressure to increase flight rates impacted other
aspects of the overall program such as the ability to implement,
evaluate, test, and certify changes in hardware design.
2. As a result of attempting to operate the Shuttle at increased
flight rates, controlling other aspects of the program such as the
flight production process and manifest also became a more complex
and difficult aspect of program administration.
Recommendations
1. NASA must reconsider its efforts to categorize the Shuttle as
an operational transportation system.
2. The Configuration Management System designed to control
such changes must be reexamined by NASA as to its effectiveness
in assuring that all hardware changes take place in a safe and reli-
able fashion.
Issue 2
Is the change control process sufficiently defined for all elements
of the Shuttle system?
Findings
1. The NSTS engineering and process change guidelines are, for
the most part, sufficiently well-defined for the majority of the sub-
systems that comprise the Space Shuttle.
2. NASA gives the same level of scrutiny to changes involving a
minor component (such as moving velcro strips in the Orbiter) as
those involving mission critical elements of flight hardware.
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Recommendation
NASA should review its change control process to determine the
usefulness of differentiating between minor changes and significant
changes.
2. Organization and Policy Management
a. Management Structure
Issue 1
Does the management of the Shuttle Program adequately define
the lines of authority and are managers given authority commen-
surate with their responsibilities?
Finding
The management of the Shuttle Program is complex and diversi-
fied and it is not always clear who has authority or respor_ibility.
NASA's "lead center" concept has resulted in placing the manage-
ment of the program at JSC, one of three centers participating in
the program; however, because Johnson does not have control of
the other centers' resources, the NSTS Program Manager's author-
ity to manage the program is limited and the responsibility is un-
clear.
Recommendation
NASA should restructure the Shuttle Program management to
define clear lines of authority and responsibilities. This restructur-
ing should take into account the special role each center must play
and be especially sensitive to the need for the cooperation and sup-
port of all the participants to achieve a common goal. NASA
should give special consideration to moving the Program Manager
to NASA Headquarters to avoid the confusion and inter-center ri-
valry that result from having a large multi-center program man-
aged out of one of the participating centers.
Issue 2
Are astronauts adequately represented in management?
Finding
The Committee finds no evidence that astronauts are denied the
opportunity to enter management if they so choose.
b. Communication
Issue 1
Are there adequate opportunities to communicate problems
within the Shuttle Program management structure?
Finding
There are many regularly scheduled meetings and telecons at all
levels of management throughout the Shuttle Program. In addi-
tion, "special" meetings and telecons are routine. No evidence was
found to support a conclusion that the system inhibited communi-
cation or that it was difficult to surface problems.
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Issue 2
Is too much information being disseminated so that important in-
formation is lost?
Finding
Large amounts of information are disseminated on a routine
basis, often with little or no indication of its importance to all of
the recipients.
Recommendation
NASA management should review the process of providing infor-
mation on significant actions so that awareness by concerned man-
agers is assured.
Issue 3
Are communications filtered so that important information is
prevented from reaching the decision makers?
Finding
NASA managers delegated the responsibility for making techni-
cal judgments to lower level managers or assistants. Therefore, the
information that reached the top decision makers was "filtered" in
that it was interpreted by others that were presumed to have more
specialized experience or expertise in a given area. There is no evi-
dence that middle level managers suppressed information that they
themselves deemed to be significant. In fact, as discussed in the
section on technical expertise, the failure was not the problem of
technical communications, but rather a failure of technical decision
making.
c. Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance
Issue 1
Is NASA's decision to establish a new Office of Safety, Reliability
and Quality Assurance appropriate and, if so, what should its role
be?
Finding
The Committee finds that the Rogers Commission recommenda-
tion that NASA should establish an Office of Safety, Reliability
and Quality Assurance that reports directly to the Administrator is
indeed appropriate. However, it is not clear what the activities of
this office will encompass.
Recommendations
1. The Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability and Qual-
ity Assurance (SR&QA) should provide to the Committee the agen-
cy's draft plan delineating the organization, goals, implementation
strategies and resource requirements of the Office of SR&QA.
2. After the Office of SR&QA is fully operational, the Committee
will wish to continue oversight over its activities.
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Issue 2
Has NASA applied sufficient resources to support adequate
SR&QA efforts within the NSTS program?
Findings
1. The Committee finds that reductions in NASA civil service
personnel that have occurred over the past decade have adversely
impacted the agency's ability to maintain the appropriate level of
oversight and control of the SR&QA activities within the NSTS.
2. NASA has become increasingly dependent upon outside
SR&QA support from the Department of Defense (Defense Contract
Administration Services (DCAS) and Air Force Plant Representa-
tive Office [AFPRO]) and contractors.
3. NASA has reduced or reassigned to other program areas in-
house safety, reliability and quality assurance tasks such as test-
ing, analyses and instrumentation and has reduced or shut down
in-house facilities for performing SR&QA research and technology
development. The degree to which these factors have adversely im-
pacted the safety, reliability and quality assurance activities within
the NSTS program has not been adequately assessed.
Recommendations
1. NASA should establish and maintain a strong and effective
SR&QA program. Continuing support for such a program must
come directly from the Administrator.
2. Although it is appropriate to establish strong contractor capa-
bilities in the areas of SR&QA, the internal oversight responsibil-
ities and coordination of SR&QA tasks must be the responsibility of
NASA itself. In order to assure that the appropriate interfaces
among the various subsystem elements that comprise the NSTS are
maintained, a sufficient complement of NASA SR&QA manage-
ment and support staff must be available to perform the necessary
oversight and coordination tasks.
Issue 3
Are the responsibilities of safety engineers and design engineers
adequately specified within NASA's "risk management" program?
Finding
The roles of safety, design as well as reliability engineers are not
adequately and uniformly defined throughout the NSTS program.
In some cases, the Committee learned that safety engineers were
not participating in major decisions related to flights of the Shut-
tle.
Recommendation
It should be the responsibility of the new Associate Administra-
tor for SR&QA to fully specify the roles of safety and reliability en-
gineering as well as quality assurance personnel within the NSTS
program, so that all critical aspects of the program and decisions
related to the adequacy of hardware and subsystem performance
are fully reviewed by these disciplines.
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Issue
Does the SR&QA program require improved coordination be-
tween centers, contractors and NASA Headquarters?
Findings
1. Although guidelines have been published that describe the re-
sponsibility of contractors in the areas of SR&QA, NASA's guide-
lines do not adequately distinguish these various activities as dis-
tinct disciplines requiring specialized skills and centralized coordi-
nation.
2. In its review of the agency's reliability and quality assurance
programs as they relate to the Space Shuttle, the Committee found
there was little commonality among the cognizant officials at
MSFC, JSC, KSC, and Headquarters in the perception of the vari-
ous responsibilities associated with these separate and distinct dis-
ciplines.
Recommendations
1. It is important that a clear delineation of responsibilities for
the separate SR&QA disciplines be appropriately documented. It is
also essential that the relative importance of each of the three sep-
arate disciplines be established as an integral part of the NSTS
program. These functions are the responsibility of NASA Head-
quarters.
2. NASA must carefully review the staff and resources devoted
to the SR&QA function within NASA and contractor organizations
for adequacy. The Administrator shall report to the Committee
with his findings and recommendations.
cL Contractor Incentives
Issue
Key Shuttle contracts (e.g., Solid Rocket Booster Production Con-
tract and the Shuttle Processing Contract (SPC)) provide incentives
both for reliability, integrity, and safety of products and services on
the one hand, and for cost and schedule on the other. Do these con-
tracts provide an appropriate balance between the two types of in-
centives? That is, does NASA utilize contracts to reward and pro-
mote operational safety?
Findings
1. The SPC provides far greater incentives to the contractor for
minimizing costs and meeting schedules than for features related
to safety and performance. SPC is a cost-plus, incentive/award fee
contract. The amount of the incentive fee is based on contract costs
(lower costs yields a larger incentive fee) and on safe and successful
launch and recovery of the Orbiter. The award fee is designed to
permit NASA to focus on those areas of concern which are not sen-
sitive to the incentive fee provisions, including the safety record of
the contractor. However, the incentive fee dwarfs the award fee--
while the maximum value of the award fee is only one percent of
the value of the SPC, the incentive fee could total as much as 14
percent of the SPC.
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2. During the developmental phases of the Thiokol contract for
Solid Rocket Booster production (1980-1983), the contractor re-
ceived consistent ratings of "Excellent-Plus" or "Superior" under
the cost-plus, award-fee contract. NASA contracted with Thiokol on
a cost-plus, incentive-fee (CPIF) basis beginning in July 1983. The
CPIF contract pays strictly on the basis of costs, although penalties
may be invoked for delays in delivery or for Shuttle accidents due
to SRB failure. At the time of the Challenger accident, Thiokol was
eligible to receive a very large incentive fee, probably on the order
of $75 million.
Recommendations
1. NASA should reexamine all Shuttle contracts and report to
the Committee with its findings and recommendations on whether
more incentives for safety and quality can be built into these con-
tracts. This report should address, inter alia, the SRB Production
Contract and the SPC.
2. NASA's new Office of SR&QA should be involved in the pro-
curement and award fee processes, both to establish reasonable
guidelines and rewards in new contracts and to judge performance
of ongoing contracts.

IV. BACKGROUND
INITIAL EVENTS FOLLOWING THE ACCIDENT
On January 28, Chairman Fuqua stated on the floor of the House
that the Committee would conduct comprehensive hearings and
prepare its report on the Challenger accident and its implications
after the National Aeronautics and Space Administration had com-
pleted its immediate investigation. NASA's effort was to follow the
same investigative approach it had taken after the Apollo 204 x fire.
In preparation for this time, Mr. Fuqua working with Mr. Lujan,
the Ranking Republican Member, appointed a steering group of
Committee Members two days following the accident to guide the
Committee's work. This group consisted of:
Don Fuqua Manuel Lujan, Jr.
Harold Volkmer Robert Walker
Bill Nelson Ron Packard
However, this plan and timetable were changed when President
Reagan, by Executive Order, established a Presidential Commission
on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident on February 3, 1986. The
order directed the Rogers Commission to make its final report to
the President and the Administrator of NASA within 120 days. The
order directed the Commission to: "(1) Review the circumstances
surrounding the accident to establish the probable cause or causes
of the accident; and (2) Develop recommendations for corrective or
other action based upon the Commission's findings and determina-
tions."
With this important new development, the Committee Steering
Group met and decided to modify its earlier approach of investigat-
ing NASA's inquiry to that of reviewing the Rogers Commission's
investigation. It was determined that the Committee's formal work
would begin as soon as practicable after the Rogers Commission
issued its report.
COMMITTEE PREPARATION
On February 5, the Chairman, Mr. Fuqua, and Mr. Lujan, wrote
a letter to Chairman William P. Rogers stating their support for
the serious task which was ahead of the Presidential Commission.
In that letter Messrs. Fuqua and Lujan also outlined the Commit-
tee's approach, saying:
We would like to begin our over_ight process by asking
you to establish procedures for providing us with progress
reports as appropriate so that we can be kept advised of
On January 27, 1967, astronauts Virgil Grissom, Edward White II and Roger Chafee were
killed when their Apollo spacecrait was destroyed by fire on the launch pad.
(35)
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theactivitiesof your Commission. At the conclusion of the
Commission's work, we will undertake a thorough review
of your report; we expect that this review will be similar
to the review and hearings held after the Apollo 204 fire
and the Apollo 13 incident. 2
It is our understanding that the Commission is tasked
with completing its report in 120 days. In light of this fact,
we would like to request your appearance before the Sci-
ence and Technology Committee during the first week in
June, or within one week of your final report, should you
complete it sooner.
The letter to Chairman Rogers also noted that a similar letter
had been sent that same day to the NASA Acting Administrator,
Dr. William R. Graham. It stated that the Committee also planned,
after hearing from the Commission, to take testimony from NASA
management on the accident, and "closely review NASA proposed
management plans designed to implement the Commission's recom-
mendations."
Chairman Fuqua and Chairman Rogers then worked out an in-
formal arrangement for the Committee Steering Group so that
when there was sufficient reason to meet, in the opinion of the two
chairmen, Chairman Rogers would brief the Steering Group on the
progress of the investigation.
By April 22, the Steering Group felt it had heard sufficient infor-
mation to brief the Members of the full Committee on Science and
Technology. This was done in a closed meeting that day.
On May 16, 1986, Chairman Fuqua sent a memorandum to all
Members stating that he had asked Congressman Robert Roe, the
Ranking Majority Member, to chair the Committee hearings on the
Challenger accident, stating that "there is a distinct possibility
that follow-through activities related to the hearings will carry
over into the next Congress in which I shall not serve."
COMMI'I'FEE TRIP
When itappeared that the Rogers Commission would be able to
meet its 120-day deadline, Mr. Roe arranged to take a group of
Committee Members and key staffto the Kennedy Space Center on
June 6, 1986. At the Center the Members heard detailed accident
briefings,took a tour of the Vehicle Assembly Building where a set
of Solid Rocket Motors and External Tank was examined, and
viewed the recovered debris from the Challenger spacecraft.
THE HEARINGS
The Rogers Commission report was released on June 9, 1986. Im-
mediately thereafter, the full Committee began its inquiry under
the direction of Mr. Roe. The Committee heard from 60 witnesses
during 10 days of hearings, for a total of 41 hours. A compilation
follows:
2 On April 13, 1971, Apollo 13's Command and Service Modules were disabled by an oxygen
tank explosion en route to the Moon. The crew was recovered safely.
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_itneaes U tetaldaysof Wnep]
Total W'_Daysolhearings witnesses
June10, ]986 .......... 3 ............... Hun.WilliamP. Rogers,Chairman,PresidentialCommissionon the SpaceShuttleChallenger
Accident.
Ndl Armstrong,V'_ Chairman.
Dr.AltonKeel,ExecutiveDirector,
June1], 1986.......... 7 ............... Dr.JamesC. Fletcher,Administrator,NASA.
RADMRichardTruly,AssociateAdministratorfor SpaceFlight, NASA,accompaniedby Mr.
EdwardAidridge,Secretaryof the AirForce,Washington,DC.
ArnoldD. Ak_ich,Manager,NationalSpaceTranspurtatiollSystem,NASA.
Dr.WilliamGraham,DeputyAdministrator,NASA.
Dr.DanGermany,Leader,PhotoandI'V AnalysisTeam,NASA.
Capt.RobertL Cril)10el,Astronaut,NAS/L
June12, 1986.......... 12............. Dr.JamesC. Fletcher,Administrator,NASA.
ArnoldD. Aldrich,Manager,NationalSpaceTransportationSystem,NASA.
Mr. L MichaelWeeks,DeputyAssociateAdministTator(Technical),Officeof SpaceFlight,
NASA.
Dr.MiltonA. SUvera,ChiefEngineer,NASA.
RADMRichardTruly,AssociateAdministratorfor SpaceFlight,NASA.
J.R.Thompson,ViceChairman,NASA,STS5]-L Designand DataAdalysisTaskForce,NASA.
Dr.WidliamGraham,DeputyAdministrator,NASA
REPRESENTATIVESFROMNASA'STASKTEAMS
DanGermany,DeputyManager,SpaceStationProject Office,NASA,JohnsonSpaceCenter.
JohnThomas,ManagerAdHuc,SolidRocketMotorDesignTeam,MarshallSpaceFlightCenter.
ThomasJ. "Jack" Lee,DeputyDirector,MarshallSpaceFlightCenter.
ThomasHoSoway,Chief,FlightDirectorOffice,NASA,JohnsonSpaceFlightCenter.
ThomasUtsman,DeputyDirector,NASA,KennedySpaceCenter.
June]7, 1986.......... 10............. CharlesS. Locke, Chairmanof the Boardand Chief ExecutiveOfficer, MortonThiokoie.
JosephC. Kilminster,V'_ President,SpaceOperations,MortonThiokoL
AllanJ. McDonald,Director,SRMVerificationTaskForce,MortonThiokol.
RogerM. Boisjoly,StaffEngineer,MortonThidkoL
U. EdwinGarrison,President,AerospaceGroup,MortonThiokol.
CarverG. Kennedy,VicePresident,SpaceBoosterPrograms,MorionThiokol.
ArnoldR. Thomp_n,Supervisor,StructuresDesign,MortonThiokol.
Dr. WilliamGraham,DeputyAdministrator, NASA,accompaniedby ThomasMoser,Deputy
Administrator,Officeof SpaceFlight,NASA.
RADMRichardTruly,AssociateAdministratorfor SpaceRight,NASA.
Dr. WilliamLucas,Director,MarshallSpaceFlightCenter,accompaniedby J. WayneUttles,
DeputyDirectorof Scienceand Engineering,MarshallSpaceFlightCenter.
LawrenceMulloy,Assistantto the Directorfor Scienceand Engineering,MarshallSpaceFlight
Center.
Gerald W. Smith, Manager,Solid Rocket BoosterProject,Marshall Space FlightCenter.
StanleyReinartz(no comment),Manager,SpecialProjectsOffice,MarshallSpaceFlight Center.
WilliamSneed,AssistantDirector,PolicyandReview,MarshallSpaceRightCenter.
June]8, ]986 _ ...... 5 ............... U. EdwinGarrison,President,AerospaceGroup,MortonThiokol.
JosephC. Kilminster,VicePresident,MortonThidkoL
CarverG.Kennedy,V_ President,SpaceBoosterProgram,MortonThiokoL
AllanJ. McDonald,Director,SRMVerificati_TaskForce,MortonThiekel.
RogerM. BoisjolyStaffEngineer,MortonThiokoL
ArnoldR. Thempson,Supervisor,StructuresDesign,MortonThiokel.
June25, 1986.......... 6 ............... Maj. Donald"Deke" K. Siayton,Brig.Gen.JamesA. McDivitt,Capt.Jo_nW. Young,Col.Henry
W. Hartstield,Jr., Comdr.RobertL Gibson,Gen.ThomasStafford.
July]5, 1986........... 3 ............... GeorgeJeffs, President,NorthAmericanSpaceOperations,RockwellInternational.
RichardM. Davis,President,MartinMariettaMichoudAerospace.
GeorgeMurphy,ExecutiveV_ Presidentand GeneralMana8er,United TechndogyBooster
ProductionCo.
July16, 1986...........7 ...............ED. Sargent, President, LuckheedSpaceOperationsCo. and ProgramManager,Shuttle
ProcessingContract,accompaniedby Fred Xaiso,President,GrummanTechnicalServices
Division.
CarverKennedy,VicePresident,SpaceBoosterPrograms,MortonThickoL
DavidOwen,LockheedSpaceOperationsCo.and DeputyProgram Manager,KennedySpace
Center.
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[1Vrtnessesandtotaldaysofhearings]
Daysof hearings Totalw_tonsses Witne_es
C'narfieFloyd,SystemsEngineer,LockheedSpaceOperationsCo.
JamesR. Dobay,Presidentand GeneralManager,EG&GFlorida,Inc., accompaniedby Dr.
DonaldKerr,SeniorV_ President,EG&GFlorida,Inc.
GeorgeR. Faenza,V'ce Presidentand GeneralManager,McDennetlDouglasAstrenaut_CO.
July23, ]986........... 2 ...............Alan M. Lovelace,vice Presidentand GeneralManager,SpaceSystemsDivision,General
DynamicsCorp.
JohnF. Yardley,President,McDonnellDouglasAstronaoticsCO.
July24, 1986...........5 ............... Lt. Gen.JamesA. Abrahamsen,Director,StrategicDefenseInitiative,Departmentof Defense.
JesseW. Moore,Director,JohnsonSpaceCenter,NASA/Houston,Texas.
RobertF. Thompson,Vice President,Space Statiens,McDonnellDouglas AstronauticsCO.
GS. Lunney,President,SatelliteSystemsDivision,RockwellInternat_al.
ArnoldA|drioh,Manager,National SpaceTranspadationSystem,Lynden8. JohnsonSpace
Center,NASA/Houston,Texas.
Total............ 60.............
=Continuedfrom)unet7, MortonThioko#_ly
V. THE ACCIDENT
A. INTRODUCTION
This section as well as Sections VII and VIII identify what hap-
pened, as well as what did not happen, to cause the loss of the
Challenger. This section also discusses why the accident happened
in an effort to prevent future catastrophes.
By the time the Rogers Commission had completed its report, it
had been learned that many items investigated by the Commission
did not contribute to the accident. Consequently, this section is di-
rected toward a more narrow range of possible contributing causes.
There were human as well as technical failings that combined on
the morning of January 28, 1986, to cause the Challenger accident.
Most of NASA's personnel were not involved in the Solid Rocket
Motor program while there were others outside of NASA, such as
the media, the Congress and the Administration, who were in-
volved through their influence on the Shuttle program.
It should also be recognized that this report has the advantage of
hindsight. Our investigation indicates that the decision to launch
Challenger on January 28 suffered equally from a lack of informa-
tion, misinterpretation of the information that was available, and a
complex interplay of personalities among the principals involved.
We are equally convinced, however, that the resulting decision to
launch was arrived at as a logical conclusion of faulty premises,
coupled with a failure to recognize the effect of temperature on the
design.
We hope the lessons learned from this accident will lead to
design improvements in the Shuttle Program. Just a few years ago,
the collapse of the Hartford Civic Center contributed to the im-
provement of engineering design techniques to accommodate the
unique secondary forces inherent in long-span structures. The
Gothic cathedrals of the fourteenth century were constantly im-
proved after their early failures were studied.
We hope this section, as well as Sections VII and VIII, properly
identify the mistakes that led to the Challenger accident. It is the
intent of the Committee to identify these mistakes so that NASA
will regain its former level of excellence. The Committee has confi-
dence that the men and women of the Natic_'al Aeronautics and
Space Administration will meet the challenge, improve the Shuttle
and their management methods, and go on to explore new frontiers
in space. This assumes, however, that the agency will now receive
resources adequate to support the programs it is authorized to
carry out by the Congress and the President.
(39)
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For the benefit of those who may not be familiar with the Space
Transportation System, the Shuttle consists of an Orbiter (51-L's
Orbiter, the Challenger, was one of a four-vehicle fleet), an Exter-
nal Tank (ET), and two Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs). (See Figure
V-1.) A brief description of the Solid Rocket Booster and the Solid
Rocket Motors is included to familiarize readers with these sys-
tems.
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The Solid Rocket Boosters operate in parallel with the main en-
gines for the firsttwo minutes of flightto provide the additional
thrust needed ifthe Orbiter is to escape the gravitational pull of
the Earth. At an altitude of approximately 144,000 feet(24 nautical
miles),the SRBs separate from the Orbiter/External Tank, descend
on parachutes, and land in the Atlantic Ocean. They are recovered
by ships,returned to land, and refurbished for reuse.
The heart of the booster isthe Solid Rocket Motor (Figure V-2).
It is the largest solid propellant motor ever developed for space
flightand the firstbuiltto be used on a manned craft.Larger solid
motors have been test-firedbut have never been carried through
complete development to actual use in flight.The huge Solid
Rocket Motor is composed of a segmented motor case loaded with
solidpropellant,an ignitionsystem, a movable nozzle,and the nec-
essary instrumentation and integration hardware.
SRB
SRM
NOSE CAP
PRUOI_UM
FORWARDSKIRT
FORWARDSEGMENT
FORWAROCENTER
SEGMENT.
AFT CENTER
SEGMENT
AFT ATTACHRING
AFT SEGMENT
WITHNOZZLE
AFT SKIRT ='Z/._.___
STATISTICS FOR EACH BOOSTER
THRUST AT LIFT-OFF (2,650,000 pounds)
PROPELLANT
Atomized aluminum powder
. (fuel), 16 percent
Ammonium perchlorate
(oxidizer), 69.83 percent
Iron oxide powder
(catalyst), 0.17 percent (varies) .
polybutadlene acrylic acid :
acryIonitrile (binder), 12 percent
Epoxy curing agent, 2 percent
WEIGHT
"Empty; (193,000 pounds)
Propellant:(1,107,000 pounds)
Gross: (1,300,000 pounds)
I_GuP_ V-2
Each motor case is made of 11 individual weld-free steel seg-
ments (Figure V-3). Averaging approximately 1.27 centimeters (0.5
inch) thick, the steel is a high-strength formulation. Each segment
is heat-treated, hardened, and machined to the exact dimensions
required. The 11 segments are held together by 177 high-strength
steel pins at each case segment joint. The clevis-type joints are
wrapped with reinforced fiberglass tape and sealed with a rubber
seal band that is bonded to the case with adhesives.
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In this report there are many references to the joint design, ero-
sion and O-ring seals. There are several different joint designs used
in the Solid Rocket Motor. The joint that failed on the last Chal-
lenger flight, the aft field joint, was not the one that had been
giving NASA the most trouble. More O-ring erosion had been expe-
rienced on nozzle joints, the design of which is significantly differ-
ent than the aft field joint. However, since NASA treated erosion
as a problem that impacted both the nozzle and field joints, the
data on erosion in this section includes that obtained from the
nozzle joint.
Whenever a temperature is specified, it is essential that it be re-
lated to a specific medium such as air (or ambient temperature),
rocket propellant, or casing joints, for example. The temperature of
the joints, air and propellant can all be different at the same time,
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just as the ocean temperature at the beach on a 90-degreeday
couldbe 75 degrees.
Much of thisdiscussionconcerns heat,or the absence thereof.
For example, ifan O-ringhad given up heat during the night,it
would very likelybe at a lower temperature than the temperature
ofthe airin the morning afterthe sun had risen.Thiswas the situ-
ationatthe time Flight51-L was launched.The heatgainedby the
jointin the time aftersunrisewas not sufficiento raisethe tem-
peratureof the O-ringmaterialto a levelwhere Thiokolengineers
believedthe O-ringcould respond and sealthe jointunder ignition
pressures.
The followingchartdescribesthe principalstepsin the evolution,
flight,and reconditioningofthe SolidRocket Motors (FigureV-4).
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SOLID ROCK_ MOTOR
PRINCIPAL STEPS IN THE EVOLUTION_ FLIGHT AND RECONDITIONING OF
SOLID ROCKET MOTORS
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NASA
DESIGN THE MOTOR TO MEET ALL PERFORMANC
REQU I REMENTS DUR ING ALL ANT I C I PATED
CONDITIONS OF BLIGHT. .
MORTON TBIOKOL
ASSURE THAT DESIGN MEETS ALL REO.UIREMEI<
MORTON TI{1OKOL
NASA
PROCURE MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS, PRODU
AND ASSEMBLE AN OPERATIONAL MOTOR IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE DESIGN.
MORTON THI.0KOL
KONR INDUSTRIES
pARKER SEAL COMPANY'
LOAD, TRANSPORT, UNLOAD AND STORE MOTOR
SEGMENTS,
MORTON THIOKOL
ASSEMBLE MOTOR SEGMENTS IN PREPARATION "
FOR FLIGHT.
MORTON THIOKOL
REVIEW AND DECISION ON LAUNCH, IGNITE
MOTORS, SEPARATE AND RECOVER SPENT MOTOF
NASA
MORTON I'HIOKOL
RESTORE COMPONENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
SPECIFICATIONS.
MORTON TIIIOKOL
FZGURE V-4
I_G uP._V-4
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Because of the difficulty the reader may find in understanding
the NASA Flight Readiness Review for the Solid Rocket Booster
for Flight 51-L and the terms used to describe the steps in the
process, the following chart describes the level of review, office con-
ducting the review, and the scope of the review. In addition to the
following meeting chart, there were numerous other ad hoc meet-
ings on the SRMs including the meeting between NASA and Thio-
kol personnel during the evening before the launch of Flight 51-L.
TABLEL--FLIGHTREADINESSREVIEWS
[STS-SIL]
Levelanddate Rt_| office Scope_
IV--Dec. 11, 1985.................. ThiokolWasatch.......................Conductedby ThickolSolidRocketMotorprogrammanagersin
preparationfor presentationsto MarshallSpaceRight Center
(MSFC),
III--cec. 17, 1985..................SRMOtt_ ...............................Conductedby Larry Wear,Managerof the Solid RocketMotor
ProgramOffice,MSFC.Materialpresentedby Thidkolpersonnel.
ItI--Jan. 3, ]986.....................SR6Pro_ct_ice ...................Cond_tedby Larry Mu.l_, Managerof the SolidRocketBooster
ProjectOffice.Thisis a combinedbriefingonthe SRMandthe
elementsmaking up the boosterassembly,which, when
integratedmakeupthe Shuffle,SolidRocketBoosters.
Ill--Jan. 9, 1986.....................ShuttleProJects........................Conductedby StanleyReinartz,Manager,SpaceShuttleProjects
Office,MSFC.Thisreviewdiscussesall elementsof the Shuttle
managedby Marshall.
Ill--Jan. 13,1986...................CenterBoard............................Conductedby Or. WilliamLucas,MSR:Director.final Oiscuss_
of Marshallhardwarein preparationfor reviewby the Space
TransportatmSystemProgramManager.
ll--Jan. 14, ]986....................$TS Program............................Conductedb? Arnoid,_drich,SpaceTran_partatienSystemPro-
gram Manager.Firstreviewdealingwith the flightvehicleand
assodatedgroundsupportinits entirety.
I--Jan 15, ]986......................SpaceFlight.............................Cenductedby JesseMoore,AssociatedAdministratorfor Space
Flight.Remainingitemsthat impactlaunchare discussedand
assignedfor disposition.Certif_te of Flight Readinessis
signed.
I--Jan. ,_5, 1986.....................L-] Review..............................Meetingof the MissionManagementTeamto receivereportsen
actionitemsremainingfrom the FlightReadinessReview.All
actionitemsshouldbe closedby thistime.
Considerable reference will be made to the "joint design"
throughout this section of the report. Consequently, the fol]owing
description of the joint is provided. (See Figures V-5 thru V-7.)
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5O
B. SOLID ROCKEr MOTORS
1. HISTORY
Issue
Was there sufficient time to correct the problems with the Solid
Rocket Motor?
Findings
1. Problems with the joints which connect the Solid Rocket
Motor casings were recognized for many years. While attempts
were made to correct these problems, the measures taken were in-
sufficient to provide a reliable joint.
2. The joint seal problem was recognized by engineers in both
NASA and Morton Thiokol in sufficient time to have been correct-
ed by redesigning and manufacturing new joints before the acci-
dent on January 28, 1986. Meeting flight schedules and cutting cost
were given a higher priority than flight safety.
Discussion
At seven different times in the Shuttle Program, NASA and
Thiokol managers made poor technical decisions that ultimately
permitted continued flight of an unsafe Solid Rocket Motor design.
1. NASA's issuing of a performance specification that did not
adequately take into account the known weather conditions that
occur in Florida during the winter months.
2. Accepting the new joint design without sufficient certification
and testing.
3. Failure to accept John Miller's 1 recommendations to redesign
the clevis joint on all on-coming hardware at the earliest date.
4. Establishing a specific value for the upper limit of erosion
that could be tolerated in flight on the basis of a "computer pro-
gram model" instead of recognizing the erosion itself as a failure of
the joint.
5. Proceeding through more than four years of Shuttle flights
with continuing joint/seal problems without designing, testing and
incorporating a new type of field joint and nozzle joint as well.
6. NASA's permitting Thiokol to continue making Solid Rocket
Motors without conducting full scale tests as had been requested by
NASA 14 months previously.
7. Mr. Mulloy's description of joint failures as being within
"their experience base." In other words, if it broke before and the
size of the recent break was no bigger than those before, then there
was no problem. Even when the erosion surpassed all .previous ex-
perience, NASA then went on and expanded its "expermnce base."
What follows is a list of events and documents which relate to
the cause of the accident. They are included here to demonstrate
that there was adequate experience and information available
before the accident and that this information should have been suf-
ficient to cause the initiation of corrective action before the launch
of Flight 51-L.
John Q. Miller is Chief, Solid Motor Branch, Marshall Space Flight Center, NASA.
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July 16, 1973.--NASA issues a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the
Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor project. Under "Scope of Propos-
al," the RFP stated in part:
NASA considers that a prime contractor's use of estab-
lished expertise in the private sector is an essential ap-
proach toward the objective of maximum economic effec-
tiveness. Proposals from joint ventures will not be accept-
ed, and the development of new expertise by a prime con-
tractor, either in-house or elsewhere in the private sector,
is to be avoided to the extent possible, since the latter
course detracts from the stated objective.
This RFP is specifically directed toward the design, de-
velopment, test, production, acceptance, operation, and re-
furbishment of the Solid Rocket Motor and its ancillary
equipment, post-flight analysis, and support functions. It is
imperative in all considerations of the proposal and its
subsequent implementation, that effort be made to mini-
mize production and operating costs while maintaining
reasonable DDT&E costs. The minimization of these costs
entails the utilization of design and production approaches
that will result in the lowest possible cost per flight con-
sistent with the Space Shuttle Program early year funding
constraints and the design, performance and reliability
requirements, la
August 27, 1973.--Thiokol, in the Executive Summary to its re-
sponse to the RFP, addressed NASA concerns regarding SRM reli-
ability (Appendix N, RFP 8-1-4-94-98401). Among other failure
modes identified by NASA, Thiokol described the steps it had
taken to prevent O-ring seal failure. These included:
DESIGN FEATURES
Redundant seals,
Protection of mating surfaces;
Assure proper environment and capability.
TEST AND CONTROL FEATURES
Functional leak check of dual seals prior to test or use;
Material migration/compatibility tests to demonstrate
suitability, m
November 19, 1973.--In its report to NASA Administrator James
C. Fletcher, the Solid Rocket Motor Source Evaluation Board (SEB)
evaluated the proposals generated by the Solid Rocket Motor RFP.
Thiokol scored 124 out of a possible 200 points for its motor design,
the lowest score among the four competitors. The only design
strength identified by the Board: "Case joint leakcheck capability
increases reliability and improves checkout operations." _
NASA, Marshall Space Flight Center, "Request for Proposal: Space Shuttle Program Solid
Rock Motor Project," RFP 8-1-4-94-98401, Volume 1, July 16, 1973, pp. 1-3, 1-4.
IThiokol, "Executive Summary: Proposal for Solid Rocket Motor Project for the Space Shut-
tle Program," Publications No. 0873-73270-1, Volume 1, August 27, 1973, p. 3-10 (Table 3-4).
k NASA, Marshall Space Shuttle Center, "Presentation to NASA Administrator: Solid Rocket
Motor Project Source Evaluation Board," RFP 8-1-4-94-98401, November 19, 1973, Chart D-4.
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November 1973.--The SEB Design, Development and Verification
Team Report rejected proposals by Aerojet and United Technol-
ogies Corporation to test motor performance at 40" and 90 ° Fahren-
heit. The report stated that "The temperature conditioning of two
motors to verify the motor performance over the range of 40" to 90"
is not required, as this data can be obtained from the normal varia-
tion in ambient conditions." _
December 12, 1973.--NASA Administrator James C. Fletcher an-
nounced selection of Morton Thiokol as contractor for Design, De-
velopment, Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) of the Solid Rocket
Motors. In the source selection statement, "Selection of Contractor
for Space Shuttle Program, Solid Rocket Motors," a statement was
included that indicates that Thiokol ranked fourth out of the four
bidders in the design category (see Appendix V-A). NASA, howev-
er, placed greater importance on cost reduction and Thiokol had an
attractive cost proposal. 2
January 9, 1978.--Major problems with the joint design were
identified when Mr. John Miller of NASA sent a memo to Mr.
Eudy. In it Miller stated, "Calculations performed by MSFC [Mar-
shall Space Flight Center personnel] and agreed to by Thiokol show
that distortion of the clevis joint tang for any joint can be suffi-
cient to cause O-ring/tang separation. Data from DMT-1 [Develop-
ment Motor Test-l] showed that this condition could be created by
joint movement . . ." Miller continued, "All situations which could
create tang distortion are not known, nor is the magnitude of
movement known." Miller also noted that 15 percent industr_ rec-
ommended a compression value of 15 percent for adequate O-ring
performance. He also cited a Thiokol test report dated August 15,
1977, TWR-11507, which showed a maximum compression of 5.8 to
7.0 percent for O-ring material and spliced joints. Finally, Miller
also recommended a redesign of clevis joints on all on-coming hard-
ware at the earliest possible effectivity to preclude unacceptable,
high risk, O-ring compression values.
November 7, 1978.--Ten months later it would appear that there
was nothing to worry about when a letter from E. G. Dorsey of
Thiokol to Mr. George Hardy of MSFC contained the statement,
"The extrusion data presented in the review and mentioned in the
minutes have confirmed the capability of the O-rings to prevent
leakage under the worst hardware conditions." Mr. Dorsey at-
tached the Thiokol TWR-12019, dated October 6, 1978 to his letter.
February 2, 1979.--Mr. Eudy and Mr. Ray of NASA visited the
Parker Seal Company. A trip report was sent to Messrs. Hardy/
Rice/McCool of NASA which contained the following statement:
"Parker experts would make no official statements concerning reli-
ability and potential risk factors associated with the present design
however, their first thought was that the O-ring was being asked to
perform beyond its intended design and that a different type of seal
should be considered. The need for additional testing of the present
design was also discussed and it was agreed that tests which more
NASA Marshall Sna_ Flight Center "Design, Development and Verification Team Report:
Solid Rocket Motor Projectr--,'' November 1973, p. _0.
NASA, "Selection of Contractor for Space Shuttle Program, Solid Rocket Motors" January
2, 1974.
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closely simulated actual conditions should be done." This report
also referred to the O-ring extrusion gap being larger than Parker
had previously experienced. (See Appendix V-I.)
November 12, 1981.--During STS-2, the second Shuttle flight,
erosion of the primary O-ring was discovered in the 90 degree loca-
tion of the aft field joint of the right hand Solid Rocket Motor. The
0.053 inch erosion was not discussed in the STS-3 Flight Readiness
Reviews. 3 This was the deepest O-ring erosion that would be discov-
ered in any case field joint.
February 25, 1983.--Employees of Thiokol discussed joint "gap
size" and "O-ring compression" at a briefing at the Marshall Space
Flight Center (MSFC). 4
March 17, 1983.--Mr. Lawrence Mulloy, MSFC Solid Rocket
Booster (SRB) Project Manager, informed NASA Level 1 (meaning
the Associate Administrator for Space Flight), of the pending
change in criticality from 1R to 1, which meant that a single seal
failure could result in the loss of the Shuttle and crew. That
change was approved on March 28, 1983. 5
April 4, 1983.--STS-6 was the first flight to use the "lightweight
case." It was also the first flight where a criticality factor of 1, in-
stead of 1R, was assigned to the joint. After the flight, "blowholes"
in the nozzle to case joints, not the case field joints, were found in
both the left and right Solid Rocket Motors. These observations
were not discussed in the Flight Readiness Reviews for STS-7. 8
December 6, 1983.--An internal Marshall Space Flight Center
(MSFC) memo from Mr. Miller to Mr. Horton highlighted the seal
leak detection and zinc chromate putty problems. (See Appendix
V-D.)
February 22, 198_.--Marshall Space Flight Center memorandum
from Ben Powers to Horton requested that post-flight and post-
static firing inspection on specific joints be made. The memo ex-
pressed concern about adhesion life of the zinc chromate sealant
after installation on the SRM. See Appendix V-F.
March 2, 198_.--Thiokol personnel described the erosion discov-
ered in the 351 degree location of the left Solid Rocket Motor for-
ward field joint of STS-41B at a Flight Readiness Review. The ero-
sion extended over three inches with a maximum depth of 0.040
inches. This was the first time the subject of O-ring erosion sus-
tained on flights STS-2 and STS-6 was discussed as a technical
issue at a Flight Readiness Review. 7
March 8, 198$.--The notion of ACCEPTABLE EROSION was
mentioned at a meeting of the Shuttle Projects Office Board for
STS-41-C. Even though the joint was now classified as Criticality
1, which meant that failure of the joint could lead to the loss of the
Shuttle and crew, the concept of "maximum possible" erosion,
0.090 inches, was accepted as an absolute value based on a comput-
s Thiokol Report, TWR-300209, Brian Russell, "Narrative History of SRM Seal Erosion and
Blowby Incidents," June 25, 1986, p. 3.
4 Rogers Commission Report, Volume II, p. H-1.
s Ibid.
de 6 Ibid. _.NOTE.--The nozzle _ case jointdesign is significantl_ different than the case field joint
eslgn wmcn caused the _.nmlenger accident. However, it is cited here because some of the prob-
ms are relevant to the mimre of the aft field joint.]
7 Ibid.
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er program which was supported by limited data. Furthermore, the
0.090 inch value was based on the concept that the O-ring would
seal at 3 times the actual motor pressure even if the erosion ex-
tended to 0.095 inches thereby giving comfort in continuing with a
known problem, s
March 198_.--Thiokol submitted their "Performance Charateris-
tics of the SRM O-ring Assembly Test Plan," TWR-14336, which
contained the following statement: "O-ring seals in rocket motors
in general and the Space Shuttle SRMs in particular can suffer
thermal degradation because of exposure to the high temperature
motor chamber gases. Although none of the SRM primary O-rings
to date have failed to perform their design function, there is some
concern because of isolated events which show localized erosion as
high as 0.053 inches. The postulated scenario for this thermal deg-
radation effect is a short time duration impingement of a high
energy jet which is induced during ignition pressurization by a
combination of voids in the protective vacuum putty and the filling
of available free volumes created by the tolerances of mating parts
and the O-ring slots."
March 20, 198_.--Acceptable erosion was again discussed at the
Flight Readiness Review briefing to the Marshall Center Board. 9
March 27, 198_.--Mr. Mulloy discussed O-ring erosion at the
Level 1 Flight Readiness Review for STS41-C. As a result, he re-
ceived an "action item" to review the case and nozzle seals. The
action did not have to be completed before the flight of STS41-C. 1°
Mr. Lawrence Wear, the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Element
Manager, then directed Thiokol to establish a plan and a test pro-
gram to investigate the issue. Thiokol was directed to determine if
the O-ring erosion was acceptable and if so, why? 1_
April 6, 198_.--Heat degradation of the O-ring in the left SRM
aft field joint of STS41-C was found, along with 'qMowholes" in the
putty.
April 12, 198_.--In an internal Marshall Space Flight Center
memorandum, John Q. Miller told Mr. Horton that "stacking diffi-
culties and observed O-ring anomalies" were increasing with the
use of Randolph putty. The former supplier, Fuller O'Brien, had
discontinued producing the putty previously used in the Shuttle
program. Accordingly, putty was ordered from Randolph Products.
The memo requested expedited development of a putty with the
characteristics of the Fuller O'Brien putty used prior to STS-8.
May 4, 198_.--Morton Thiokol prepared a Program Plan for the
protection of Space Shuttle SRM primary motor seals. Thiokol's ob-
jective was to isolate the joint problem and to eliminate damage to
the motor seals, the O-rings. The plan called for analysis and test-
ing of O-rings, putty and associated lubricants. _2 See Appendix
V-B.
s Ibid.
g Ibid.
_o Ibid.
t i Ibid.
t_ Morton Thiokol, "Program Plan, Protection of Space Shuttle SRM Primary Seals," TWR-
14359, May 4, 1984.
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May 23, 198_.--NASA responds to Thiokol's plan, endorsing the
Program Plan, supplementing it and expressing continued concerns
about zinc chromate putty performance. _3 See Appendix V-C.
May 30, 198_._A presentation by Thiokol personnel at the SRM
Preboard Flight Readiness for STS41-D described the problems
with STS41-C. 14
June 8, 198_.--The Marshall Center Board review for STS41-D
took place without mention of the SRM problems found on
STS41-C, even though Thiokol had prepared briefing charts for the
review, is
June 18, 198_.--MSFC memorandum from Miller to Horton men-
tioned zinc chromate putty installation discrepancies and recalled
eroded/heat exposure O-ring experiences on QM-4, STS-2, STS-6,
STS-11 (41B) and STS-13 (41C).
June 18, 198_.--The Level 1 Flight Readiness Review for
STS41-D took place, but again without mention of the O-ring prob-
lems discovered on STS41-C.
June 29, 198_.--Scenario of hot gas jet impingement against O-
ring is substantiated in a teleconference between Thiokol and
MSFC.
August 30, 198_.--STS41-D was launched. Upon disassembly of
the SRM casings at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). O-ring ero-
sion was found in both the right-hand forward field joint and the
left-hand nozzle joint. The field joint erosion was 0.028 inches deep
and extended over a 3 inch span in the 275 degree location. 1_
September 12, l$8_.--Thiokol personnel discussed the problems
with STS41-D at the STS41-G SRM Preboard Review. 17
September 19, 198_.--For the first time, at the STS41-G Shuttle
Projects Board review, Mr. Mulloy mentioned the term "allowable
erosion." He used the same briefing charts on September 20 at the
Marshall Center Board Review. is
Flights STS41-G and STS51-A successfully flew without O-ring
damage, a fact that was mentioned in the SRM Preboards for
STS51-A and STS51-C. _9
January 24, 1985.--With a calculated O-ring temperature of 53
degrees F, STS51-C suffered erosion and blow-by in the two case
field joints. The primary O-ring in the left-hand forward field joint
was eroded 0.010 inches over a span of 4.25 inches at the 163
degree location, with a considerable amount of soot between the
primary and secondary O-rings. The primary O-ring in the right-
hand center field joint was eroded 0.038 inches over a 12.5 inch
space at the 354 degree location. There was soot behind the pri-
mary O-ring over a 110 degree arc and the secondary O-ring was
heat damaged over a span of 29.5 inches.
January 31, 1985._At the STS51-E Preboard review, Thiokol
personnel described the previous O-ring damage in detail as well as
isNASA, letterfrom John Miller,MSFC, "Evaluation ofTWR-14359, 'Program Plan,Protec-
tionof Space,Shuttle SRM Primary Motor Seals,'"EP 25 (84-49),May 23, 1984.
_4Rogers Commission Report, Volume lI, p. H-1.
15Ibid.
1'Ibid.
_71bid., p. H-2.
_mIbid.
_9Ibid.
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joint performance. They also showed analytical predictions of the
"maximum expected erosion." 2o
February 12, 1985.--Mr. Mulloy and Thiokol personnel presented
a summary of STS 51-C O-ring related problems during a briefing
to the Shuttle Projects Office Board. A portion of the problem sum-
mary on the briefing charts referred to a field joint O-ring blow-by
problem as being an "acceptable risk." In this briefing the second-
ary O-ring was referred to as a "redundant seal using actual hard-
ware dimensions" even though the field joint had been officially
classified as Criticality 1 for two years. 21
February 14, 1985.--Mr. Mulloy addressed the Marshall Center
Board but did not comment on the STS 51-C O-ring problems in
detail.22
March 7,1985.--MSFC Memo to Mr. Mulloy from Mr. McCool.
McCool was concernedthat 14 months had elapsedsincefullscale
diameter teststo providedata on zincchromate puttybehavior as
itrelatedto itseffecton jointleak checks were requested.McCool
pointedout that the only positiveresponse from Thiokol was the
Program Plan submittedon May 4,1983.2s(SeeAppendix V-E.)
April 4,1985.--A letterfrom MSFC to Mr. Joseph Kilminsterof
Morton Thiokol requestedspecificsub-scaleand full-scaletestson
effectsofzincchromate puttieson O-ringsealingintegrity.
April 12,1985.--STS 51-D was launched and, upon disassembly,
erosionofthe primary O-ringsin both nozzlejointswas discovered.
The right-handnozzleprimary O-ringeroded to a depth of 0.068
inchesover a 6 inch span at the 116 degreelocation.The left-hand
nozzleprimary O-ringerodedto a depth of 0.011inchesover a 2.12
inch span at the 14 degree location.There was no blow-by past
eithernozzleO-ring.
April 17, 1985.--The Shuttle Projects Board for STS 51-B was
held without mention of seal problems. There was also no mention
of seal problems associated with STS 51-C or 51-D at the Level 1
Flight Readiness Review on April 23, 1985. 24
April 22, 1985.--Thiokors evaluation of a second source for putty
is issued. The evaluation states: "The Randolph Products putty is
the only material presently qualified for use on the Space Shuttle
Program. It is the desire of Morton Thiokol to evaluate and qualify
a second source for a joint filler material." The evaluation went on
to state, "The material has demonstrated poor processing charac-
teristics and is moisture sensitive. ''s5
April 2_, l$85.--Problem Assessment System Record Number
A07934, tracking damage to the field joint seals, contains the fol-
lowing entry: "At NASA request, a solution for O-ring erosion will
not involve a radical design change. Therefore, the possible solu-
tions under current investigation are linked to: (1) new O-ring [ma-
2o Ibid.
_ Ibid.
22 Ibid.
zs NASA, MSFC, Memo from Mr. Alex McCool "Request for Initiation of Testing to Provide
Data for Resolving the Burned O-Ring Seal Problem on the Space Shuttle SRM," EPOI (85--48),
March 7, 1985.
z4 Ro_ers Commission Report, Volume II, p. H-2.
_ Thlokol, S.H. Cardall, "SRM Evaluation of Second Source Joint Filler Material," TWR-
14946, April 22, 1985, pp. 1-2.
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terials] and/or diameter and (2) new vacuum putty and/or layup
procedure.
April 29, 1985.--Flight STS 51-B was launched and when the
Solid Rocket Boosters were recovered, it was found that the worst
O-ring erosion to date had occurred. The left-hand nozzle primary
O-ring eroded to a depth of 0.171 inches over a 1.50 inch space at
the 54 degree location. There was evidence of considerable blow-by.
The secondary O-ring was eroded to a depth of 0.032 inches over a
3 inch span which was also at the 54 degree sector. The right-hand
nozzle O-ring eroded to a depth of 0.005 inches over a 3.50 inch
span at the 14 degree location.
May 8, 1985.--Blowholes through the putty in one field joint
from each of the STS 51-B SRMs was mentioned before the SRB
Board for Flights STS 51-F and STS-51-G.
May 29, 1985.--The STS 51-G Shuttle Project Board took place
without mentioning O-ring problems.2
May 18, 1985.--The Center Board Review for STS 51-G took
place without mentioning O-ring problems. 2_
June 11, 1985.--The Level 1 Flight Readiness Review for STS 51-
G took place without mentioning O-ring problems, e8
June 17, 1985.--STS 51-G was launched, experiencing blow-by
and erosion in both nozzle joints. The right-hand nozzle primary O-
ring was eroded in two different places. The left-hand nozzle pri-
mary O-ring was also eroded and there was blow-by associated with
all three locations.
July 1, 1985.--A combined Flight Readiness Review for the Mar-
shall SRM Preboard, SRB Board, Shuttle Project Office Board, and
Marshall Center Board was held at which Thiokol personnel pre-
sented an extensive analyses of the problems discovered on Flight
STS 51-B. 29
July 2, 1985._Mr. Mulloy briefed the Level I Flight Readiness
Review for STS 51-F and presented the STS 51-B O-ring erosion
problem as a "closed item." Mr. Mulloy based this resolution on
the use of a higher 200 psi leak check stabilization pressure and
introduced, for the first time, a rationale for accepting secondary
O-ring erosion. The Roger Commission would not find any refer-
ence to O-ring problems in any Flight Readiness Review associated
with Flight STS 51-D or STS 51-G. 3°
July 19, 1985._An attempt to form an SRM Erosion team at
Thiokol "virtually failed" according to Mr. Roger M. Boisjoly be-
cause of lack of commitment on the part of Thiokol personnel.
July 22, 1985.--0ne of the engineers who appreciated the joint
problem was Mr. Boisjoly of Morton Thiokol. In a "Progress
Report" he wrote, "This problems has escalated so badly in the
eyes of everyone, especially our customer, NASA, that NASA has
gone to our competitors on a proprietary basis and solicited their
experiences on their joint configuration. ''sl (See Appendix V-G.)
2s Ibid.
27 Ibid.
2s Ibid.
22 Ibid.
so Ibid., p. H-3.
sl Thiokol, Roger Boisjoly, "Progress Report: Applied Mechanics Center," July 22, 1985.
64-420 0 - 86 - 3
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July 29, 1985.--STS 51-F was launched without O-ring erosion
problems. However, there was a blowhole through the putty in the
right-hand SRM nozzle and the primary O-ring was affected by
heat.
July 31, 1985.--Boisjoly wrote an interoffice memo to R.K. Lund,
Morton-Thiokol's Vice President of Engineering: On it, he warned
that the rationale for flying the joint design was now suspect as a
result of the secondary O-ring erosion on STS 51-B. 3_ See Appen-
dix V-J.).
August 7, 1985.--The Shuttle project review for STS 51-I was
conducted, followed on August 13 by the Marshall Center Board
and on August 15 by the Level 1 Flight Readiness Review. The O-
ring damage was noted at these reviews.
August 19, 1985.--Thiokol gave a presentation to Mr. Weeks,
NASA Deputy Associate Administrator for Flight (Technical), and
others at NASA Headquarters, which contained the following
chart.
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT OBSERVATIONS
All joints:
Seal damage always has associated putty blowhole
Putty blowholes exist without resultant seal damage
Soot blowby can occur away from a putty blowhole
Frequency of O-ring damage has increased since incorporation of:
Randolph putty;
Higher stabilization pressures in leak test procedure;
High performance motors.
Randoph putty is more susceptible to environmental conditions such as humidi-
ty and temperature.
Can become leathery in dry conditions;
Becomes extremely sticky in moist conditions and in some cases begins to
disintegrate, sa
August 20, 1985. A Thiokol interoffice memo mentioned that a
Nozzle O-ring Investigation Task Force had been formally institut-
ed, stating, "As you are aware, we have experienced O-ring damage
on a random basis in the case field joints and prevalently in the
case/nozzle joint on the Space Shuttle Booster Motors. The fre-
quency had increased in recent flights. While we have not compro-
mised the performance of any motor to date, the result of a leak at
any of the joints would be catastrophic."
August 27, 1985. Flight STS 51-I was launched, after which it
was discovered that there was primary O-ring erosion in two loca-
tions on the left-hand SRM nozzle joint. At the reviews for STS 51-
J, which occurred on September 9, 1985, September 17, 1985, Sep-
tember 19, 1985, and September 26, 1985, the O-ring erosion noted
on STS 51-I was merely itemized as, "left-hand nozzle to case pri-
mary O-ring erosion within experience base." There was no O-ring
damage on Flight STS 51-J.
August 30, 1_Q85. One year and four months after the original
drafting of Thiokors Program Plan TWR-14359, for improvement
of Space Shuttle SRM Motor Seals, the revised version of the plan
was issued.
3m Thiokol, Roger Boisjoly, "SRM O-Ring Erosion/Potential Failure Criticality," Memo 2870:
FY 86: 073, July 31, 1985.
az Rogers Commission Report, Volume II, p. H-73.
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October 1, 1985. R.V. Ebeling of Morton Thiokol submitted a
weekly activities report to A.J. McDonald, Director, Solid Rocket
Motor Project, with copies to J. Kilminster and others, which in-
cluded the following statements:
Executive Summary. HELP! The seal task force is con-
stantly being delayed by every possible means. People are
quoting policy and systems without work-around. MSFC is
correct in stating that we do not know how to run a devel-
opment program.
5. The allegiance to the O-ring investigation task force
is very limited to a group of engineers numbering 8-10.
Our assigned people in manufacturing and quality have
the desire, but are encumbered with other significant
work. Others in manufacturing, quality, procurement who
are not involved directly, but whose help we need, are gen-
erating plenty of resistance. We are creating more instruc-
tional paper than engineering data. We wish we could get
action by verbal request but such is not the case. This is a
red flag.
(See appendix V-H.)
October _, 1985. Roger Boisjoly's Activity Report identified prob-
lems in obtaining support from Mr. Kilminster for the O-Ring In-
vestigation Task Force.
October 30, 1985. STS 61-A experienced erosion of the right-hand
nozzle primary O-ring to a depth of 0.075 inches over a 13 inch
space at the 97 degree location. There was also blow-by past the
primary O-rings in the center and aft field joints on the left-hand
SRM. But these problems were not discussed at the STS 61-B SRB
Board Review on November 4, 1985. However, Mr. Mulloy included
a note at the Shuttle Project Board Review on November 6, 1985,
"SRM Joint O-ring performance within experience base."
November 18, 1985. Mr. Mulloy briefed the Level 1 Flight Readi-
ness Review stating, "Post flight inspection of SRM revealed hot
gas erosion of primary nozzle/case joint-O-ring on right-hand
SRM--Within previously accepted experience."
November 20, 1985. Thiokol briefing document TWR-15349,
"SRM O-ring Task Force Status and QM-5" Recommendations,
presented new seal design concepts and recommendations for Qual-
ification Motor-5 testing on February 20, 1986.
November 2¢, 1985. STS 61-B experienced primary O-ring erosion
in both nozzle joints. There was also blow-by past the primary O-
ring in the left-hand nozzle joint. These observations were noted at
the STS 61-C SRB Board Flight Readiness Review on December 2,
1985.
December _, 1985. At the STS 61-C Shuttle Project Board, Mr.
Mulloy noted "SRM joint O-ring performance within experience
base." The Commission's copy of the December 9, 1985, Marshall
Center Board briefing was incomplete; however, at the December
11, 1985, Level I Flight Readiness Review, it was reported that
there were "No 61-B flight anomalies."
6O
December 11, 1985. Thiokol management holds a Solid Rocket
Motor Flight Readiness Review for STS 51-L. No discussion of O-
ring anomalies occurs.
December 17, 1985. Larry Wear holds a Flight 51-L Solid Rocket
Motor Project Flight Readiness Review at Marshall Space Flight
Center.
January 3, 1986. The Level III Flight Readiness Review for Flight
51-L takes place at Marshall. SRB recovery system changes are the
primary point of discussion.
January 9, 1986. Larry Mulloy makes his Flight 51-L presenta-
tion at the MSFC Shuttle Projects Office Readiness Review. SRB
parachutes are discussed. O-rings are not.
January 12, 1986. STS 61-C experienced nozzle Joint O-ring ero-
sion and blow-by and a field joint O-ring was eroded 0.011 inches
over an 8 inch span at the 162 degree location. There was blow-by
past the primary O-ring in the left-hand nozzle joint between the
255 degree and 335 degree locations. The primary O-ring in the left
SRM aft field joint was eroded 0.004 inches over a 3.5 inch span at
the 154 degree location.
January 13, 1986. Marshall Space Flight Center 51-L Readiness
Review. Mulloy again does not mention O-ring anomalies.
January 14, 1986. Mulloy's Flight 51-L presentation to the Level
II Flight Readiness Review indicates there were "no 61-C flight
anomalies."
January 15, 1986. During the STS 51-L Level I Flight Readiness
Review, Mr. Mulloy noted that there were "No 61-C Flight Anoma-
lies," and that there were "No major problems or issues."
January 25, 1986. According to Mr. McDonald, Mr. Mulloy men-
tioned that 61-C had suffered O-ring erosion "within experience
base" at the STS 51-L L-1 Flight Readiness Review.
January 26, 1986. The Orlando Sentinel printed an article titled,
"Bitter freeze is expected to clobber state Tuesday." 32a
January 27, 1986. Thiokol and Marshall personnel spend approxi-
mately three hours in a teleconference debating the effect that pre-
dicted low temperatures will have on the performance of the O-ring
seals.
January 28, 1986. The ice/frost evaluation team visits Launch
Complex 39B at 1:45 a.m., 6:45 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. Meeting with
Rockwell personnel concluded with a decision to continue the
launch countdown.
January 28, 1986. STS 51-L was launched at approximately 11:38
a.m. Eastern Standard Time.
2. SUMMARY OF CASING JOINT DESIGN
Issue
Why did the aft field joint between the steel containers that hold
the Solid Rocket Motor propellant fail to contain the burning gases
of the propellant during lift-off and flight operations?
ss, John Wark, "Bitter Freeze is Expected to Clobber State Tuesday," The Or/ando Sentinel,
Jan. 26, 1986, p. B-3.
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Findings
1. The design of the field joint was unsatisfactory and could not
reliably contain the burning propellant gases under the range of
operating conditions to be expected during the lift-off and flight
phases.
2. The O-ring materials and putty used in the design of the joint
were unsatisfactory as used on the Shuttle, particularly during the
winter months. Furthermore, neither NASA nor its contractor,
Morton Thiokol, can adequately control the quality or consistency
of these kinds of materials, which are made from recipes known
only by the manufacturer and which can be changed without certi-
fication and approval.
Recommendations
1. NASA should write and issue a new and more accurate per-
formance specification which would cover the full range of thermal
and structural requirements for the Solid Rocket Motors, with an
adequate factor of safety for unusually low temperatures.
2. The Committee concurs with the Rogers Commission Report
Recommendations on new joint design, but believes it is more ap-
propriate to be more explicit in identifying the weaknesses in the
joint design that need correction.
3. The field joints of the Solid Rocket Motors should be rede-
signed to account for the following features while providing a sig-
nificant factor of safety:
a. Movement in the joint;
b. Proper spacing between tang and clevis;
c. Seals made to withstand high and low temperatures under
all dynamic thermal and structural loadings;
d. Adequate sealing without the use of putty;
e. Protection against insulation debonding and propellant
cracking.
Discussion
This section is a summary of Section VII, Casing Joint Design.
For details and substantiation of the statements made in this sum-
mary, refer to Section VII.
The evidence, consisting of recovered pieces of the right Solid
Rocket Motor casings, photographs of smoke and flame emanating
from the right Solid Rocket Motor and telemetry data transmitted
from STS 51-L back to Mission Control at the Johnson Space
Center verify the failure of the aft field joint of the motor.
As mentioned earlier, NASA's performance specifications did not
anticipate operations at temperatures below 31 degrees, a tempera-
ture that might occur in Florida during the winter months. The
design of the joint was unsatisfactory to provide for the low tem-
peratures or water in the joints that existed on January 28. While
it was based on an existing similar rocket casing joint design that
had been successful, the design was changed to accommodate the
manufacturing requirements of the larger sized shuttle rocket
motors. There were even some features of the revised design that
indicated the changes were an improvement. It was easier to as-
semble in the field and it had a second O-ring. The designers
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thoughtif the first O-ring failed, the second would surely hold the
propellant gases.
The casing joints, as described in the Introduction, have to with-
stand various structural loads, which change dramatically as the
shuttle is assembled, through launch operations, separation of the
Solid Rocket Booster and retrieval from the ocean. The joint is dy-
namic; the components move under these loads. The loads carried
by the aft field joint are different from those carried by other
joints. The design, based on these loads and 24 successful missions,
appeared satisfactory.
One of the loads, however, that of the propellant gas pressure,
was not adequately accommodated. The zinc chromate putty, in-
tended to protect the O-rings from this high temperature and rela-
tively high pressure gas, frequently failed and permitted the gas to
erode the primary O-rings.
Instead of redesigning the joint, NASA and Thiokol persisted in
trying to fix the problem by changing leak-test pressures, changing
the size of the O-rings, and trying to control proper spacing be-
tween the tang and clevis where the O-rings were located.
Complicating this problem, two of the materials used in the joint,
the putty and the fluorocarbon elastomer O-rings, were not suited
to the task of containing the propellant gas under the full span of
Shuttle operating conditions. The behavior of the fluorocarbon elas-
tomer O-rings was something of a mystery to NASA and its con-
tractor. The material was "proprietary," meaning that the con-
stituents used were known only to the manufacturer. Fluorocar-
bons are expensive, so fillers are frequently added to reduce the
cost of the material. These materials behave unlike most other ma-
terials. The particular material used in the manufacture of the
shuttle O-rings was the wrong material to use at low tempera-
tures. 33 Nitrile or silicon based materials would have demonstrated
better performance characteristics.
It became necessary to find a new putty when the original sup-
plier, Fuller O'Brien, stopped making it because it contained asbes-
tos. The characteristics of the new putty changed substantially in
response to the quantity of water in the air and it was difficult to
apply in both the dry climate of Utah and the dampness of Florida.
Its performance in use was highly unpredictable. Again, NASA and
its contractor tried to make up for the unsatisfactory material by
storing it under refrigeration prior to application in Florida.
After ignition of the solid propellant in the SRM, it was learned
that the O-ring could be seated by the motor's gas pressure yet still
suffer erosion as the hot gases came in contact with it. As men-
tioned, O-ring erosion was noted after various flights and tests.
Also seen was damage given the name "blow-by", a condition
where erosion was not necessarily present but where there was evi-
dence that the propellant gas had bypassed the primary O-ring.
But rather than identify this condition as a joint that didn't seal,
that is, a joint that had already failed, NASA elected to regard a
certain degree of erosion or blow-by as "acceptable." To make mat-
ters worse, confidence was mistakenly obtained from a mathemati-
s_ NASA's primary concern was having a very durable material with excellent high tempera-
ture performance characteristics.
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cal model which suggested that if the erosion did not exceed a spe-
cific depth, the O-ring would still seal that joint. In cases where the
erosion did exceed the maximum predicted by the model, NASA ex-
panded its experience base to cover this increased damage.
As the joint seals continued to exhibit erosion or blow-by or both,
more research illustrated the importance of maintaining proper
gap spacing between the tang part of the joint and the O-ring face
of the inner clevis leg. Too little space, and the O-rings would not
seal. Too much space, and again the seals would fail. Since the
joint opens, or "rotates," when the Solid Rocket Motor is ignited,
maintaining proper spacing was difficult if not impossible. The
maintenance of such close tolerances in spacing, on the order of 20
thousandths of an inch, while joining 300,000 lb. segments that
have been bent during shipment, was not sufficiently provided for
in the design. Months passed until, in 1985, engineers at NASA rec-
ognized that the design was unsatisfactory. In fact, NASA had writ-
ton to several other contractors soliciting help with the joint prob-
lems. Unfortunately, in the quest to meet schedule and budget, the
warnings of the engineers were not heeded.
Based on the above conditions and the evidence, the Committee
has endeavored to determine the way in which the joint failed; rec-
ognizing that such a determination is difficult, if not impossible, to
make with 100% certainty.
The following is the most probable sequence of the joint failure:
1. The failure occured in the lower assembly joint near a strut
that connects the Solid Rocket Booster to the External Tank.
2. At that location, the spacing between the two casings was too
small to facilitate a tight seal.
3. Also, at that location, there probably existed a hole through
the insulating putty, which would act as a conduit concentrating
the hot propellant gas on the primary O-ring.
4. The freezing temperatures reduced the capability of the O-
rings to seal. Worse, at this particular location, near the connect-
ing strut, the joint was made even colder by the further loss of
heat caused by the direct connection to the liquid hydrogen fuel, at
423 degrees below zero, in the external tank.
5. When the Solid Rocket Motors were ignited, the pressure from
the motor changed the spacing between the casings. Among other
effects, this can prevent the secondary O-ring from sealing.
6. Seven inches of rain fell while the shuttle was being prepared
for launch. Water very likely penetrated the joints and froze. Ice in
the joints could have dislodged the secondary O-ring even if the
change in spacing, coupled with a cold and stiff O-ring, did not.
7. Smoke at ignition occurred at a location near the connecting
strut to the external tank. At that location, the primary O-ring was
either unseated or eroded and the secondary O-ring was unseated.
8. The primary O-ring was sealed at other locations around the
motor casings.
9. The breach in the primary O-ring clogged with burned char
and aluminum oxide from the propellant in less than 3 seconds,
causing the smoke to stop.
10. At 37 seconds, 45 seconds and 58 seconds into the flight, the
Space Shuttle encountered heavy turbulence, which forced the
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steeringcontrolsto cyclethroughchangesmoreseverethanprevi-
ousflights.
11.After throttling backto 65%powerasplanned,at 57seconds,powerwasincreasedto 104%.
12.The combinedeffectof the turbulenceand the increasein
powercausedthe material which cloggedthe joint to break free,
reopeningthejoint.
13.A flame from the right SolidRocketMotor wasseenat the
locationneartheconnectingstrut.
14.This flameburnedthroughtheexternaltank andcausedthe
destructionof theshuttle.
Sincethetechnicalfaults in thejoint designmustbecorrectedif
safeshuttle flight is to resume,this subjecthasbeendiscussedin
moredetail in SectionVII.
3. TESTING AND CERTIFICATION
Discussion
In developing the Solid Rocket Motor, Thiokol concentrated most
of their efforts and concerns on the proper design and performance
of the propellant. There is no question that this is where the em-
phasis on safety and performance is required. The propellant is a
high performance material, dangerous to manufacture and handle
and which must be prepared to the highest quality standards. Con-
sequently, testing and certification of the propellants, as well as its
performance, was carefully controlled. This does not mean that the
design of the casings was ignored. Considerable attention was paid
to the design of the casings because they were larger than seen on
any previous Solid Rocket Motor, because this Solid Rocket Motor
would be used on a manned flight system, and because these par-
ticular motors would be brought back, refurbished and reused.
Given this background, the testing of the joint was included in
static firing tests. While there were no special tests conducted to
confirm and certify the joint as a separate item, analysis was per-
formed to assure that the joint was adequate. Later, during the op-
eration of the Solid Rocket Motor, it was discovered that the per-
formance of the joint was unsatisfactory.
4. MANUFACTURING
The Solid Rocket Motor is 126 feet long and 12 feet in diameter.
The propellant weighs 1.9 million pounds and the average thrust is
2.3 million pounds. Fifty of these motors have been produced. The
segmented Solid Rocket Motor case is roll formed from D6AC steel.
The case is weld-free and consists of eleven segments. The propel-
lant is made in batches at 135 degrees F and it takes 40 to 43 of
these batches to load one casting segment. One segment includes
two steel cases which are joined in the factory. The content and
quality of the materials used to make the propellant is inspected
prior to mixing. The motor is designed for a short burn time (122
seconds) and therefore has a high mass flow which requires a large
burning surface. In manufacture, either new steel casings or previ-
ously used casings are employed. The first step is to apply the
rubber insulation liner around the inside of the casings. The insu-
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lation is removed from a roll and spread around the inside of the
casings with special tooling. After application it is cured in place in
an autoclave. After the casings have been insulated, they are
placed in a casting pit. The propellant is then poured into the cas-
ings under vacuum. The propellant is then cured and the casings
are removed from the pit. There is no indication that there were
any manufacturing defects that contributed to the loss of the Chal-
lenger.
5. STACKING OPERATIONS
Issue
Was there any damage to the casing joints or contamination that
occurred during the stacking operations when the Shuttle was as-
sembled in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) that could have
contributed to the failure?
Finding
There was no evidence of joint contamination, fracture, or other
damage from foreign objects or due to casing ovality that contribut-
ed to the joint failure. Although certain problems occurred during
stacking and the procedures were violated once, there was no evi-
dence that these events contributed to the Flight 51-L accident.
Discussion
The discussion of the assembly of the aft field joint on the right
hand Solid Rocket Booster is drawn from the "STS 51-L SRB Joint
Mate Review Team" report 33a The report was provided to Commit-
tee staff during the Committee's trip to KSC on June 6, 1986.
There were 24 Solid Rocket Booster sets (48 SRBs) stacked prior
to STS 51-L. The stacking experience of the technicians involved in
STS 51-L ranged from 5 to 20 stacking operations. Sixty percent of
the technicans and all of the supervisory personnel, including lead
technicians, had participated in the 14 stacking operations per-
formed since the Shuttle processing contract was awarded to Lock-
heed. Thiokol managed the stacking operations for Lockheed under
a subcontract. The NASA Accident Review Team found that all
personnel assigned to the stacking of STS 51-L were experienced
and qualified to perform their assigned tasks.
Aft segment receiving inspection and processing in the Rotation,
Processing and Surge Facility (RPSF) was normal. No problems
were reported relative to the aft segment clevis during offload from
the railcar, mate to the aft skirt, aft booster assembly, or in prepa-
ration for transfer to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) for
stacking. Some surface defects were identified on non-sealing sur-
faces of the aft segment clevis, but were found not to exceed the
specification in the Operations and Maintenance Requirements
Specification (OMRS) document. There were no defects identified in
the clevis O-ring grooves. The aft segment was processed normally
in the RPSF to prepare for stack.
3so NASA, J. Robert Lang, KSC, "STS 51-L SRB Joint Mate Review Team Report," March 18,
1986.
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A problem was reported at the 165-168 degree location where a
segment case-to-insulation bondline separation 0.109 inch in depth
(longitudinally) was found. The OMRS document specifies no sepa-
rations in excess of 0.050 inch. A Material Review Board (MRB)
repair was approved and the separation was filled with an asbestos
float-filled, liquid epoxy resin sealant. This repair is standard for
this type of separation, and has been performed on numerous seg-
ments. Some surface defects were identified on the tang, but none
were found to exceed specification.
The right aft booster assembly was transferred from the RPSF
directly to the VAB transfer aisle. Positioning of the aft booster as-
sembly on the Mobile Launch Platform (MLP) holddown posts was
normal. One iteration of shimming was performed and the subse-
quent holddown post strain gauge output indicated proper distribu-
tion of aft booster assembly loads.
Holddown hardware was installed and stud tensioning began
with ultrasonic measurement of stud initial lengths. A problem
was reported at holddown post # 1 when ultrasonic measurements
indicated a stud length twice the actual. The stud and associated
hardware at post # 1 were removed for offline bench testing. The
problem was isolated to a faulty ultrasonic transducer. While
awaiting replacement hardware, studs at holddown posts #3 and
#4 were tensioned satisfactorily.The stud at holddown post #2
was tensioned but adequate margin was not attained.
This problem in tensioning studs at holddown posts # I and #2
led to a revision in the schedule. All lefthand Solid Rocket Motor
segments were stacked while problems on the right hand side were
resolved.This procedure had been employed in one-third of the pre-
vious stacking operations and was not an uncommon method of
stacking.
After installationof the replacement hardware at holddown post
# 1, studs at posts # 1 and #2 were tensioned. The replacement
stud at post # 1 was brought up to satisfactorytension, but con-
cerns over stud tension at post #2 prompted engineering to re-
quest that a problem report be generated.
Engineering determined the tension (approximately 690,000 Ibs.)
was adequate for SRB stacking, but marginal for launch loads.
Therefore, stud removal and replacement was planned after SRB
stack but prior to Orbiter mate.
While holddown post stud tensioning proceeded, preparation and
inspection of the aft segment cleviswas put in work. No problems
were identified on the aft segment clevis during this inspection.
Since a stacking delay was evident, the clevis was secured and
sealed to maintain inspection integrityuntil stacking could resume.
A Solid Rocket Motor configuration change was released as a
result of a handling incident.The SRM-25 leftforward center seg-
ment was damaged during processing in the RPSF.34 Deviation Ap-
proval Request (DAR) Number RWW-376R1 was approved to re-
lace the damaged segment with a leftforward center segment for
RM-26 motor set. In order to prevent flightperformance imbal-
ance, the right aft center segment was also reassigned from SRM-
s4 Mishap Report 86-0024, R.G. Smith, "Report of SRM Handling Ring Mishap Investigation
Board, Dec. 13, 1985.
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26 to the SRM-25 flight motor set. The SRM-26 right aft center
segment was transported to the VAB for stacking.
While this segment was outside the VAB, a storm occurred. A
Problem Report was generated as rain water was reported leaking
from under the segment protective covers. The segment was
brought into the VAB transfer aisle and hoisted for pre-stack in-
spection. At this time, all visible moisture was removed from the
aft surfaces of the segment. Inspections were performed and no
problems were identified as a result of rain water intrusion. The
MRB repair of the separation of insulation from the segment case
located at 165/168 degrees was reinspected and final acceptance
was verified. A complete inspection of tang surfaces and aft insula-
tion surfaces was performed and no problems were identified.
The use of this segment violated assembly procedure which re-
quires that the segments be protected from direct water entry and
it should not have been employed. While there is no evidence of a
direct connection to the joint failure, the decision to use this aft
center segment was a compromise that need not have been made.
The aft segment clevis diameter was measured at six locations
and corresponding measurements were taken of the aft center seg-
ment tang. Measurements indicated that a potential for interfer-
ence existed along the 0/180 and 30/210 degree axes where the
tang diameter was larger than that of the clevis. The normal proce-
dure for changing the shape (ovality) of the tang was initiated. The
procedure calls for reconfiguration of the segment lifting beam
from a four-point to a two-point lift configuration to decrease the
tang outside diameter along the axis of interference. The procedure
was followed and after stabilization, a decrease in tang diameter of
0.178 inch was measured along the axis of potential interference.
Shuttle Processing Contractor (SPC) engineering was called on to
evaluate the latest overall characteristics of the joint. At that time
the aft center tang was larger in diameter than the aft segment
clevis by more than 0.31 inches along the two axes, 0/180 and 30/
210.
These measurements still indicated a potential for interference
based upon normal KSC experience. SPC engineering determined
that additional deflection of the aft center segment case was neces-
sary and prescribed installation of the SRM Circumferential Align-
ment Tool along the 16/196 degree axis of the tang. The Circumfer-
ential Alignment Tool was installed and maximum hydraulic pres-
sure was applied (1200 psig), producing a deflection of 0.196 inch.
Later an unspecified torque on the Circumferential Alignment Tool
tension rod nut produced an additional deflection of 0.040 inch.
This additional torque caused an additional load and exceeded the
safe working limit of the tool. Technicians noticed an increase in
hydraulic pressure on the pumping unit gauge to 1300 psig at the
time torque was applied. This pressure indicates a force of up to
3250 pounds may have been applied to the segment case. Currently,
a force of 5000 pounds may be applied to the segment case. The
safety limits of the Circumferential Alignment Tool were exceeded
(safety factor reduced to 1.2), but the force applied to the segment
case was still well below the established maximum. However, the
procedure was determined to be inappropriate by the post-accident
investigation.
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The alignment toolused on the aftcentersegment ofSTS 51-L's
righthand SolidRocket Motor isnow consideredinappropriateby
NASA due to the concentratedloadsappliedat two points.A new
alignment toolisnow being designed.However, the use ofthistool
did not appear to have contributedto the STS 51-L'saccident.
With the CircumferentialAlignment Tool installed,the rightaft
centersegment was hoistedfrom the transferaisleand positioned
above the aft segment in the VAB High Bay. Installationof pri-
mary and secondaryO-ringswas performed,and no problems were
identified.Closeoutphotographs were then taken showing the O-
ringand zincchromate puttyinstallation.
The jointmating operationproceededwith finalinspectionofthe
greasedjointsurfaces.No problems were identifieduring engage-
ment ofthe tang intothe clevis,aidedby the nearlyco-planarrela-
tionshipof the mating surfaces(within0.15inch).The jointmate
was completed with installationof allclevispins and pin retainer
clipsper the normal procedure.No difficultieswere encountered.
After disconnectionof the segment liftingbeam, the SRM field
jointleak testwas performed.Following the 200 psigpressuriza-
tion,the 50 psigdecay testwas performed and zeropressuredecay
was recorded,indicatingsuccessfulassembly ofthejoint(maximum
allowabledecay is1.0psigovera 10 minute period).
Fieldjointcloseoutswere performed in the normal fashion.No
problems were reportedduring pin retainerband and cork insula-
torinstallation.Data alsoindicatednormal applicationofthe bead
ofgreasearound the seam of the joint.Installationof the systems
tunnelfloorspliceplateacrossthe fieldjointsatthe 90 degreeloca-
tioncompletedthe closeout.
Because of itsunique design,the clevisof the aft case must
always be used as the fieldjointat the forward end ofthe aftseg-
ment. Itwas previouslyflown on the leftboostersegment on STS
51-C. Itwas alsoutilizedin _ualificationtestmotor QM-4 which
was statictestfiredatThiokols Utah plant.
The fieldjointtang of the STS 51-L aftcentersegment (serial
number L60 had flown previouslyas forward centersegment toaft
centersegment fieldjointtang on the leftboosteron STS 41-D.
In a memo toJ.Harrington ofNASA's Data and Design Analysis
Task Force on February 24, 1986,the Chairman of the SRB Joint
Mate Review Team noted the conclusionthat the 200 psigO-ring
seatingoperationcould produce a blowhole in the putty.Such a
blowhole would not be known priorto launch.Since the putty is
intendedtoprovidea heat shieldto protectthe O-rings,the O-rings
would be unprotectedin caseswhere blowholesoccurred.
6. SUMMARY OF LAUNCH OPERATIONS
Issue 1
How was the decision to launch STS 51-L arrived at and why
was it wrong?
Findings
1. The Flight Readiness Review for STS 51-L was conducted in
accordance with established procedure.
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2. The decision to launch STS 51-L was based on a faulty engi-
neering analysis of the SRM field joint seal behavior.
3. Compounding this erroneous analysis were serious ongoing
weaknesses in the Shuttle Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assur-
ance program which had failed to exercise control over the problem
tracking systems, had not critiqued the engineering analysis ad-
vanced as an explanation of the SRM seal problem, and did not
provide the independent perspective required by senior NASA
managers at Flight Readiness Reviews.
4. The initial response of Marshall managers to the attempts of
Thiokol engineers to raise the issue of temperature effects on the
SRM seals caused Thiokol management to discount proper techni-
cal concerns and engineering judgement in their recommendation
to launch.
5. The Director of Marshall's Shuttle Projects Office may have
violated NASA's Flight Readiness Review policy directive by failin.g
to report the results of the January 27 teleconference to the Assocl-
ate Administrator for Space Flight.
6. The decision of the STS Program Manager to launch despite
the uncertainty represented by ice on the Fixed Service Structure
was not a prudent effort to mitigate avoidable risks to the Shuttle.
7. The Launch Director failed to place safety paramount in eval-
uating the launch readiness of STS 51-L.
8. No launch should have been permitted until ice was cleared
from the platform leading to the pad escape system.
9. Ice Team personnel and Rockwell contractors properly con-
veyed their inability to predict the post-ignition behavior of ice.
10. Post-flight analysis indicated that ice did not exhibit the be-
havior predicted by analysis, and that ice traversed a distance suf-
ficient to strike the Shuttle during lift-off.
11. Failure to enforce a clear requirement for definite readiness
statements contributed to failures in communication between
NASA and its contractors during launch preparations.
Discussion
Significant in the loss of Challenger was NASA's decision to
launch the Shuttle on January 28. The Rogers Commission and the
Committee investigation found sufficient evidence to indicate that
STS 51-L should not have been allowed to lift off until a number of
problems had been corrected. The Committee has examined docu-
mentation made available to the Rogers Commission and has re-
viewed recordings made of conversations among personnel in KSC
Firing Rooms on January 27 and 28 in developing its analysis.
What seems evident in the Committee's review of this material is
that clear indications existed on the morning of January 28 argu-
ing that a launch of the Shuttle vehicle would not be a prudent de-
cision. Significantly greater risks were present for this launch at-
tempt than were usually found during a launch of the Shuttle. De-
spite these signals, some of which reached officials with the author-
ity to delay the launch, STS 51-L was allowed to proceed. The
Committee is disturbed that expected safeguards in the launch de-
cision process failed to operate.
Specifically, this section examines the inability of the Flight
Readiness Review procedure to compensate for poor technical anal-
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ysis in preparingthe Shuttlesystemfor launch.Also, the efforts
initiated by Thiokolengineersto delaythe launchuntil SRMseal
temperatures had risen were unsuccessful, nor were their argu-
ments conveyed to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight, as
NASA policy apparently requires. Finally, the heavy ice on the pad
Fixed Service Structure led NASA's ice team leader to recommend
that the launch be scrubbed, but his objections were apparently
never conveyed to the STS Program Manager. The Committee con-
cludes that sufficient warning of the risks to STS 51-L was avail-
able, and the launch therefore should not have occurred. Readers
are directed to Section VIII-A of this report for a complete discus-
sion of each of these areas.
NASA has developed a highly involved procedure to prepare a
Shuttle mission for flight. Much of this preparation is discussed in
Section VI-A.2.b. In the period immediately proceding a launch,
project and program managers participate in a number of meetings
that together are known as the Flight Readiness Review. In the
case of the Solid Rocket Motor, the apparent cause of the accident,
eight levels of review were required to certify the flight readiness
of the STS 51-L hardware. (See Table I for date and scope of these
reviews)
Flight Readiness Reviews employ the so-called "delta review"
concept, meaning that the data presented only represents those ele-
ments on the previous flight that fall outside the expected perform-
ance of the hardware. The responsible project or program manager
must then explain the failure to the satisfaction of the review
board and describe the steps that have been taken to assure that
the situation will not recur on the upcoming flight. In the case of
STS 51-L, however, this concept permitted the SRM seal erosion
problem to evade scrutiny. STS 61-C, the mission immediately pro-
ceding 51-L, did not fly until halfway through the 51-L FRR cycle.
Thus, there was no previous mission to obtain data from Only at
the last stage of the cycle, at the L-1 review, did the Associate Ad-
ministrator learn that the SRM seal erosion problem had been
noted again. Mr. Mulloy's presentation characterized the situation
as "within the experience base," according to Thiokol's Mr. McDon-
ald.
The history of SRM seal erosion demonstrates the effect that
faulty engineering analysis has on the Flight Readiness Review
process. Thiokol and Marshall engineering personnel declared the
seal erosion problem to be "acceptable," even though the seal
design clearly recognized that the elastomeric O-ring seals were not
designed to stand up to propellant gases during flight. Relying on a
computer model of the situation and a limited battery of tests,
Marshall continued to present the situation in Flight Readiness Re-
views as "within the experience base;" that is, the deterioration in
the seals was no worse than previous cases and thus no concern
was warranted.
It is the conclusion of the Committee that the Flight Readiness
Review operated as well as its design permitted in the case of STS-
51-L. See Section VI-B.I.b.3. It seems clear that the process cannot
compensate for faulty engineering judgement among participants.
Had the engineering analysis led Marshall to a different conclusion
about the severity of the SRM seal erosion problem, the system
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would have reacted to these concerns long before the 51-L Flight
Readiness Review.
If the Flight Readiness Review process did not fail, however, why
was STS 51-L launched? The Committee is seriously concerned by
the fact that information indicating that the SRM seals might fail
became available in time to delay the launch, and yet these con-
cerns were overridden. Engineers from Marshall and Thiokol
argued for hours on the night of January 27 regarding the effect of
temperature on the performance of the seals. In the end, Thiokol
managers chose to recommend that the launch proceed over the ob-
jections of their engineering staff.
In hindsight, it is unfortunate that Thiokol engineers did not
present their objections in terms of developing a new launch
commit criteria on the SRM joint seal temperature. Doing so would
have required that the STS Program Manager would have had to
listen to the engineers' presentation. It would also have guaranteed
that a more rigorous analysis of the situation would have been
forthcoming, simply to explain why the situation had been allowed
to continue for so long. Even so, the Committee's investigation indi-
cates that these discussions should have been brought directly to
the attention of the Associate Administrator for Space Flight by
Marshall's Shuttle Project Office Director. The Committee's inves-
tigation also questions whether doing so would have altered the de-
cision made on January 28. (See Section VI-B.I.b.4)
The question remains: Should the engineering concerns, as ex-
pressed in the pre-launch teleconference, have been sufficient to
stop the launch? The Committee concludes the answer is yes. Thio-
kol's recognized expert on SRM seals had evidence he believed con-
elusive and sufficient. His opinion, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, should have been accepted until such time as better
information became available.
Finally, the Committee examined the taped conversations among
NASA and Rockwell personnel discussing the ice that covered the
pad's Fixed Service Structure on January 28. Because the tempera-
ture dropped below freezing, NASA had permitted critical water
systems on the pad to run during the night. The pad drainage
system could not handle the water flow, and allowed water to spill
out onto the gantry platforms and freeze.
NASA personnel were sent to the pad to examine the situation
and determine whether the situation posed a threat to the Shuttle.
What they found was described by Rockwell personnel as "some-
thing out of Dr. Zhivago." Icicles hung from platforms and hand-
rails, and could be easily broken off. Sheets of ice covered the
gantry platforms, including the platform across which the crew
would have to run if it became necessary to use the pad escape
system. The ice team leader indicated that he felt the situation was
a distinct hazard to the Orbiter thermal protection system, since
Main Engine ignition would likely release a great deal of ice
debris. Blown by the wind or sucked up by the engines and boost-
ers, the ice could inflict damage on the delicate silica titles that
made up the Orbiter heat shield. Asked for his opinion, the ice
team leader recommended that the launch be scrubbed until the
ice had been removed from the gantry.
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Rockwellpersonnelin Downey, California, expressed similar con-
cerns about the situation after seeing the pad on television. They
attempted to determine what would happen to the ice by use of
computer modelling, but were not satisfied with the result. Rock-
well's chief engineer finally concluded that the situation was little
better than "Russian roulette." The company's liaison at KSC
noted that the situation was much worse than the threat from ice
in the liquid oxygen vent arm, which NASA considered a definite
threat to the Orbiter. However, the STS manager, relying on an
analysis by engineers at KSC and JSC (using the same model Rock-
well found inadequate), decided to launch.
As a whole, the Committee's review of the decision to launch
STS 51-L on January 28 indicates a number of questionable prac-
tices. It is not clear to the Committee why so many warnings went
unheeded by NASA personnel that morning. What is certain, how-
ever, is that the Associate Administrator for Space Flight and the
Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability and Quality Assur-
ance should restore a more conservative set of launch rules prior to
resuming flights of the Space Transportation System.
Issue 2
Should firing room personnel be allowed to waive launch commit
criteria or equipment redlines during a launch countdown without
a well-developed technical reason for doing so?
Finding
NASA's ma_gement waived its own launch commit criteria on
January 28, 1986, without a valid technical reason for doing so.
Discussion
Conversations obtained from the Operational Intercommunica-
tion System (OIS), used by the launch team during Shuttle count-
downs, indicates that launch commit criteria were waived without
sufficient technical justification on January 27 and 28. The Com-
mittee reviewed tapes and transcripts which indicate that engi-
neering personnel wrote a waiver for launch commit criteria on the
External Tank nose cone temperatures that justified using lower
temperatures on the basis of a backup procedure that was invalid.
Should the temperature sensors in the ET nose cone fail, accord-
ing to Launch Commit Criteria 5.1-4, a secondary procedure corre-
lating data obtained from telemetry channels with a previously de-
rived curve could be substituted. The curve, however, was limited
to an ambient temperature range of 40-99 degrees Fahrenheit. Am-
bient temperatures were outside this range during the countdown,
meaning that the backup procedure could not be used. According to
the Launch Commit Criteria, exceeding the lower temperature
limit could cause "inaccurate ullage pressure readings." Since
these pressure readings might be significant in operation of the
Shuttle's main engines, inaccuracies might have threatened the
safety of the mission. During flight, pressure in the fuel tanks for
the main engines is maintained by bleeding off excess gas from the
main engine heat exchangers and circulating it back into the Ex-
ternal Tank. Misreading the pressure might cause the Orbiter gen-
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eral purposecomputersto over-or underpressurize the tanks and
disrupt fuel flow to the engines.
Also, in discussion with Thiokol personnel during the latter
stages of preparing this report, the Committee learned that liquid
hydrogen remained in the External Tank throughout the night of
January 27. Notwithstanding the effect this had on heat transfer
through the aft attachment strut (see Section VII on casing joint
design), this indicates that criteria requiring an eight-hour period
between tanking cycles may have been violated. This is significant
in that, had the tanking cycles been carried out as required, launch
of STS 51-L would have taken place in the afternoon of January 28
or the next day. The Committee has not confirmed this possibility.
7. RETRIEVAL, TRANSPORTATION, AND REFURBISHMENT
Issue
Were the motor casings used on STS 51-L damaged as a result of
the retrieval, transportation and refurbishment operations follow-
ing previous launches?
Finding
There was no evidence of damage to the casings or joint due to
prior use or preparation for reuse.
Discussion
The aft field joint on Flight 51-L was between two casings that
were used previously on STS 51-C. After approximately two min-
utes of burn-time during the launch operation, the Solid Rocket
Boosters are separated from the External Tank, at which time they
fall toward the ocean for a considerable distance. Before impact,
parachutes are deployed from the Solid Rocket Boosters to slow
their decent and minimize impact forces. The Solid Rocket Boosters
strike the ocean at a speed of approximately 60 miles per hour (ver-
tical speed component). (There has been no evidence that the cas-
ings are distorted by impacting the ocean since the impact loads
are low and the cases are still assembled at this point.) The para-
chutes and boosters are retrieved by divers at sea and both Solid
Rocket Boosters are towed back to the Cape by ships. They are
towed into a special dock, lifted in slings, conveyed to a wash rack
and completely washed down to remove salt water. The casings are
made of high carbon steel which is very susceptible to corrosion.
The casings are then disassembled, given a visual inspection, and
shipped back to Utah for refurbishment. At a plant in Clearfield
they are further cleaned and "shot with glass beads" to assure that
all foreign contaminants have been removed. The cases are then in-
spected to determine the dimensions of tang and clevis and for
cracking. Inspection for cracks is performed by using a magnetic
flux technique. The procedure calls for a test whereby cracks must
be of such a minimum size as to be able to withstand four more
flight uses without failure. The casings are then subjected to a hy-
droburst test where they are pressure tested with a mixture of oil
and water, to assure sufficient strength to withstand propellant
pressure during flight. The hydroburst test is conducted at 1.1
times the maximum expected operating pressure (MEOP). This
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gives assurancethat the strength can accommodate10 percent
more load than the casings will experience in use. There was no
indication that there had been any damage to the casings from
Flight 51-C.
C. EXTERNAL TANK
Issue
The External Tank was obviously involved in the accident. Was
that involvement a cause or an effect?
Findings
1. The Committee adopts the "Finding" of the Rogers Commis-
sion that: "A review of the External Tank's construction records,
acceptance testing, pre-launch and flight data and recovered hard-
ware, does not support anything relating to the External Tank
which caused or contributed to the cause of the accident. ''35
2. The External Tank ruptured under the forces of a failed Solid
Rocket Booster motor. These forces were far outside of any possible
design considerations that could have been applied to the External
Tank. 36
Discussion
The 154 foot long, 27 foot diameter external disposable fuel tank
contains the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen used by the Space
Shuttle's three main engines. Structurally, the External Tank (ET)
serves as the keel, or backbone, of the Space Transportation
System. The two Solid Rocket Boosters are attached to the Exter-
nal Tank near the front and rear of the ET. The Space Shuttle Or-
biter is also attached to the ET at one forward, and two aft attach-
ment points.
The Committee was interested in the findings of the Rogers Com-
mission concerning the External Tank because it was obvious to all
that the External Tank was directly involved in the accident.
The Rogers Commission investigated five potential faults or fail-
ures of the External Tank which could have contributed to the ac-
cident. 37
They are:
Premature detonation of the External Tank Range Safety
System;
A structural flaw in the tank;
Damage at lift-off;
Structural overload;
Overheating.
The Committee is satisfied that the Range Safety System on the
External Tank did not cause the STS 51-L accident because: 3s
There is no flight data to support premature detonation of
the ET range safety package;
s6 Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, p. 42.
g0 Ibid., Volume II, p. L-23.
s7 Ibid., Volume I, p. 4i
su Ibid., Volume II, p. L-16.
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The photographic evidence does not support premature deto-
nation;
Most of the explosive charges included in the ET Range
Safety System were recovered with the ET wreckage, undeton-
ated.
The Committee affirms the Rogers Commission finding that
there is no data to support structural faults which might have
propagated to a size which could have caused catastrophic failure
of the External Tank. 39
The evidence from the Ice Team examination, and photo analysis
and television monitoring of the launch give no indication whatso-
ever that there was any damage to the External Tank during
launch and lift-off.
The examination of all flight data indicates that the maximum
structural load on the External Tank on STS 51-L was less than 80
percent of the allowable design load from launch until the final ex-
plosion. 4o
The Committee also affirms the Rogers Commission finding that
the evidence does not support any theory of independent overheat-
ing of the External Tank as a cause of the accident. _1
The failed joint in the Solid Rocket Motor permitted the burning
solid propellant gases to escape in the direction of the aft External
Tank attachment strut. Temperatures and velocity of these gases
caused a rapid erosion and deterioration of the aft strut to the
point where it failed structurally under turbulence and maneuver-
ing loads. There were no deficiencies in the design of the external
strut. However, the strut was not designed to withstand the "blow-
torch" effect of the propellant hot gas stream. During its investiga-
tion, the Committee staff visited Martin Marietta's External Tank
assembly plant in Louisiana. An issue raised during this visit was
whether or not the strut could be relocated such that in the event
of another joint failure in that vicinity, the strut would not be
damaged. It was learned that relocating the aft strut created more
problems that it solved. Furthermore, it was also learned that the
gas stream would have almost instantly cut through the insulation
on the External Tank and destroyed it anyway. After the failure of
the aft strut, the flame continued to bear on the bottom of the Ex-
ternal Tank, breaching that tank at the joint of the aft dome. This
caused the liquid hydrogen to escape from the tank. Once the
flame had penetrated the tank at the weld of the aft dome the fail-
ure of that weld spread rapidly and completely around the tank's
diameter severing the dome from the rest of the tank. The burning
hydrogen ignited by the flame then caused the External Tank to
act much like a rocket and created an upward thrust. The right
Solid Rocket Booster without the attachment strut to the External
Tank, rotated around its long axis. 41a In so doing, it may have
39 Ibid., Volume I, p. 42.
(o Ibid.
( _ Ibid.
(_° It should be noted that the right Solid Rocket Booster did not swing outward at the bottom
and cause the nose of the booster to collide with the External Tank as had originally been
thought. For this to have happened, the right Solid Rocket Booster would have extended out-
ward at the bottom at a wide angle that is not supported by any of the photographic or telemet-
ric evidence.
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jammed the upper Solid Rocket Booster to the External Tank at-
tachment structure and caused it to fall. That structure is located
on a large cross beam in the intertank which in turn possibly dam-
aged the cross beam. The other distinct possibility is that the burn-
ing hydrogen forced the External Tank upward and caused the
cross beam to be damaged and at the same time, caused a rupture
of the oxygen tank. With the massive release of energy from the
burning of the hydrogen/oxygen, the Shuttle system completely
broke apart.
NASA's Accident Analysis Team determined that the Orbiter
was destroyed by aerodynamic forces beyond design limits, not by
the actual explosion of the External Tank. The report stated,
All fractures and material failures examined on the Or-
biter, with the exception of the SSME's, were the result of
overload forces and they exhibited no evidence of internal
burn damage or exposure to explosive forces. 4_
D. CREW SURVIVAL
Issue
Was the accident of STS 51-L on January 28, 1986, survivable?
Findings
In the case of the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger and
her crew on January 28, 1986, the Committee is convinced that the
accident was not survivable.
Discussion
During the first two minutes and eight seconds of Shuttle flight
the two Solid Rocket Boosters provide approximately three million
pounds of thrust. That thrust is transferred to the External Tank
through the forward Solid Rocket Booster/External Tank attach-
ment structure. The thrust is then transferred to the Orbiter
through the External Tank. While NASA has established a "Fast-
separation sequence" to allow the Orbiter to separate from the Ex-
ternal Tank and Solid Rocket Boosters, the engineering analysis in-
dicates that if separation was attempted while the ,,Solid Rocket
Boosters were still firing, the Orbiter would "hang-up' on the for-
ward attachment structure. This would lead to a violent maneuver
which would greatly exceed maximum aerodynamic loads on the
Orbiter with resulting structural failure and loss of Shuttle and
crew.
During the course of hearings before the Committee on the acci-
dent the question of survivability was frequently raised. The Com-
mittee accepts the view of Captain Robert L. Crippen, who in-
formed the Rogers Commission:
I've said this before publicly, and I'll say it again, I don't
think I know of an escape system that would have saved
the crew from the particular incident that we just went
4 lb ' uNASA, Leshe Kampschror, Space Transportation System Mission 51-L Structural Recon-
struction and Evaluation Report," Enclosure 8 in "STS 51-L Data and Design Analysis Task
Force Search, Recovery and Reconstruction Team Report," Volume IV, Rev. A, May 8,
1986, p. 3.
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through. I don't think it is possible to build such a
system.42
Specifically, the Committee finds that the Space Shuttle System
was not designed to survive a failure of the Solid Rocket Boosters
during the first 2 minutes of flight; that is, until all the solid
rocket propellant fuel has been expended. There were no corrective
actions that could have been taken once the boosters ignited. The
Challenger was not equipped with any means for separation during
the first two minutes of flight. In addition, the crew did not have
any means to escape from the Orbiter during this first-stage ascent.
Neither the Mission Control Team nor the 51-L crew had any
warning of impending disaster. Even if there had been warning,
there were no actions that could have been taken to save the
crewfl 3 (The issue of launch abort and crew escape is discussed in
Section VI.A.2.d.)
Joseph P. Kerwin of NASA's Johnson Space Center summarized
the circumstances in a memo to Rear Admiral Richard H. Truly,
Associate Administrator for Space Flight. The undated memo read
as follows:
DEAR ADMIRAL TRULY: The search for wreckage of the
Challenger crew cabin has been completed. A team of engi-
neers and scientists has analyzed the wreckage and all
other available evidence in an attempt to determine the
cause of death of the Challenger crew. This letter is to
report to you the results of this effort.
The findings are inconclusive. The impact of the crew
compartment with the ocean surface was so violent that
evidence of damage occurring in the seconds which fol-
lowed the explosion was masked. Our final conclusions are:
The cause of death of the Challenger astronauts
cannot be positively determined;
The forces to which the crew were exposed during
Orbiter breakup were probably not sufficient to cause
death or serious injury; and
The crew possibly, but not certainly, lost conscious-
ness in the seconds following Orbiter breakup due to
in-flight loss of crew module pressure.
Our inspection and analyses revealed certain facts which
support the above conclusions, and these are related below:
The forces on the Orbiter at breakup were probably too
low to cause death or serious injury to the crew but were
sufficient to separate the crew compartment from the for-
ward fuselage, cargo bay, nose cone, and forward reaction
control compartment. The forces applied to the Orbiter to
cause such destruction clearly exceed its design limits.
The data available to estimate the magnitude and direc-
tion of these forces included ground photographs and
measurements from onboard accelerometers, which were
lost two-tenths of a second after vehicle breakup.
4z Rogers Commission Report, Volume V. p. 1431.
4s Ibid., Volume I, p. 180.
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Two independent assessments of these data produced
very similar estimates. The largest acceleration pulse oc-
curred as the Orbiter forward fuselage separated and was
rapidly pushed away from the External Tank. It then
pitched, nose-down and was decelerated rapidly by aerody-
namic forces. There are uncertainties in our analysis; the
actual breakup is not visible on photographs because the
Orbiter was hidden by the gaseous cloud surrounding the
External Tank. The range of most probable maximum ac-
celerations is from 12 to 20 G's in the vertical axis. These
accelerations were quite brief. In two seconds, they were
below four G's; in less than ten seconds, the crew compart-
ment was essentially in free fall. Medical analysis indi-
cates that these accelerations are survivable, and that the
probability of major injury to crew members is low.
After vehicle breakup, the cre/v compartment continued its
upward trajectory, peaking at an altitude of 65,000 feet approxi-
mately 25 seconds after breakup. It then descended striking the
ocean surface about two minutes and forty-five seconds after break-
up at a velocity of about 207 miles per hour. The forces imposed by
this impact approximated 200 G's, far in excess of the structural
limits of the crew compartment or crew survivability levels.
The separation of the crew compartment deprived the crew of
Orbiter-supplied oxygen, except for a few seconds supply in the
lines. Each crew member's helmet was also connected to a personal
egress air pack (PEAP) containing an emergency supply of breath-
ing air (not oxygen) for ground egress emergencies, which must be
manually activated to be available. Four PEAP's were recovered,
and there is evidence that three had been activated. The nonacti-
vated PEAP was identified as the Commander's, one of the others
as the Pilot's, and the remaining ones could not be associated with
any crewmember. The evidence indicates that the PEAP's were not
activated due to water impact.
It is possible, but not certain, that the crew lost consciousness
due to an in-flight loss of crew module pressure. Data to support
this is:
The accident happened at 48,000 feet, and the crew cabin
was at that altitude or higher for almost a minute. At that al-
titude, without an oxygen supply, loss of cabin pressure would
have caused rapid loss of consciousness and it would not have
been regained before water impact.
PEAP activation could have been an instinctive response to
unexpected loss of cabin pressure.
If a leak developed in the crew compartment as a result of
structural damage during or after breakup (even if the PEAP's
had been activated), the breathing air available would not have
prevented rapid loss of consciousness.
The crew seats and restraint harnesses showed patterns of
failure which demonstrates that all the seats were in place and
occupied at water impact with all harnesses locked. This would
likely be the case had rapid loss of consciousness occurred, but
it does not constitute proof.
Much of our effort was expended attempting to determine wheth-
er a loss of cabin pressure occurred. We examined the wreckage
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carefully,including the crew module attach points to the fuselage,
the crew seats, the pressure shell, the flight deck and middeck
floors, and feedthroughs for electrical and plumbing connections.
The windows were examined and fragments of glass analyzed
chemically and microscopically. Some items of equipment stowed in
lockers showed damage that might have occurred due to compres-
sion; we experimentally decompressed similar items without con-
clusive results.
Impact damage to the windows was so extreme that the presence
or absence of in-flight breakage could not be determined. The esti-
mated breakup forces would not in themselves have broken the
windows. A broken window due to flying debris remains a possibili-
ty; there was a piece of debris imbedded in the frame between two
of the forward windows. We could not positively identify the origin
of the debris or establish whether the event occurred in flight or at
water impact. The same statement is true of the other crew com-
partment structure. Impact damage was so severe that no positive
evidence for or against in-flight pressure loss could be found.
Finally, the skilled and dedicated efforts of the team from the
Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, and their expert consultants,
could not determine whether in-flight lack of oxygen occurred, nor
could they determine the cause of death. 4_
E. SABOTAGE
Issue
Could the accident have been caused by sabotage, terrorism, or
foreign covert action?
Finding
The Committee is convinced that there is no evidence to support
sabotage, terrorism or foreign covert action in the loss of the Chal-
lenger.
Discussion
The Committee carefully reviewed all of the evidence, classified
and unclassified, to ensure that there was no sabotage associated
with the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger.
Committee staff met with the Director of Safety, Reliability and
Quality Assurance, and the Director of Protective Services and his
staff to review the National Resource Protection Plan for the Ken-
nedy Space Center. The Committee is concerned with the vulner-
ability of the Space Transportation System and endorses the efforts
being taken by NASA to provide adequate protection to all ele-
ments of the system.
F. ADDITIONAL AVENUES OF INVESTIGATION
Issue
Could the accident have been caused by some failure other than
failure of the joint between the casings?
44This memo was part ofa package release,NASA, 86-100,draft,July 21, 1986.
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F/nding
As of September 15, 1986, the Committee has not found any cred-
ible evidence to support any cause of the Challenger accident, other
than the failure of the aft casings joint in the right-hand Solid
Rocket Booster. Nor has there been any substantial evidence of a
secondary or parallel failure on Flight 51-L.
Discussion
After the accident, the Committee waited until the Rogers Com-
mission completed its work in order not to interfere with the
progress being made by the Commission appointed by the Presi-
dent. By the time that work was completed the preponderance of
evidence clearly pointed to a failure in the field joint of the right
Solid Rocket Booster. However, the Committee was obligated to ex-
plore other possibilities which could have led to the same type of
failure. Among these possibilities were the following: a failure of
the propellant, a structural flaw in the steel casing, and separation
of the NBR insulation from the casing. In addition, the Committee
was contacted by and sought additional testimony from private cit-
zeus who offered their concerns and hypotheses pertaining to the
cause of the Challenger accident. These included the following:
either a main engine fire or a fire in the main engine compartment
of the Orbiter, inadvertent firing of an OMS engine, inadvertent
firing of one or more thrusters on the Orbiter, overloading of the
aft field joint due to excessive "moment:' developed in transit of
the Shuttle from the VAB to the launch pad and the use of four
separate propellant casings instead of one large casing without
field joints.
1. Main Engine Fire
The photographs in Volume I of the Rogers Commission report
on pages 26 and 27 indicate a bright spot in the vicinity of the
main engine compartment. Photographic evidence is customarily
taken to be accurate. In this case, however, it must be realized that
the photographs were taken from roughly three miles away and
that they were enhanced by computer methods. Computer enhance-
ment has the ability to highlight bright objects and subdue dull
ones. In this way, the photographs become distorted, that is, the
difference between light and dark becomes unrealistically pro-
nounced. The bright spot in the photographs does, in fact, look like
a flame. The second consideration is that the orientation between
the Orbiter and the ground where the cameras were is difficult to
visualize and leads to erroneous conclusions. During flight the
main engines are monitored continuously for changes in pump
speed, temperature and pressure. There was no indication whatso-
ever of a malfunction with the main engines. A fire in the main
engine compartment outside of the engines is not credible because
of the lack of combustible material to support a fire of any appre-
ciable magnitude. The exception would be a hydrogen leak. But,
that was not supported by telemetry data. In addition, NASA has
submitted photographs to the Committee from four past successful
launches which show the same bright spots. The Committee, there-
fore, has rejected this as a cause of the accident or as an independ-
ent problem.
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2. Independent Firing of the OMS Engine or Orbiter Thrusters
The theory that either the OMS engines or the Orbiter thrusters
were inadvertently activated and fired is also based on the same
photographs stated previously. Those photographs show a bright
spot in the same general area where these engines and thrusters
are. The Committee has received photographs from Flights 41-G,
61-A, 61-13, and 61-C, all of which show similar "bright spots" in
the same location as those seen on Flight 51-L. The Committee is
still evaluating the possibility of a second failure in this regard and
has requested additional telemetry data from Flight 51-L. Had the
thrusters been firing, however, it would have had little impact on
the launch of the Challenger. The thrust from these tiny engines is
insignificant compared to the thrust from the two Solid Rocket
Boosters and the main engines. The inadvertent activation of the
OMS engine has been ruled out on the basis of telemetry data re-
ceived from NASA. NASA has stated that the bright spot seen in
the photographs is a reflection from the plume of the Solid Rocket
Booster motors. Neither of these possibilities contributed to the
Challenger accident.
3. Overloading of the Joint
It is true that in transit from the VAB to the launch pad, the
Shuttle system, standing erect on the launch platform and being
carried by a crawler, does experience a left-hand turn. At that
time, because of the configuration of the Shuttle system, an addi-
tional moment, that is force times a distance, is transferred to the
field joints including the aft joint on the right-hand Solid Rocket
Booster that failed. However, this moment exerts a force which is
only 10 percent of the force that the joint receives during other
phases of the launch operations. The Committee concluded that
this had no impact on the Challenger accident.
4. Insulation Debonding
The Committee investigated the possibility of separation of the
insulation from the inside of the motor casings as a potential cause
of the Flight 51-L accident. Had the insulation broken lose from
the casing, there would have to have been a condition which would
have permitted the burning propellant gases to get between the in-
sulation and the casing. Furthermore, there would have to be a
continuous gas flow at that point for the propellant gas to transfer
a sufficient amount of heat to the casing to cause a failure. This
would require an extremely large debonding of the insulation
which has never been seen on any Shuttle flight when the Solid
Rocket Motors were returned and disassembled for use later. When
the Shuttle motors were inspected after usage, what remained of
the insulation has always been in place with little damage. A de-
bonding accident would have had to provide tremendous amounts
of heat and again would have required a very high flow of the gas
into the area where the debonding occurred. That flow of gas would
have to be continuous and there is no rationale for envisioning how
that could happen. In the case of the Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor
design, the pressure acts to maintain the bond between the insula-
tion and the casing, not to remove it. In the absence of these re-
82
quirements the Committee found that debonding of the insulation
was not a cause of the accident.
5. Crack in the Propellant
The Committee investigated whether or not a crack in the pro-
pellant could have contributed to loss of the Challenger. A crack in
the propellant would have increased the burning surface of the pro-
pellant after ignition. This increase in the surface would have re-
sulted in an increase in th thrust from the right Solid Rocket
Motor. There was no evidence during the flight of 51-L of a greater
thrust in the right Solid Rocket Motor. In additional, a propellant
failure would have been more explosive in nature and would not
have been observed as one continuous gas flame in a localized area.
Consequently, it was concluded that a propellant failure did not
contribute to the cause of the accident.
6. Crack in Motor Casing
The Committee was concerned that a crack in the rocket motor
casings might have caused the accident if it was located in the
same general area where the smoke and flame was observed during
launch. All of the casings used on Flight 51-L were hydroproofed
at 1.1. maximum expected operating pressure. Had there been a
signficant crack in the casing it would have failed the hydroproof
test. However, it could be argued that a crack developed between
the test and the time the Solid Rocket Motor segments were assem-
bled at the Kennedy Space Center. The failure of cracks under the
pressures, such as those contained within the Solid Rocket Motors,
would have been a catastrophic failure. The casings would have
failed instantly at ignition because cracks in high carbon steel
would propagate at a rate near the speed of sound. This is incon-
sistent with the smoke seen during the early part of the launch,
and the lack of smoke or flame up until 58 seconds into the launch.
It is also inconsistent with the pieces of the rocket motor casings
which were recovered from the ocean which clearly show the abra-
sion of the hot rocket propellant gases. Consequently, a crack in
the casing was ruled out as a contributing cause of the accident.
7. Joint putty temporarily holds and then releases full motor
pressure
During the post-accident tests conducted by NASA and Thiokol,
it was learned that the performance of the putty used in the joint
can be quite variable. In some instances, including temperatures as
warm as 75°F, the joint putty can hold back the full operating pres-
sure inside the motor without transferring any of this pressure to
the O-rings. 45 In this circumstance, the O-rings will not "seat" and,
as the joint "rotates" due to the pressure build-up within the
motor, contact can be lost between the O-rings and the metal sur-
faces they are meant to seal. 46 If the putty were then to release
45 Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, p. 64.
46 NASA, briefings from staff.
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high pressure gases into the joint, these gases could "blow-by" the
O-rings, thus causing the joint to fail. This scenario is not a likely
failure mode for STS 51-L, because it would produce a leak across
a broad area of the joint rather than a small localized leak as ob-
served in the Challenger accident.

VI. DISCUSSION OF CRITICAL ISSUES
A. TECHNICAL ISSUF_
1. HARDWARE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION
a. Problems in Hardware Certification
Issue 1
Having all elements of Space Shuttle flight hardware been ade-
quately certified?
Findings
1. The overall design and certification processes prescribed by
NASA for each major element of Space Shuttle flight hardware are
very comprehensive.
2. Prior to the STS 51-L accident, in spite of the comprehensive
nature of NASA's prescribed design and certification processes, in-
sufficient testing had been conducted to permit an adequate under-
standing by either Morton-Thiokol or NASA regarding the actual
functioning of the Solid Rocket Motor joint. Also, the Solid Rocket
Motor had not been adequately certified to meet the natural and
induced environmental conditions that are stated in NASA's design
standards. The issue of whether or not standards were adequate is
discussed in Section VII.
3. The deficiencies in Solid Rocket Motor testing and certifica-
tion persisted in spite of many reviews of the program by panels of
experts: (1) within the manufacturer; (2) within NASA; and (3) from
independent, outside groups.
4. These deficiencies in testing and certification of one major ele-
ment of the Space Shuttle system raise the possibility that other
elements of flight hardware (or other subelements of the Solid
Rocket Motor) could have similar deficiencies.
5. If NASA is unable to explain why the deficiencies in Solid
Rocket Motor testing and certification went undetected by the ex-
isting comprehensive set of processes and procedures, the agency
will not be able to protect against a similar break-down in its
system of checks and balances in the future.
Recommendations
1. NASA should devote more attention to determining why the
deficiencies in Solid Rocket Motor testing and certification went
undetected, so that appropriate action can be taken to uncover
latent problems in existing hardware and to prevent similar prob-
lems in future development programs.
2. NASA and its contractors should thoroughly reassess the ade-
quacy of all of the testing and certification that has been conducted
(85)
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to date on each element of Space Shuttle flight hardware. Where
deficiencies are found, they must be corrected.
Discussion
In background briefings for the Committee staff prior to the start
of the hearings, NASA described the system of formal reviews that
were employed to scrutinize the design and certification of each
element of flight hardware.
The review process began with a System Requirements Review in
the early 1970's. About 18 months later, each hardware element
went through a Preliminary Design Review (PDR). This review was
conducted when about 10 percent of the engineering drawings were
complete and resulted in approval for the hardware to move into
the final design stage. The Critical Design Review (CDR) was held
when about 90 percent of the engineering drawings were complete
and resulted in an authorization to carry the manufacturing proc-
ess through to completion. After the end of a detailed test and cer-
tification program, NASA conducted a Design Certification Review
(DCR) to ensure that all tests and certification results were consist-
ent with specified design requirements and standards.
Because of the extreme complexity of the Orbiter, a series of
Configuration Acceptance Reviews (CARs) was also conducted in
addition to the standard process of reviews described above. The
Phase I CAR was a verification review to ensure that the Orbiter
was ready to begin test. Prior to the start of the Orbiter combined
system test, several additional incremental test reviews were also
conducted. The Phase III CAR was the verification review that re-
sulted in final acceptance of the vehicle for delivery from the man-
ufacturer to NASA.
In Appendix K in Volume II of the Rogers Commission Report,
the Development and Production Team discusses in further detail
the design and certification processes that were used by each prime
contractor. For example, this appendix indicates that Rockwell
used a total of 17 design review teams (some divided into as many
as 17 subteams) to oversee the design and production work on the
Orbiter. The appendix also describes the requirement verification
system used by Thiokol for the Solid Rocket Motor as a "closed-
loop" system intended to track each specification requirement. The
system specified the method of verification (analysis, inspection,
test, etc.) that was to be used for each program phase (develop-
ment, acceptance, prelaunch, etc.), along with all applicable re-
quirements of the verification plan. These were tracked through
the test plans and reports and then culminated in the issuance of a
formal "certificate of qualification". 1
In addition to this comprehensive system of oversight and review
by each prime contractor and each NASA field center responsible
for monitoring the work of those contractors, detailed outside re-
views of the design and testing programs for each major element of
flight hardware also occurred. For example, the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel regularly reviewed the safety aspects of Space
Shuttle flight hardware and annually reported their concerns to
1 Rogers Commission Report, Volume lI, pp. K-12 and K-28.
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the NASA Administrator. 2 As another example, NASA Headquar-
ters in 1980 created a Space Shuttle Verification/Certification
Committee to thoroughly study the flight worthiness of the entire
Shuttle system. 3 This independent committee was chaired by Dr.
Walt Williams, NASA's Chief Engineer, and was comprised of rec-
ognized experts drawn from the military, private industry, and aca-
demia. There was also additional reviews such as a study of the
Space Shuttle Main Engine conducted by Professor Gene Covert of
MIT. 4
Finally, before the first flight of the Space Shuttle in 1981,
NASA had each contractor and each field center carefully review
all of the requirement specifications and certification tests for their
flight hardware to ensure that all contract end-item requirements
had been adequately certified. Upon determining that all certifica-
tion requirements had been satisfied, each NASA project and tech-
nical manager was requried to sign a Verification Completion
Notice (a copy of which is contained in Appendix VI-A of this
report). This entire process was then duplicated prior to the first
"operational" flight of the Space Shuttle (i.e., STS-5 in 1982). This
latter process also culminated in each NASA project and technical
manager signing a second Verification Completion Notice (a copy
of which is contained in Appendix VI-A of this report.).
Given this comprehensive system of reviews, it is difficult to un-
derstand how major inadequacies in design and certification for
any element of flight hardware could have gone unnoticed. But it
is exactly what happened for the Solid Rocket Motor. Specifically,
the Commission concluded that:
The joint test and certification program was inadequate.
And,
Prior to the accident, neither NASA nor Thiokol fully
understood the mechanism by which the joint sealing
action took place. 5
In addition, the Development and Production Team concluded that:
Prior to the STS 51-L accident, there was a lack of un-
derstanding on the part of MTI [Morton Thiokol Inc.] and
NASA of the joint operation as designed.
And,
JSC 07700, Volume X [the NASA master requirements
document for the Space Shuttle program], clearly states
the natural and induced environments to which the SRM
[Solid Rocket Motor] is to be designed and verified. The
field joints . . . were not qualification tested to the full
range of the contractually required environments. This led
to a lack of complete understanding of the joint design
limits. 8
2 Ibid., Volume I, pp. 160-161.
s Ibid., pp. 124-125.
4 Ibid., Volume II, p. K-24.
s Ibid., Volume I, p. 148.
Ibid., Volume II, p. K-30.
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Relative to this last point, the NASA requirement documents
state that: "The Shuttle Flight Vehicle design shall satisfy the nat-
ural environmental design requirements . . .", including air tem-
perature extremes of 20"F to 103°F at "Ferry Sites" and 31°F to
99°F for "Vertical Flight". Also, the requirement documents state
that: "Each element of the Shuttle Flight Vehicle shall be capable
of withstanding the induced environments imposed during trans-
portation, ground operations, handling and flight operations . . .",
including induced Solid Rocket Booster surface temperatures as
low as 25°F and induced temperatures as low as 21°F at the point
where the aft strut attaches the Solid Rocket Boosters to the Exter-
nal Tank. (Excerpts documenting these temperature requirements
are contained in a briefing given by NASA to Joseph Sutter of the
Rogers Commission on May 19, 1986, which is reproduced in Ap-
pendix VI-A-4 of this report.)
Of principal concern to the Committee is the fact that none of
the extensive systems of checks and balances within the Space
Shuttle program discovered the lack of adequate testing and certifi-
cation of the Solid Rocket Motor. This failure of the management
and review system indicates to the Committee that other elements
of Shuttle flight hardware or other subelements of the Solid Rocket
Motor may also be inadequately understood or certified. This will
obviously require NASA and its contractors to conduct a careful
review of all the testing and certification efforts that have been
conducted to date for each element of Space Shuttle flight hard-
ware.
A parallel concern of the Committee is that NASA does not yet
know how or why this break-down occurred in this comprehensive
system of reviews, checks, and balances. Without such an under-
standing, the teams that will now be conducting the required re-
views of each element of flight hardware will be somewhat disad-
vantaged because they cannot be certain that they are "asking the
right questions" or "looking for the right things." Further, without
an understanding of how and why the existing management and
control system broke down, NASA will not be able to make the
necessary managerial and procedural changes required to be confi-
dent that this problem will not reoccur in the future.
Issue 2
Does the Space Shuttle Main Engine have adequate operating
margins, and is the "fleet leader" concept adequate to ensure safe
operation?
Findings
1. The Space Shuttle Main Engine is an impressive technological
achievement. However, it also is one of the higher risk elements of
the Space Shuttle system. Anomalous component performance or
premature engine shutdown could prove catastrophic to the Space
Shuttle and its crew.
2. Some NASA officials familiar with the Space Shuttle Main
Engine believe that it should be operated at a throttle setting of
109 percent only in an emergency; others believe the engine could
be safely operated at 109 percent on a routine basis.
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3. It is widely accepted that the Space Shuttle Main Engine
would be safer if its operating margins (for temperature, pressure,
operating time, etc.) were increased.
4. The Committee agrees with the sense of Dr. Feynman's con-
cerns with respect to NASA's current, "fleet leader" concept for
certifying Space Shuttle Main Engine components, such as high
pressure turbopumps, for flight.
5. On a case by case basis, NASA regularly violates its own certi-
fication requirements by permitting individual engine components
to be used for flight even though they have accumulated an operat-
ing time in excess of 50 percent of the two fleet leaders (i.e., in vio-
lation of the "2X" rule).
Recommendations
1. NASA should continue its active development program for the
Space Shuttle Main Engine. The program should be focused more
on increasing operating margins.
2. Because of the safety concerns raised by some knowledgeable
officials, NASA should give serious consideration to restricting use
of the 109 percent engine throttle setting to emergency situations
only. If NASA decides that it needs to use the 109 percent throttle
setting for other than emergency situations, the space agency
should take whatever actions are required to ensure that adequate
margins are present to maintain safety.
3. NASA should closely scrutinize each of the concerns raised by
Dr. Feynman regarding the agency's "fleet leader" concept for cer-
tifying Space Shuttle Main Engine components. The agency should
also closely reassess its practice of selectively violating its "2X"
rule for some Main Engine flight hardware elements.
Discussion
The Space Shuttle Main Engine is, very appropriately, described
by the Development and Production Team as a "high technology,
high power density, state-of-the-art rocket engine. ''7 Indeed, the
Space Shuttle Main Engine represents a major increase in operat-
ing performance over that provided by any other available rocket
motor. In his paper Dr. Feynman notes that the Main Engine "is
built at the edge of, or outside of, previous engineering experi-
ence." s The Development and Production Team also observed that
the Space Shuttle Main Engine is "a very complex and high risk
element of the Space Shuttle system." 9
It is this last observation that is of more concern here. Specifical-
ly, if the Space Shuttle Main Engine were to experience a major
problem in flight, the results could be catastrophic. Even prema-
ture engine shutdown could prove fatal during certain segments of
flight because it would mean that the Orbiter would have to ditch
at sea--a maneuver that the Rogers Commission concluded would
probably be non-survivable. 1o
T Rogers Commission Report, Volume 1I, p. K-3.
s Ibid., p. F-2.
9 Ibid., p. K-3.
_° Ibid., Volume I, p. 182.
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Therefore, the key question is: how safe is the Space Shuttle
Main Engine? An informal review of failures that have occurred
during ground testing over the past five years was reported to the
Committee staff.__ It concluded that five of these failures would
probably have been catastrophic ifthey had occurred in flight•_2 It
is also of note that each of these failures occurred at an engine
thrust setting of 109 percent or greater. However, closer examina-
tion of the cause for each failure indicates that most were the
resultof:poorly installedtestinstrumentation (engine 2208);an im-
properly tested "fix" to an engineering problem (engine 2013);the
use of "deactivated" components because no others were available
(engine 0204);or the existence of a phenomenon that cannot recur
because of the adoption of a new safety "red line" in current flight
engines (engine 0108). The failure of engine 2308, on the other
hand, did uncover a lifelimit on current engine hardware. That
particular engine had accumulated about 20,000 seconds of oper-
ation (the equivalent of 40 Space Shuttle missions) in the compo-
nent which failed (the main combustion chamber). Further, this
engine had reportedly logged a significant amount of operating
time at a power levelof 109 percent.
However, the question of engine safety stillremains. The majori-
ty of present and past Space Shuttle Main Engine program officials
who briefed the Committee staff were personally uneasy at the
thought of operating the Main Engine at a thrust setting of 109
percent in anything other than an emergency situation.Specifical-
ly, in certain emergency or abort situations,the throttle must be
advanced to 109 percent to either reach orbit or to successfully
return to the launch site.Under these circumstances, the risks of
not using the 109 percent throttlesetting (and having to ditch the
Orbiter at sea) would obviously be greater than the risks of using
that throttlesetting.These officialsalso noted that, at the outset of
the Main Engine development program, the 109 percent power set-
ting was referred to as the "Emergency Power Level". As the pay-
load liftperformance of the Space Shuttle became increasingly
marginal, however, the 109 percent setting was redesignated as the
'Tull Power Level." Subsequently, several engines were ground
tested at the 109 percent power setting for a sufficientduration to
certifyuse of that power settingin normal launch operations.
In addition to Space Shuttle Main Engine program officialsat
NASA, others have expressed concern with using the 109 percent
throttlesetting.For example, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
voiced concern that "each time NASA fliesat 109% we are really
pushing the capabilityof the engine". _3 In his testimony before the
Committee, Mr. George Jeffs,President of Rockwell International
(manufacturer ofthe engine) conceded that:
•..we don't have a lot of margin at 109 percent.... To
be comfortable . . .we would recommend that we go to a
_tDiscussions with personnel from Rocketdyne, Pratt & Whitney, and Aerojet General,
August, 1986.
xzThese include the destructivefailuresof engine 0204 in September 1981;engine 2013 in
p_Paril1982; engine 2208 in August 1982; engine 0108 in February 1984; and engine 2308 in
rch 1985.
i_ Discussionwith Aerospace SafetyAdvisory Panel,May, 1986.
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larger throat . . . and that we also add to that the dual
manifold gas system .... ,, 14
All observers agree that the "wear and tear" on an engine oper-
ating at 109 percent is substantially greater than when it operates
at the more standard 100 to 104 percent throttle settings. However,
some NASA officials believe that the successful completion of a tra-
ditional certification program involving two engines operating at
109 percent thrust levels is adequate justification for use of the 109
percent power setting for standard missions involving heavy pay-
loads. Other officials, on the other hand, continue to believe that
this power setting should be used only in emergencies. If this latter
view is adopted, it would mean that the heaviest payloads now
planned for launch by the Space Shuttle would have to be moved to
expendable launch vehicles. The Committee is not now in a posi-
tion to accurately predict the programmatic ramifications of such a
decision, but the recent national commitment to an enhanced ex-
pendable launch vehicle fleet could possibly minimize the negative
impacts of a decision to restrict Space Shuttle Main Engine thrust
levels to no more than 104 percent.
Though there is substantial disagreement whether or not the
Space Shuttle Main Engine should be used routinely at a thrust
setting of 109 percent, there is little or no disagreement that the
Main Engine would be safer if its operating margins (for tempera-
ture, pressure, operating time, etc.) were increased. Indeed, the De-
velopment and Production Team noted in its report that one of the
formal actions being taken by Rocketdyne in response to the STS
51-L accident is the creation of a "Margin Improvement Board." 15
This board will review and suggest appropriate actions on all rec-
ommendations for increased engine operating margins.
Another concern that has been raised regarding the certification
of the Space Shuttle Main Engine relates to NASA's use of the
"fleet leader" concept. NASA's basic engine certification guidelines
require that all components be tested on the ground in two engines
for a period of time at least twice as long as the time that those
components will accumulate in flight. For example, before turbo-
pumps can be used for four successive flights, the turbopumps in
two ground test engines must be tested for the equivalent time that
would be required to accomplish eight successive flights. Dr. Feyn-
man cites several problems with this approach. These include:
The question of what constitutes an "unsuccessful" test?
To the Federal Aviation Administration, a cracked turbine
blade would constitute a failed test. To NASA, on the
other hand, a turbine blade would not be considered to
have "failed" until it actually broke in two. 18
14 Hearings before the House Science and Technology Committee, "Investigation of the Space
Shuttle Challenger Accident," 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., Transcript, July 15, 1986, p. 13. (Hereafter
referred to as Cmte Hgs).
l_ Rogers Comm'.msion .Rel_.rt, Volume If, p. K-27. , .........
ts After further investigation, the .Committee has marneo t.nat some quallEcmg re marmstoa_
required for Dr. Feynman's characterization of the F.AA engine cLum.ifi,cat,ran p.roceaures .
totally accurate. The FAA does not permit cracla_, in. wha.t it calls crmc_, en_ne .com_.nenm.
However, cracks located at, or above, the vase o_ a mrome maae are not consmerea crmca_ oy
the FAA because: (1) commercial jet engines possess adequate internal shielding to contain any
Continued
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The question of whether two "fleet leader" engines rep-
resent a better indication of component operating life than
a third engine which fails in a lesser time? In other words,
should the operating time limits for flight hardware be set
at one-half that of the two fleet-leader engines or one-half
that of the shortest-lived components?
When a defect is found in a fleet leader engine and a
component must be replaced, what engine running time
should be used for calculating permissable flight hardware
operating times for that component using the "2X" rule:
(1) the accumulated operating time up to the start of the
final test; (2) the accumulated time as of the end of the
final test; or (3) some length of time in between these two
extremes? 17
In the staff review prior to the Committee hearings, NASA offi-
cials also noted that the agency frequently violates its "2X" rule
for engine flight hardware--permitting components to be used in a
particular mission that have not been tested on the ground for
twice as long as their intended use in flight. However, these offi-
cials noted that this was only done on a "case by case basis" and
only for those components that are considered to be highly reliable.
Possibly the most disturbing observation regarding the Space
Shuttle Main Engine made by Dr. Feynman in his report is his as-
sertion that: "the Flight Readiness Reviews and certification rules
show a deterioration for some of the problems of the Space Shuttle
Main Engine that is closely analogous to the deterioration seen in
the rules for the Solid Rocket Boosters." If true, this assertion is
obviously quite ominous. 1s
b. Recurrent Hardware Problems
Issue 1
What resolutions of inadequacies revealed in the landing gear,
tires, wheels, brakes, and nose wheel steering of the landing and
deceleration system are required?
Findings
1. The Orbiter landing gear, tires, wheels, brakes, and nose
wheel steering, as a system, is experimental, designed to criteria
outside any other experience, and uses unique combinations of ma-
terials. The original design performance specifications for speed
and landing weights are routinely exceeded. The original design
did not consider asymmetrical braking for cross wind steering as
the normal case although it has become standard practice. Stresses
which were not taken into account in the design have surfaced in
as yet a very small real world sample.
broken blades totallywithin the engine; and (2)all commercial jet aircraftare designed to fly
with one en_n:e inoperative.On the other hand, the FAA does consideras criticalany cracks in
the "firtree' region ofa turbineblade which isused to attach the blade to the hub ofthe tur-
bine.(Should a turbineblade break in thisregion,itmay be heavy enough to break through the
engine shielding.)This isthe region in which cracks are appearing in some Space ShuttleMain
Engine turbineblades.
ll_ _iR_rs Commission Report, Volume II, p. F-3.
93
2. As a consequence, Orbiter landings appear high risk even
under ideal conditions, which seldom occur. Exceptional procedural
and skill demands are placed upon the pilots to nurse the brakes
and tires through every landing. Landing rules have had increas-
ing constraints imposed that hamper operational flexibility and
usefulness of the Orbiter.
3. Brake and tire damage have been evident since early on in
the program. The Rogers Commission seems very correct in f'mding
the current landing gear system unacceptable. Resolution of land-
ing gear system problems can no longer be put off.
Recommendations
The Committee recommends that NASA:
1. Assemble all of the fragmented studies, analyses, and conclu-
sions on landing gear problems and integrate them into one engi-
neering description of the system as it is now intended to be used.
This should include consideration of the basic strength of the struts
themselves and their attachments.
2. Write a new system specification and match the proposed
design improvements to an acceptable reliability and certification
specification.
3. Design a test and certification program adequate to meet cri-
teria to fly and to continue well into future operations until under-
standing and confidence in the landing gear system is attained.
4. In anticipation of requirements for a new brake specification,
accelerate a program to provide:
Increased brake mass and/or heat sink;
Substantial increase in energy absorption;
Evaluation which weighs the experimental nature of the pro-
posed 65 million foot pound carbon brake and its impact on the
system against the penalty of weight of known materials (e.g.
steel) for operational confidence.
5. Write updated subsystem specifications to upgrade the landing
gear system to acceptable levels of performance to respond to the
Rogers Commission's recommendations.
Discussion
The sheer volume of testimony and documentation inevitably
gives rise to apparent contradictions. None have surfaced that are
assessed as consequential in evaluating the landing gear system
problems (NASA's "anomalies") with a view to their solution.
The main landing gear (see Figure VI-1) consists of two heavily-
loaded, two-wheel struts with two brakes on each and is designed
for deceleration only. Roll-out and cross-wind steering correction
was originally assigned to the nose wheel steering for the normal
case. Each tire, wheel, and brake is supported by redundant fail
operational anti-skid brake actuators, control valves, control boxes,
and hydraulic power.
The nose wheel strut has two wheels on a common axle, no
brakes, and is steerable. At the time of the accident nose wheel
steering was not permitted except in an emergency because it did
not have fail operational or fail safe redundancy. This places addi-
tional requirements on the main gear braking system that were a
substantive source of main gear problems. Need for correction of
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this oversight was most apparent and is the simplest of several dif-
ficult landing gear problem solutions. The lack of definitive action
in five years of operations is not explained.
The tires apparently meet all of their design specifications but
are critical for other reasons: (1) If a tire is soft or fiat at the time
of the nose down load spike (caused by negative lift on the wing,
when the nose wheel makes contact) the other tire on that strut
will take loads far in excess of its 130,000 pound limit and fail. (2)
There is a body of opinion that at almost any time in the landing,
one failed tire will assure the failure of its mate. (3) There is no
assurance at launch that there is adequate pressure in any of the
tires to assure spec performance. (3) Scuffing, cutting, abrading,
and wear from spin up, asymetrical braking (cross wind steering),
surface roughness, and debris have been more than expected and
disallow reuse of most tires (one landing per tire was spec). (4)
Anti-skid becomes inactive at 20 knots and damaged brakes will
lock up and blow both tires. It would appear that solving a host of
other problems will resolve a number of the major tire problems.
The brakes by all standards are very large, very light, of conven-
tional configuration, and very experimental because of extensive
stretching of materials technolgy by using carbon-beryllium. Brake
design is not rigorous, it is very empirical and results are often un-
predictable in new designs. The Orbiter brakes incorporate berylli-
um stators and carbon lined beryllium rotors. Beryllium has low
density, high strength, and high heat capacity. Beryllium is very
tender and not well behaved at high temperatures. Beryllium has
unreliable plastic characteristics at higher temperatures. Use of be-
ryllium in lieu of steel saved perhaps 1000 pounds in the cumula-
tive landing gear weight. The C-5A aircraft uses beryllium rotors
and stators.
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For the first 23 Orbiter flights, brake damage occurred to vary-
ing degrees on 15 flights for a sum of 32 damaged brakes. Failure
seemed to favor the right hand gear. A great majority of these
damages were not necessarily associated with heavy demands. A
very mw were caused by approaching the design energy absorption.
A case cannot be made against the heavy footed pilot. Regression
analysis indicates that there are no significant trends that show
brake damage is a function of energy demands within limits, peak
demands, or landing weight. It appears that the brakes, relieved of
asymmetric steering loads, will approach design energy absorption
specifications for one landing but those specs are inadequate to cur-
rent requirements for repetitive operations.
The primary source of failure is cracking and fragmentation
damage arising from hot spots and chatter or dynamic loads from
vibrations. It was conjectured that these can be worse if the brake
is lightly used ("not tightly clamped"). The pilots were given the
astounding instructions to never release a brake once applied be-
cause if the brake is reapplied the loose fragments will destroy it
and cause seizure. 19
From the history unfolded to the Commission and Committee in-
vestigation, it is not difficult to understand why the landing gear
system is marginal in today's operation. The original Orbiter
design criteria were quite different and are in part:
System OriginalOrbiter CurrentOrbiter
Droguechute...............................................Primarydeceleration.....................................Deleted.
Nosewheelsteering....................................Asymmetricloads.........................................Delete-emergencyonly.
Tires............................................................Onelandingper tire.....................................Same.
Landingweight,abort(worstcase)...........225,000Ib...................................................240,000lb.
Lightweightwheelbrakes............................Emergency,drogueback up and final Primarydecelerationandstop.
deceleration.
Wheelbrakelife..........................................5 landingsdynamometercertified................ Same.
(Typical:
Bombers..............................................40 landings.
Airliners...............................................lO0 landings
5 maxlandings.
1 emergency.
(all withoutthrustreversal).
The whole operational load to decelerate, stop, and steer fell on
what was originally the emergency backup brake system. The five
landing design is impossible to fine tune to that degree and may
yield only a design of imminent failure. It follows that every land-
ing with the now increased normal and abort landing weights is an
engineered emergency. How much the increased demands and
weight have intruded into the landing gear strut design factor of
safety and margin are unknown, but certainly a concern.
In summary, weight savings and inability to retrofit (i.e. larger
tires and/or brakes) collided with the then state of the art result-
ing in the normal high risk of landing being compounded. It is a
tribute to the pilots that they were able to carry such a tender
system this far. Redundancy of tires and wheels has never been
_ Rogers Commission, "Meeting of Challenger Commission; NASA, JSC", Halloway, T. et al,
March 9, 1986, p. 313; and Bobko, K. et al., March 24, 1986, p. 152.
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design practice. A successful landing could be made with both tires
and brakes gone from one side with a steerable nose wheel and la-
terial stability from the opposite truck, if on a hard surface (con-
crete). The lake bed and stabilized overrun zones would probably be
another matter.
Testimony implies that full-time nose wheel steering and higher
capacity brakes are a top priority requirement for return to oper-
ations. Reference is made several times to a replacement 55 million
foot pound all carbon brake in lieu of the 42 million foot pound
carbon-beryllium brake. Rockwell International gave testimony
that a 65 million foot lb. brake was in work. 2° To maintain the
equivalent BTU's per pound, the carbon brakes must peak at much
higher temperatures. This poses a new stress on the temperature
environment of the tires and wheels. Carbon brakes used on the
Concorde, B747, 757, 767 and C-5B are said to be experiencing dy-
namic failure modes. Carbon brake design has a better data base to
work from than the beryllium but such a new brake will continue
to be experimental and developmental in nature in the Orbiter ap-
plication.
Issue 2
What actions should be taken relative to other recurrent prob-
lems with flight hardware?
Finding
There have been many instances of in-flight anomalies and fail-
ures of other elements of Space Shuttle hardware, some involving
mission critical pieces of equipment. Some of these past problems
have been corrected while others have not.
Recommendation
NASA should ensure that before reinstituting Space Shuttle
flight operations, it fully understands and has corrected all in-
stances of serious in-flight anomalous behavior or failures involv-
ing mission critical pieces of flight hardware.
Discussion
Throughout the Space Shuttle program, there have existed a
number of recurrent hardware problems in addition to those dis-
cussed elsewhere in this report. Some have already been solved.
For others, new hardware has been ordered that hopefully will re-
solve the problem, while still other problems remain unsolved.
Listed below are some examples of recurrent problems that have
occurred with elements of Space Shuttle flight hardware:
Anomalous behavior of Space Shuttle Main Engine hydraulic
actuators--on two occasions (STS-41D and STS-51F). This re-
sulted in engine shutdown just prior to liftoff.
Numerous instances of failure of temperature and pressure
sensors within Space Shuttle Main Engines--in one case (STS-
51F) this resulted in the premature shutdown of a good engine
2oCmte Hgs, Transcript, July 15, 1986, p. 9.
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during flight. 21 (During some periods of the launch phase, this
could result in ditching of the Orbiter at sea, with probable
catastrophic results.)
Frequent occurrence of cracks in turbine blades and sheet
metal parts of Space Shuttle Main Engines, requiring that
engine components be replaced often.
Nonconsistent erosion performance of Solid Rocket booster
nozzles--with one instance (STS-8) nearly resulting in a poten-
tionally disastrous "burn through".
Evidence of damage to Solid Rocket Booster nozzle O-rings in
13 of the 23 missions for which the booster sets were recov-
ered. 22
Malfunctions in the Solid Rocket Booster recovery system
(e.g., parachutes)--with one occurrence (STS-4) resulting in the
loss of a flight set of Solid Rocket Boosters.
At least 48 instances of anomalous inflight behavior of the
Auxiliary Power Units that drive the Orbiter's flight controls
during launch and landing. 23 In one case (STS-9), two auxilia-
ry power units failed during landing, shutdown, and then ex-
ploded several minutes after the Orbiter had come to a step on
the runway.
Anomalous behavior or total failure of the General Purpose
Computers on the Orbiter.
Ejection of thermal insulation from the "intertank" region
of the External Tank (i.e., the region between the liquid
oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks), causing tile damage on the
Orbiter.
Failures in the Orbiter's Thermal Protection System, includ-
ing the loss of tiles, the disconnection of thermal blankets, and
chemical decomposition of the "screed" layer beneath many
tiles on the Orbiter Challenger.
At least 63 instances of anomalous inflight behavior of the
Reaction Control System that controls the flight orientation of
the Shuttle while in orbit and during the initial stages of re-
entry. 24
At least 78 cases of anomalous inflight behavior of the com-
munications and tracking equipment on board the Orbiter. s5
Clearly, some of these problems are more serious than others,
and as noted earlier, some have been solved. However, the Commit-
tee is mindful of the conclusion of the Rogers Commission regard-
ing the existence of similar situations for the Solid Rocket Motor
prior to STS 51-L: "a careful analysis of the flight history of O-ring
performance would have revealed the correlation of O-ring damage
and low temperature." _.6 Also referring to Criticality I flight hard-
slThe two events mentioned in thisand the preceding paragraph involvingMain Engines on
STS-51F were separatedb_ 17 days,with the pad abort due to an actuator failureoccurring on
July 12,1985,and the infllghtabort due to a double thermocouple failureoccurringon July 29,
1985.
ssRogers Commission Report,Volume I,pp. 129-31.
23 NASA, 'Shuttle Flight Data and InflightAnomaly List,Revision H," Johnson Space
Center,Houston, Texas,January, 1986,pp. 2-8 and 2-9.
24Ibid.,pp. 2-6 and 2-7.
2_Ibid.,pp. 2-16 and 2-17.
2sRogers Commission Report, Volume I,p. 148.
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ware elements, the Commission recommended that, "NASA should
establish a system of analyzing and reporting performance trends
for such items." 27
In a similar vein, Dr. Feynman observed:
The argument that the same risk was flown before with-
out failure is often accepted as an argument for the safety
of accepting it again. Because of this, obvious weaknesses
are accepted again and again, sometimes without a serious
attempt to remedy them, or to delay a flight because of
their continued presence.
And,
The acceptance and success of these (previous) flights is
taken as evidence of safety. But erosion and blow-by are
not what the design expected. They are warnings that
something is wrong. The equipment is not operating as ex-
pected, and therefore there is a danger that it can operate
with even wider deviations in this unexpected and not
thoroughly understood way. _8
In the spirit of these observations, it would seem clear that
NASA should make sure that it fully understands all past in-
stances of inflight anomalies and failures involving critical ele-
ments of hardware. Then, when appropriate, NASA should correct
the underlying causes of these anomalies and failures.
c. Other Engineering Concerns
Issue
What action should be taken relative to other engineering con-
cerns regarding critical elements of Space Shuttle flight hardware?
Finding
In recent years, serious engineering concerns have been raised
regarding the safety of some elements of Space Shuttle flight hard-
ware, such as the 17 inch flapper value and the heat exchanger
feeding the liquid oxygen tank.
Recommendation
1. NASA should ensure that, as a part of its current review of
Space Shuttle safety, it identifies, thoroughly evaluates, and then
takes appropriate action on all serious engineering concerns raised
regarding mission critical elements of Space Shuttle flight hard-
ware.
2. NASA should give special attention to both the cost and risks
of using Filament Wound Case Solid Rocket Boosters for very
heavy Space Shuttle payloads versus the cost and programmatic
impacts of simply transferring those payloads to expendable launch
vehicles.
2_ Ibid., p. 201.
2s Ibid., Volume II, p. F-1.
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Discussion
In the months since the Challenger accident, there has been re-
newed interest in scrutinizing engineering concerns that have been
raised in recent years regarding the safety of some elements of
Space Shuttle flight hardware. Typical examples of some of these
concerns involve the following pieces of equipment:
The 17 inch "flapper valves" on the fuel lines between the
External Tank and the Orbiter. The inadvertent closing of one
of these valves before Main Engine shutdown could be cata-
strophic,causing a rupture of a fuel line and/or the External
Tank. Failure to close after engine shutdown, on the other
hand, could cause the External Tank to crash into the Orbiter
afterbeing jettisoned.
The heat exchanger used to produce gaseous oxygen to pres-
surize the liquid oxygen tank in the External Tank. This heat
exchanger islocated inside one of the turbopump preburners of
the Space Shuttle Main Engine. Should a rupture occur in the
wall of the heat exchanger, high temperature hydrogen gas
could be driven into the liquid oxygen tank or additional
oxygen could be driven into the preburner--either situation
could be catastrophic. A solution to this problem could be to
move the heat exchanger outside of the Main Engine, possibly
using the engine's hydrogen cooling jacket as a source of heat
to produce the required gaseous oxygen.
The Filament Wound Case version of the Solid Rocket Boost-
er now under development for use in launches involving very
heavy Space Shuttle payloads. The Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel argues that this system may have questionable structur-
al strength safety margins in the transition areas between in-
dividual case segments, s_ Safety concerns such as these have
been raised regarding the Filament Wound Case Soild Rocket
Boosters by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel for several
years. In testimony before the Committee on May 15, 1986, Mr.
John Brizendine, Chairman of the panel, repeated a conclusion
from the panel's most recent report:"Until the issue can be re-
solved with a high level of confidence,.., the Filament
Wound Case Solid Rocket Boosters should not be used for STS
launch .... ,,3o
Regarding the last concern in the above listing,the Committee
notes that the recent decisions to substantiallydelay the availabil-
ity of the Space Shuttle launch facilitiesat Vandenberg Air Force
Base and to increase the availabilityof expendable launch vehicles
could potentially eliminate the need for Filament Wound Case
Soild Rocket Boosters. Specifically,the Filament Wound Case Solid
Rocket Boosters were originally intended only for use at Vanden-
berg; and the increased availabilityof large expendable launch ve-
hiclesmay provide a viable option to heavy-liftlaunches using the
Space Shuttle.
sgHearings before the Space Science and ApplicationsSubcommittee of the House Science
and Technology Committee, "Strategy for Safely Returning Space Shuttle to Flight Status,"
99th Cong.,2nd Sees.,Transcript,May 15, 1986,p.102.
so Ibid.
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The current requirement for preeminent emphasis on Space
Shuttle flight safety obviously necessitates that all major engineer-
ing concerns such as those listed above should be identified, thor-
oughly scrutinized, and appropriately acted upon.
d. Desirable Tests Not Yet Approved
Issue 1
Is the current ground test program for the SSME adequate to
provide a complete understanding of the engine's operating charac-
teristics and safety margins?
Findings
1. The Committee st_pports the Findings and Conclusions of the
Development and Production Team concerning the SSME, particu-
larly the concern that "Hardware availability and the potential of
damage to hardware and facilities resulting from tests malfunc-
tions have constrained . . . [full margin] . . . testing during the
ground test program." 31
2. The Committee shares Dr. Feynman's concern that there has
been a slow shift toward decreasing safety in the SSME program.
3. There is not a sufficient understanding of SSME blade cracks
and fractures.
Recommendations
1. The Committee concurs with the Development and Production
Team conclusion that over testing, limits testing, and malfunction
testing in the SSME program should be re-emphasized to demon-
strate full engine capability. 32
2. NASA should prepare and submit to the Committee a cost-
benefit analysis of testing a SSME to destruction including: (a) uti-
lizing additional SSME test stands; (b) utilizing additional hard-
ware for the ground test program; and (c) the value of such a test.
3. A vigorous study of fracture behavior should be conducted to
minimize the hazard of cracked SSME blades and to increase the
reliability and safety margin of blades. New blades and/or new
policies for duration of blade use should be incorporated prior to
the next Shuttle flight.
Discussion
The development and operation of the SSME is a remarkable
achievement and represents the leading edge of technology in large
liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen rocket engines. Great attention to
detail was emphasized by engineers at both Rocketdyne and Mar-
shall as well as timely recognition and resolution of technical prob-
lems. 33 Despite intense oversight, individuals privately speculated,
prior to the 51-L accident, that if an accident were to occur it
would probably be the result of an SSME failure simply because of
the uncertainties innate to a technology pushing the "edge." This
awareness of the uncertainties promoted high quality engineering
and contributed to the success of the SSME program unlike the ap-
s i Rogers Commission Report, Volume II, p. K-32.
s_ Ibid.
s3 Ibid.
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parent complacent attitude toward the mature solid rocket technol-
ogy.
Volume II of the Rogers Commission Report analyzes in great
detail the development, production and operation of the SSME. 34
The Commission's Findings and Conclusions regarding the SSME
are appropriate. However, the Committee feels that even more rig-
orous testing of the main engine is necessary to ensure that safety
margins and hardware reliability are not compromised.
For example, Commission member Dr. Feynman notes that the
"top-down" 35 approach used to design the SSME has made it diffi-
cult and expensive to discover the causes of component and subsys-
tem problems. 36 Specifically, Dr. Feynman writes that NASA and
Rocketdyne (the SSME prime contractor and a division of Rockwell
International), do not have a relatively precise knowledge of when
a turbine blade is likely to crack, how quickly a crack will grow to
fracture, and under what various rated power levels these phenom-
ena will occur. 37
Mr. Jeffs, President, North American Space Operations, Rock-
well International, described the blade problem and explained
Rocketdyne's testing efforts to improve blade life and minimize
blade cracks and fractures.
• . . we are working the blades and bearing problems and
have been for some time.
We have given ourselves confidence in flying the engine
with those kinds of blades through off-limit testing. We've
taken the worst cracked blades we could possibly find and
run them in engines to see if we could make those cracks
grow. We have not been able to do so. At the same time,
it's not satisfactory for us to continue in the long-term
flying cracked blades, and that's why we're putting so
much effort on fixing those blades. I believe that we
should have fixes for those blades before the next flight.
• . . the blades on the engines... I hedge a little bit on
exactly when we can incorporate those into the vehicle. I
believe we can do it by the 1988 period, but it's going to
take a lot of certification testing...3s
During staff discussions with NASA personnel, the issue of
SSME destruction testing arose. Some NASA personnel expressed
the desire to test an SSME to destruction, but noted the lack of test
stands and hardware. 39 Curently, NASA and Rocketdyne have
three test stands. Some individuals privately noted that the SSME
program should have four or five test stands to run and engine to
destruction, to test product improvements, for flight support and
anomaly resolution, and for acceptance tests of hardware. Others
have explained that it is not necessarily the number of test stands
that is the key to a successful SSME program, but rather the
a4 Ibid., pp. K-23 through K-27; K-31.
s5 Most military and civilian aircraft engines are designed from the bottom-up ap roach in
.... P ,
whmh each component, starting with the materml used all the way through engineering testing
of subsystems and subcomponents, is evaluated prior to the finaldesign of the entire engine.
s8 Rogers Commission Report, Volume II, p. F-2.
a 7 Ibid.
as Crate Hgs, Transcript, July 15, 1986, pp. 10-12, 61.
as Discussion with NASA personnel, Washington, D.C., May 30, 1986.
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amount of hardware available to feed the test stands. The Rogers
Commission found that:
The number of engine test firings per month had de-
creased over the past two years. Yet this test program has
not yet demonstrated the limits of engine operation pa-
rameters or included tests over the full operating envelope
to show full engine capability. In addition, tests have not
yet been deliberately conducted to the point of failure to
determine actual engine operating margins. 4°
In addition, Dr. Feynman said:
Using the completed engine as a test bed to resolve such
questions is extremely expensive. One does not wish to lose
entire engines in order to find out where and how failure
occurs. Yet, and accurate knowledge of this information is
essential to acquire a confidence in the engine reliability
in use. Without detailed understanding, confidence can not
be attained. 41
There has been some concern raised about the value of testing an
SSME to destruction. It is important that engine testing simulate
flight as closely as possible so that information learned in testing
can readily be applied to actual flight engines. For example, run-
ning an engine longer than an actual flight may not be useful in
understanding what effects starting and stopping have on lifetimes
of engine components, such as turbine blades. However, damaging
or destroying an engine while testing components under flight con-
ditons will yield valuable information. Consequently, it is impor-
tant for NASA and Rocketdyne to aggressively test components to
their design life even at the expense of a ground failure. It is un-
derstandable that the 51-L accident may have resulted in a more
conservative SSME ground test program in terms of a fear of fail-
ure. However, if safety is to be the prime consideration in the STS
program, then there has to be the freedom to fail in order to learn.
It is far better to lose an engine on the ground than in flight.
Issue 2
Is the leak/combustion threat of the External Tank's hydrogen
pressure valve a hazard warranting testing?
Findings
1. The Committee supports the Rogers Commission concern re-
garding the hazard posed by the liquid hydrogen vent and relief
valve.42
2. The Committee suports the intent of the ET prime contractor,
Martin Marietta, to pursue outdoor wind tunnel testing to elimi-
nate the liquid hydrogen vent/relief valve hazard. 4a
40 Rogers Commission Report, Volume l, p. 192.
_1 Ibid., Volume II, p. F-2.
42 Ibid., Volume I, pp. 192-93.
4a Ibid., Volume II, p. K-23.
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Recommendation
NASA, in conjunction with the appropriate contractor, should
consider designing and conducting an ET liquid hydrogen leak/
burn test to determine if corrective actions should be taken prior to
the next Shuttle flight.
Discussion
The Rogers Commission identified the hazard posed by the par-
tially open vent/relief valve on the ET's liquid hydrogen tank. This
valve can indicate it is closed when, in fact, it might be partially
open. A liquid hydrogen leak and subsequent combustion could
result in the loss of vehicle and crew. 44 There are two ways of de-
termining if the valve is closed. While both are highly accurate,
neither can adequately assure closure. To date,
• . . no test has been permitted to leak and burn hydro-
gen in a wind tunnel and analytical methods of determin-
ing the heating rates associated with leaking hydrogen gas
into the 1.5-foot thick boundary layer of External Tank are
recognized by the analyst to be inadequate and inconclu-
sive.45
During the Commission investigation representatives of Martin
Marietta stated a concern for the vent/relief valve leak hazard and
indicated an intent to pursue outdoor wind tunnel testing. 46
Issue 3
Does the present Range Safety System (RSS) on the External
Tank present an unreasonable risk?
__nding
There is substantial controversy over the relative benefits and
risks of the present RSS on the External Tank.
Recommendation
The Committee believes the Administrator should prepare and
submit to the Committee a comprehensive review of RSS require-
ments.
Discussion
There has been considerable discussion through the years about
the advantages and disadvantages of having a Range Safety System
(RSS) radio controlled destruction device on the External Tank.
There have been recorded instances of spacecraft being struck by
lightening during the launch. 47 At least some of the astronaut
corps feel strongly that the ET RSS creates an unnecessary risk to
the crew.
The Committee has been informed that the ET RSS was included
during the design phase because of a range safety requirement.
44 Ibid., Volume I, pp. 192-93.
• 5 Ibid,. Volume II, p. K-23.
• 6 Ibid.
4_ NASA, The Apollo Spacecraft, A Chronology, 1978, Volume IV, p. 319, Appollo 12.
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The question that should be asked is: "Do the relative risks.and ad-
vantages of an ET RSS justify its inclusion as a part of the STS?"
Therefore, the Committee believes that as part of an overall
review of safety requirements, the Administrator should ensure
that NASA and the appropriate Air Force officials responsible for
range safety requirements review RSS requirements as they apply
to the ET.
e. Production/Refurbishment Issues
Issue 1
Should 100 percent X-ray inspection of the propellant and insula-
tion for the Solid Rocket Motors (SRM) be resumed?
l_ndings
1. Previous X-ray inspections led to only one SRM being rejected
for Shuttle use.
2. There is no non-destructive inspection method which can
guarantee a defect-free SRM. X-ray inspection cannot detect "kiss-
ing" voids in which the SRM insulation is touching the SRM steel
casing but is not bonded to it. Debonded insulation at the end of an
SRM segment could provide burning propellant gases with a path
to the SRM steel casing and could result in loss of vehicle and
crew. X-ray inspection can detect propellant cracks and large voids
which if undetected could also result in a catastrophic situation.
3. Although there is no guarantee that X-ray inspection has been
a particularly effective method of detecting propellant and insula-
tion SRM flaws, it remains one of the best available methods to
monitor the SRM manufacturing process.
Recommendations
1. NASA should consider reinstating full X-ray inspection of
the propellant and insulation for all motors used on succeeding
flights until new, more accurate inspection methods can be devel-
oped and implemented and there is unquestionable confidence in
the SRM production process.
2. NASA, in conjunction with the appropriate contractors,
should investigate the development of new, more accurate inspec-
tion techniques which can detect "kissing" voids and other poten-
tial defects that cannot be detected by X-ray inspection.
Discussion
While the 51-L accident has focused attention on the design of
the SRM joint, the explosion of a Titan 34D rocket on April 18,
1986, has focused attention on the production and inspection proc-
esses of the SRM. Evidence has shown the Titan failure was caused
by a "thermal insulation coating that pulled away from inside one
of the two Solid Rocket Booster motors, allowing hot propellants to
burn through the rocket's outer casing" nine seconds after being
fired from Vanderberg Air Force Base. 4s
48 Michael Isikoff, "Major Flaws Ruled Out in Two Rockets," Washington Post, July 3, 1986, p.A-1.
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The Titan SolidRocket Motors receiveonly visualinspectionof
bond linesand localultrasonicinspectionas required.
While thereare some significantdifferencesbetween the Shuttle
SRB and the Titan motor,the designof the ShuttleSRB was pri-
marily based on the Air Force'sTitan IIIsolidrocket.49 Also,the
designof the insulationon the Shuttleboosterisvirtuallyidentical
with the Titan design.5° Brig.Gen. Nathan Lindsay,Chairman of
the Air Force board investigatingthe accidentsaid,"This was a
failurewe would have assigneda very low probabilityto.We've
flown 70 flightswith the [Titan]SolidRocket Motor and thiswas
the first failure." Sl
The Shuttle SRB has flown 25 flights with one unrelated failure.
In testimony before the Rogers Commission, NASA officials "made
it clear that the kind of separation of insulation that apparently
led to the destruction of the Air Force Titan 34D was commonplace
on the Shuttle." 52 According to NASA officials, it was also
common practice to visually inspect and repair unbonded insula-
tion of the SRM end segments. 53
Full X-ray inspection was conducted on all SRM segments used
in the demonstration and qualification programs and the first five
Shuttle flights. Full X-ray inspection of these early motors was re-
quired as part of the development and verification plan, and was
scheduled for reassessment after the flight of STS-5. During this
period 24 motors were fully X-rayed. Three demonstration center
motor segments exhibited excessive voids in their propellant, but
only one segment was rejected. Studies established the voids were
due to low casting rate and the method of dispersing propellant
into the segments. As a result controls were implemented and veri-
fied by X-ray inspection. It was also discovered during this time
that an SRM segment of the size required for the Shuttle could
contain 12,000 voids and be fired successfully without threat to the
mission, vehicle or crew.
After evaluation of data from the SRM segments used up
through STS-5 and data from military Solid Rocket Motors,
NASA's confidence in the SRM production process was such that
the SRM X-ray policy was changed. A cost-benefit analysis also
contributed to this decision. Beginning with STS-6, X-ray inspec-
tion was only conducted on all aft segments in the propellant hand-
trimmed area and the segment produced following the identifica-
tion of a process anomaly, process change, or design change. X-ray
inspection of the aft segments in the propellant hand-trimmed area
was continued because data indicated that only 3 percent of a seg-
ment's insulation had to be bonded, particularly the ends, in order
of the segment to burn properly and safely. In October of 1985
NASA implemented a recommendation from the Aerospace Adviso-
ry Panel to change its X-ray policy to include random inspection of
one SRM segment per month. Because of a SRM production lead
4_ Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, p. 121.
s0 David E. Sanger, "Flaw in Titan's Boosters is Identified," the New York Times, June 4,
1986, p. A-23.
st Isikoff, pp. A-l, A-20.
s_ Sanger, p. A-23.
5s Ibid.
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time of approximately eight months, no SRM segment inspected
under this new policy was flown before the 51-L accident. 54
X-ray inspection, while the best available method to detect pro-
pollant voids and cracks, cannot detect so-called "kissing voids" in
which the insulation is touching but not bonded to the SRM steel
casing. Staff discussions with NASA personnel revealed that other
inspection methods are being analyzed. Thermography and accous-
ticolography techniques could both be used to detect voids and un-
bonded insulation. These techniques may not be refined enough to
use on the boosters flown on the next Shuttle flight. However, a
mechanical pull test should be available to test the new motors to
ensure that insulation is bonded to the SRM steel casings prior to
pouring the propellant. In addition, NASA will reinstate its initial
100 percent full X-ray policy which applied to the earlier demon-
stration motors and first five flights. According to NASA officials
the continued use of X-ray inspection once Shuttle flights have re-
sumed will depend upon success of the new SRM design and devel-
opment of new inspection techniques.
Issue 2
Are all production and other activities involving Criticality 1 and
1R hardware at prime and secondary contractor facilities labeled
as "critical" processes?
Findings
1. Critical processes are formally identified and controlled by
NASA. All processes are classified and controlled by the contrac-
tor's Process Change Control Board. 5s
2. The O-ring used in the case joint is critical to the sealing in-
tegrity of the joint, yet it is not designated as a "critical process by
either the Parker Seal Co. or Hydrapack, the manufacturer and
supplier respectively. 56 This raises the possibility that other Criti-
cality 1 and 1R hardware components are also not appropriately
designated by their manufacturer as "critical" processes.
Recommendations
1. NASA should require the manufacture of critical items, such
as the O-rings, to be designated "critical" processes. Contractors
should formally notify their employees involved in critical manu-
facturing processes of the serious nature of particular production
processes.
2. NASA should conduct a thorough review to ensure that all
manufacturing processes involving Criticality 1 and 1R hardware
components of prime and secondary contractors are appropriately
designated "critical" processes.
Discussion
"Critical processes are formally identified and controlled by
NASA. All processes are classified and controlled by the contrac-
) " 57tor s Process Change Control Board. Failure of Criticality 1 and
54 Discussion with NASA personnel, Washington, D.C., Sept. 12, 1986.
55 Rogers Commission Report, Volume II, p. K-14.
66 Ibid., p. K-31.
67 Ibid., p. K-14.
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1R components or systems will result in loss of vehicle and/or
crew. The Commission's investigation revealed that the O-ring used
in the case joint, whose failure led to the destruction of 51-L, was
not designated a critical process. 58 NASA personnel explained that
O-ring production was not so classified because final O-ring inspec-
tion occurred at KSC. 59
NASA's safety, reliability and quality assurance (SR&QA) philos-
ophy is that you cannot inspect quality into products, rather you
must build it in. It is questionable, then, why NASA would choose
to rely solely upon O-ring inspection for quality control and not
emphasize the criticality of the O-ring production process to the O-
ring manufacturers and their employees.
While the O-ring manufacturing process did not contribute to the
51-L accident, the fact that such a critical item was not designated
a critical process raises the possibility that other critical items may
not be so designated. Identifying critical processes and educating
contractors and subcontractors about critical items and manufac-
turing processes would be in line with NASA's policy of building in
quality and safety.
Issue 3
Do O-ring repairs compromise safety?
Finding
The Committee supports the Development and Production Team
Finding and conclusion that the "limit of five repair joints
per O-ring is an arbitrary number" and that "repair of inclusions
and voids in the rubber.., appears to be an area of potential
problem." 6o
Recommendation
NASA should review its O-ring repair policy and contractor
repair practices in terms of their effects on O-ring performance and
safety. Such review should be completed prior to the resumption of
Shuttle flights if, as anticipated, the new SRB joint design
uses O-rings.
Discussion
The NASA/Commission Development and Production Team
questioned the adequacy of the SRM joint O-ring process and qual-
ity control. According to the D&P Team, "the O-ring is allowed to
include five scarf joints, a quantity which is arbitrarily established,
and repairs of inclusions and voids are routinely made by the
vendor after receipt of the material supplies". 81
Issue
What impact does growth of SRM case size have upon booster
and Shuttle performance and safety?
s8 Ibid., p. K-31.
s_ Staff meeting with NASA personnel, Headquarters, Washington, D.C., May 13, 1986.
so Rogers CommiBsion Report, Volume II, p. K-31.
sl Ibid., p. K-3.
109
Finding
The Committee concurs with the Development and Production
Team Finding that "Remeasurement of two used 8RM case seg-
ments indicated both tang and clevis sealing surfaces have in-
creased in diameter beyond the anticipated design limits." 62
Recommendation
NASA and the appropriate contractor should resolve through
analysis and testing prior to the next Shuttle flight the cause of
SRM case size growth and its impact upon booster and Shuttle per-
formance, reliability of refurbished SRM case segments, and safety.
Discussion
During the investigation of the 51-L accident, the NASA/Com-
mission D&P Team "determined by measurement of two flown case
segments that both the SRM tang and clevis sealing surfaces have
increased in diameter beyond the anticipated design limits. The
growth is believed to be material related and related to the hydro-
static proof test pressure level." 63
f. Review of NASA's Redesign/Recertification Plan
Issue
Is NASA's SRM redesign and hardware recertification plan a
viable and realistic one which will result in a safer, more reliable
Space Transportation System?
Findings
1. NASA's SRM redesign plan is a step in the right direction.
Moving the proposed launch date beyond June 1987 is a responsible
and realistic decision. The membership of the SRM Redesign Team
is representative of qualified individuals in and outside of NASA.
With the export assistance of the specially appointed National Re-
search Council (NRC) Independent Oversight Group, the new SRM
design should be a significantly safer and more reliable Shuttle ele-
ment.
2. NASA's current hardware recertification plan is also a step in
the right direction. The use of independent review contractors dis-
tinguishes this recertification plan from earlier reviews. However,
given the failure of previous reviews to discover the deficient SRB
joint certification, the Committee is concerned there is still the pos-
sibility that the recertification effort may not reveal other certifica-
tion deficiencies, if indeed they exist. The plan also raises concern
about the qualifications of independent reviewers to evaluate cer-
tain elements given the uniqueness of particular Shuttle compo-
nents.
3. The joint was never fully tested as a separate element of the
SRM. The various forces that act on the joint during stacking,
launch, and flight are difficult, if not impossible, to duplicate in a
test of the joint under all conditions that could be experienced
during launch and flight.
62 Ibid., p. K-31.
6s Ibid., p. K-3.
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4. It is unclear what function the new Safety Office will perform
in the redesign of the SRB field joint and other critical elements of
the Shuttle, as well as NASA's recertification plan.
Recommendations
1. The Committee recognizes the national need to return the
Shuttle to flight status as soon as reasonably possible. As noted in
NASA's July 14, 1986, report to the President, safety will deter-
mine the launch schedule. However, NASA should consider the
proposed launch date of early 1988 as a flexible one which should
be slipped further if necessary. The Shuttle should not be launched
again until NASA can assure that safety criteria have been met.
2. In establishing a test program to certify the new Solid Rocket
Motor design, NASA should consider the feasibility of including in
combination and in the proper sequence all of the thermal and
structural loads expected to be experienced by the Solid Rocket
Motor during ignition, lift-off, and flight.
3. The independent review contractors participating in the hard-
ware recertification plan should utilize sufficient specific technical
expertise to insure adequate recertification of all elements of the
STS.
4. The Committee requests that the new Office of Safety, Reli-
ability and Quality Assurance conduct an independent assessment
of the SRB field joint redesign efforts. In addition, the new office
should also be integrally involved in reviewing all other critical
component redesign efforts and NASA's recertification plan.
Discussion
The "Strategy for Safely Returning the Space Shuttle to Flight
Status" includes the plans to redesign the SRM joint, reverify
hardware design requirements, and to completely revmw all "criti-
cal" items. This strategy was proposed March 24, 1986, by.Admiral
Truly, the Associate Administrator for Space Flight and supple-
ments the Rogers Commission's recommendations. 84
The redesign of the SRM joint is being conducted and supervised
by a cross section of competent and qualified individuals from
NASA centers, including Marshall Space Flight Center, the Astro-
naut Office, and individuals from outside NASA. An expert adviso-
ry panel of 12 people, six from outside NASA, has also been ap-
pointed. Further, at the request of the NASA Administrator, the
National Research Council has established an Independent Over-
sight Group which reports directly to the Administrator. (See Ap-
pendix VI-B.)
To date, "many design alternatives have been evaluated, analy-
ses and tests have been conducted, initial verification plans have
been established, and overall schedules have been developed. ''85 In
addition to designing a new joint that will use existing hardware,
an alternate design that does not use current hardware is also un-
derway. Study contracts have been let to five companies to inde-
pendently develop new designs and review current baseline ideas
and tests already conducted by NASA.
e4 NASA Response to Rogers Commission, July 14, 1986, pp. 37-40.
e_ Ibid., p. 12.
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In 1985, as joint problems continued with the Solid Rocket
Motors, NASA recognized the need for a design that would limit
the rotational movement between the joint tang and clevis that
occurs at motor ignition. NASA was embarking on the design of a
Filament Wound Casing which would have the advantage of allow-
ing for an increase in payload. Since a new design was called for, it
was to NASA's advantage to correct some of the joint problems at
this time. In the new design, to reduce the rotational movement in
the joint, a hook was added to the inner leg of the clevis. This
would significantly limit any change in the spacing gap between
the tang and the clevis in the area where the O-rings are installed.
Shortly thereafter, Thiokol, on its own initiative, ordered new forg-
ings which were thicker in the tang area so that the capture fea-
ture could be machined into the casing. The hook has become know
as the "capture feature". In August of 1985, however, the capture
feature then under consideration was significantly different than
current joint designs with the capture feature. Some of these differ-
ences include the presence of a third O-ring, the addition of a
second pressure test pert, the adoption of an interlocking design for
the case insulation in the vicinity of the joint, and the removal of
all putty from the joint•
The new design, however, with the capture feature, appears to
complicate the stacking operations and could increase the potential
for damage, particularly leading to the creating of metal silvers
during mating operations.
The hardware recertification plan appears to be a thorough ap-
proach to verifying that components meet design requirements.
The recertification plan involves three levels of review to be con-
ducted by: (1) NASA personnel; (2) current Shuttle contractors; and
(3) independent contractors.
A major concern about the thoroughness of the hardware recerti-
fication plan was expressed by Mr. Nelson:
• . . looking back on how the whole system functioned we
found out that there were a whole bunch of people in-
volved in the SRB design and the certification process.
There were the internal groups at Thiokol; there was the
oversight by Marshall; there was a through review by an
outside group, headed by Dr. Williams; there was the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel; there was the certifica-
tion process and signing off, [not only for the test flights]
but for the first Shuttle flight, STS-1; and then there was
that same certification process and signing off again that
occurred before STS-5.
Now, still all of those problems went undetected by so
many groups. 66
A more detailed discussion of previous hardware certification is
in Section VI-A.I.a. of this report.
Mr. Nelson further asked how this plan could provide confidence
that it is relatively safe to fly again.
66 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, July 15, 1986, p. 95.
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The use of independent contractors distinguishes this recertifica-
tion plan from previous ones. Mr. Davis, President, Martin Mariet-
ta Michoud Aerospace, said:
• . . some of the things that are being done differently...
I think will help . . . Marshall Space Flight Center has
contracted with other companies for independent FMEA/
CIL assessments of their hardware. In particular, Rockwell
is doing a total independent assessment of my External
Tank hardware, and I think that's well looked-to. I look to
their expertise to question everything we did and maybe
give us some advice on how to make it better. 67
Mr. Murphy, Executive Vice President and General Manager,
United Technology Booster Production Company, commented:
I think one of the things that is going to prevent a re-
currence of what happened in the past, as far as oversight
committees are concerned, is that we have come a long
ways since the initial certification of the program. We now
have advanced analytical tools which were not available
before. We also have the flight environments for the 24 su-
cessful flights; it gives us a true indication of what the en-
vironment is that we're going to be facing. Plus, again, the
environment of the whole aerospace industry has changed
dramatically since 51-L. And all of these, I think, will be
taken into consideration and will provide the oversight
and the proper review of items that never occurred
before. 8s
Mr. Murphy explained how his company will recertify the new
SRB design:
The recertification has three primary elements which
follow a logical progression of evaluation. First, we will re-
establish the basic design requirements from Level II and
Level III. Second, we will establish a verification program
based upon those requirements. And third, we will reestab-
lish that the design and the hardware are in compliance
with the first two elements.
Key activities to be performed as we recertify the SRB
will include the traceability of all the requirements into
all levels of SRB design and system environments, verifica-
tion of the SRB design data base and analyses, establish-
ment of tools such as the failure modes and effects analy-
sis, and validation that our paper systems have properly
incorporated requirements, constraints, and criteria. 8_
Another distinction of this plan is that hardware will be com-
pletely recertified through actual testing and analysis as if it were
being done for the first time. Some earlier certification reviews
were abbreviated paper checks many of which focused on only cer-
tain components.
6"_Ibid., p. 96.
as Ibid., p. 98.
6, Ibid., p. 50.
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Mr. ROE .... we're talking, where at all possible, actual
field testing. Do you concur with that approach?...
Mr. DAVIS. Yes, I'd say I agree with that. As a matter of
fact, I believe that's what all the program contractors, are
out doing at this point. 7o
The use of independent review contractors is a necessary and
critical component of the recertification plan. However, a legiti-
mate concern has been raised by the current contractors and Com-
mittee staff regarding the ability of independent contractors to
review technologies and components for which they may have lim-
ited expertise. For example, solid and liquid rocket propulsion has
often been referred to as a "black art" for which there are few ex-
perts. NASA has contracted with Martin Marietta to independent-
ly review the SRB and SRM certification. Understanding the
uniqueness of rocket propulsion, Martin Marietta has supplement-
ed their in-house talent with outside experts to assist in the certifi-
cation review.
The complete review of the Critical Items List (CIL), Hazard
Analyses (HA), and Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEA) is
in response to the Rogers Commission's third recommendation and
is intended to identify those items that must be improved prior to
flight, and to affirm the completeness and accuracy of each FMEA/
CIL for the current NSTS design. This is the first such review since
the system was originally instituted at the beginning of the NSTS
program and involves, according to NASA, many man-hours of
effort and a very large staff. Supporting this effort are independent
contractor reviews of the various FMEA/CIL activities associated
with each major component and system of the National Space
Transportation System. There are six such activities. These in-
clude, in addition to the four major subsystems that comprise the
Shuttle (Orbiter, Solid Rocket Booster, Space Shuttle Main Engine,
and the External Tank), the Vandenberg Launch Site and the Ken-
nedy Space Center operations. The re-evaluation is scheduled to be
completed by March 1987. It will involve all levels of NASA man-
agement, with auditing and oversight functions to be provided by
outside personnel from the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel and
the National Research Council in accordance with the recommen-
dations of the Rogers Commission.
A reconsideration of the level of design center involvement (i.e.,
the field centers that are responsible for designing various compo-
nents of the Shuttle) in equipment processing or systems processing
is required. The establishment of an Office of Safety, Reliability
and Quality Assurance under a separate Associate Administrator
should lead to improvements or an increase in the audit activities
associated with the overall development and production process ac-
tivities within the program. A systems design review that is pres-
ently underway within NASA has led to some 70 or 80 items over
and above the CIL review that have been brought to the attention
of Level II as potential problem areas. 71
7o Ibid., pp. 59-60.
_l Discussion with NASA officials, Washington, D.C., July 10, 1986.
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Program management at Level II has requested a complete audit
of the problem reporting system in order to assure that only priori-
ty issues are elevated to the Level II status for review. NASA sug-
gests the problem has been that too many items of lower categori-
zation than Criticality 1 or 1R have been brought up to Level II
and have swamped the ability of this management level to ade-
quately analyze Criticality 1 items.
The new office of Safety Reliability and Quality Assurance is
now operational. It is the view of the new Associate Administrator
that the role of the SR&QA office will be to assure that modifica-
tions to the SRB field joint design, are extensively reviewed during
the processes of development, fabrication and testing. 72 It is the
plan of this office to establish a position at headquarters to review
the configuration management system that presently operates
across the National Space Transportation System. It is also a goal
of the Associate Administrator to establish and improve lines of
communication among the various NSTS elements in order to im-
prove component integration and information interfacing among
the various elements of the Shuttle.
The Committee is fully aware that faulty designs, improper fabri-
cation techniques and component certification efforts can only be
detected and identified through the implementation of proper qual-
ity control methods and procedures. The task of the NSTS program
managers and the contractors is to assure that the quality is built
into the design and production of Shuttle hardward. Nevertheless,
the Committee also recognizes that the highest level of quality con-
trol methods and reliability engineering must be applied to all
phases of the Shuttle production process, utilizing the latest state-
of-the-art techniques of testing and analyses.
2. OPERATIONS
a. Shuttle Processing Issues (including Spare Parts)
Issue
In 1983, NASA consolidated fifteen separate contracts and
awarded a single Shuttle Processing Contract (SPC) encompassing
all ground processing related to launch and landing of the Space
Shuttle. There are two issues associated with this contract: (1) How
sound is the concept of a unified SPC; and (2) How well has the
SPC contractor actually performed? A related issue is the quality
of essential logistical support, especially spare parts, provided to
the contractor by NASA.
Findings
1. Performance under the SPC has improved since the inception
of the contract. However, up to the time of the Challenger accident,
contractor performance continued to be plagued by excessive over-
time, persistent failures to follow prescribed work procedures, and
inadequate logistical support from NASA.
2. High overtime rates have hampered SPC performance. Over-
time rates had increased significantly during the six months prior
72 Discussion with NASA officials, Washington, D.C., August 13, 1986.
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to the Challenger launch, to the point that critical personnel were
working weeks of consecutive workdays and multiple strings of 11-
and 12-hour days. Fatigue resulting from work patterns of this sort
can constitute a threat to safety. In fact, worker fatigue was a con-
tributing factor in a mission-threatening incident on Flight 61-C,
the mission immediately prior to the January 28 Challenger
launch.
3. There are numerous documented cases when contractor em-
ployees failed to comply with guidelines for carrying out assigned
duties, including specific "Operations and Maintenance Instruc-
tions" (OMrs). Such failures contributed to both of the major mis-
haps in 1985 involving Shuttle processing--namely, the November
8, 1985, "handling ring" episode which led to significant damage to
a Solid Rocket Motor segment slated for use on STS51-L, and the
March 8, 1985, "payload bay access platform" episode which led to
significant damage to a payload bay door. Failure to follow an OMI
also led to improper (and mission-threatening) handling of the hy-
drogen disconnect valve during the 51-L launch operations. All of
these incidents show a lack of discipline, both with respect to fol-
lowing prescribed procedures and with respect to reporting viola-
tions of these procedures.
4. At the time of the Challenger accident, the lack of spare parts
caused a degree of cannibalization (i.e., the removal of a part from
one Orbiter to satisfy a need for a spare part on another Orbiter),
which was the highest in the history of the Shuttle program and
which was a threat to flight schedule and flight safety. Excessive
cannibalization leads to multiple installations, retesting, added doc-
umentation, delayed access to parts, and increased damage poten-
tial. As a result, cannibalization contributes directly to excessive
overtime.
5. There is no clear evidence whether or not greater involvement
of the development contractors would improve Shuttle operations.
Recommendations
1. Because of the serious quality and safety concerns surround-
ing the contract, NASA should conduct a careful review of Shuttle
processing, the SPC contract, and the relationship of flight hard-
ware contractors and report its findings, recommendations, and
proposed contract modifications to the Committee. NASA's reexam-
ination should include a comparison of efficiency and safety under
the SPC versus efficiency and safety during pre-1983 Shuttle proc-
essing operations, which heavily involved the development contrac-
tors.
2. NASA should examine the issues of spares availability and
cannibalization and provide the Congress with a management and
budgetary plan for correcting previous logistical problems.
3. NASA should stop routine cannibalization and develop guide-
lines (including appropriate control and review procedures and
roles for the SR&QA office) governing permissible cannibalization.
4. The Committee recommends that NASA provide its re-invig-
orated safety office with the authority to enforce scheduling that
leads to safe overtime rates.
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Discussion
In a press release dated September 5, 1986, NASA announced
that it has extended the SPC with Lockheed for three additional
years, beginning October 1, 1986. Admiral Truly also announced
his intent to conduct a thorough review of the SPC, a process
which might lead to contract amendments.
Lockheed's award fees at the Kennedy Space Center have not
been at the highest possible levels due to mishaps and management
problems. The contractor has received the following award fees for
Shuttle processing at KSC:
LOCKHEEDSHUTTLEPROCESSINGCONTRACT--AWARDFEEHISTORY
Perce_to_
Awardfee Ratingadjective Rating maximum Awa,'dfeePeriod From available we awardfile earned
earned
First............................................... Oct. 1, 1983 ............
Second.......................................... Aix. l, 1984 ............
Third.............................................. Oct. 1, 1984 ............
Fourth............................................Apr.I, 1985............
Fifth...............................................Oct. l, 1985............
Sixth..............................................Apr.I, 1986............
$6,618,880 Excellent............... 90.0 80 $5,295,104
1,299,404 Good..................... 78.5 32 415,809
1,308,554 Good..................... 76.0 24 314,053
1,308,554 Excellent............... 91.0 84 1,099,185
1,308,554 Veil good............. 89.0 76 994,50l
1,296,664 (') ....................... (_) (') (')
' Tobedetermined.
The rating scale runs from unacceptable to marginal, good, very
good, excellent and superior. Two of the five ratings to date have
been at the lower end of the scale.
At the time of the Challenger accident, Shuttle processing had
suffered from inadequate spare parts for well over a year, and the
problem was getting worse. The inventory of spare parts had run
close to projections until the second quarter of fiscal year 1985. At
that time, inventory requirements for spares began to increase
faster than deliveries. A year later, the inventory should have been
complete, but only 65 percent had been delivered. 73
The number of cannibalized parts was increasing at an alarming
rate. Forty-five out of almost 300 required parts were cannibalized
for Challenger before Mission 51-L. 74 Eighty-five parts were canni-
balized on 61-C, the mission preceding 51-L. 75 In fact, the number
of cannibalized parts on each of these 1986 missions far exceeded
the number of cannibalized parts on any previous mission. In 14
missions flown in 1984-1985, the average number of cannibalized
parts was 14; in the 1986 mission, the number had increased nearly
five-fold to 65.
The cause of the spare parts crisis was budgetary decisionmaking
by NASA management. In October, 1985, the logistics funding re-
quirements for the Orbiter program, as determined by Level III
management at Johnson, were $285.3 million, but that funding was
reduced by $83.3 million, necessitating major deferral of purchases
of spares. 7e By the spring of 1986, the Shuttle logistics program
7s Rogers Commission Report, Volume II, p. 1-16.
74 Ibid.
7s Cmte Hgs, Transcript, July 16, 1986, p. 42.
76 Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, p. 173.
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was about one year behind; and under the proposed flight schedule,
no Orbiters would have been available as spare parts bins.
NASA is well aware of the spare parts problem. In fact, during
the Committee's hearings, Admiral Truly testified:
I can assure you that during our downtime we're going
to take a hard look at it and make sure that the flight
rates that we build up to after this accident are support-
able by the logistics system that we have in place, vv
The Committee received mixed reactions on whether develop-
ment contractors need to be more involved in the SPC. Proponents
of this approach argue that the current separation of responsibil-
ities between the design organizations and the processing organiza-
tion has created additional interfaces which make coordination,
communication, and responsiveness more complex. Further, the
processing contractor may not possess the necessary technical back-
ground to recognize either system degradation resulting from mul-
tiple missions or the criticality of the hardware being tested and
processed. 7s The Rogers Commission report stated that the likeli-
hood of improper Shuttle processing would probably be decreased if
Rockwell, as overall development contractor, and Martin Marietta,
who has a consulting role on the pre-launch processing of the Ex-
ternal Tank, were subcontractors to Lockheed, as the other Shuttle
development contractors are. 79
At Committee hearings, contractors reacted predictably to pro-
posed changes in the SPC. Development contractors, such as Rock-
well and Martin Marietta, told the Committee that their organiza-
tions should be vested with beginning-to-end responsibility--design,
development, manufacturing, operation, and refurbishment of their
respective Shuttle element, s° Lockheed, on the other hand, argued
that there is already a very close relationship between itself and
the development contractors. For example, there is one develop-
ment engineer for every four Lockheed engineers. Development
contractors participate in all meetings and are required to author-
ize and approve anything that is anomalous to the regular docu-
mented procedure, s 1
Ultimately, SPC performance will determine the proper balance
of development contractors in the processing contract. NASA, in
close consultation with the Congress, will need to make an impar-
tial and ongoing assessment of comparative safety and performance
under a consolidated versus unconsolidated SPC. Preliminary fig-
ures from NASA seem to indicate that Shuttle processing incidents
have actually declined during the more recent consolidated-con-
tract phase. 8s Further, it is likely that the fundamental problem to
date with the SPC--overtime--would be exacerbated by the addi-
tional contractor coordination that would be required by greater in-
clusion of development contractors.
T7 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, July 11, 1986,p. 39.
7s Rogers Commission Report, Volume II, p. K-32.
7, Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, p. 195.
so Crate Hgs, Transcript, July 15, 1986, p. 62.
sl Crate Hgs, Transcript, July 16, 1986, pp. 13-14.
s_ NASA, documents on the SPC contract, supplied to the Committee in July, 1986; Crate Hgs,
Transcript, July 16, 1986, p. 67, and Attachment C.
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The responsibility for high overtime rates in the SPC must be
shared by both NASA and the contractor. Mr. E.D. Sargent, Presi-
dent of Lockheed Space Operations Company, testified:
One of the problems that bothers us and drives us to
overtime is either unplanned work or another form of un-
planned work which is a hold or abort on the pad where
we have critical skills that are required to perform func-
tions, s3
There is no doubt that late mission changes initiated by NASA
are in large part responsible for Lockheed exceeding the five per-
cent overtime target in the SPC contract.
But in fact overtime levels had grown from an initial SPC rate of
5.3 percent in April, 1984, to 13.9 percent in January, 1986--levels
far in excess of what could be attributed solely to late mission
changes. The peak monthly overtime level of 15.2 percent occurred
in November, 1985. Although NASA managers at Kennedy at-
tribute the November rate to the Thanksgiving holiday, the overall
trend in overtime is undeniable--for each of the six months prior
to the launch of STS 51-L, overtime exceeded 10 percent, s4
More important that the average overtime rates was the over-
time for certain employees with critical skills. Records show that
there was a frequent pattern at Kennedy of combining weeks of
consecutive workdays with multiple strings of 11- or 12-hour days.
For example, one Lockheed mechanical technician team leader
worked 60, 96.5, 94, and 80.8 hours per week in succession during
the four weeks ending January 31, 1986. 85 While shiftwork is com-
monplace in many industrial settings, few can equal a Shuttle
launch's potential for inducing pressure to work beyond reasonable
overtime limits.
Research has shown that when overtime becomes excessive,
worker efficiency decreases and the potential for human error
rises. Noteworthy in this regard is Lockheed's review of 264 inci-
dents that caused property damage in 1984 and 1985. More than 50
percent of these incidents were attributable to human error, in-
cluding procedural deviations, miscommunications and safety
violations, s6 On one occasion a potentially catastrophic error oc-
curred just minutes before a scrubbed launch of Shuttle flight 61-C
on January 6, 1986, when 18,000 pounds of liquid oxygen were in-
advertently drained from the Shuttle's External Tank. The investi-
gation which followed cited operator fatigue as one of the major
factors contributing to this incident. The operators had been on
duty at the console for eleven hours during the third day of work-
ing 12-hour night shifts. If the launch had not been held 31 seconds
beforeliftoff,the missionmight not have achievedorbit,s7
The adequacy of and adherence to Operations and Maintenance
Instructions(OMI's)have been raisedas areasofconcern leadingto
qualityand safetyproblems.Review ofvariousSPC mishap reports
and of the procedures leadingto the launch of 51-L and earlier
ss Cmte tlgs, Transcript July 16 1986, p. 24.
84 J JNASA, aocuments on the SPC contract, supplied to the Committee in July, 1986.
ss Rogers Commission Report, Volume II, pp. G-2-3.
ae Ibid., p. G-1.
s7 Ibid.
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Shuttle flights highlight both the need for review and update of in-
adequate OMrs and the need for improved contractor performance
in implementing adequate OMI's. _8 NASA's own review of flight
51-L showed several examples of improperly implemented proce-
dures. The most serious error occurred when a console operator im-
properly closed the liquid hydrogen disconnect valve to the Exter-
nal Tank liquid hydrogen manifold. Although the valve appeared
to function during 51-L, improper valve operation could have
doomed 51-L just as surely as the failed rocket booster. As impor-
tant as the failure to follow the OMI was the fact that the valve
closure problem was never documented. Without proper documen-
tation a full assessment of the problem was not made prior to
launch of 51-L. s9 This lack of documentation is reminiscent of
what occurred during "de-stacking" of Solid Rocket Motor seg-
ments from STS-9. Although destacking revealed water in the
joints, this incident was never documented--an oversight which ul-
timately may have prevented an appreciation of the dangers of ice
formation in booster joints during a cold-weather launch. 9°
b. Pressures on Shuttle Operations
Issue
Was NASA under pressure to fly more flights? How did this
pressure originate? Will it recur?
Findings
1. The Congress and the Executive Branch jointly developed the
policy that the Space Shuttle should, in a reliable fashion and at
an internationally competitive cost, provide for most of the Free
World's space launch needs. By and large, both Branches failed to
appreciate the impact that this policy was having on the operation-
al safety of the system.
2. NASA was under internal and external pressure to build its
Shuttle flight rate to 24 per year, primarily to reduce costs per
flight, but also to demonstrate and achieve routine access to space.
NASA has never achieved its planned flight rate.
Recommendations
1. NASA must not attempt to achieve a flight rate beyond that
which (i) can be supported by the budget and staff resources avail-
able; and (ii) is consistent with the technical maturity of the Shut-
tle and the flexibility desired and needed in scheduling payloads.
Management should ensure efficient use of resources but should
not impose a flight rate on the system.
2. Once operation of the Space Shuttle resumes, the Committee
should maintain a close and continuous oversight of Shuttle flight
rate, planning, and operations. The Committee should ensure both
that flight rate flows logically from the resources provided and that
flight safety is not compromised beyond acceptable limits.
ss Kennedy Space Center Mishap Reports, No. 85-0070, April 5, 1985, and No. 86-0024, Dec.
13, 1985.
s9 Rogers Commission Report, Volume II, p. 1-15.
9o Ibid. p. 1-14.
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Discussion
Flight Rate. The goal of the Shuttle program has been to become
the Nation's primary space transportation system launching virtu-
ally all U.S. payloads and many foreign payloads, all at a reasona-
ble price. Thus, there has been an explicit promise to deliver
launch services.
Being a very complicated vehicle, the Shuttle demands a large
trained workforce which must be retained between launches. In ad-
dition, there are the costs of maintaining large and complex launch
facilities. Therefore, there is a large fixed cost in the Shuttle pro-
gram of approximately $I.2 billion per year. By comparison the ad-
ditive or marginal cost for a single flight is around $60 million (de-
pending on how the accounting is done). Therefore, it is clear that
(within limits) the cost-per-flight can be reduced by flying more
flights, that is, by spreading the large fixed cost over more flights.
However, it is also clear that the total cost--that is, the total
amount of money that has to be appropriated--will increase as the
number of flights increases because fixed costs are fixed and mar-
ginal costs must be added for each additional flight.
Therefore, to focus on cost-per-flight can be misleading. A lower
cost-per-flight, achieved by flying more often, would allow a lower
price to be charged to users, but does not lower the cost of the pro-
gram. Because NASA had committed to lower the price to custom-
ers of Shuttle flights, there was a pressure to do this by increasing
the flight rate. Nevertheless, NASA never achieved its planned
flight rate.
For example, in 1976 NASA predicted 49 flights in fiscal 1984
and 58 in 1985. As late as August 15, 1983, 45 days before the start
of fiscal year 1984, NASA planned 9 flights for fmcal 1984 and 12
for 1985. NASA actually flew four Shuttle flights in fiscal 1984 and
8 in 1985. 91 Of course management worked hard to reduce this gap
between plans and performance.
The emphasis on reducing costs per flight and delivering launch
services has caused a very basic and pervasive pressure to increase
the flight rate in the Shuttle program. This is well documented in
Chapter VIII of the Rogers Commission report. 92
Presumably, the Challenger accident has changed this situation.
Recommendation VIII of the Rogers Commission states in part that
"NASA must establish a flight rate that is consistent with its
resources. ''93 NASA's response to this recommendation hints that
this may not be the case. NASA speaks of determining "the maxi-
mum achievable safe flight rate. ''94 Such a flight rate would again
leave no "margin in the system to accommodate unforeseen hard-
ware problems" as the Commission found was the case before the
accident. 95 The NASA response makes it clear that the flight rate
91 Hearingm before the House Committee on Science and Technology, FY 1978 NASA Authori-
zation, September 14, 1976, Volume 1, Part 1,p. 394; NASA, "Space Shuttle Payload Flight As-
signments," August 15, 1983. NASA; "Space Shuttle Payload Flight Assignmente," November,
1985.
_2 Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, pp. 164-77.
gs Ibid., p. 201.
94 NASA Response to Rogers Commission, July 14, 1986, pp. 30-31.
95 " 'Rogers Commmslon Report, Volume I, p. 177.
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will be determine based on studies and that "program enhance-
ments . . . required to achieve the flight rate" will be implemented
[emphasis added]. 98 This is reinforced in the NASA response to
Recommendation IX where NASA says "NASA has initiated an as-
sessment of spare parts requirements to adequately support the
flight rate planning." [emphasis added] 9_ Thus, it seems that once
again a planned flight rate could become a controlling factor.
A finding of the Pre-Launch Activities Team is that during the
preparation of 51-L for launch "Manpower limitations due to high
workload created scheduling difficulties and contributed to oper-
ational problems. ''gs This is perhaps one of the clearest examples
of the inappropriate logic at work in the system before the acci-
dent, because "manpower limitations" are not due to "high work-
load" in the system. Manpower and other resources are limited
before the workload is planned. Problems are created when the
workload assigned is inappropriate to the manpower available.
In a March 24, 1986, memorandum on "Strategy for Safely Re-
turning the Space Shuttle to Flight Status," Admiral Truly reveals
a better attitude toward flight rate in speaking of a "realistic and
• . . achievable launch rate that will be safely sustainable." Admi-
ral Truly also states that "the ultimate safe sustainable flight rate
and the build up to that rate will be developed utilizing a 'bottoms
up' approach in which all required work for the standard flow...
is identified and that work is optimized in relation to the available
work force. ''99
NASA prepared several reports for the Rogers Commission, and
the Mission Planning and Operations Team (MPOT) Report indi-
cates a good awareness of the general problem of over-ambitious
flight rate planning. For example, that report states that compared
to the need to devote resources to making the transition to an oper-
ational system the "increasing flight rate had the highest priority."
The MPOT report continues, "In other words, it appears that the
flight rate was not tied to the ability of the system to support it,
but rather the system was reacting to the established flight rate."
A major conclusion of the MPOT report is that "The NSTS Pro-
gram should develop a bottoms-up strategy for expanding flight
rate." 1oo In other words, flight rate cannot be imposed from above,
but must be determined by available resources.
The disturbing fact is the trend in the NASA statements. The
earlier statements (i.e., the Truly memo and the MPOT report) in-
dicated an awareness of the danger of trying to achieve an imposed
flight rate. However, as mentioned above, the most recent state-
ment, the NASA response to the Commission, once again speaks of
achieving the planned flight rate.
The Rogers Commission has documented the fact that before the
Challenger accident the Shuttle system was approaching a state of
saturation in which no more flights could be accommodated. If the
accident had not occurred flight rate saturation may have eventu-
ally been reached due to bottlenecks in crew training on the mis-
,6 NASA Response to Rogers Commission, July 14, 1986, p. 31.
97 Ibid., p. 33.
9s Rogers Commission Report, Volume II, p. 1-14.
9_ NASA Response to Rogers commission, July 14, 1986, p. 40.
loo Rogers Commission Report, Volume II, p. J-3L
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sion simulators _o_ or because of inadequate spare parts for the Or-
biter. 102
Availability of training time on simulators and availability of
spare parts can both be improved by the application of more re-
sources. Nevertheless, if the achievement of a planned flight rate is
the overriding concern, removal of one bottleneck may only reveal
another one. Eventually, pressures will be brought to bear on
safety. The pressure on NASA to increase Shuttle flight rate has
been complicated by the need to maintain program flexibility
(which means to accommodate changes in the payloads on the
manifest) and by the "developmental" nature of the Shuttle
system. Manifest changes and the developmental nature of the
system create problems in the planning of Shuttle missions.
In addition, it is interesting to note that until the training,
spares, and mission planning problems are resolved, achievable
flight rate may not depend on whether or not Challenger is re-
placed.
c. Impact of Pressures on Shuttle Operations
Issue
Did operating pressures adversely affect the safety of the Shuttle
program?
l__ndings
1. The pressure on NASA to achieve planned flight rates was so
pervasive that it undoubtedly adversely affected attitudes regard-
ing safety.
2. The pressure to achieve planned flight rates was compressing
mission preparation as earlier missions were delayed due to unfore-
seen problems. Had the accident not occurred there would soon
have been a collision between planned launch dates and mission
preparation needs which could not have been met by overtime, can-
nibalization, or other undesirable practices. Operating pressures
were causing an increase in unsafe practices.
3. The schedule of payloads planned to fly on the Shuttle (the
manifest) was frequently changed. Each change rippled through
the NASA Shuttle organization and through the manifest and, es-
pecially if made shortly before launch, would increase the demands
on personnel and resources in order to achieve the planned flight
rate.
4. The Space Shuttle has not yet reached a level of maturity
which could be called operational as that term is used in either the
airline industry or the military. Each Shuttle flight is fundamen-
tally unique, and requires unique preparations. Therefore, small
changes in a mission can cause significant perturbations of mission
planning and crew training.
Recommendations
1. The new Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability and
Quality Assurance must assure that any pressures to increase the
to_ Ibid., Volume I, p. 170.
,or Ibid., p. 174.
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Shuttle flight rate do not adversely influence mission preparation.
The Associate Administrator must have the authority not only to
stop a particular flight, e.g., at a Flight Readiness Review, but to
stop the whole mission planning process if necessary.
2. Where appropriate, NASA should take steps to make the mis-
sion planning process standard and routine to reduce the time and
resources needed to plan a mission. Before requesting more re-
sources for the existing mission planning process (manpower, facili-
ties, equipment) NASA should identify ways to improve the proc-
ess.
Discussion
There is no doubt that operating pressures created an atmos-
phere which allowed the accident on 51-L to happen. Without oper-
ating pressures the program might have been stopped months
before the accident to redesign or at least understand the SRB
joint. Without operating pressure the flight could have been
stopped the night of January 27. This is documented in the Rogers
Commission report in Chapters V and VI. 1°3 Specific manifesta-
tions of launch pressure and the resultant atmosphere in the
agency are described in detail in Section VIII of this report.
Nevertheless, it has become clear that the Shuttle launch system
was not functioning well and was becoming increasingly unsafe as
flight rate was increased. This is documented in Chapter VIII of
the Rogers Commission report. 104
Mission Planning.--Mission planning refers to the process of de-
fining and preparing each Space Shuttle mission. It is important to
understand the mission planning process in order to understand
why pressure to achieve a given flight rate could have adverse im-
pacts. The process is lengthy, complex, and tightly interrelated.
That is, many steps must be done in sequence, and many different
flights have to use limited resources and facilities.
Mission planning begins at NASA headquarters with the custom-
er services manager in the Office of Space Flight. Both financial
and policy agreements between NASA and the customer are nego-
tiated and signed. Technical documentation begins at this time al-
though the level of mission-specific work is low.
After flight assignments are made by NASA Headquarters and
the mission is dei'med, a process of continual review begins. Pay-
loads are assigned to a particular flight 33 months prior to launch.
At this time a Payload Integration Plan (PIP) is developed which
includes a preliminary analysis of the mission.
Payload safety is the responsibility of the payload developer. He
must be throughly familiar with NASA safety requirements and
must certify that his payload meets them. NASA audits the certifi-
cation process but performs no visual inspection of the payload for
conformance to safety standards.
Once the cargo of a particular mission has been defined, or
"baselined", the significant engineering work of mission processing
actually begins. NASA refers to this as the "production process .
The product of the process is the launch of a particular mission,
_o8 Ibid., pp. 82-151.
_o4 Ibid., pp. 164-77.
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but there are many other intermediate products such as flight and
training software, crew activity plans, and handbooks and check-
lists for the crew to take on the flight.
The launch production process template is displayed schematical-
ly on Figure VI-2. The template begins 15 months before the sched-
uled launch date (L-15), at which time a Flight Definition and Re-
quirements Directive (FDRD) is issued. This marks one of seven de-
fined "freeze points" of the 15 month mission-specific pre-launch
activity. A freeze point simply means that a particular activity is
norminally defined so that no time changes can occur without a
formal process to authorize and document the change. In theory,
non-mandatory changes are not made after a freeze point. As noted
below, significant changes do indeed occur after the various freeze
points in the schedule.
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At 7.7 months before launch, the Cargo Integration Review (CIR)
occurs. This is a critical point in the mission definition and launch
process. The customer participates in this review. All baseline re-
quirements for flight design, flight and ground operations, and
crew size are defined. The engineering requirements for a particu-
lar mission are approved. The CIR essentially separates the design
process and concept documentation from the actual Orbiter proc-
essing, installation and certification of the hardware and software,
and final crew training and engineering verification of the various
systems on the Orbiter. Typically 10 to 20 percent of the mission-
specific preparation work is accomplished by the time of the CIR,
and after the CIR the process is driven by the Shuttle mission
preparation milestones.
At L-3 months the flight operations review (FOR) takes place.
This freeze point allows the customer to review all final flight oper-
ations plans. At approximately the same time the launch site flow
review (LSFR) takes place, at which the timing and flow of the
Shuttle and its cargo through the Orbiter processing facility (OPF),
the vehicle assembly building (VAB), and to the launch pad are all
reviewed and baselined. No changes should occur after this point in
time, but, of course, some do.
At L-2 weeks the Flight Readiness Review (FRR) takes place. Its
purpose is to verify the fact that for this mission the hardware and
software are ready for flight. It is here that the final commitment
to a specific launch date and time is made.
At the FOR typically 40 to 50 percent of the work of the produc-
tion process has been accomplished. At the time of the Flight Read-
iness Review, almost all of the work must have been accomplished
because the Flight Readiness Review is not for the purpose of
working out problems but merely to certify that problems have
been resolved.
As the targeted flight date approaches, conditions are continually
reviewed and last minute changes are made as necessary through a
series of meetngs and teleconferences.
This simplified description does not begin to reveal the details of
the launch production process but study of the template should
give some indication of its complexity. With over 50 percent of the
work typically needing to be accomplished in the last three months
before launch, and with typically 20 or more flights in work at any
given time, it should be clear that last minute changes can be very
disruptive and costly.
The developmental or non-operational status of the Shuttle also
contributed to problems as the flight rate increased. Less time be-
tween flights meant that results from one flight could not be incor-
porated into the early planning for the next one. In other words,
any change resulting from feedback from the previous flight was
necessarily a last-minute change. Because of the developmental
nature of the Shuttle system, such changes were to be expected. At
24 flights a year there would be about two weeks between flights.
Allowing some time for flight data analysis, this would mean that
results of the previous flight typically would not be available at the
Flight Readiness Review. Indeed, the O-ring erosion results of
flight 61-C were available only immediately before the 51-L
launch.
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Thecomplexandlengthymissionplanningprocess was under in-
creasing pressure and was being strained to achieve the planned
launch rate. Two activities that were compressed were training of
the flight crew and training of the ground launch crew.
Training.--When training and other preparations is compressed,
progam quality is likely to suffer, and errors become more likely.
Given the situation with NASA's safety program--which the
Rogers Commission described as "silent"--errors were less likely to
be detected before harm could occur. Errors can be caused by per-
sonnel taking shortcuts with respect to established procedures. Two
examples are given in the Pre-Launch Activities Team report:
The most significant error encountered was during the
launch countdown. While preparing for propellant loading,
the LH2 Orbiter to ET disconnect Valve was opened by the
console operator. He had erroneously failed to follow the
required steps in the OMI. A follow-on error was made in
that this occurrence was not properly documented. Since
proper documentation was not present, a full assessment
of the problem was not made prior to the launch of STS
51-L. Flight data from STS 51-L indicated the valve did
perform satisfactorily.
Another major error occurred when the integrity seals
on the ET aft restraints were broken and not reported. It
is believed that the seals were broken in error, but the
break of integrity was not reported in accordance with es-
tablished procedures.
The underlying factors contributing to these errors were
not determined during the processing reviews, i o5
These errors apparently had no adverse impact on the mission,
but indicate a breakdown of the discipline so necessary for a proc-
ess as complex as launching a Shuttle.
Shuttle crew training is an important part of mission prepara-
tion. The crew of 51-L had training loads as high as 70, 63, 65, 59
and 58 hours in the several weeks before their launch. This was
due to the fact that their training started some 3 weeks later than
scheduled.
It must be noted that the crew also had 3 easy weeks during this
period. During the weeks which included Thanksgiving, Christmas
and New Year's they only trained 31, 27 and 49 hours, respectively.
No harmful effects of compressed Shuttle crew training have been
documented but common sense indicates that the situation must
have been less than optimal.
It will be recalled that the launch of flight 61-C, which immedi-
ately preceded 51-L, was delayed several times. It was originally
scheduled to launch on December 18th and eventually launched on
January 6th. The Commission report describes how the launch date
slips for 61-C became a scheduling factor for the training through
integrated simulations for 51-L. 1°6 Delay of 61-C launch pushed a
bow wave of tests at the Kennedy Space Center which required 51-
L prime crew and/or mission control center resources and thereby
,o5 Rogers Commission Report, Volume II, p. 1-15.
zoe Ibid., p. J-13.
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constrained the time at which integrated simulation training could
be conducted. The 51-L training schedule was changed several
times during the last weeks prior to launch due to launch slips of
61-C and the desire to suspend work between the Christmas and
the New Year holidays. Eventually all 51-L training was accom-
plished with some change of spacing between the simulations. If
the originally planned spacing of simulation training was optimum,
then the changed spacing probably was not.
It is not clear exactly why the 51-L crew was late in starting its
training, because it should have started training before the delays
of the 61-C launch began. What is clear is that the crew training is
a serial effort which cannot occur until software is available to
drive the simulation computers. 1°7 The necessary software cannot
be written until the specific flight configuration of the mission has
been designed. This is a situation in which each event must wait on
the completion of the previous one. In the case of 51-L there were
delays and development of some software elements. But it is not
clear that the development of these elements was in fact started on
time. It is clear that there was considerable remanifesting of 51-L,
for example during most of 1984 the Cargo Integration Review was
scheduled to occur on September 4 but due to remanifesting this
slipped and the CIR eventually occurred on June 18, 1985. In April
1985 a major change was made when the Orbiter assigned to the
mission was changed (from OV-104 to OV-099) and major payload
changes were made. This caused a slip of launch date from Novem-
ber, 1985, to January, 1986. There were small middeck payload
changes in October, November and December of 1985.1 os
It is clear that these changes must have delayed the delivery of
software which, in turn would delay the start of crew training.
Crew training was not related to the accident, but it does seem
clear that the system was breaking down (i.e., data presented in
the Commission report shows that in January of 1986 the delays in
the projected start of crew training were growing). 109
Examination of the record shows that pressure to achieve the
planned flight rate was forcing the crew to train later and later,
which meant higher weekly training loads. This was very likely
compromising the effectiveness of the crew training and thus the
safety of the missions, although no harm had been documented at
the time of the accident.
Manifest Changes--As described in detail above, the planning of
a Shuttle mission requires more than a year of significant work,
with the first major "freeze point" occurring 15 months before
planned launch. A freeze point is a place in the mission planning
schedule where decisions are made about the mission and its imple-
mentations. In theory, these decisions are made in a cumulative
fashion so that earlier decisions do not have to be changed as the
mission is refined through the planning process. Indeed, if there
are no changes, this is in fact the way the system works; however,
there are changes.
_o7 Ibid., p. J-38.
_os Ibid., pp. J-7-12.
_o9 Ibid., p. J-42.
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The first freeze point occurs when the mission is officially de-
fined and payloads are assigned to a specific Orbiter. Another
major freeze point occurs approximately seven months before
launch at the Cargo Intergration Review (CIR). Typically, more
than 80 percent of the work necessary to prepare a mission occurs
after the Cargo Integration Review. Changes in the mission after
the CIR tend to be much more expensive than changes made earli-
er in the process."° The Rogers Commission has adequately docu-
mented the fact that changes to the Shuttle manifest were common
and major. ''1 As of April, 1986, the six missions planned to follow
flight 51-L which were not dedicated missions, i.e., not missions
having only one customer, had a total of 30 changes or an average
of five each after the start of the production process. Eleven of
these changes were major that is, they involved the exchange of
different types of major payloads. 112
Manifest changes can be divided into four basic categories de-
pending on the origin of the change. Some changes are caused by
hardware problems such as when the Tracking and Data Relay
Satellite was found to have a problem and was deleted from flight
51-E. As there is no reason to launch a faulty satellite, NASA vir-
tually is obligated to allow such faulty satellites to be changed out.
The second category of manifest change results from what could
be called "customer request." For example, many communication
satellites have been rescheduled at the customer's request for busi-
ness reasons. Again, NASA is in an awkward position because if
the satellite is not needed, NASA would not want to be in the posi-
tion of insisting that it be launched. (Although there have been
cases when customers launched satellites and stored them on-
orbit.)
A third category is caused by the belated recognition of oper-
ational constraints in the Shuttle system. For example, it has been
found that a payload combination would exceed the landing
weights for the transatlantic abort sites.
In another example of this type of change, it was found that
there was no acceptable launch window for a planned combination
of payloads which needed to be put in different orbits. It would
seem that NASA could improve its mission planning production
process to minimize this kind of manifest change by doing a better
job of assessing the impact of operational constraints on payload
combinations earlier in the planning process. Of course, one must
allow for the late emergence of subtle operational constraints
which would only be discovered as a result of deep analysis rela-
tively late in the process. Nevertheless the MPOT report suggests
that NASA sometimes carries unworkable flights on the mani-
fest., '3
The fourth category of manifest change is due to external fac-
tors, many of which are totally within NASA's power to deny. It
appears that many of the Headquarters requests for changes are
made in order to put on the manifest science experiments which
Jo NASA briefing on STS Production Process by Elaine Hofstetler--Presented to Committee
Staff on May 19, 1986.
_11 Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, pp. 166-73; Volume II, pp. J-26-29, J-33-51.
112 NASA briefing, May 19, 1986.
113 -- •Rogers Commmmon Report, Volume II, p. J-46.
130
are essentially payloads of opportunity. This would include the Get
Away Specials (or GAS-cans). It has been considered highly desira-
ble to give this kind of standby status to scientific experiments be-
cause they have had low priority on the manifest. That is, it is a
way for such experiments to get a relatively early flight.
When changes are made in the manifest they tend to ripple
through the system and affect not only the mission in work but
also all the other missions in work. For example, changes mean
rework--things need to be done over. Software for the mission may
have to be rewritten. Inevitably, this causes some delay and com-
presses the time available for other work scheduled downstream in
the process if the launch date is to be maintained. Of course, if the
flight rate is to be achieved, launch dates must be kept.
Other missions are affected because the reworks necessary as a
result of changes will pull engineers and technicians away from
other projects. For example, in January, 1986, there were 21 flights
in process. Given the fact that that resources available were finite,
more work on one mission means that other missions have to wait.
The result is that the mission preparations for the other missions
also are compressed as they wait for the proceding mission to clear
the process. The world system becomes less and less resilent, there
is more and more overtime, and there is temptation to take short-
cuts in the process.
It is important to note that "manifest changes" can also be
viewed as "payload flexibility" as in the case of the "GAS-cans"
mentioned above. Therefore, there may be a need to decide more
specifically what we intend the Shuttle system to accomplish. If
maximizing flight rate is to be the overriding consideration, then
flexibility will have to suffer. However, if NASA adopts to rigid a
posture with regard to payload changes, customers or users may
object. For example, as pointed out above, there is no point in
launching a faulty satellite. Most space operations are simply not
mature enough for NASA to enforce a rigid manifest.
It would seem that a better way to minimize the adverse impacts
of manifest changes would be to simplify the mission planning
process so that freeze points could be later, that is nearer to the
launch date, so that consequently changes would occur relatively
earlier in the process, therefore with less impact.
Given the history of the program, it is known that there will be
changes in the manifest and that the impact of these changes will
be serious. It does not seem, therefore, that it would be particularly
fruitful to try to develop analytical management tools to predict
the impact of changes in the existing system (an effort NASA has
suggested). Rather, effort should be directed toward developing a
new, improved mission planning system. Also, the MPOT report
claims that the impact of changes is already predictable, and can
be budgeted. 114
Operational Status of the System.--In addition to reconsidering
the priority which should be attached to maximizing flight rate,
there is also a need to consider the degree to which the Shuttle
itself can be made more "operational."
t _• Ibid., p. J-38.
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The Rogers Commission Report makes much of the fact that the
Shuttle is not operational. __5 The same point was made strongly to
Committee staff in interviews with personnel at Kennedy Space
Center involved in launch processing. The Roger Commission made
no recommendation on this matter and NASA in its reponse to the
Commission has not direcly commented on it.
As early as 1981, senior NASA officials agreed that the Shuttle
should be brought "to a cost-effective operational status" and that
to that end Shuttle design should be "frozen". _6
The Shuttle was declared operational after its fourth flight, but
that the program clearly was not capable of functioning in a
manner that would be called operational in any other milieu. Each
Shuttle flight is, indeed, unique. Large amounts of software must
be written de novo for each flight. This is appropriate for a develop-
mental program but clearly but clearly will not work as NASA
tries to move into a truly operational phase.
Prior to the Challenger accident NASA had realized that the
mission planning process had to be drastically improved, probably
through standardization. Unfortunately, pressure to increase the
flight rate was driving all available resources into speeding up the
existing system. There simply were not resources available to ana-
lyze the mission planning system and see where it could be simpli-
fied.117
If the Shuttle is to fly routinely, the mission planning system
must be reworked to that end. For example, the Commission report
makes the point that the two flight simulators were a bottleneck in
the astronaut training process, lzs Undoubtedly this was true.
What is not clear is whether there is another way. For example,
would it be possible to develop specialized crews, say a group of as-
tronauts trained to deploy communication satellites, who would
need much less training to repeat identical or similar missions,
thus reducing the demands on the simulators? The point is not
that such savings must be found or can be found, but that they
must be sought and resources must be dedicated to the search for
such savings. If, indeed, no such standardization of mission plan-
ning is possible, NASA must face up to this fact and operate the
Shuttle accordingly. As mentioned above, there are disturbing
signs that NASA is moving once again toward achieving the high-
est possible flight rate without fundamentally changing its ap-
proach to Shuttle operations.
Pressure to Reduce Cost and Turn-around T/me.--NASA was
under pressure to reduce flight costs and to reduce turn-around
time between flights. In some cases they could achieve both objec-
tives at once by eliminating work done between flights (e.g., testing
and refurbishment). A NASA memo shows that such actions were
being pursued as early as August, 1981, after only one Shuttle
Is Ibid Volume I, . 170-71.116 Metro from W. _. Luc_, Director, Marshall Space Fhght Center, to James M. Beggs, Ad-
ministrator, dated Au,_st 21, 1981; subject: "ET/SRB Productibility/Cost Reduction"; the rele-
vant sentence reads: '1 wholeheartedly agree with your statements that Shuttle performance
requirements and design should be frozen so that we can concentrate all efforts on bringing the
system to a cost-effective operational status."
117 Rogers Commission Report, Volume II, p. J-31
ILS Ibid., Volume I, p. 170.
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flight. 119 Attached to the memo are lists of activities to improve
the producibility and reduce the cost of the SRB and ET. These in-
clude reduction of "mandatory government inspection require-
ments" for SRM processing by Thiokol and reduction of SRM pro-
pellant verification testing.
The point is not that these particular actions were unsafe, but
that even very early in the flight program there were pressures on
testing and inspection activities in the program.
Shuttle Process Issues.--Section VI.A.2.a. of this report, on "Shut-
tle Processing Issues" discusses several matters such as the avail-
ability of spares, overtine, and the adequacy of OMIs. It is clear
that operating pressure aggravated and issues discussed there. For
example, had there been no operating pressure there would have
been less pressure on spares, less overtimd, and more time either
to revise OMIs or to execute them.
Change Control Process.--Section VI.B.I.d. on "Change Control
Process discusses how the pressure to increase flight rate compro-
mised the hardware change control process. An important factor is
the developmental (i.e., not-yet-operational) nature of the Shuttle
System which means that large numbers of significant hardware
changes can be expected.
d. Other Safety Issues
Issue 1
What is the criticality of landing safety associated with pro-
grammed and abort landing sites and their local characteristics?
F_ndings
1. The Committee finds that many of the normal and abort land-
ing safety problems will be alleviated when the Rogers Commis-
sion's and the Committee's (section V.A.I.b., this report) recommen-
dations to upgrade the landing gear system are implemented.
When the landing gear system is understood, straightforward cal-
culations and operational rules will determine acceptable runway
dimensions and conditions.
2. The Committee found no reason to fault NASA's current pro-
cedure on launch constraints based upon operational judgement
and conservative rules on local conditions at planned abort and
landing sites. However, since an obvious finding is that the Orbiter
is a developmental system, it is axiomatic that unanticipated
"dicey" circumstances will arise.
3. It was found that for the least landing gear system stress,
runway preference is Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB) (concrete),
KSC, and Rogers Dry Lake (EAFB "lake bed") in that order. No
mason was found to invalidate the KSC runway design. The rea-
sons for the "dry" course surface still prevail over concern about
wear on tires designed for one landing. Additional constraints at
KSC because of lesser lateral stabilized overrun area may be
needed to bring its safety to the level of the EAFB runway.
4. The NASA Landing Safety Team's proposal to provide stand-
ard landing aids and arresting barriers at all sites and their em-
11QNASA Memo from W.R. Lucas, to James M. Beggs, Administrator, dated August 21, 1981.
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phasis on runway surface characteristics for repetitive tire use
takes on a new dimension that is in addition to the Rogers Com-
mission's recommendations.
5. Weather, by far, is the most significant factor governing oper-
ational decisions, Orbiter damage, and landing safety. The con-
straint is simply that acceptable weather must be forecast with
confidence within the time frame needed. Ultra-conservative rules
prevail because of the predictable unpredictability of Cape weather.
New and innovative local weather analysis and forecasting re-
search is a high priority. The African Coast and southwestern
United States sites enjoy more stable and predictable weather.
Recommendations
The first priority to achieve an acceptable degree of landing
safety and to have a sensible base to work from for improvement is
to implement the recommendations of the Rogers Commission and
the Committee on the landing gear system improvement to attain
an operational capability. Then:
Instrument the system, and schedule all landings at Edwards
runway for systematic concurrent testing until the landing
gear system is understood.
Write a clean sheet set of rules based on results.
Determine the risk of accident with the B-747 Shuttle Carri-
er Aircraft (SCA) and its impact upon the Shuttle program.
Extend every reasonable effort to assure a mission planning
process to minimize the need for abort site landings.
Reevaluate and determine the degree of risk acceptable at
abort site landings and bring abort site capability up to meet
that risk level.
Expand astronaut matched team flight landing practice to
cover all known exigencies. Propose additional training craft if
necessary.
Join in a venture with NOAA to invent new technology and
techniques to learn new ways to understand the dynamics of
Cape Kennedy weather phenomena to supplant current inad-
equacy to forecast two hours ahead.
Discussion
This discussion assumes that landing gear system improvements
are to be implemented. The substance of the testimony and results
of the Committee investigation are fairly clear.
The EAFB runway will remain the primary programmed landing
site for the duration of the Shuttle program simply because of the
capricious nature of the Cape weather. All landing parameters
favor Edwards runway as the best for safety and it approaches 100
percent predictable availability.
The safety of Rogers dry lake is permanently compromised be-
cause of the lake bed surface. Its firmness and surface strength are
variable and the surface has considerable debris scattered on it.
Should the tires blow on one strut, it would dig in and the Orbiter
would not be controllable as it would be on a concrete runway with
nose wheel steering and brakes. This is also true of stabilized later-
al and longitudinal overrun areas of the concrete runway.
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From the body of testimony, it can be deduced that given a land-
ing gear system that meets operational requirements, acceptable
weather, and an adequately trained pilot, the Orbiter can consist-
ently achieve the acceptable level of low risk landings that was
originally intended at Edwards and KSC. The worst KSC case is
the heavy weight abort Return To Launch Site (RTLS) landing.
Night landings at these sites add an element of risk that cannot be
evaluted until day landing confidence is restored. The only astro-
naut testimony on night landings was not favorable. _2o
Landing safety at remote abort sites presents, by far, the worst
case including all facets of navigation, weather, energy manage-
ment, depth of pilot training, other air traffic intrusion, alignment,
approach, heavy weight high speed landing, narrow and short run-
ways, and fire and rescue support, and perhaps even terrorism or
sabotage. In short, the classical emergency landing is just that--an
emergency landing. It will surely test the skill of the pilot. The
only sure cure for abort landing exposure is a successful launch.
Testimony gave reference to one RTLS site (KSC), five TAL
(Trans Atlantic or Trans Abort Site) sites (Casablanca, Dakar,
Moron, Rota, Zaragoza), and three AOA (Abort Once Around) sites
(EAFB, White Sands Northrop, KSC). At least one each of these
must be available within the rules of visibility, wind, dew point,
precipitation, ceiling, cloud cover, turbulence, and gusts, and pro-
vide TACAN, MLS, PAPI (Precision Approach Path Indicators),
and Ball Bar lights as deemed necessary for the mission; the RTLS
within 25 minutes of launch, the TAL at about 35 minutes, and the
AOA in an hour and 45 minutes.
The Orbiter is not a good handling airplane to fly. The Orbiter
landing is the most demanding task of airmanship expected of an
aviator today. It is a complex and sophisticated blend of automa-
tion, systems management, and manual skills:
The Orbiter re-enters with a 1100 mile cross track capability
to begin the Terminal Area Management phase, 52 miles out
at Mach 2.5 and 82,000 feet.
Computer energy management delivers the Orbiter to the
alignment circle on TACAN where the pilot takes over at
three minutes out on a 19 degree glide scope aligning on PAPI
lights.
At 13,000 feet, 6 miles and two minutes out, he initiates flare
to intercept the 1.5 degree glide slope at 275 knots.
Guiding on the Ball Bar lights, he approaches and lands
around 200 knots depending on his weight.
At 140 to 120 knots, he begins to brake and decelerates to a
stop.
If MLS terminal navigation is not available, the pilot can rely
upon onboard radar for precision altitude and use his heads up dis-
play to assist what is nominally a visual approach and landing.
There is no room for computer, navigation or pilot error. Training
aircraft training and practice is an element of major importance to
successful Orbiter landings under the variety of conditions facing
the pilots. Unrationed crew team flight training is deemed essen-
12o Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, p. 1455.
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tial to landing safety. Conversely, suggested autoland systems for
this application did not find much support because they would pose
a whole new development and certification hazard.
Landing safety will make a lot more sense if and when the cloud
of imminent landing gear system failure is dissipated. That has
been a pervasive note through the entire testimony and investiga-
tion.
Issue 2
Has adequate provision been made for crew safety in case of in-
flight emergencies? That is, has adequate provision been given to
launch abort options and crew escape options?
Findings
1. Crew escape options were considered when the Shuttle was
originally designed and the basic situation has not changed. Many
initially attractive options do not significantly reduce risk to the
crew either because they may not reduce exposure to the principal
hazards or because they add risks of their own.
2. A crew escape system for use in controlled gliding flight might
be feasible and worthwhile.
3. Crew escape during the ascent phase appears infeasible.
4. Launch abort during SRB burn appears impossible but it may
be possible to decrease risk to the crew after SRB separation, pri-
marily through mission design.
Recommendation
NASA should continue to respond to the recommendations of the
Rogers Commission regarding (i) crew escape during controlled
gliding flight and (ii) increasing the possibility, of successful emer-
gency runway landings. NASA should re-examine all crew survival
options and report to the Committee on its findings.
Discussion
Before addressing the particulars of the findings and recommen-
dations regarding launch abort and crew escape a few general com-
ments on safety and risk will establish a useful framework.
Any new safety equipment installed on the Orbiter will bring
with it its own new risks. It will also add weight to the Orbiter and
will have associated capital and operating costs. Each of these must
be addressed.
New Risks.--Consider for example the possibility of adding.ejec-
tion seats to the Orbiter. The United States Air Force expermnce
with ejection seats has been that they are only about 80 percent
effective. 121 The point is that ejection seats are not a panacea. Any
safety equipment has a chance of failing; ejection seats in particu-
lar always have a potential of premature activation which would
result in the crew being ejected when there is no need.
Additional Weight.--In order to accomplish its purpose, the
Shuttle must put payloads, i.e., weight, in orbit. Adding weight to
12 Briefin_ to Committee Staff May 28 1986 "Report of the First Stage Abort Options Histo-
ry Task Group Chartered by the Mission Planning and Operations Team --Barney Roberts, Ad-
vanced Programs Office, Johnson Space Center.
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the Orbiter reduces the payload weight that can be orbited and
therefore reduces the justification for the program. This is perhaps
made clearer by considering a reductio ad absurdurn. Suppose one
could develop a new escape system--perhaps an ejection pod which
could reduce risks to the crew by 90 percent but weighed approxi-
mately 65,000 pounds. Since the Shuttle payload capability is only
about 65,000 pounds there would be no remaining payload capacity
in the Shuttle, and some risk would still remain. There would be
no point to installing such a system because it would be a very bad
trade. Evidently, one must do an engineering cost-benefit calcula-
tion and decide if the benefit is worth the penalty for each pro-
posed change.
New Costs.--The same type of cost-benefit calculation must be
done in the financial dimension. It is important to emphasize that
the question is not "how much is a life worth?," but rather "where
can an extra amount of funding best be spent to reduce total risk
to the crew, the mission, and the Orbiter?"
Risks will never be zero--what NASA must do is to better under.
stand the risks and minimize the most dangerous exposures.
The risk, cost and weight penalties of crew escape systems that
could hope to operate effectively while the SRB are thrusting are
very large. This dictates that it is much more efficient to put pro-
gram resources into reducing risks by improving the reliability of
the SRB's and the whole Shuttle system during the period of time
that the SRB's are thrusting. For example, if one of the SRB's
should develop a problem so that there was a need to separate the
Orbiter from the SRB's and External Tank, it is essentially impos-
sible to do this successfully while the SRB's are still thrusting.
There are potential means of terminating SRB thrust which
amount to explosively opening holes in the rocket casing. The holes
allow the burning gases to exit the casing at several places so that
there is no net thrust. Such a mechanism has the potential of pre-
mature activation which could lead to loss of the crew and the mis-
sion. In addition, the resulting deceleration loads on the Orbiter
would require significant redesign, if the Orbiter were to sur-
vive. 1 2 2
A large part of the problem is that the launch situation is very
dynamic. Decisions and implementation of decisions must be made
very rapidly. The decisions are binary; that is, either "go" or "no-
go," and the implementation must be largely automated for speed
of execution. Thus, if a premature activation begins it will almost
certainly go to completion.
In the case of 51-L accident, the first ambiguous indication of a
problem came at about 65 seconds into the mission. At 72 seconds
the system was coming apart and by 74 seconds the Orbiter was
destroyed. The first signs of trouble were ambiguous because indi-
cations that the Orbiter was adjusting to aerodynamic forces due to
the leak in the SRB joint appear very similar to signals generated
when the Orbiter responded to upper atmosphere winds. It would
be very risky to initiate any kind of crew escape action based on
122Cmte Ugs, Transcript, June 25, 1986, pp. 132-35, 139-41. Former astronaut, General
Thomas Stafford, testified strongly in favor of crew escape systems but seemed to represent a
minority view.
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this sort of signal. The Solid Rocket Boosters began coming off the
system at 72 seconds, after which an escape system might well
have been inoperable due to mechanical deformations of the Orbit-
er structure under the aerodynamic loads that resulted. Thus,
there was a period of time of something less than 9 seconds during
which some kind of escape system might have been able to help the
crew. It seems clear that attempting to develop a system to respond
effectively to a situation such as this would be unproductive and
that it would be wiser to improve the safety and realiability of the
system during this ascent phase.
After the termination of SRB thrust, immediate crew escape is
difficult because the Orbiter has achieved a very high altitude.
However, under a range of circumstances it is possible to fly the
Orbiter back to a controlled gliding landing at a runway. Under
other circumstances, for example if the main engines fail shortly
after SRB termination, the Orbiter may be forced to ditch into the
ocean and such a ditching is not survivable.
Therefore the Rogers Commission recommended, and the Com-
mittee agrees, that NASA should attempt to minimize these risks.
That is, NASA should take steps to increase the probability of the
Orbiter being able to fly to a landing site and NASA should at-
tempt to develop a way for the crew to escape from controlled glid-
ing flight, for example, if the Orbiter is approaching a ditching or a
crash landing.
After SRB termination a principal risk is that the Orbiter could
lose one, two or three main engines. Depending on when and how
this occurred it might be possible to fly the Orbiter to a landing
site. It may be possible and perhaps practical to increase the proba-
bility of the Orbiter successfully accomplishing this maneuver
through flight design. That is, it might be possible to accept some-
what reduced payloads and achieve more conservative trajectories
which would minimize the exposure of the Orbiter to ditching or
crash landing if main engine failure were to occur during the
accent phase.
If the Orbiter finds itself in a situation (due to Main Engine fail-
ure or other failure) where it cannot fly to a runway but is other-
wise under control, the crew might be able to escape during the
controlled gliding descent. This would apply not only during the
ascent phase but also during the landing phase. For example, if the
reentry trajectory were miscalculated and the Orbiter could not
reach the planned landing site the crew might have adequate time
to bail out. There is a change that such a bailout system could be
achievable with acceptable performance penalties. Certainly this
last option--crew bail-out during gliding flight--must be very care-
fully studied.
The trade offs and calculations that have to be made in the area
of crew escape and launch abort are activities in which astronaut
involvement would be most useful.
Astronauts clearly represent the principal source of flight experi-
ence and therefore can make major inputs to decisions regarding
what is practical to accomplish during flight. It is pointless to add
risks, weight, and cost for a system that cannot be operated by the
astronauts during flight conditions. Involvement of astronauts in
management is discussed in section VI. B. 2. a. of this report.
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In summary,spaceflight will alwaysbea boldand dangerous
venture.NASAmustwork to betterunderstandthe risksof space
flight and in particular the risks of eachShuttle launchand to
reducetheseto anacceptablelevel.
B. MANAGEMENT ISSUE
1. TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT
a. Risk Management Issues
Issue
There a coordinated and effective risk management program in
the NSTS?
Findings
1. NASA does not explicitly use a centralized program that co-
ordinates all the factors that encompass an adequate risk manage-
ment program.
2. As a result of the accident, NASA is reexamining the Failure
Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEA) and Hazard Analyses (HA) to
reassess risks associated with the designs of Shuttle subsystems.
3. NASA's lack of statistical data on the performance of certain
components will limit the usefulness of sound engineering judg-
ment in much the same way as it limits the usefulness of probabi-
listic risk assessment.
Recommendations
1. NASA should develop and provide to the Committee a descrip-
tion of an overall risk management program as it relates to the
Space Shuttle. This effort should include a determination of wheth-
er or not a more centralized coordination of a risk management
program and issuance of direct risk management guidance direc-
tives are needed.
2. NASA should review analytical methods utilized in the per-
formance of risk assessment, including statistical analyses, trend
analyses and probabilistic risk assessment methodologies to deter-
mine their applicability to the NSTS program. Assistance from the
National Academy of Sciences, or other appropriate organizations
with expertise in these matters, may be required to adequately per-
form this review.
3. NASA should review its certification testing to ensure that all
critical items are adequately tested. Data obtained from these tests
should be used when appropriate in conducting a formal risk as-
sessment.
Discussion
NASA does not have a specifically labeled risk management pro-
gram. The process is accomplished by the agency through its con-
figuration management program and the FMEA performed on each
component of the Space Shuttle. The identification of critical items
is the principal product of these analyses. The ability to make the
programmatic or engineering changes necessary to enhance the
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safety and performance of flight systems while controlling costs
and schedule is the task of the risk management activity.
The process of risk management as applied to systems such as
the Shuttle can be described schematically as shown in Figure VI-
3, _2a which shows the various steps that might be imposed upon
flight systems such as the Shuttle through a risk management pro-
gram.
t2s Douglas B. Feaver, "Success Relaxed NASA's Vigilence", Washington Post, May 26, 1986,
pp. A-l, A-10.
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RISKMANAGEMENT;DECIDINGHOWSAFE IS SAFE?
FIGURE VI-3
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Top NASA managers lack a clear understanding of risk manage-
ment. Dr. Fletcher, NASA's Administrator, made the following
statement, when asked by Mrs. Lloyd to "describe the elements of
NASA's risk management activities . . .":
Well, risk management is a pretty generic term. Risk
management is decided in Headquarters in terms of what
are the chances of an overall failure of a system under a
given set of circumstances. When you get down to the
flight team, the launch crew in those last several hours or
couple of days, risk management is an entirely different
thing. They have to look at the factors that have come up
just before launch and assess whether this is a risk we
want to take. This is a judgement question; you can't make
calculations at this point. 124
Dr. Silveira, NASA's Chief Engineer, testified on the same day
that,
As we had mentioned in the testimony that we gave pre-
viously .... the only time that we had gone into trying to
assess a probability, if you will, or a risk, was as a result of
a request that was made by DOE for their analysis that
they were performing at that time, to assess the probabili-
ty of failure of the vehicle, to assess the danger when we
are flying the RTG's, the radioactive material.
As far as in our program, and any major decisions that
we would make, we have a number of reasons why our
past history had indicated that that was not a good way of
doing it. As a result, we don't use it generally in our risk
management, we prefer using things like the failure ef-
fects and analysis that we do; the technical engineering
judgement, using things to control our failures rather than
depending upon a probability analysis to assess it. 125
However, Mr. Robert Thompson, who was Shuttle Program Man-
ager from 1970 to 1972, testified on July 24th before the Committee
in a much less ambiguous fashion regarding his view on the impor-
tance of risk management:
I would first like to make an observation on the deci-
sionmaking process. Evidence, in retrospect, points to a
long period of time, especially based on post-flight inspec-
tions when the joint design weakness was 'sending a mes-
sage' and the true potential of this message was not per-
ceived and reacted to.
This, combined with perlaunch discussions between Mar-
shall and Thiokol, points out the need that must pervade
the Shuttle management team in the future. A very strong
risk management... I have parentheses around risk
management. ! will be happy to expand on that. It has a
certain meaning to me. A very strong risk management or-
ganization must be kept in place and a continuing search
for potential failures must be maintained ....
_24 Cmt Hags, Transcript, June 12, 1986, p. 186.
_2s Ibid. p. 187.
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The role of the program manager in this risk manage-
ment organization must be very strong and clear. The
entire program organization from top to bottom must be
clearly chartered and as people come and go these organi-
zational relationships must be carefully maintained. 126
Based upon the divergences of these testimonies, the Committee
concluded that although NASA's Space Transportation System pro-
gram contains the elements of a risk management program, there
needs to be a new and heightened coordination of the separate ac-
tivities by NASA in order to minimize the risks inherent in Shuttle
flights.
The FMEAs determine the worst case "What if" scenarios for all
possible failure modes and their potential worst case or intended
effects. 12v As a result of performing the FMEA, a list of critical
items is identified. NASA's FMEA assure that all Criticality 1 and
1R systems are properly identified and classified. The failure of
these items would produce loss of life and/or loss of vehicle. The
FMEA applies strictly to the hardware associated with the NSTS
and is '"bottoms-up" analysis, in which a single component failure
is traced and its effect on a particular subsystem, subsystem inter-
faces, and the overall flight systems is determined. Accompanying
the FMEA is the Hazard Analyses (HA) which is, according to
NASA, a "top-down" approach that takes into account human fac-
tors in evaluating the consequences of particular accidents or acci-
dent scenarios. Hazard Analysis is the basic tool of the safety eval-
uation.
The FMEA as used by NASA assigns no probability numbers to
event sequences along a given failure path. Although NASA re-
gards the methodology of FMEA as rigorous, within the agency
there was a wide variation in the engineering judgments among
the design engineers and senior management in the NSTS program
on the probability of failure of the Shuttle. 12s The Committee, in
hearings held earlier this year related to the safety aspects of the
Shuttle Centaur in its utilization of Radioisotope Thermoelectric
Generators on board the Shuttle spacecraft, also found wide dis-
crepancies in the estimate of the failure probability for the Solid
Rocket Booster among the experts. 129
NASA has rejected the use of probability on the basis that such
techniques are insufficient to assure that adequate safety margins
can be applied to protect the lives of the crew. They also argue that
their problem correction procedures preclude the establishment of
a sufficient statistical database, because once a single point failure
has been identified through the FMEA, steps are taken to design
_6 Ibid., July 24, 1986, p. 106.
_27 It is the prime responsibility of the design engineers working with reliability analysts to
perform the FMEA in accordance with guidelines established in NASA documents (Appendix
VI-C). These documents are provided as part of each statement of work submitted to the con-
tractor. From such FMEAs, a Critical Items List is established in which particular components
under the responsibility of the contractor are categorized in accordance with their criticality to
the mission, crew, and/or spacecraft. Included as Appendix VI-D is NASA's document 100-2G
entitled Reliability Desk Instruction, Flight Hardware Failure Mode and Effects Analyses
(FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL).
12s Rogers Commission Report, Volume II, p. F-4.
_2# Hearing before Subcommittee on Energy Research and Production and Subcommittee on
Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science andTechnology, 99th Cong., 2nd
Sess., March 4, 1986 (No. 97). "Review of RTG Utilization in Space Missions."
143
the safety features into the component, thereby eliminating the
failure mode or establishing sufficient redundancy to preclude cata-
strophic failures associated with the particular component. This
change of the component means that earlier data no longer apply.
On the other hand, with respect to certification testing of the
Space Shuttle Main Engine, NASA seems to argue that a useful
statistical data base can be generated even though the configura-
tion of the engine is changed as data is accumulated. That is, as
running time is accumulated in SSME certification testing, major
components--e.g., the high pressure turbopumps--are replaced,
and yet NASA seems to believe that the total accumulated running
time has some meaning for determining engine life time. 13o
All subsystems of the NSTS are intended to meet design require-
ments that incorporate the fail-safe features as a minimum with
fail-operational/fail-safe criteria placed on all Orbiter avionics sys-
tems. TM Fail-safe requirements are defined as designs which can
withstand a single failure and permit return of the crew to the
ground safely. Fail-operational/fail-safe is defined as permitting
two sequential failures while enabling crew return. There are some
parts of the NSTS which must be exempted from meeting these cri-
teria. The reason is that it is not possible to improve the safety fea-
tures of these systems through redundancy or other means. Such
systems are the primary structure, the thermal protection system,
pressure vessels and the premature firing mode of the pyrotech-
nics. For example, the pressure vessel cannot be provided with re-
dundancy in a safe manner because addition of another pressure
vessel would only enhance the failure probability or the criticality
of this component.
The FMEA is a very conservative analysis according to NASA
since it provides information on worst case situations of all possible
failure modes and the potential worst case effects. Even so, the
Committee was unable to determine the degree to which flight
anomalies and trend analyses in historical performance data are
utilized to insure that the appropriate measures are taken in the
design and testing of various critical components to assure ultimate
safety and minimization of risk.
NASA is presently reviewing the 748 Criticality 1 items and the
1,621 Criticality 1R items. Based upon a series of tests and analyses
and the availability of methods and instrumentation to detect prob-
lems associated with various Criticality 1 and 1R items, waivers
are given to permit flight of critical items. Before a waiver is grant-
ed, according to NASA, extensive documentation and review of
each item on the Critical Items List (CIL) for which a waiver has
been applied must be undertaken and approved all the way
through Level 1 management. There is a difference between the
number of waivers granted and the total number of items on the
Critical Items List. For Criticality-1 items this difference reflects
the number of systems exempted from the criteria of fail-safe or
fail-operational/fail-safe. NASA, however, does not distinguish in
its quality control procedure between exempted items and those
items which are not exempt from the waiver process. According to
tso Rogers Commission Report, Volume II, pp. K25-26.
1sl NASA Briefing on July 10, 1986.
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NASA, this categorization of exempt versus waiver is strictly a
management technique for identifying components and systems on
the Space Shuttle in terms of their safety compatibility.
The Committee finds the FMEA to be an appropriate method for
identifying the Critical 1 and 1R elements of the NSTS; however,
not all the elements so identified pose an equal threat. Without
some means of estimating the probability of failure of the various
elements it is not clear how NASA can focus its attention and re-
sources as effectively as possible on the most critical systems.
Moreover, waivers can be granted without assurance that an ade-
quate level of safety has been achieved.
b. Launch Decision Process
Issue 1
Is the process for establishing launch constraints and dealing
with them effective?
Findings
1. There is no clear understanding or agreement among the vari-
ous levels of NASA management as to what constitutes a launch
constraint or the process for imposing and waiving constraints.
2. Launch constraints were often waived after developing a ra-
tionale for accepting the problem rather than correcting the prob-
lem; moreover, this rationale was not always based on sound engi-
neering or scientific principles.
Recommendations
1. NASA should establish rigorous procedures for identifying and
documenting launch constraints. The individual(s) responsible for
implementing this procedure should be clearly identified, and well
defined and understood criteria for waiving the constraints should
be established.
2. NASA should exercise extreme caution in waiving launch con-
straints before correcting the problem that led to the launch con-
straint. The rationale should be based on rigorous scientific/engi-
neering analyses or tests and should be understood and accepted by
the Program Manager.
Discussion
No single system exists for establishing and dealing with launch
constraints within the Shuttle Program; for example, Marshall
maintains their own system through their Problem Assessment
Center (PAC) to deal with problems affecting the propulsion
system. In testimony before the Rogers Commission, Mr. Mulloy ex-
plained that the system was established to provide visability for
problems relating to the propulsion system and a "launch con-
straint" was in effect a flag to alert the Project Office to address
the problem at the Flight Readiness Review.
A launch constraint means that we have to address the
observations, see if we have seen anything on the previous
145
flight that changesour previousrationale,and address
that at the FlightReadinessReview.132
TheNSTSProgramManagerstatedthat hewasunawarethat a
launchconstrainthad beenimposedasa result of the O-ringero-
sion.Unawarenessof this launchconstraintwasalsoclaimedby
theLevelI ProgramOfficeandkeyThiokolpersonnel:Mssrs.Ebel-
ing,Kilminster,Russell,McDonald,andBoisjoly.133
In staffbriefings,it wassuggestedby NASApersonnelthat per-
haps"launch constraint"wasa poor choiceof wordsto describe
this processfor flaggingproblems.Thoseindividualswhoclaimed
no knowledgeof a launch constraint had certainly beenmade
awareof the O-ringerosionproblem.Thisproblemandthe resolu-
tionhadbeendiscussedthroughoutthe systemincludingtheFRRs.
Therefore,althoughit is difficult to understandwhy the Program
Managerandothersweren'tmorefamiliar with the MarshallPAS,
asa practicalmatter it probablyhadlittle effecton the final deci-
sions.These"launchconstraints"werepotentialproblemsthat had
to be resolvedprior to flight and the Level III ProjectManagers
wereresponsiblefor resolvinganyproblemsdealingwith their sys-
tems. During the RogersCommissionhearings,Mr. Mulloy ac-
knowledgedthat he had ultimate responsibilityfor waiving the
launchconstraintsandultimateresponsibilityfor the launchreadi-
nessof theSolidRocketBoosters.
Althoughthe O-ringerosioncontinuedto occur,andwith noap-
parent pattern, the SRBProjectManagerrepeatedlywaivedthe
launch constraint.Throughoutthe RogersCommissionhearings
and the hearingsof the Committeeon Scienceand Technology,
NASA witnessescontinuallyjustified their decisionto continue
flying the Shuttlebasedon their previoussuccessfulflights. This
relianceon their "experiencebase"wasa majorfactor in the re-
peatedwaiversof the Marshallimposedlaunchconstrainton the
SRBs.ChairmanRogersaskedMr. Mulloywhatwasmeantby "ad-
dressing"the problem,andMr. Mulloyresponded:
I meanpresentthe dataas to whetheror not whatwe
haveseenin our mostrecentobservation,whichmaynot
bethe last flight, it maybetheflight beforethat, is within
our experiencebaseandwhetheror not the previousanal-
ysesand teststhat previouslyconcludedthat wasan ac-
ceptablesituationis still valid, baseduponlater observa-
tions.13 4
Mr. Mulloy also explained his reliance on the experience base in
testimony before the Science and Technology Committee:
That was presented to me as a rationale to continue
flying, one we had seen it on STS-2, what we saw on the
last flight wasn't as bad, therefore it was an acceptable
risk. 13 5
_a2 Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, p. 1513.
1an Ibid., p. 1590; note: Yet it was Mr. McDonald who wrote a letter to the SRB Project Office
recommending that the O-ring problem be dropped from the Problem Assessment System (PAS},
which was in fact equivalent to removing the launch constraint.
_a4 Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, p. 1513.
_a5 Crate Hgs, Transcript, June 17, 1986, p. 151.
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The Committee concurs with Dr. Feynman's analysis that NASA
had no understanding of the O-ring erosion phenomenon, and their
rationale for accepting it was not based on sound engineering prin-
ciples.
• . . The acceptance and success of these flights is taken
as evidence of safety. But erosion and blow-by are not
what the design expected. They are warnings that some-
thing is wrong .... The fact that this danger did not lead
to a catastrophe before is no guarantee that it will not the
next time, unless it is completely understood .... The
origin and consequences of the erosion and blow-by were
not understood.., officials behaved as if they understood
it, giving apparently logical arguments to each other often
depending on the "success" of previous flights. 136
Issue 2
Are the launch commit criteria procedures adequate to ensure
the safety of the mission?
Findings
1. The procedure used for developing launch commit criteria is
systematic and thorough; however, violations of the criteria do not
necessarily mean "no go". Therefore, NASA sometimes relied on
engineering judgments made during the terminal countdown in de-
termining whether to launch.
2. Launch commit criteria were sometimes waived without ade-
quate engineering analysis or understanding of the technical rea-
sons for establishing the criteria.
Recommendations
1. NASA should review the launch commit criteria procedures,
especially those for dealing with violations, to lessen the reliance
on engineering judgments under stress.
2. When situations arise where "real time" engineering judg-
ments are unavoidable, NASA should adopt a more conservative
approach to waiving previously established criteria. In no case
should a criterion be waived without a thorough understanding of
the rationale for the establishment of the criterion.
Discussion
Launch commit criteria define limits on specific system param-
eters which are required to be monitored during the terminal
countdown. When these limits are exceeded the launch is held
until the condition is corrected or an acceptable alternate capabil-
ity or procedure is instituted.
Proposed criteria are developed by NASA and contractor person-
nel and are submitted to the NSTS Program Office for review and
disposition. All changes are controlled by the Level II PRCB (Pro-
gram Requirements Change Board) and all launch commit criteria
are reviewed prior to each flight at the launch site flow review (8
weeks prior to launch), the Flight Readiness Review and the L-1
136 Rogers Commission Report, Volume If, p. F-1.
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review. Where practical Launch Commit Criteria include pre-
planned decisions on courses of action to be taken when violations
occur.
The process described for developing and controlling the launch
commit criteria is systematic and thorough; however, in briefings
by NASA personnel it was learned that it is not uncommon to ex-
perience violations of the specified limits. These can often be re-
solved in a straight forward manner based on a prior plan of
action; however, the Committee is concerned that in those situa-
tions where no preplanned course of action is available, real time
engineering decisions are being made under the stress that is in-
herent in a pre-launch environment. This is particularly undesir-
able when it is perceived that there are pressures to launch.
For example, it was learned that on the morning of the sched-
uled launch of STS 51-L the Mission Evaluation Room (MER) Man-
ager requested a waiver of the Launch Commit Criteria lower limit
of 31 degrees F. Is7 The Flight Director can not unilaterally waive
launch commit criteria and since the temperature at launch was
above 31 degrees it became unnecessary to pursue the matter fur-
ther. Had it been necessary to waive the criterion, the Flight Direc-
tor would have advised the Program Manager who then would
have orally polled the Project Managers before making the final
decision. One can only conjecture at this point what the decision
would have been; however, the Committee is concerned that at
least two key managers in the decision making chain (i.e. the MER
Manager and the Flight Director) were prepared to waive the crite-
rion without thoroughly understanding it.
Issue 8
Are the launch readiness review procedures and communications
adequate?
Finding
The Committee finds that the review procedures and communica-
tions used to assure flight readiness were systematic, thorough, and
comprehensive and provided ample opportunity for surfacing hard-
ware problems prior to flight. Level I FRRs are usually recorded
(audio); however, there is often no record made of other key pre-
launch meetings.
Recommendation
NASA should make every reasonable effort to record meetings
where key decisions might be made; in particular, all formal Flight
Readiness Reviews, including the L-1 and the Mission Manage-
ment Team meeting should be recorded, where feasible by video.
Discussion
The Flight Readiness Review process encompasses a series of re-
views beginning with contractor reviews of their systems, and
going through the Project Management review (Level III), and
NSTS Program Management review (the "Pre-FRR"), and culmi-
i sv Rogers Commission Report, Volume II, pp. J22-23.
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nating in the Level I (Headquarters) review which isreferred to as
"the" FRR. One additional formal review takes place 24 hours
before launch and iscalled the "L-I" review. This isconducted by
the Mission Management Team (MMT) which is appointed by the
Associate Administrator for Space Flight at the time he callsfor
the FRR. All open work and action items identifiedat the FRR are
closed out at the L-I. In addition to conducting the L-1 review, the
MMT functions as a technical advisory body for the Program Man-
ager and ison callbeginning 48 hours before the launch until after
the mission iscompleted and the Orbiter issafed.
The Committee concurs with the Rogers Commission that NASA
should record key pre-launch meetings; however, the Committee
finds no basis for concluding that the Flight Readiness Review pro-
cedure isflawed; on the contrary, the procedure appears to be ex-
ceptionallythorough and the scope of the issuesthat are addressed
at the FRRs issufficientto surface any problems that the contrac-
tors or NASA management deem appropriate to surface. However,
the Flight Readiness Reviews are not intended to replace engineer-
ing analysis,and therefore, they cannot be expected to prevent a
flightbecause of a design flaw that management had already deter-
mined represented an acceptable risk.In addition all the appropri-
ate offices,including the Chief Engineer representing SR&QA, are
represented at the FRRs. Specifically,from the firstevidence of O-
ring erosion to the final decision to launch 51-L, the process pro-
vided ample opportunity to review and assess the severity of the
problems; moreover, all levels of NASA management were made
aware of the erosion.Iz8 However, a process is only as effectiveas
the responsible individuals make it.For example, see section VI
B.2.c.on the weakness in the SR&QA organization.
Issue
Was the failure to inform the Level I or Level II Program Man-
agers of the Teleconference involving NASA and Morton Thiokol
on the eve of the launch a factor in the decision to launch?
Findings
1. The Committee finds that Marshall management used poor
judgment in not informing the NSTS Program Manager or the
Level I Manager of the events that took place the night before the
launch, specifically the stated concerns of the Thiokol engineers.
However, the Committee finds no evidence to support a suggestion
that the outcome would have been any different had they been
told.
2. The Committee finds the efforts of Thiokol engineers to post-
pone the launch commendable; however, Thiokol had numerous op-
portunities throughout the normal flight readiness process follow-
ing flight 51-C in January, 1985 to have the new minimum temper-
ature criteria established.
138 Ibid., pp. H1-97.
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Discussion
The management of the Shuttle Program has given the responsi-
bility for the Solid Rocket Boosters to the Marshall Space Flight
Center. It is the Marshall Center that contracts with Thiokol for
the hardware and related services pertaining to the SRBs. The
NSTS Program Manager relies on the Marshall management and
technical expertise for issues relating to the SRB and it is unrea-
sonable to expect him to take technical advice from the contrac-
tor's engineers. This position is supported by the actions taken by
Mr. Aldrich and Mr. Moore with regard to the Rockwell concerns
over ice. _39 Unlike the SRB situation where the Thiokol managers
gave a written positive recommendation for launch, the Rockwell
managers refused to give an unqualified go for launch; yet Mr. Ald-
rich asked for and accepted the recommendations of the Orbiter
Project Manager and the Directors of Engineering at JSC and KSC.
The Committee finds no evidence to suggest that in the instance of
the Thiokol engineers' concerns, either Mr. Aldrich or Mr. Moore
would have disregarded the recommendation of the technical man-
agers with the expertise in solid rockets (i.e. Marshall and Thiokol)
and relied instead on their own assessment of the engineers' con-
cerns.
Launch commit criteria and launch constraints should be estab-
lished well in advance of a scheduled mission and should be based
on rational, scientific and engineering arguments, including previ-
ous flight experience. Thiokol engineers based their arguments for
a 53 degree temperature criteria on the fact that this was the cold-
est temperature experienced to date and they had experienced
severe (but not necessarily the worst) erosion on that flight. Howev-
er, a test firing had been conducted at 40 degrees joint temperature
which resulted in no joint problems (technicians had "tamped" the
joint putty before the test, however, a procedure not used on flight
hardware). Moreover, it was pointed out in the hearing that this
flight had occurred a year earlier and no mention had been made
of changing the temperature criteria for launch.
Mr. VOLKMER. But in all of the memorandums, et cetera,
that had occurred before--in-between the time, January
1985 and January 1986, you don't specifically say
that ....
Mr. BoISJOLY. That is right, . . . It was nobody's expec-
tation we would ever experience any cold weather to that
degree before we had a chance to fix it again, so that basi-
cally is why it wasn't pursued any further than that from
my personal standpoint. _4o
That was later questioned by Mr. Nelson in remembering that
flight 61-C (the flight just prior to 51-L) had been scrubbed four
times for reasons unrelated to temperature when the temperatures
were less than 53 degrees during several of those scrubs, reaching
down into the low 40s during the first scheduled launch.
is9 Ibid., Volume I, pp. 114-17.
l,o Cmte Hgs, Transcript, June 18, 1986, pp. 83-84.
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Mr. NELSON .... and so my question is, did any of these
same concerns with the temperature come up in discus-
sions during the final checks before those attempted
launches?
Mr. MCDONALD. I am not aware that they had, Congress-
man. I don't know. I wasn't at that launch, but I don't
recall that that came up. '41
Mr. Nelson later asked the Commander of 61-C, Cdr. Robert L.
Gibson, whether he recalled any discussion among management or
any of the contractors regarding the desirability of launching in 41
degree weather; Commander Gibson also recalled no special con-
cerns regarding temperature. 142
Mr. Packard also questioned Mr. McDonald about the tempera-
ture during earlier attempts to launch 51-L and asked whether in
fact it had been below 53 degrees during some of those attempts.
Mr. McDonald replied, "That is correct", and when asked whether
temperature had been discussed at those times, Mr. McDonald said,
"No, it was not . . . Nowhere was it, no." Mr. Packard also asked
why, in Mr. McDonald's judgment, temperature had not been dis-
cussed in as much as the temperature was below what they be-
lieved to be safe, and Mr. McDonald answered, "I don't--I can't
answer that." 143
Mr. Packard also noted the delay in evaluating the effects of
temperature, quoting from Mr. Kilminster's testimony, "As launch
was scheduled for early the next day, our engineers immediately
commenced evaluating the available data." He asked why they
waited until the night before the launch to begin even considering
the whole question of O-ring resiliency and O-ring problems under
cold weather conditions. Mr. Kilminster replied that this was in re-
sponse to a specific request by NASA. _44
This indicated that the concerns and recommendations of the
Thiokol engineers were solicited by NASA, and in as much as they
had not come forth with the recommendation for a higher mini-
mum temperature criterion on earlier occasions when it was
planned to launch at temperatures below 53 degrees, it is unlikely
that this recommendation would have been made on this occasion
without the specific inquiry by NASA.
The Committee finds no evidence that new data were presented
during the January 27th teleconference that were not available to
Thiokol at the time of the Flight Readiness Review. Moreover, the
information presented was substantially the same as that present-
ed at the August 19th briefing (see Section VIII) at which time they
had recommended that it was safe to fly as long as the joints were
leaked checked to 200 psi, were free from contamination in the seal
area and met O-ring squeeze requirements. No mention was made
of a temperature constraint at that time or anytime between then
and the January 27th teleconference.
The Committee finds that Thiokol's advice and recommendations
to NASA were inconsistent, and therefore, the arguments present-
L*'Ibid., p. 98.
'4_lbid., June 25, 1986, p. 78.
'4slbid., June 18, 1986, p. 100.
_44Ibid., p. 101.
151
ed during the January 27th teleconference might not have been as
persuasive at the time as they now appear to be in hindsight.
Issue 5
Do the principal contractors have an appropriate role in the
launch decision making process?
Finding
The principal contractors have an active role throughout the de-
cision making process right up to the launch; however, the look of
a firm requirement for their concurrence at the time of launch
does partially relieve them of responsibility for mission success.
Recommendation
Principal contractors should be required to make a clear, unam-
biguous statement concerning launch readiness just prior to
launch.
Discussion
Participating contractors are required to sign off prior to launch
that their flight system or facility is ready to support the flight.
This is generally a one-time requirement for a given mission and
although they are orally polled prior to the flight, they are not gen-
erally required to make any additional written positive commit-
ment for a "go" prior to launch. Mr. Richard Davis, President,
Martin Marietta Michoud Aerospace, explained:
Up to and including the L-minus-one-day review, there's
no doubt that every company has a very strong voice; and,
as a matter of fact, at the L-minus-one-day review, they
are required to stand up and commit their hardware as go
or no-go. And those are very unequivocal commitments,
also. After that time, then the reviews are more mission
management meetings that are held, and as you get down
into the countdown, it turns into more of a real time poll-
ing of the people that are actually controlling the launch.
In those latter meetings we are not, I would say, formal-
ly involved in those unless there is some problem with the
hardware itself . . . We are polled by the Director of En-
gineering prior to the launch actually proceeding, so we
are sort of polled in an informal manner. We are not
asked at any time after the L-minus-one-day for a formal
go or no-go. 145
Contractors can stop the launch if they have serious reservations
about the safety of the mission, and presumably they would.
Mr. DAVIS .... I have never felt that if I needed to stop
a launch, I could not stop it. While I have not been asked
for a positive go or no-go, the ability is always there if I
decide no, to stop the launch. 148
145 Ibid., July 15, 1986, pp. 71-72.
146 Ibid., p. 73.
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However, the present system permits them to "express concern"
without actually saying, "stop the flight, it is unsafe". If the odds
favor a successful flight they do not have to be responsible for can-
celling, yet if the mission fails they are on record as having warned
about potential dangers. (see Section V, discussion over Rockwell
concerns over ice)
Issue 6
Are astronauts adequately represented in the decision making
process?
Finding
The astronauts believe they currently have the opportunity to
make inputs into the process and are reluctant to assume a greater
responsibility for the decision to launch.
Discussion
Considerable discussion at the hearing focused on the astronaut's
interest in being more involved in the decision making, for exam-
ple by attending management meetings. Capt. Young made the
point that astronauts really didn't have the time to attend a lot of
meetings, or the technical expertise to influence the decision.
We could certainly put people in those kinds of meet-
ings. I am not sure they have the technical expertise to
really be able to say go or not go. 147
With regard to the SRB seals, he pointed out that he and Cap-
tain Crippen had attended a briefing at Thiokol where it was
stated that the seals weren't even necessary, and some people were
complaining about having to put two seals in. And he suggested
that if others in the agency had understood the problem they
would have stopped the flights.
The rest of the a_ency, if they had been aware of this
problem, we wouldn t have flown. We would have fixed it.
If other people responsible in the management structure
had the feeling this was a serious problem, we wouldn't
have gone. We have to believe that, because there, on the
Orbiter, there are 1500 criticality 1 items on the Orbiter
alone, on STS-1, those items are still there, and if the
management system can't make sure those things are
ready to fly, we can never fly again.
If you have an astronaut saying every step of the way,
don't fly because of this, that or this, where they have no
expertise, it would be troublesome. 14s
Mr. Lujan asked whether NASA should consider a new class of
astronauts with specific technical expertise who would fly occasion-
ally. Capt. Young suggested that this was not a good use of an as-
tronaut's talents.
You can get real good engineers to do the same thing, a
heck of a lot cheaper, and make just as good inputs ....
147 Ibid., June 25, 1986, p. 42.
148 Ibid., p. 44.
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In the main, you like to keep astronauts around to fly
spaceships because that is their talent, and that is what
they want to do .... 149
General McDivitt concurred:
There should be a caution about putting too much respon-
sibility on astronauts, when they don't have the time to do
it. Like the flight crew commander is very busy prior to
flight and does not have time to spend a lot of his time in-
volved in reviewing engineering decisions that have al-
ready been made by very professional people .... 150
In response to suggestions that the astronauts might have
stopped the launch of 51-L had they been aware of the problems
with the seals, Capt. Young provided an excellent analogy to illus-
trate his skepticism that they would have altered the decision to
launch:
If an engine man comes up and says that engine is ready
to fly and the turbine blades are a little cracked but we
have run tests and we can show with a cracked turbine
blade the engine pumps are not going to come apart and
we have got to fly, would an astronaut say no, you are not
going to fly until you change the turbines, for example? 151
There was complete agreement among the astronauts who testi-
fied that the crew should be able to make inputs to the decision
making process, but they all felt they now have this opportunity;
they can and do attend FRRs and other meetings. However, there
was a strong feeling among the astronauts that they had to rely on
the expertise of the engineers and the technical competence of the
managers and could not be expected to intervene in that process.
They believed it was unrealistic to expect the crew to make the go
or no-go decision; astronauts should not be expected to represent
the principal concern for safety.
Major Slayton made the point that astronauts in general were
willing to take more risk than management, not less.
One philosophical point that needs to be brought out
here . . . is that the crew commanders and astronauts in
general view things a little bit different than everybody
else does to begin with and you have to recognize that and
be a little bit cautious.
In general a crew commander, if given a choice, is will-
ing to take more risk than his management. That has been
the case in the past and he is more likely to give you a 'go'
and you need somebody at a higher level that is willing to,
on his behalf, willing to take the bull by the horns and
have the guts to say 'no go' on behalf of the crew. 152
Col. Hartsfield concurred:
149 Ibid., p. 49.
_5o Ibid., p. 53.
_sl Ibid., p. 64.
Bz Ibid., p. 54-55.
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I wanted to say that I feel that it is just like in our own
government, the buck stops at the White House or the
Congress perhaps, but somewhere, but certainly above the
level of the rest of us.
I think that the decison to go or "no go" rightfully be-
longs with the upper management, and not, my personal
opinion, not with the crew. The crew input should be felt
very strong. 15s
c. Technical Expertise of Personnel
Issue
Does NASA have an adequate level of in-honse technical exper-
tise to manage the Shuttle Program properly?
Findings
1. During the last decade NASA has had significant decreases in
manpower. A disproportionate reduction may have occurred in the
safety, reliability and quality assurance staff at NASA headquar-
ters and at the Marshall Space Flight Center. Additionally during
the period preceding the Challenger accident, the Office of Space
Flight also suffered a decline in staff. The decreases may have lim-
ited the ability of those offices to perform their review functions.
2. The information presented to NASA headquarters on August
19, 1985 was sufficient to require immediate and concentrated ef-
forts to remedy the joint design flaws. The fact that NASA did not
take stronger action to solve this problem indicates that its top
technical staff did not fully accept or understand the seriousness of
the joint problem.
Recommendations
1. NASA should review the numbers and qualifications of key
staff in technical and management positions and should consider
additional training and recruitment of individuals to further the
quality and safety of NASA's missions.
2. The Committee should maintain on-going oversight of this
analysis and conduct an in-depth examination upon the conclusion
of NASA's review.
Discussion
In the wake of the Challenger accident, serious questions arose
over whether NASA had sufficient technical capability to identify
and solve problems like the SRB seal problem. It is argued that
through reductions in staffing levels and departures to the private
sector by experienced technical employees, NASA lacked in-house
problem assessment capability. This is an issue that is not subject
to ready answers, and an in-depth examination of NASA technical
capacity was generally beyond the scope of the Committee's hear-
ing.
However, it is clear that over the last 15 years NASA has had
significant staffing reductions and that a disproportionate number
of these reductions may have occurred in the areas of quality as-
surance and safety. 154 While NASA ar_,es that its personnel
levels for these functions "were adequate,' 155 the Rogers Commis-
sion found:
,6s Ibid., p. 55.
'54Ibid., June 11, 1986, pp. 59-70.
'u Ibid., p. 60; material supplied for the record.
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Reductions in safety, reliablility and quality assurance
work force at Marshall and NASA Headquarters have seri-
ously limited capability in those vital functions. 156
Reductions were not limited to the safety and quality assurance
program. The former Associate Administrator for Space Flight,
Jesse Moore, testified that his office also experienced a decline in
the number of staff. As Mr. Moore observed, "we need to . . . get
as much technical expertise into the Office of Space Flight as we
possibly can" in order to "work on a plane with the real experts--
the contractors, the engineers, the safety people at the contractors
and at the NASA centers..." 157
Similar views were voiced by former Shuttle program manager
Robert Thompson:
I think we have to look pretty deep in our organization
to make sure we are keeping enough technical muscle in
the organization to continually search for these pending
problems that are somtines pretty subtle. Sometimes they
just don't, as I say, announce themselves. So you have to
be willing to expend the resources and keep that technical
muscle in place and you have to put that technical muscle
close to the heart of the issue so that they can perceive a
problem if it is just beginning to occur. 15s
It does not necessarily follow however, that reductions in the
numbers of technical personnel automatically limit the ability of
headquarters to identify and correct emerging problems. The ad-
verse impact flows from those reductions that cut into crucial
areas. Accordingly, the Committee is pleased that Admiral Truly
has undertaken an examination "throughout the agency and _,awr_ticularly in... the Space Shuttle program" to make sure that
have not only the right numbers but the right kind of trained
people..." 159 It is hoped that this analysis will identify appropri-
ate technical staffing levels and positions that must be maintained
if the agency is to properly perform its function.
NASA technical expertise is further reduced by the departure of
highly skilled employees. During fiscal year 1985, approximately
1500 employees left the agency, over one-half of these (784) were
engineers, technicians and scientists, x6o If present trends continue,
1_6 Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, p. 161.
1s7 Cmto Hgs, Transcript, July 24, 1986, pp. 80-81.
_ss Ibid., pp. 117-18.
_6g Ibid., _une 11, 1986, pp. 61-2. Former Shuttle Program Manager, Robert Thompson, indi-
cated the need for this analysis, stating: "... and I think the matter of being sure you have the
pro ._.r people selected and that those people are properly indoctrinated and trained for. tbelr
lX__ltion and they clearly understand the res_)onsibility andreport!ng channels of their positions,
I think those are all areas for improvement. ---Crate Hgs, Transcript, July 24, 1986, p. 121.
_eOMaterial submitted for the record in response to written questions from Chairman Roe
(letter dated 9/18/86). That submission includes the following table:
NASA LOSSF_ FISCAL YEAR 1981-86
[In lineal years]
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Total ........................................................................................1,983
Non-AS'F* Engineers ....................................................................... 92
AST ngineers ..................................................................................... 665
Life scienti_s .................................................................................... 6
Technicians ........................................................................................ 261
1,5,56 1,176 1,530 1,494 1,169
26 13 19 9 5
503 386 576 569 457
6 0 3 2 4
207 161 156 204 180
*Non-Aercepace Technologist.
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NASA can expect to lose between 7500 and 9000 technical and sci-
entific employees over the next ten years. 181 While 50 percent of
these personnel losses are formally attributed to retirement, NASA
officials "know...that many retires leave NASA for higher paying
jobs in industry." 182 Additionally, 17 percent of the departing em-
ployees acknowledge that they are leaving NASA for more finan-
cially rewarding jobs. i es
NASA is concerned that the difficulty it will experience in re-
placing these employees is essentially the same that led to the de-
partures; the agency's "salary structure is not sufficiently flexible
and competitive to attract the very best talent our nation has to
offer." le4 Therefore, despite liberal hire authority for engineering
positions, NASA is experiencing difficulty in recruiting entry-level
engineers, largely due to salary. As noted by the Agency:
Currently the Government pays GS-7 recent college
graduates in all engineering disciplinesa special salary
rate of $23,170. This isthe statutory maximum under the
current special salary rate provisions.At the same time,
our private sector competitors are offeringthese graduates
an average salary of $27,000 to $29,000 depending on the
engineering discipline.It would take approximately a 20
percent increase for us to match our competitors. Howev-
er, absent a legislativechange, the most we could offerin
the next year would be the percentage increase to the Gen-
eral Schedule (perhaps two or three percent in January
1987).
A continuing infusion of recent collegegraduates iscriti-
cal to the continued success of NASA's mission and accom-
plishing this has become increasingly difficult.Inadequate
salaries are an equally significantproblem at the execu-
tive levelsin the agency. 185
While outside witnesses did not fullyconcur as to the prevalence
of departures for the private sector,all acknowledged the need to
create incentives for quality people to enter and remain with the
agency. 186 To thisend, NASA Administrator Fletcher isexamining
means by which his organization can retain its highly skilledtech-
nical employees through a "more motivational type of organiza-
tional structure" and premium pay scheduled,x67 The Committee
shares NASA's concern that it maintain a strong in-house techni-
cal capabilityand support staff.
In addition to the number of technical managers, itisalso neces-
sary to examine their technical performance. Insight into NASA
_e_Ibid.
_s2Ibid.
Is8Ibid.
_6,Ibid.
IesIbid.
_66CrateHgs, Transcript,July 24, 1986,pp. 119-23.
J67Ibid.,pp. 123,125.
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headquarters'technicalabilityto discernand react to emerging
problems may be gained from an examination of the manner in
which itaddressedthe growing concerns with the O-ringsin the
summer of 1985.Prior to that time the problems with the O-rings
had been briefedat alllevelsofthe agency and had been presented
to headquarterson at leasttwo occasions.lesHowever, increasing
problems with case-to-caserosionprompted headquarters to re-
quest a complete briefing"to go over the situationin detail."189
The meeting was chaired by Mr. Moore's deputy for technical
matters,L. Michael Weeks, and attended by a number of other
headquarterspersonnelwhich Mr. Moore characterizedas having
"some knowledge about the SRB.''IT°In testimony before the
Rogers Commission, Mr. Moore describedthe compositionof the
meeting:
Mr. Winterhalter,who was Shuttle PropulsionDivision
Acting Directorat thattime,Mr. BillHamby was the STS
program integrationDeputy Director,Mr. Paul Wetzel,
who was the Solid Rocket Booster programs chief,Mr.
Paul Herr, who was the SolidRocket Motor program man-
ager,and Mr. Henry Quong, who was the reliability,main-
tainabilityand qualityassurancedirectorofthe chiefengi-
neer'soffice.
Those were the group of peopleat NASA headquarters
who attendedthe meeting.Mr. Mulloy of Marshall Space
FlightCenter,who was a Solid Rocket Booster program
manager, attendedand Mr. Bob Swinghammer ofMarshall
alsoattended,who isthe materialand processeslaborato-
ry directorat Marshall.Thiokol had a totalof six people
_6sSee, e.g., testimony of L. Michael Weeks, Cmto Hgs, Transcript, June 12, 1986, p. 130;
Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, pp. 120-140.
169 Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, p. 1051, testimony of Jesse Moore. A somewhat dif-
ferent version of thegenesis of the August 19 briefing was presented by Allen McDonald, Thio-
kors Director of Solid Rocket Motor Project, in testimony before the Rogers Commission (Ibid.,
pp. 1591-92):
Mr. MCDoNALD. The meeting that occurred on August 19 came about as a result of this prob-
lem with the nozzle eroding through, and that is what drove that meeting. Headquarters wanted
to hear about that. We lost theprtmary seal and eroded some secondary.
We all sat down together and got together with the engineering people and put.together that
presentation and collectively said, you know, we ought to address the whole seal issue, not _ust
that failure, becatme we all felt that if that ever happened in the field joint we were in vao
trouble because the nozzle has a much bettor secondary seal than the field joint does.
Mr. Su_'zR. At this meeting on August 19th at headquarters, that was called because of Thic-
kors concern that the joint was really in treuble?
Mr. McDoNALD. No, it was called--we had had another meeting scheduled at Washington
headquarters at that time that had a problem with the mixer fire earlier in the year, and there
was a review of that.
I believe Mike Weeks either called Joe or I or one of us and said wel], you're here, you ought
to come and addre_ a couple of other issues that lmve happened recently that we are very in-
torested in.
One of them is we had broken the structural test article on the filament would case I believe
in July down at Marshall, and they wanted to hear about that.
The other one was they were made aware that we had violated the primary seal in the nozzle
and wanted to hear about thatand what our rationalewas tocontinue.
See also,Crate I-Igs,Transcript,June 17,1986,pp. 98-101.
17oCmto Hgs, Transcript,July 24, 1986,p.97.
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there, including Mr. Mason, Mr. Wiggins, Mr. Kilminster,
Mr. McDonald and Mr. Speas. 17
The briefing documents prepared by Thiokol included a detailed
history of seal erosion which noted, inter alia, that the "frequency
of O-ring damage has increased since incorporation of Randolph
putty; higher stabilization pressures in leak test procedures; and
high performance motors." The briefing documents also listed
MTI's primary concerns; the highest concern was "Field joint--
joint deflection and secondary O-ring resiliency."
It is suggested that the August 19th briefing failed to give a com-
plete picture of the seriousness of the O-ring problem because it did
not include data on the effect that temperature would have on re-
siliency of the seals. As Michael Weeks noted in his testimony
before the Committee:
When the briefing was presented to us on August 19th
of 1985--as you will look in the briefing that was provided
to the Commission on February 10th--there was no tem-
perature data presented that showed that the resiliency
was such a critical factor. It wasn't until after the disaster
of 51-L that I actually saw the resiliency data that showed
that Viton, which is the O-ring material that we've been
using, is so slow to recover at very low temperatures -172
Mr. Weeks correctly notes that the briefing documents did not
include data which resulted from bench testing which concluded
that resiliency is a function of temperature. _73
Other participants in the meeting felt that the temperature issue
had been presented at the briefing.
General KUTYNA. Secondly, there has been some ques-
tion that people understood that there was a temperature
problem. I remember your conclusions chart, your file
chart, and the very first bullet of that chart had the word
"resiliency" in it.
Do you feel when you talked about resiliency at that
meeting people got the connection between resiliency and
temperature, that resiliency was a function of tempera-
ture, or was that lost?
Mr. McDoNALD. It may have gotten lost because we
hadn't run a very long range of temperatures when we got
that data.
General KUTYNA. So it is possible that people at head-
quarters from that briefing did not understand tempera-
ture was a concern?
Mr. MCDONALD. I guess it is possible they could have.
General KUTYNA. IS it probable?
Mr. MCDONALD. I don't know if it is probable, because
we put it as the first bullet of why we thought that was
171 Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, pp. 1051-52.
_2 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, June 12, 1986, p. 138.
_73 Letter from Brian Russell, Manager MTI SRM Ignition System to James W. Thomas, Mar-
shall Space Flight Center, August 9, 1985.
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our highest concern, and if that hadn't have happened, we
wouldn't have had that concern. _74
The briefing recommended an "accelerated pace" to eliminate
SRM seal erosion but concluded that "it is safe to continue flying
existing design as long as all joints are leak checked with a 200
psig stabilization pressure, are free of contamination in the seal
areas and meet O-ring squeeze requirements." Sometime thereaf-
ter, Mr. Weeks reported to Mr. Moore on the briefing, indicating
that it was safe to continue the program and that it was not "an
issue that ought to ground the fleet. ''17s
In evaluating the information presented at the August 19, 1985,
briefing, the Rogers Commission found:
The O-ring erosion history presented to Level I at NASA
headquarters in August 1985 was sufficiently detailed to
require corrective action prior to the next flight. 17e
The current NASA administrator concurs in the finding. _77
Despite the clarity of the Commission's conclusions, none of the
participants at this meeting (all with technical backgrounds) m
NASA or Thiokol--recommended that the Shuttle be grounded
until the problem with the seals was solved. _Ts Rather, as noted
above, the unanimous recommendation was to accelerate the ef-
forts to irLx the problem but continue flying. In adopting this
course, did NASA take steps to seek a solution that was reasonably
commensurate with a threatened failure of a criticality 1 item? Mr.
174 Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, pp. 159,5-96.
175 Ibid., p. 1052. See also, Crate Hgs, Transcript, June 12, 1986, pp. 143-44, and July 24, 1986,
p. 90. A conflict in the testimony arose on the question of the briefing Mr. Weeks provided Mr.
Moore following the August 19th meeting. According to the testimony presented by Mr. Weeks,
"I briefed on the results of that [meeting] and told him about the briefing and showed him the
briefing [documents]." Ibid., June 12, 1986, p. 143. Mr. Moore disagreed with this recitation of
the facts (Ibid., July 24, 1986, pp. 89-91):
Mr. ScHEv_. Are you telling us that you didn't receive a briefing from Mr. Weeks and that
you didn't receive the briefing documents from Mr. Weeks that was given to headquarters by
the Thiokol officials?
Mr. MooRE. To my recollection, the first time I remember seeing that document was on
August--was on January 29th or January 30th, right after the Challenger accident. I was shown
a document which contained the briefing material. It also subsequently came up in one of the
earlier discussions with Chairman Rogers and his Commission is the other time I have seen
some of that.
Post-accident was the first time I had, to my knowledge, as I said, seen that particular brief-
ing. I had not sat down and been given a briefing on the Thiokol presentation on August 19th.
Mr. Weeks verbally'said that the meeting w_ held that day on August'19th and tha_ in effect
that he felt comfortable with the overall conclusions, although he did have one more concern.
He felt he wanted to talk to somebody else at Marshall and he did, I believe, talk to Mr. Hardy
and said that he thought baaed on the data and also on the Titan success that in fact there was
an acceptable position as far as he was concerned and that is where I left the information and
that was the information I was given.
Mr. SCHEUER. He didn't indicate the kind of depth of concern that would have led you to be-
lieve that additional time was needed or that additional resources needed to apply to some of
these problems before lunch?
Mr. MoosE. No sir. I did not get the feeling that we should have grounded the Shuttle fleet
prior to the next flight as a result of that particular briefing.
In a subsequent interview with staff, Mr. Weeks recanted his earlier statement and acknowl-
edged that he did not show Mr. Moore a copy of the briefing document and that to the best of
his knowledge Mr. Moore did not see this document until after the Challenger accident. More-
over, Mr. Weeks stated that he did not tell Moore specifically that Morton Thiokol was calling
for an accelerated pace to eliminate the seal ero6ion problem nor did he state that additional
resources were needed to be committed to solve the problem.
178 Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, p. 148.
177 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, June 12, 1986, p. 129.
17a Ibid., June 17, 1986, pp. 97-8, 101.
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Moore, when asked what he would have done had he received the
oral briefing and reviewed the briefing document responded:
I believe that looking at the document and looking at
some of the issues that were cited about criticality 1, flight
safety issues and mission success issues that came out in
the series of the document there, I believe we would have
initiated a formal team to go off and take a much more
concentrated look at it.
So I believe my actions would have been to form a team
of experts to asess this data and to make recommendations
on what our course of action should be at this point in
time. _79
Unfortunately this team of experts was not formed until after
the Challenger accident. Rather, NASA proceeded on the course
summarized in the following exchange between Chairman Roe and
Michael Weeks:
Mr. ROE. Therefore, there are a group of people--whom-
ever they were--that participated at this particular meet-
ing, reviewed these facts that were available, and they de-
termined two things, according to your testimony. One,
they determined that if everything--if they had their
"druthers," or whatever the case may be--it would take
two years in their judgment to be able to correct that; but
in spite of that decision they took and made the second
judgement. And the second judgement, well, we can con-
tinue to fly. We'll start the mechanisms going to get this
corrected, but we can continue to fly until we get that
done. Isn't that the decision that was made, according to
what you're saying?
Mr. WEEKS. That is correct.
Mr. ROE. Therefore, some people who were at that spe-
cific meeting had to be the people who made that specific
decision. 1s o
In attempting to assess the reasons for NASA Level 1 managers
not adopting a more aggressive posture to the O-ring problem, it is
suggested that insufficient information was communicated to
top. lsl However, as Deputy Acting Administrator Graham ob-
served:
They could have transmitted the information in a higher
profile way, but also as engineers, as managers at head-
quarters, there was certainly a responsibility to perceive
the significance of this. ls2
There was plainly a failure of NASA technical managers, and for
that matter those at Thiokol, to grasp the seriousness of the prob-
lem. As former Shuttle Program Manager Robert Thompson ob-
served:
xTg Ibid., July 24, 1986, pp. 91-2.
_so Ibid., June 12, 1986, p. 141.
isz The issue of whether communications are filtered so that important information is pre-
vented from reaching decision-makers is addressed in Section VIB.2.b.
_sg Cmte Hgs, Transcript, June 17, 1986, p. 207.
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Sometimes these problems are very subtle. Sometimes
they stand up and shout louder than at other times.
Frankly, this time I think it was standing up and shouting
pretty loudly. 1s 3
Why then did top technical managers in the Office of Space
Flight at NASA Headquarters (Level I), Johnson Space Flight
Center (Level II), and the Marshall Space Flight Center (Level III)
fail to take stronger action? (See VI. A.l.f.) The answer may be
simply poor technical decision-making, perhaps in combination
with a type of collective rationalization described by Larry Mulloy:
You asked why wasn't more done. You know, in the six
years previous. And I have had that question posted to me
many times in the last four months, and I have asked it of
myself many times since the tragic accident. And my
answer has been in hindsight, obviously, more should have
been done.
The turning, I think we started down a road where we
had a design deficiency. When we recognized that it had
design deficiency, we did not fix it. Then we continued to
fly with it, and rationalized why it was safe, and eventual-
ly concluded and convinced ourselves that it was an ac-
ceptable risk.
That was--when we started down that road, we started
down the road to eventually having the inevitable acci-
dent. I believe that. 1s4
d. Change Control Process
Issue 1
Has the pressure to maintain operational flight rates and sched-
ules for the Shuttle compromised the hardware Change Control
Process?
__ndings
1. When NASA declared the Space Shuttle to be an operational
system, additional pressure to increase flight rates impacted other
aspects of the overall program such as the ability to implement,
evaluate, test, and certify changes in hardware design.
2. As a result of attempting to operate the Shuttle at increased
flight rates, controlling other aspects of the program such as the
flight production process and manifest also became a more complex
and difficult aspect of program administration.
Recommendations
1. NASA must reconsider its efforts to categorize the Shuttle as
an operational transportation system.
2. The Configuration Management System designed to control
such changes must be reexamined by NASA as to its effectiveness
in assuring that all hardware changes take place in a safe and reli-
able fashion.
lss Ibid., July 24, 1986, p. 117.
Is4 Ibid., June 17, 1986, pp. 215-16.
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Discussion
The Rogers Commission noted that, "Following successful com-
pletion of the orbital flight test phase of the Shuttle program, the
system was declared to be operational." ls5 The Commission found
that as a result, NASA reduced its safety, reliability and quality
assurance activities related to the Shuttle. The Commission report
goes on to note that this reasoning was faulty; "The machinery is
highly complex, and the requirements are exacting. The Space
Shuttle remains a totally new system with little or no history."
Program officials frequently find it necessary to consider chang-
ing existing hardware designs or production processes. Such
changes can be required for a number of reasons, including: to cor-
rect the deficiency in a component; to improve a component's per-
formance or the length of this operating life; to enhance the ease of
maintaining the component; or to reduce the cost of manufactur-
ing, servicing, or processing the component. Typically, change pro-
posals originate from a manufacturer and are reviewed by the cog-
nizant NASA field center and frequently by the Level II Program
Office at the Johnson Space Center as well. In his review process,
NASA compares the cost and schedule impacts of the proposed
change against the performance improvement that is anticipated.
Of particular concern are the safety aspects related to the change
(e.g., What analyses and tests must be conducted to insure that the
change does not directly or indirectly have a negative impact on
the systems safety or reliability?).
It is clear that these activities or steps in the process of imple-
menting essential changes are complex and time consuming, espe-
cially if the components to be evaluated are some of the larger and
critical elements of the Space Shuttle. Therefore, it is the Commit-
tee'sview that untilsuch time as allelements ofthe Space Trans-
portationSystem can be fullyevaluatedthrough extensiveflight
testingand trend analyses,itispremature to impose an operation-
ai flightscheduleon the system in a manner comparable to that
imposed upon,forexample, an airtransportationsystem.
Issue 2
Is the change control process sufficiently defined for all elements
of the Shuttle system?
Findings
1. The NSTS engineering and process change guidelines are, for
the most part, sufficiently well-defined for the majority of the sub-
systems that comprise the Space Shuttle.
2. NASA gives the same level of scrutiny to changes involving a
minor component (such as moving velcro strips in the Orbiter) as
those involving mission critical elements of flight hardware.
Recommendation
NASA should review its change control process to determine the
usefulness of differentiating between minor changes and significant
changes.
t86 Rogers Commi_ion Report, Volume 1, p. 159.
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Discussion
NASA's Change Control System is shown in Figure VI-4. From
the chart, it is evident that the success of the system is highly de-
pendent on the information flow among the various levels of man-
agement control.
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The Configuration Management System Requirements are docu-
mented in JSC 07700 Volume 4, entitled "Configuration Manage-
ment Requirements," dated March 2, 1973. Changes to this docu-
ment have periodically been issued over the course of the program.
The configuration management system defines requirements for all
levels of management within the NSTS program. A baseline set of
requirements is defined for each level of management (Level I
through Level IV). This baseline establishes what is to be accom-
plished at each level of management and established the control-
ling procedures that supposedly prevent deviations from the base-
line program. This baseline program is specified for each flight and
includes specifications on payloads for each flight as well.
Changes to the flight and system requirements and the accept-
ance baselines are made, according to NASA, only by directives
issued by the Program Requirements Control Board at Level I and
Level II and the Change Control Boards. For example, there is an
Orbiter Avionics Software Control Board (OASCB) that has joint
Level II and Level III authority for managing the program-wide re-
quirements for Shuttle computer hardware and software systems
as part of the Orbiter project. The Board also assures the correct
configuration of the software within the Orbiter avionics system
for all vehicle and test operations.
Design changes at the contractor level are processed through sev-
eral levels of technical and managerial reviews. Design and engi-
neering changes on the Orbiter, for example, undergo Technical
Status Reviews (TSR's),Avionics Status Reviews (ASR's), Prelimi-
nary Design Reviews (PDR's), Critical Design Reviews, (CDR's),
Design CertificationReviews (DCR's), and numerous special meet-
ings of NASA and the Rockwell management are utilizedto review
issuesand concerns about any design drawing or specification.Ac-
cording to Rockwell, Is6 "Changes are reviewed at a TSR or ASR
and the Change Control Board for approval. Any outstanding
design dispute is tracked as an open action until itis resolved by
Rockwell and NASA management."
The Committee questions,however, whether the complex and ex-
tensive processes involved in NASA's change control management
system allow for sufficientdistinctionbetween minor changes and
the significant changes. For example, the systems requires the
same level of management attention to as minor a change as
moving velcro stripson the Orbiter as itisapplied to all Criticality
i item such as changing a turbo-pump on the SSME.
2.ORGANIZATION AND POLICY MANAGEMENT
a.Management Structure
Issue 1
Does the management of the Shuttle Program adequately define
the lines of authority and are managers given authority commen-
surate with their responsibilities?
_se Responses to Committee Questions, dated August 22, 1986.
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Finding
The management of the Shuttle Program is complex and diversi-
fied and it is not always clear who has authority or responsibility.
NASA's "lead center" concept has resulted in placing the manage-
ment of the program at JSC, one of three centers participating in
the program; however, because Johnson does not have control of
the other centers' resources, the NSTS program manager's author-
ity to manage the program is limited and the responsibility is un-
clear.
Recommendation
NASA should restructure the Shuttle Program management to
define clear lines of authority and responsibilities. This restructur-
ing should take into account the special role each center must play
and be especially sensitive to the need for the cooperation and sup-
port of all the participants to achieve a common goal. NASA
should give special consideration to moving the Program Manager
to NASA Headquarters to avoid the confusion and inter_center ri-
valry that result from having a large multi-center program man-
aged out of one of the participating centers.
Discussion
The line of management responsibility, authority, and account-
ability for NASA programs is from the Administrator to the Asso-
ciate Administrator to the Field Center Directors, who delegate im-
plementation authority to a program/project manager. JSC has
been designated the "lead" center for the NSTS Program and has
the responsibility for systems engineering and integration, oper-
ations integration, and management integration. Marshall has the
responsibility for the propulsion system and Kennedy has the re-
sponsibility for launch operations.
The Associate Administrator for Space Flight (the Level I pro-
gram manager) performs oversight over the program but doesn't
have the technical staff to effectively manage the program. The
NSTS Program Manager, i.e. the Level II manager at JSC, func-
tions as a program coordinator; he is responsible for integrating
the various program elements and he controls all the project inter-
faces. He clearly does not control all the program elements since
the individual (Level III) Project Managers are accountable to their
Center Directors who are in turn accountable to the Associate Ad-
ministrator who controls the funding. For example, the Level II
manager told the Rogers Commission that he was unaware that
the SRB Project Office had procured additional Solid Rocket Motor
casings to be used for testing of the joints;
Now it turns out that the budget for that kind of work
does not come through my level II office. It is worked di-
rectly between the Marshall Center and NASA Headquar-
ters and there again had I been responsible for the budget
for that sort of work, it would have to come through
me, .... 187
187 Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, p. 1490.
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The witnesses who addressed the management issues at the Com-
mittee hearings had differing philosophies regarding the best possi-
ble solution; however there was general agreement that the
present system tended to cause confusion. There was also strong
sentiment for strengthening the headquarter's role. Mr. Jesse
Moore, former Associate Administrator for Space Flight, testified:
I think we need to go back and make sure we clearly
define the roles of NASA headquarters, the roles of the
centers in the overall management of the STS.
I think we need to re-look at that kind of interaction
and the kind of specific roles, responsibilities, to ensure
that authority and responsibility is commensurate in
terms of the role definitions for the varous levels of man-
agement in NASA.
I think we need to look at strengthening NASA head-
quarters. I would say that in my tenure a NASA head-
quarters we had a decline in staff in the Office of Space
Flight. It was a decline in the number of staff, and I think
we need to look at what is the proper level of staffing re-
quirements to do this particular job.
I also think we need to look to make sure we get as
much technical expertise into the Office of Space Flight as
we possibly can. lSS
General Stafford, a former Gemini and Apollo astronaut, also
stated: "... I guess I was never comfortable with the lead center
type of management structure, after having seen how satisfactorily
Apollo worked." 1s9 (Note: The Apollo program was managed out
of headquarters.)
With regard to the appropriate role of the Program Manager
(Level II), there was not a clear consensus. In discussing the Rogers
Commission's recommendations, General Abrahamson stated:
• . . However, I would also like to point out that many
of these recommendations have long been incorporated in
NASA management procedures. The Program Manager, by
definition, has the necessary authority to get the job
done. 19o
When asked if the program management should remain at JSC,
Mr. Moore, who is currently Director of JSC, replied:
I think that is certainly a topic that is going to be stud-
ied very, very carefully.
I think there are a couple of options that can be looked
at that would keep the major parts of program manage-
ment that has been in operation at the Johnson Space
Center at the Johnson Center.
There are a lot of tools, roots and capabilities. I think,
on the other hand, there should be some looks at the
Office of Space Flight for finding some way to strengthen
_ss CmteHgs, Transcript, July 24, 1986, pp. 80, 87.
lsgIbid., June 25, 1986, p. 128.
19°Ibid., July 24, 1986, p. 11.
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the overall program management in the Office of Space
Flight.
And one concept might be to have a Shuttle Program Di-
rector within the Office of Space Flight and working with
the Level II program office at the Johnson Space Center.
My answer is, I believe the Level II program office, with
some strengthening, and the level I program office, with
some strengthening--we can make it work and it should
remain at the Johnson Space Center.'9'
This was in direct contrast to the view held by John Yardley,
former Associate Administrator for Space Flight. In discussing the
Rogers Commission's recommendations, he stated:
The one in particular that I think I have some back-
ground in that I think is not correct is they are trying to
strengthen the authority and responsibility of the Program
Manager at Johnson. Let me just relate what happened
when I went to NASA.
I hadn't been there but a couple of weeks and one of the
other centers called me and said, "Hey, the Program Man-
ager wants to take 15 million of my money and put it on
the Orbiter." It became immediately apparent to me to
have one of the center people handle the funding decisions
was not going to be in the best interests of cooperative
technical activity.
So I pull, t the final decisions on the money to Washing-
ton, where I think they still are...,92
Major Slayton made a similar observation concerning the prob-
lems with having a multi-center program managed at one of the
field centers:
• . . I think when you look at relationships between the
centers and how the organization is structured; and you
could say it could be restructured so you don't have inter-
center jealousies interfering with the communications
channel.
A lead center concept where Level II is viewed by the
other centers as being another center instead of having its
headquarters' level is one reference I would make. 193
Major Slayton went on to say that any organization could work
with the proper people:
A lot of it is in the management attitude; but again, my
opinion is, you can make any organization work if you got
the right people, and if you don't have the right people I
don't care how you organize it, it will not work, so you still
end up dealing with individuals. '94
,9, Ibid., p. 99.
'g_ Ibid., July 23, 1986, p. 10.
,9_ Ibid., June 25, 1986, p. 101.
194 Ibid.
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Other witnesses also alluded to the problems with inter-center ri-
valries under the current system and the break down of esprit de
corps. Mr. Moore called for a new effort to re-instill the team spirit:
I believe an approach to that has got to be building team
work, again, to make sure--the Shuttle program involves
many elements, many contractors, many NASA centers,
all playing together as a team.
I believe we have to go back and re-instill in our people,
in our participants, a team work approach...
I think the overall structure of the Shuttle program is
obviously built upon people and, you know, there are
humans all the way up the chain, all the way from the en-
gineers at the subcontractors to the engineers at the con-
tractors, the NASA centers and so forth.
I think we have got to make sure that each of those par-
ticipants in the program feel a dedication, feel a dedication
to safety, feel a dedication to the program that they are
making a valuable contribution and I think we need to do
that by personal communications as well as trying to look
at our structure to make sure we have not defined some-
thing that will at least maybe encourage, tend to encour-
age communications breakdown. ' 95
General Abrahamson made the following observations with
regard to changing organization:
It is true that when any organization is formed, it is
formed to help you accomplish a particular task. By the
same token, once it is there, it develops momentum and
procedures and impediments sometimes to exactly what
you would like to have, a dynamic and modifying organiza-
tion for the challenges of the future. This is always diffi-
cult.
I believe that we had an organization that was designed
for the development of the Shuttle, and when we got there,
since it was only the second flight, that we had a tremen-
dous change of attitude that we had to be able to create,
and that was to create an organization that would think in
terms of operations of the Shuttle and overcome the flight
test problems. 'ge
Issue 2
Are astronauts adequately represented in management?
Finding
The Committee finds no evidence that astronauts are denied the
opportunity to enter management if they so choose.
Discussion
The Rogers Commission has suggested that NASA should make
greater use of astronauts in management; however, the Commis-
195 Ibid., July 24, 1986, pp. 69-70.
,ge Ibid., p. 17.
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sion report provides no basis for that recommendation. Astronauts
generally have shown little interest in going into any kind of desk
job, including management positions, until such time as their
active flying days end. At that time, management jobs within the
astronaut program become attractive alternatives to some; howev-
er, opportunities in this area are naturally limited. Major Slayton
expressed this very well when he testified about his experience
with the Mercury Program:
I had the misfortune at that time of having been ground-
ed due to a medical problem so I was elected to take over
the management of the astronaut corps, a job I didn't par-
ticularly care about, but it was the next best thing. 19T
Mr. Nelson asked the astronauts whether any of them felt there
was a "modus operandi" within NASA that excluded either active
or former astronauts from the management structure. General
McDivitt stated he had seen no bias in his three years as Program
manager for the Apollo Program. Mr. Nelson then asked Deke
Slayton if he had ever seen any bias in NASA and Major Slayton
confirmed that he too saw no evidence of bias against astronauts in
management. General Abrahamson observed:
Throughout my tenure, astronauts were in key program
office positions and one served as an Assistant Associate
Administrator in the Office of Space Flight .... 19s
There was agreement among the astronauts that the astronaut
office should be moved up higher in the organization. General
McDivitt summed up the astronauts' position:
I think I would recommend that the Flight Crew Oper-
ations Directorate be moved up to report to the Center Di-
rector as well as the Flight Operations Director.
I think both of those organizations are very key to
flying, and having them go through another layer of man-
agement before they get to the Center Director creates a
filter which is not necessary or desirable for either one of
them.
I think it also gets them on the same level as the engi-
neering organizations within the manned spacecraft
center,and gives them better access to the program. 199
b. Communication
Issue 1
Are there adequate opportunities to communicate problems
within the Shuttle Program management structure?
Finding
There are many regularly scheduled meetings and teleconfer-
ences at all levels of management throughout the Shuttle Program.
In addition, "special" meetings and telecons are routine. No evi-
,9, Ibid., June 25, 1986, p. 11.
,98 Ibid., July 24, 1986, p. 11.
199 Ibid., June 25, 1986, p. 52_
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dence was found to support a conclusion that the system inhibited
communication or that it was difficult to surface problems.
Discussion
Every day at noon central time a teleconference is held among
all NASA Space Shuttle Program participants. This is the daily
"special" Level II PRCB (Program Requirements Change Board)
meeting and includes, among others, all the managers of the vari-
ous program elements, the JSC Directors of Flight Crew Oper-
ations, Mission Operations, Engineering, Mission Support, SR&QA,
and Space and Life Sciences. Program status, urgent problems, and
program requirements are brought up at this meeting. The PRCB
convenes by teleconference on alternate Fridays to discuss all other
(less urgent) program issues; in addition, other special meetings are
called by the PRCB secretary when deemed necessary.
Each of the supporting organizations also has regularly sched-
uled meetings, often by teleconference when they involve more
than one location. Regularly scheduled (often daily) teleconferences
are also held between various directors and managers.
Level I at headquarters conducts daily status meetings and also
participates in the noon teleconference. These meetings plus all the
Flight Readiness Reviews provide ample opportunity to surface
problems.
Issue 2
Is too much information being disseminated so that important in-
formation is lost?
Finding
Large amounts of information are disseminated on a routine
basis, often with little or no indication of its importance to all of
the recipients.
Recommendation
NASA management should review the process of providing infor-
mation on significant actions so that awareness by concerned man-
agers is assured.
Discussion
In a NASA briefing to staff on Mission Operations (May 21,
1986), NASA managers revealed that they routinely received infor-
mation copies of all sorts of memoranda, such as directives, re-
quests, approvals for changes, etc. Often the individual receiving
these copies had no direct involvement with the specific subject of
the memoranda, and they acknowledged that it was entirely likely
that an important piece of information could cross their desk with-
out their awareness.
Issue 3
Are communications filtered so that important information is
prevented from reaching the decision makers?
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Finding
NASA managers delegated the responsibilityfor making techni-
cal judgments to lower levelmanagers or assistants.Therefore, the
information that reached the top decision makers was "filtered"in
that itwas interpreted by others that were presumed to have more
specializedexperience or expertise in a given area. There isno evi-
dence that middle levelmanagers suppressed information that they
themselves deemed to be significant.In fact,as discussed in the
Section on Technical Expertise, the failurewas not the problem of
technical communications, but rather a failure of technical deci-
sionmaking.
Discussion
Itistypicalin any large,complex organization that as managers
rise higher in the organization the scope of their responsibilities
broadens to encompass technical areas beyond their own special-
ized expertise.Therefore they must rely increasingly on the techni-
cal judgments of lower level managers or assistants.There is the
additional risk of subordinates' reluctance to transmit unpleasant
information upwards; however, itisnot evident that NASA manag-
ers suppressed information about problems they themselves under-
stood.
Throughout the hearings, witnesses said that had they known
about the seriousness of the problem with the SRM joint,they
would have stopped the flights;or (in their opinion),had the deci-
sion makers known about it the flightswould have stopped. The
witnesses acknowledged that the problems with the SRM joint had
been briefedat alllevels,but always in a way that didn'tcommuni-
cate the seriousness of the problem; it was not viewed as life-
threatening. Yet the witnesses appeared reluctant to attribute this
to poor technical judgments on the part of the managers or techni-
cal staffwith expertise in propulsion, preferring instead to blame it
on poor communications or a poor "decision-making process."
Mr. Scheuer questioned Jesse Moore specificallyon this point
when he asked, referring to Mr. Weeks' summary of the August 19
meeting, "Was ita failureof decision-making on his part or com-
munications on his part?" Mr. Moore responded:
Sir,I think that in a position like Mr. Weeks is in, we
have to work as a team, for example, and people have to
make assessments on situations and I think Mr. Weeks
looked at the data and his assessment was that he thought
we had a program adequate to cover the activitiesin the
SRB and he believed that after he had talked to the people
at Thiokol and he also believed that, I think, after talking
to the people at Marshall and I believe his position was
that in fact was an acceptable posture for him to take.
Part of his responsibility is to make technical judg-
ments. 2oo
Mr. Moore went on to explain that he believed the lack of under-
standing of the SRB joint extended throughout the agency:
zoo Ibid., July 24, 1986, p. 94.
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I would say, sir, in looking up and down the system and
what has been determined about the SRB from the many
analyses and work that has been done in the past, I don't
think the system all the way from day one of the program
really understood all the implications of how the SRB
joints worked and I think that we have learned, all of us
have learned, an awful lot about the SRB...2o_
And again referring to the August 19 meeting:
That was a report from my deputy (Mr. Weeks), that he
believed the situation was acceptable as far as assessment
of the data presented to him, and I trust the people in the
organization to make those kinds of judgments.
We have to make those judgments on a day-to-day kind
of basis, but I did hear at Flight Readiness Reviews, as ev-
erybody as a member of the overall Shuttle team heard
about issues associated with the O-ring problem. I believe
the first time this was experienced on the Shuttle Program
was all the way back to flight 2 . . . I did not, as the head
of the Level I office, believe the problem with the SRB O-
rings was serious enough to consider stopping the
launches.
If I did, I would have stopped the launches, sir. 2°_
Mr. Scheuer again asked Mr. Moore to identify where the failure
was, "Was it in your being communicated with by Mr. Weeks? Was
it a failure of judgment on Mr. Weeks' part that all systems were
go? Where was the failure?" At that point, Mr. Moore blamed the
failure on communications:
I think in looking at the whole situation, I think there
was a failure to communicate the technical seriousness
from the contractors involved in this program
through .... 2o3
But, Mr. Scheuer suggested that the contractors had communi-
cated the problem at the August 19th meeting. Mr. Moore then
suggested that perhaps someone should have made a stronger
statement; however, in their collective judgment it was not a seri-
ous problem:
On the basis of the specific August 19 briefing that was
presented, I believe there should have been a stronger
statement made to me that we have a much more serious
problem by Mr. Weeks or any of the people who attended
that briefing. Mr. Weeks was not the only one at the brief-
ing. There were others at the briefing who had some
knowledge about the SRB ....
I don't recall the specific list of attendees at that par-
ticular meeting, but people that were in the overall pro-
pulsion area of the office of space flight--and the office of
space flight is level one--that is the level one--people who
had experience in this thing.
2o_ Ibid., p. 95.
_o2 Ibid.
2os Ibid, pp. 96-97.
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I believe if they felt after that August 19th briefing that
we had a problem, that the system should be grounded,
that somebody would have come and said, "We have got a
problem serious enough to ground the Shuttle flight."
That did not occur, and I believe it was based on a col-
lective set of judgments that we did not believe the prob-
lem was as serious. 2o4
The Committee finds no reason to doubt Mr. Moore's observa-
tions that no one within NASA understood the problem with the O-
ring and accepts his conclusions:
In hindsight, I think we should have taken much strong-
er action after the August 19th briefing . . . if I had the
knowledge then that I have today, we would have ground-
ed the fleet.
I did not have it at the time. 2°5
In hindsight, the August 19th briefing, as well as the January
27th telephone conversation clearly identified a serious problem.
Perhaps the Thiokol engineers understood the seriousness of the
problem; however, Thiokol's own summary and recommendation at
the conclusion of the August 19th briefing stated:
Analysis of existing data indicates that it is safe to con-
tinue flying existing design as long as all joints are leak
checked with a 200 psig stabilization pressure, are free of
contamination in the seal areas and meet O-ring squeeze
requirements. 2o6
This conclusion was accepted by all who heard the briefing, and
this was the information that was transmitted throughout NASA.
The evidence does not support a conclusion that the top decision
makers would have arrived at a different conclusion from the man-
agers at Marshall and the Level I managers with propulsion back-
grounds. (For additional discussion on this issue, see Section
VI.B.I.c.)
c. Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance
Issue 1
Is NASA's decision to establish a new Office of Safety, Reliabil-
ity, and Quality Assurance appropriate and, if so, what should its
role be?
Finding
The Committee finds that the Rogers Commission recommenda-
tion that NASA should establish an Office of Safety, Reliability
and Quality Assurance that reports directly to the Administrator is
indeed appropriate. However it is not clear what the activities of
this office will encompass.
204 Ibid, p. 98.
206 Ibid.
zo6 Rogers Commission Report., Volume II, p. H-95.
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Recommendations
1. The Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability and Qual-
ity Assurance (SR&QA) should provide to the Committee the agen-
cy's draft plan delineating the organization, goals, implementation
strategies and resource requirements of the office of SR&QA.
2. After the Office of SR&QA is fully operational, the Committee
will wish to continue oversight over its activities.
Discussion
Chapter 7 of the Rogers Commission report deals with the sub-
ject entitled "The Silent Safety Program." The Commission identi-
fied shortcomings in NASA's overall Safety, Reliability and Quality
Assurance Programs, and recommended the formation of a sepa-
rate Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance that would
report directly to the Administrator. The role of safety and quality
assurance in the decisionmaking processes associated with Shuttle
flight production requirements has been relatively undefined and
ambiguous. The formation of a centralized coordination and control
organization should serve to remedy the situation. As the Rogers
Commission report notes, "... No one thought to invite a safety
representative or a reliability and quality assurance engineer to
the January 27, 1986 teleconference between Marshall and Thio-
kol." 2o_
On July 8, 1986, the Administrator established the position of As-
sociate Administrator for Safety, Reliability and Quality Assur-
ance, and briefly delineated the responsibilities of this office in
NASA's responsive document to the Rogers Commission report. 2°8
According to NASA, the purpose of this office is to strengthen
the role of the SR&QA functions across all the the NASA pro-
grams. This will be accomplished by establishing centralized coordi-
nation under the Associate Administrator for SR&QA who reports
directly to the Administrator on all pertinent matters related to
the NSTS. The Associate Administrator is chartered to examine
the adequacy of the agencies resources in these areas and to make
recommendations for improvements as appropriate. Functional or-
ganizations that were previously under the purview of the Chief
Engineer's office will now report directly to the Associate Adminis-
trator for SR&QA.
The major contractors to the NSTS agree with the Commission's
recommendation to form a separate NASA SR&QA organization re-
porting directly to the Administrator. They are, however, of the
opinion that responsibility for the work required to recommend or
implement changes or modifications in the quality assurance area
must remain with Level III and the contractors themselves.
The Committee does not argue with the contention that strong
SR&QA capabilities must reside at the contractors' plants. Further,
the Committee suports NASA's efforts to enhance its in-house ca-
pabilities in order to improve the agency's monitoring and over-
sight capabilities in the areas of SR&QA. Strengthening Headquar-
ter's ability to provide guidance and centralized coordination in the
2o7 Ibid., Volume I, p. 152.
2os NASA Response to Rogers Commission, July 14, 1986, p. 20.
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areas of configuration management, product reliability and quality
assurance and risk management, are essential to returnng the
Shuttle to flight readiness condition.
Issue 2
Has NASA applied sufficient resources to support adequate
SR&QA efforts within the NSTS program?
Findings
1. The Committee finds that reductions in NASA civil service
personnel that have occurred over the past decade have adversely
impacted the agency's ability to maintain the appropriate level of
oversight control of the Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance
activities within the NSTS.
2. NASA has become increasingly dependent upon outside
SR&QA support from the Department of Defense (Defense Contract
Administration Services [DCAS] and Air Force Plant Representa-
tive Office [AFPRO]) and contractors.
3. NASA has reduced or reassigned to other program areas in-
house safety, reliability and quality assurance tasks such as test-
ing, analyses and instrumentation and has reduced or shut down
in-house facilities for performing SR&QA research and technology
development. The degree to which these factors have adversely im-
pacted the safety, reliability and quality assurance activities within
the NSTS program has not been adequately assessed.
Recommendations
1. NASA should establish and maintain a strong and effective
SR&QA Program. Continuing support for such a program must
come directly from the Administrator.
2. Although it is appropriate to establish strong contractor capa-
bilitie in the areas of SR&QA the internal oversight responsibilities
and coordination of SR&QA tasks must be the responsibility of
NASA itself. In order to assure that the appropriate interfaces
among the various subsystem elements that comprise the NSTS,
are maintained, a sufficient complement of NASA SR&QA manage-
ment and support staff must be available to perform the necessary
oversight and coordination tasks.
Discussion
Reductions in force over the past several years have reduced per-
sonnel across the agency from a complement of some thirty-six
thousand people down to twenty-two thousand people. A dispropor-
tionate decline in Reliability and Quality Assurance (R&QA) staff-
ing occured as a result of these reductions. In the Shuttle program,
many of the quality control functions and government inspection
activities have been performed by contractors in conjunction with
the Department of Defense support personnel (DCAS and AFPRO).
NASA has expressed some concern about their ability to maintain
adequate in-house staffing in these areas. The total number of civil
servant employees within NASA dedicated to the SR&QA program
177
is presently about 500 professionals. 2°9 This represents a reduction
of 71% from the 1970 complement.
NASA attributes this reduction to the termination of "in-house
flight programs, along with the transfer of certain functions.., to
other organizations within the NASA centers." In their response to
Mr. Roe's inquiry, 21° NASA makes the following statement:
"Even though we had a reduction in R&QA personnel,
our detailed review of the quality operation did not reveal
that we missed any of the quality control check points
which may be contributed to the accident."
The Committee cannot support NASA's assessment on this
matter. Although NASA may argue that the quality control check
points for the certification tests required on the ambient and in-
duced temperature effects on the O-ring seals were checked off by
the QA representative at Thiokol as having been satisfactorily com-
pleted, in actuality these tests were never performed. To what
extent this failure of the QA function to do its job conbributed to
the accident may be questioned, but the fact that the control didn't
work in this case cannot be denied.
It should be noted, however, that according to some of the prime
contractors, SR&QA staffing has actually improved over the
years. 211 For example, at the Rocketdyne Corporation, there has
been an increase in QA staffing to a level that represents nearly
40% of the corporation's manufacturing staff.
Issue 3
Are the responsibilities of safety, engineers and design,, engineers
adequately specified within NASA s risk management program?
Finding
The roles of safety, design as well as reliability engineers are not
adequately and uniformly defined throughout the NSTS program.
In some cases, the Committee learned that safety engineers were
not participating in major decisions related to flights of the Shut-
tle.
Recommendations
It should be the responsibility of the new Associate Administra-
tor for SR&QA to fully specify the roles of safety and reliability en-
gineering as well as quality assurance personnel within the NSTS
program so that all critical aspects of the program and decisions
related to the adequacy of hardware and subsystem performance
are fully reviewed by these disciplines.
Discussion
The function of the safety engineers within the NSTS program
has been to determine whether or not certain prescribed tests,
analyses, and design descriptions have been followed appropriately
2o9 Discussion with the NASA Chief Engineer's Office, May 13, 1986. Also, Crate Hgs, re-
sponse to question by Mr. Roe, Transcript, June 11, 1986, pp. 59-60.
2]o Cmte Hgs, response to question by Mr. Roe, Transcript, June 11, 1986, pp. 59-60.
2_1 Telephone Conversation, August 13, 1986.
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as they relate to safety concerns, using the techniques of HA. The
safety office has not been significantly involved in the engineering
design efforts. If an engineering problem arises that could effect
the safety of the overall system, it is the responsibility of design
engineering teams to perform technical evaluations rather than
having these analyses performed by the safety engineers. Prior to
the Challenger accident, the safety program did not have the per-
sonnel, facilities or expertise to review decisions by design engi-
neers that the O-ring erosion problem was a manageable risk. Even
though this erosion was a continuing problem, there was, according
to testimony provided to the Rogers Commission, no second set of
"eyes" available to question waiver applied to this problem. 212
Issue
Does the SR&QA program require improved coordination be-
tween centers, contractors and NASA Headquarters?
F/ndings
1. Although guidelines have been published that describe the re-
sponsibility of contractors' in the areas of SR&QA, 213 NASA's
guidelines do not adequately distinguish these various activities as
distinct disciplines requiring specialized skills and centralized co-
ordination.
2. In its review of the agency's reliability and quality assurance
programs as they relate to the Space Shuttle, the Committee found
there was little commonality among the cognizant officials at
MSFC, JSC, KSC, and Headquarters in the perception of the vari-
ous responsibilities associated with these separate and distinct dis-
ciplines.
Recommendations
1. It is important that a clear delineation of responsibilities for
the separate SR&QA disciplines be appropriately documented. It is
also essential that the relative importance of each of the three sep-
arate disciplines be established as an integral part of the NSTS
program. These functions are the responsibility of NASA Head-
quarters.
2. NASA must carefully review the staff and resources devoted
to the SR&QA function within NASA and contractor organizations
for adequacy. The Administrator shall report to the Committee
with his findings and recommendations.
Discussion
Although the controlling document describing the SR&QA func-
tions for the Shuttle contractors was provided to the Committee, no
corresponding document was identified that describes the imple-
mentation of these functions for the SR&QA engineers that are
direct employees of NASA. NASA contends that the same control-
ling document applies to agency employees. The specific oversight
2_z Testimony before the Rogers Commission, Mr. Jack Walker, Deputy Director, MSFC
Safety Office, April, 1986.
2_s NASA, "Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Provisions for the Space Shuttle
Program": NHB 5300.4 (1D-2), October, 1979
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responsibilities of these employees and their independent reviews
and analyses requires a more complete delineation in the Commit-
tee's view. The Rogers Commission report provides definitions for
the SR&QA disciplines. 214 An expansion upon these definitions is
required in order to establish a commonality of understanding of
the various functions as they apply to the Shuttle program.
The management structure within NASA that coordinates and
performs the activities associated with the SR&QA tasks for the
NSTS has become decentralized over the past decade. Until recent-
ly many of the oversight duties that at one time were handled
through Level I were moved to the field centers. Responsibilities
for various systems that comprise the Space Shuttle are delegated
to the Level III field centers. These centers establish and coordi-
nate SR&QA activities at the contractor facilities. They are also re-
sponsible for reporting any anomalies, inconsistencies, or problems
to Level II program management.
Until recently, the Office of the Chief Engineer had responsibil-
ity for SR&QA activities. For various reasons, the operations of this
office in the areas of SR&QA appear to have lost effectiveness,
either through reductions of personnel and support of those pro-
grams at the Headquarters level or through the diffusion of these
functions into various organizations within the operating divisions
at the field centers. 215 These changes reduced Headquarter's abili-
ty to participate in field center status reviews with the prime con-
tractors, limited the Level I manager's ability to survey the effec-
tiveness of the SR&QA programs agency-wide and reduced the co-
location of SR&QA personnel within Headquarter's program of-
rices. The Committee expects that the new Office of SR&QA will be
chartered to make appropriate corrections to augment the safety,
reliability and quality assurance functions within the NSTS Pro-
gram.
d. Contractor Incentives
Issue
Key Shuttle contracts (e.g., the Solid Rocket Booster Production
Contract and the Shuttle Processing Contract (SPC)) provide incen-
tives both for reliability, integrity, and safety of products and serv-
ices on the one hand, and for cost and schedule on the other. Do
these contracts provide an appropriate balance between the two
types of incentives? That is, does NASA utilize contracts to reward
and promote operational safety?
Findings
1. The SPC provides far greater incentives to the contractor for
minimizing costs and meeting schedules than for features related
to safety and performance. SPC is a cost-plus, incentive/award fee
contract. The amount of the incentive fee is based on contract costs
(lower costs yields a larger incentive fee) and on safe and successful
launch and recovery of the Orbiter. The award fee is designed to
permit NASA to focus on those areas of concern which are not sen-
214 Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, p. 152.
21b Discussion with the NASA Chief Engineer's Office, May 13, 1986.
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sitive to the incentive fee provisions, including the safety record of
the contractor. However, the incentive fee dwarfs the award fee--
while the maximum value of the award fee is only one percent of
the value of the SPC, the incentive fee could total as much as 14
percent of the SPC.
2. During the developmental phases of the Thiokol contract for
Solid Rocket Booster production (1980-1983), the contractor re-
ceived consistent ratings of "Excellent-Plus" or "Superior" under
the cost-plus, award-fee contract. NASA contracted with Thiokol on
a cost-plus, incentive-fee (CPIF) basis beginning in July, 1983. The
CPIF contract pays strictly on the basis of costs, although penalties
may be invoked for delays in delivery or for Shuttle accidents due
to SRB failure. At the time of the Challenger accident, Thiokol was
eligible to receive a very large incentive fee, probably on the order
of $75 million.
Recommendations
1. NASA should reexamine all Shuttle contracts and report to
the Committee with its findings and recommendations on whether
more incentives for safety and quality can be built into these con-
tracts. This report should address, inter alia, the SRB Production
Contract and the SPC.
2. NASA's new Office of SR&QA should be involved in the pro-
curement and award fee processes, both to establish reasonable
guidelines and rewards in new contract and to judge performance
of ongoing contracts.
Discussion
Mr. Robert Thompson, Vice President of McDonnell Douglas,
summarized the position of several Committee witnesses when he
stated:
I have never detected that a contractor would deliberate-
ly infringe on safety for a profit motive. 216
On the other hand, Thompson also admitted that contracts do
vary in the extent of their safety incentives and that, to a certain
degree, such incentives can make a difference in operational safety:
• . . the type of safety that we are looking for, for a
system like the Shuttle, I think they can be enhanced with
these kind of stipulations in a contract. They can't truly be
bought that way.
Certainly you [could] hang a larger incentive toward
safety. You may enhance a strong focus on safety and I
would not say that it wouldn't do some good to enlarge
those enhancements. 21_
The more difficult question is whether existing NASA contracts,
such as the SPC and the SRB Production Contact, strike an appro-
priate balance between safety incentives and cost/schedule incen-
tives. This question is particularly critical in light of reductions in
Ils Cmte Hgs, Transcript, July 24, 1986, p. 135.
tit Ibid.
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NASA's SR & QA programs detailed in Section VI.B.2.c. of this
report.
Both Thiokol and NASA witnesses on June 17, 1986, argued that
the penalties inherent in the Thiokol contract with Marshall Space
Flight Center provided more than adequate incentives for Thiokol
to deliver safe, reliable products. These penalties are of two types.
Late-delivery penalties amount to $100-200 thousand per unit. Pen-
alties for mission failures are much larger:
If findings of this Board of Investigation determines (sic)
that the cause of the failure is attributed to the Solid
Rocket Motor/Motors not performing in compliance with
the specification requirements of the contract, a fee reduc-
tion of $10,000,000 for each category I failure and
$5,000,000 for each category II failure shall be deducted
from any fee otherwise earned under this contract. 21 s
Similarly, in briefings for Committee staff, NASA contract man-
agers have stated that the award fee portion of the SPC, though
small, is highly visible and that contractors take the award fee and
the semiannual contract ratings very seriously. In NASA's view,
high ratings enhance a company's reputation and, therefore, its
likelihood of competing effectively for additional contracts.
Nevertheless, there are several reasons to believe that NASA
could utilize contractual terms more effectively to enhance pro-
gram safety. First, there can be no argument, for beth the SPC and
the SRB contract, that absent a major mission failure, virtually all
the financial incentives are tilted toward cost-savings and timely
delivery.
Secondly, because of the complex and overlapping division of re-
sponsibilities between NASA and its contractors, it is not clear that
contractors will be fully penalized even in cases where their actions
or their hardware appear to be directly responsible for a mission
failure. Mr. Scheuer's questioning of Mr. Charles Locke, Chairman
of the Board of Morton Thiokol, showed that Thiokol is not pre-
pared to accept the full contractual penalties for the Challenger ac-
cident. 219
Finally, it is revealing that, under its NASA contract, Thiokol
was never penalized for any of the numerous SRB flight anoma-
lies. z2° The booster joint had never worked as intended, nor was its
behavior at ignition ever clearly understood. Occurrences of O-ring
erosion and/or blow-by exceeded twenty-five at the time of the
Challenger accident. In fact, the rate of erosion/blow-by had in-
creased steadily since the beginning of the SRB contract in 1983.
The seal problem was serious enough to lead beth to briefings at
Headquarters and to establishment of a re-design task force. Yet,
in spite of all these problems, Thiokol was eligible to receive a
near-maximum incentive fee of approximately $75 million. But, in
the final analysis, it was NASA that beth approved the SRB design
21a NASA, Schedule D, NAS8-30490, April 12, 1983, p. 71.
_l_ Crate I-Igs, Transcript, June 17, 1986, pp. 55-56.
22o While this discussion focuses on possible contract penalties related to flight anomalies, it
is also interesting to note that Thiokol has never been penalized for numerous safety and proc-
ess violations at its Utah facilities. Several of these violations have resulted in serious fires and/
or explosions.
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and drew up an SRB contract which contained no provisions for
performance penalties or flight-anomaly penalties. One must not
fault Thiokol for collecting the bonus; one must fault NASA for al-
lowing the bonus to be collected at all.
The problem with the kinds of penalties that were contained in
the SRB contract is that, so long as management is convinced that
a festering problem like the seal problem is not likely to cause mis-
sion failure, there is little incentive for the company to spend re-
sources to fix the problem. In fact, if the solution involves signifi-
cant delays in delivery, there may be a strong financial dis-incen-
tive for the company to pursue a short-term solution aggressively.
For example, Thiokol engineer R.M. Boisjoly provided a clear warn-
ing of the seriousness of the O-ring problem in July, 1985, and
Thiokol engineer A. R. Thompson laid out a plan for a possible
short-term solution to the problem. TM Whatever its efficacy, why
was Thompson's plan apparently dismissed so summarily? Part of
the answer may be found in the June 18, 1986, exchange between
Mr. Scheuer and Mr. Thompson:
Mr. SCHEUER. Would the research and development of
your fixes have delayed the delivery of ths SRMs to
NASA?
Mr. THOMVSON.... It probably would have delayed it a
month or two, at least for the hardware and some of the
research work .... 222
The Committee is certainly not suggesting that anyone in NASA
or Thiokol would recommend launch or would refuse to spend re-
sources fixing a problem if it was known that the problem consti-
tuted a real threat to mission safety. However, in the case of the
SRB joint, both NASA and Thiokol managers clearly misjudged the
threat to mission safety. In situations of this sort, contractual pro-
visions rewarding performance rather than cost and schedule
would have provided a far stronger incentive to fix a long-festering
problem. Ultimately, the balance between safety incentives and
cost/schedule incentives in the SRB contract may illuminate a
number of issues raised by the Challenger accident.
,sl Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, pp. 249-51.
su Crate I-Igs, Transcript, June 18, 1986, p. 18.
VII. CASING JOINT DESIGN
Discussion
(a) Introduction
The fact that the aft field joint of the right-hand Solid Rocket
Booster failed at the 300 degree location is overwhelmingly sup-
ported by the evidence. Retrieval of two large pieces of the joint
clearly show that they were destroyed by the heat and velocity of
the gas flame emanating from the right-hand booster. Additional
supporting evidence was found by reviewing the telemetry data
and the photographs taken during launch and flight. 1
For the purpose of redesigning the joint it is important that the
way in which the joint failed be determined as closely as possible.
This determination, however, is difficult, if not impossible, to make
with one hundred percent certainty. The evidence to support
progress of the failure through the joint is incomplete. However,
based on the recorded history of the joint problems encountered in
flight and in test, based on the laws of physics, and based on behav-
ior of the materials used in the joint, the following PROBABLE
CAUSE is offered.
(b) Probable Cause of Failure
1. Both the primary O-ring and the secondary O-ring were seated
when the steel casings were mated. The pressure check verified
this fact. However, from experience, the primary O-ring was seated
in the upstream position as had been previously recognized by
NASA and Thiokol engineers. (See Figure VII-1.)
Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, pp. 22-23 and 78-79.
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2. Upon ignition, the primary O-ring could not reseat at the 300
degree location in the downstream position, where it needed to be
in time to prevent blowby. At this point there were too many defi-
ciencies acting in unison which prevented the O-ring from reseat-
ing in that location. First, proper spacing between the inner face of
the tang and the opposing face of the inner leg of the clevis ap-
proximately 0.020 inches, is critical. That spacing for Flight 51-L
was too small, at the 300 degree location where the smoke was ob-
served, to facilitate prompt reseating of the primary O-ring. Calcu-
lations of segment diameters indicate the gap spacing was only
0.004 inches, near metal-to-metal contact. The ignition gases passed
the O-ring at this location (See Figure VII-2). This condition did
not exist elsewhere in the joint around the casings since the pri-
mary O-ring was able to seat around the joint in other locations.
Second, the low temperature throughout the night prior to
launch left the fluorocarbon elastomer primary O-ring stiff and
lacking in ability to spring into the downstream (seated) position at
the 300 degree location in time, relative to the buildup of motor
pressure, to provide a tight seal. The temperature of the aft field
joint at time of launch was calculated by Thiokol after the accident
to be 16 degree F. Part of the reason for this low temperature was
the heat transfer away from the joint, by conduction through the
aft attachment strut. The conduction was driven by liquid hydro-
gen, which remained in the external tank overnight. The supercold
fuel created a 430 degree temperature differential across the ship,
drawing heat out of the joint and O-rings.
At ignition, blowby occurred, either with erosion of the primary
O-ring or without erosion.
64-420 0 - 86 - 7
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3. However, there could have been one or more than one blow-
hole through the zinc chromate putty before ignition.One such
blowhole could have been made at the 300 degree location either
during the leak check at 200 psi prior to the seating of the primary
O-ring or prior to the leak check when the casings were brought
together. If so, there was a high probability that the primary O-
ring eroded at this point. The phenomena of blowing holes in the
putty had been observed many times at post-flight dismantlement
and had dramatically increased when the procedures were changed
to increase the test pressure to 200 psi. Additionally, the Randolph
putty had been found unsatisfactory on numerous occasions. 2
4. Upon ignition of the Solid Rocket Motor, this blowhole would
have facilitated and concentrated the hot propellant gas flame on
the primary O-ring, and possibly the secondary O-ring as well.
Alignment of O-ring erosion with the location of blowholes had
been observed on numerous occasions. 8
5. Between the time the casings were assembled and the launch,
the secondary O-ring was unseated from its previously sealed posi-
tion. The fact that it had been sealed has been verified by the pres-
sure check made 28 days before when the casings were joined.
Either the secondary O-ring was unseated by joint rotation coupled
with O-ring stiffness or by the formation of ice in the joint.
During the intervening period, as the Shuttle stood on Pad 39B
waiting for the launch, 7 inches of rain had fallen and some could
have easily penetrated the joints.The access of rain water into the
jointswas proved when STS-9 was disassembled and water poured
out of the assembly pin holes.In testsconducted afterthe accident,
itwas confirmed that the water in the aft fieldjoint would have
turned to ice,and that the ice could have dislodged the secondary
O-ring, pushing itupstream into a non-sealed position.In this posi-
tion,it isdoubtful that the secondary O-ring could have sealed at
ignition.
6. One of the three Solid Rocket Booster to External Tank aft at-
tachment struts isalso connected at the 300 degree location,just a
few inches below the aft field joint. As the Space Shuttle system
stood on the launch platform at Pad B on January 28, the large
External Tank was gradually filled with liquid hydrogen and liquid
oxygen. Liquid hydrogen, at a temperature of 423 deg F below zero,
and liquid oxygen, at a temperature of 297 deg F below zero,
caused the tank to contract as it was filled. Since the Solid Rocket
Boosters are firmly bolted to the launch platform, a lateral force of
approximately 190,000 pounds pulled sideways on the aft attach-
ment strut and the Solid Rocket Motor casing, including the joint
that failed. 4 Refueling of the tank was accomplished early on the
morning of January 28.
At ignition, the 190,000-pound force was instantly released when
the SRB hold-down bolts were blown loose. For the next two and a
half seconds the right Solid Rocket Motor field joints experienced a
3 cycle per second vibratory load caused by the sudden release of
NASA MSFC Memo, Miller to Horton, April 12, 1984.
3 Thiokol, "Eresion of SRM Pressure Seals, TWR 15160, Chart A-9, August 19, 1985: "Seal
damage always has a_ocmted" putty blowhole.".,, .
4 NASA, MSFC, "51-L Analysis Overvmw, April 25, 1986, p. H-203.
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the lateral force.5 The ignition pressure increased the joint spacing.
Also, the flow of motor gases through the blowhole at the 300
degree location could have resulted in damage to the primary O-
ring. The evidence of smoke at the 300 degree location is unlikely
without O-ring damage.
7. Smoke at launch, clearly visible in the photographs, stopped
at 2.7 seconds when the vibratory load damped out and the joint
sealed. The sealing of the breach at the 300 degree location was
made possible by blockage from burned material, probably consist-
ing of a mixture of insulation and aluminum oxide. Post-accident
tests performed by Morton Thiokol proved that aluminum oxide
could have successfully plugged the joint at 2.7 seconds. While the
smoke at ignition appeared to be intermittent, that appearance was
probably a result of air and main engine exhaust currents.
8. At T+37 seconds into the flight, the Shuttle encountered wind
gust loads in conjunction with planned maneuvers. Components of
these gust and maneuvering loads were transmitted to the Solid
Rocket Booster through the External Tank attachment strut. Based
on the prescence of smoke at liftoff, these forces were transmitted
to a joint already weakened by erosion and heat damage.
9. At 43 seconds into the flight, the main engines throttled back
as the Shuttle reached "Max q" (maximum dynamic pressure).
Four seconds later, the main engines had throttled up to 104%
power and the geometry of the Solid Rocket Motor propellants had
increased thrust. At this point, the motor pressure increased to 609
psi.
Additional structural loads resulted from turbulence. Flight 51-L
experienced the most severe turbulence of any Shuttle flight and,
although the loads were within the allowable design limits, those
design limits did not consider a joint that had already failed. 6 It is
unknown how much the combined effect of wind gust loads, ma-
neuvering loads and an increase in thrust contributed to the acci-
dent. But the combined effects of these forces could have dislodged
the burned material at the previously breached section of the joint.
10. Shortly after the vehicle was loaded by these turbulent
forces, at T+58 seconds, a flame appeared from the same general
region where the puffs of smoke had been seen. But, this time the
joint was continuously breached by the burning propellant gases.
In a little over two seconds, the flame had grown and acted as a
blowtorch to burn through the hydrogen tank. The appearance of
the flame at this time is also indicative of a damaged primary O-
ring and failure of the secondary O-ring to seal, for reasons ex-
plained in the Critical Items List dated December 17, 1982. 8a
The telemetry data, photographs and cockpit voice recordings
support evidence of turbulent conditions and the manner in which
the Shuttle failed.
6 The joint was designed to accommodate these loads.
e NASA. MSFC, "51-L Analysis Overview, STS 51-L--Wind Shears, April 25, 1986, p. H-597.
6. NASA, "SRB Critical Items List," December 17, 1982, page A-6A, sheet 1.
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Time(min:soc) Crewposition:' Crewcomment
T+19 ..........................................................................PLT...................................Lookslike we've _ a Iotfa wind I_e today.
T+20 ..........................................................................CDR..................................Yeah.
T+22 ..........................................................................CDR..................................It's a little hard to see out my window here.
T+28 ..........................................................................PLT...................................There'sten thousandfeet and Machpoint five.
T+30 ..............................................................................................................(Garble)
T+35 ..........................................................................CDR..................................Pointnine.
T+37 ..............................................................................................................[High thrust vector control(steering) activity
noted.Thiswas causedby upperatmoshpere
wind gustsand plannedmaneuvefs.]
T+40 ..........................................................................PIT...................................There'sMath one.
T+4I ..........................................................................CDR..................................Goingthroughnineteenthousand.
T+43 ..........................................................................CDR..................................OK,we're throttlingdown.
T+57 ..........................................................................CDR..................................Throttlingup.
T+58 ..........................................................................PLT...................................Throttleup,
T+58 ..............................................................................................................[Vehicleleadedby dynamicpressures.]
T+58 ............................................................................................................. [A flame appearedfrom same general region
where the puffs of smoke had been seen
earlier.]
T+59 ..........................................................................CDR..................................Roger.
T+ GO..........................................................................PLT...................................Wooonheooo,
T+GO ..............................................................................................................[Right SRM internal pressurebegan to diverge
fromthat of left SRM]
T+G1 ..............................................................................................................[Well-definedplumewasdeflectedindicatingthe
plumehadburnedthroughthe liquidhydro.
gen tankstructure.]
T+G2 ..........................................................................PLT...................................Thirty.five thousandgoing through one point
five.
T+64.7 ...........................................................................................................[Liquidhydrogenleaknoted.]
T+6G.8 .......................................................................CDR..................................Readingfour eightysixonmine.
66.800..............................................................................................................[Leak confirmed whon hydrogomtank leak
pressurizationsystemwasunableto maintain
normalpressurizationrate.]
T+G7 ..........................................................................PLT...................................Yep,that'swhatI'vegot, too.
T+70 ..........................................................................(;DR..................................Roger,go at throttleup.
T+72.2 ...........................................................................................................[Right Solid Rocket Booster motiondiffered
from Orbiterand left Solid RocketBooster,
indicatingfailure of lower attachmentstruc-
ture.]
T+72.G ...........................................................................................................[Liquid hydrogentank pressurefell. Leak was
growingrapidly.]
T+73 ..............................................................................................................[Liquidhydrogenand liquidoxygenpressureto
mainenginesshowedsignificantdrop.]
T+73 ..........................................................................PLT...................................Uh Oh
T+73.1 ...........................................................................................................[Circumferentialwhitepatternaroundthe Extor.
palTankaft bulkheadsuggestedliquidhydro-
gen tankstructurefailure.]
T+73.1 ...........................................................................................................[Vaporobservedat inter-tankwhichwasindica-
tive of the liquidoxygentankfailing.Liquid
oxygenthenobr,e,rved.]s
(CDR)CommanderScobee,(P1.T)P_lotSmith,(MSl) MissionS_ecialistO_izuk3,(MS2) M'L_sbon_list Resnik.
B NASA,DM. Germany,STS51LInc_er_tInvestigate,IntegratedEventsTimeLine,Johnson_paceFlightCenter,June4, 1986,as modified.
(c) Problems Discovered
The design of the joint was based on the successful design of the
joints used on the Titan III booster rocket. 9 That design was simi-
lar except that the tang pointed upward, instead of down, and the
clevis pointed downward, instead of up, as in the case of the Shut-
tle booster. Another difference was that the design of the Shuttle
joint included two O-rings instead of one as provided for in the
g NASA, "SRB Critical Items List," December 17, 1982, p. A-6A, Sheet 1.
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Titan design. But, the most important difference was the use of
putty in the Shuttle design. While the Titan employed the NBR in-
sulation to close the gap between segments, the Shuttle design
called for filling a gap between insulation with putty.
The Shuttle design was changed to accommodate manufacturing
constraints. _° The Shuttle booster is larger, 146 inches in diameter
as compared to 120 inches for the Titan. As a result of its larger
size, the Shuttle booster uses more steel. While this requirement
for more steel had no impact on other booster components, it did
have an impact on the joint design. The maximum billet size (a
piece of metal made from an ingot) commercially available to man-
ufacture the large, one-piece, weld free forward dome with an inte-
gral forward skirt tang was less than that needed for the Shuttle
Solid Rocket Boosters. However, it was found that by turning the
casings upside down, there would be just enough metal to manufac-
ture a forward dome because that component would then only have
to incorporate the single joint element, the tang, instead of the
double joint element, the clevis.
It is good engineering practice to design products to accommo-
date manufacturing tooling capabilities and methods. Furthermore,
with the clevis facing up and the tang down, field assembly at the
Kennedy Space Center was simplified. Combined with the extra O-
ring, the design change appeared reasonable. But it is also good en-
gineering practice to accommodate all the forces and conditions
that the product must perform under during its useful life. The
design of the Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor, as opposed to the Titan,
had to provide for reuse of the propellant casings, including the
wearing of joint surfaces and distortion of the case in handling and
shipment. It had to accommodate heavier propellant loads. The
design was more susceptible to water entry during storms. And,
most significant, the design had to accommodate a combination of
dynamic structural loads significantly different than those encoun-
tered by the Titan.
It is always a simple task to find fault with someone else's work;
especially after an accident occurs. It is quite another matter to
originate the work and produce a useful product.
The joint design provided a direct path between the combustion
chamber, consisting of an annulus with propellant surrounding it,
and the outside of the steel motor casings. That path was sealed
with putty and two circular fluorocarbon elastomer (rubber-like)
bands called O-rings. While O-rings are frequently used to retain
pressures much higher than those present in the Shuttle Solid
Rocket Motor, thermal and structural forces acting on the Shuttle
joints are formidable. These joints must carry and transfer these
loads between the casings.
Another essential ingredient of good engineering practice is to
use material suited to the function. Some O-rings can withstand
high temperatures. But "all . . . elastomers become brittle at low
[temperatures] .... Elastomers, like natural rubber, nitrile
rubber, and Viton A . . . that become brittle at low [temperature]
LoStaffdiscussionwith E.G. Dorsey, Thiokol Wasatch Operations,Brigham City,Utah, Sep-
tember 4,1986.
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can be used for static seal gaskets when highly compressed at room
temperature prior to cooling. ''l '
But the Shuttle's O-rings were not used in a "static" system as
evidenced by the variations in gap spacing between the tang and
clevis. Nor would they always be highly compressed at room tem-
perature prior to the cooling. Furthermore, the O-rings could not
withstand burning propellant temperatures in the range of 5800 ° F.
The design of the joint therefore provided for putty to insulate the
O-rings from the burning gases.
This putty did not always perform as had been expected, and evi-
dence of hot gas passing the putty and getting to the first, or pri-
mary, O-ring along the path to the outside of the rocket chamber
was discovered. Once the putty was breached, the joint was not
working as it had been designed. This failure, although recognized
by NASA and its contractor Morton Thiokol, was neglected on
March 8, 1984 when they chose to accept an "allowable degree of
erosion," which meant there was an allowable percentage of fail-
ure. 12
O-rings become effective (are seated) when pressure is applied to
them as they sit in a groove provided to house them.
One question that the design was intended to answer was wheth-
er or not the O-ring was seated properly in its groove. An opening,
with a fitting much like a valve stem on a tire, was provided to
allow pressure testing between two such O-rings, the primary and
the secondary.
But this design did not always answer the question: was the pri-
mary O-ring seated? Did it seal or not? Notice how the primary O-
ring in Figure VII-1 (p. 176) is forced upward (shown by the single
arrow). That is opposite to the normal direction that the propellant
pressure acts (notice the double arrows). Even with an acceptable
pressure check result, the primary O-ring would still be unseated
for a fraction of a second when the motor pressure pushed the O-
ring in the opposite direction from that which took place during
the leak check.
The second reason the assumption concerning the leak check as
"proof of sealing" could be erroneous was that the primary O-ring
did not really have to seat at all if the putty behind it (toward the
inside of the case) held the pressure during the leak check. So ear-
lier in the program there really was no way to know whether the
primary O-ring seated or not.
What appeared to be a rather straightforward joint was far from
simple. If the primary O-ring did not seat during the leak check,
and the pressure test succeeded, then the putty was doing the work
of sealing. But it still was not possible to determine from outside
the casings whether the putty or the O-ring was holding the pres-
sure. But, if the leak check failed, then the O-ring was not seated
and there was a blow-hole through the putty.
To resolve this concern, NASA and its contractor, Morton Thio-
kol, changed the leak-check procedure by increasing the pressure
until a pressure of 200 pounds per square inch (psi) was accepted as
1L Theodore Baumeister, Editor, Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers, 7th Ed., (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 18-35.
12 Rogers Commission Report, Volume II, p. H-1.
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the standard. They had ascertained that this was sufficient pres-
sure to blow a hole through the putty. 13 Then, if the O-ring failed
to seat, the pressure would blow a hole through the putty and the
test would disclose an unseated O-ring (a failed seal). But if the O-
ring held the higher pressure, the O-ring would still have been
seated in the upper position instead of the downward position. That
would be contrary to the way the O-ring would have to be seated to
contain the propellant pressure during launch of the Shuttle.
In summary, there was still no way to verify whether the pri-
mary O-ring was seated properly, meaning in the downstream posi-
tion after the cases were joined together in the field. In the begin-
ning of the development program the concept was that the putty
would act somewhat like a "piston in a cylinder" when the propel-
lant was ignited. As the chamber pressure built up, the putty was
to move downstream and compress the air in the path between it
and the primary O-ring. The compressed gas was to seat the O-ring
and thereby seal the joint. Besides, even if the primary O-ring
didn't seal, surely the secondary O-ring would, since it had already
been pressure checked, which verified it was seated in the down-
stream position.
There was no direct evidence that the primary O-ring was not
holding the pressure off the secondary ring until Flight 51-B. That
was the first flight when erosion of the secondary O-ring had been
observed, even though erosion of the primary O-ring had occurred
before. 14
Thiokol had considered the joint design to be Criticality 1R, 's
meaning that there was redundancy. While the second O-ring was
redundant by design, the joint as a whole was still Criticality 1,
since if it failed, it would mean the loss of the Shuttle and crew. In
other words, there was no backup for the joint.
The joint was designed to mate two rocket motor segment cases,
one to the other, where the lower edge of the upper case consisted
of a tang and the upper edge of the lower case consisted of a clevis.
After the tang was inserted into the clevis (which housed the two
O-rings), 177 steel pins, each approximately 1 inch in diameter,
were inserted from the outside through aligned holes which went
through the outer leg of the clevis, the tang and partly into the
inner leg of the clevis. The spacing between the inner face of the
tang and the mating face of the inner leg of the clevis where the O-
rings were housed was critical to the integrity of the joint because
that spacing, in part, determined whether the O-rings could func-
tion properly to seal against the propellant gas pressures. Not only
was the initial static spacing critical, but maintaining the proper
spacing during launch and flight under dynamic structural load-
ings was necessary for an effective seal.
Upon ignition of the Solid Rocket Motor fuel the operating pres-
sure increases to 922 psi at 40 degrees F within a little over one-
half second (0.648 sec). '6 The effect of this pressure increase is to
_s NASA, MSFC, Problem Assessment System Record No. A07934, January 23, 1986, p. 6.
14 Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, p. 1510.
15Crate Hgs, Transcript, June 18, 1986, p. 51.
_6 Morton Thiokol, TWR-10212 (CD), Table 4-9, 7_/pica! Propellant Design Data.
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cause the casings to bulge out around their midsections while being
constrained by the thicker steel sections at the ends, much like a
can of soda after freezing. The casings change shape during the
buildup of motor pressure. This bulging has an effect on the joint.
As in the case of the frozen soda can, the wall of the casing near
the joint is no longer vertical, or perpendicular to the bottom, but
angles out to meet the larger diameter in the center of the casing.
NASA calls this change in angle at the joint "joint rotation."
This joint rotation is a component of an overall spacing problem
that includes: changes caused by casing wear and tear experienced
during refurbishment; case growth (swelling) from pressurizing the
casings; distortion that occurs during shipment of the loaded cas-
ings; and the physical handling of the casings during stacking oper-
ations.
The joint rotation problem was aggravated when the steel cas-
ings were made thinner to achieve a reduction in weight and thus
an increase in payload. The rotation problem was further aggravat-
ed by changing the design of the propellant geometry to achieve
greater thrust. This increased the pressure within the casings and
thereby increased the "gap opening. ''17 These changes compro-
mised the integrity of the joint seals because joint rotation in-
creases the spacing (gap) between the tang and the O-ring grooves
in the clevis.
When the increase in the gap occurs, it can open the O-ring seal,
leaving the path from the propellant combustion chamber open to
the outside of the casing, except for any blockage by the putty. But,
as noted above, the putty frequently has holes blown through it. If
there were blowholes in the putty, and the original spacing be-
tween the metal parts of the joint was such that the joint rotation
left open spaces between the O-rings and the tang, then the joint
would fail and burning gases would escape to the outside.
(d) Joint Behavior
In a memo from John Miller to Mr. Eudy of NASA on June 16,
1980, the following statement was made:
STA-1 test data shows that the secondary O-ring can
become unseated from the tang due to joint rotation at ap-
proximately 40 percent of MEOP [Mean Effective Operat-
ing Pressure], and therefore, is not likely to assume a seal-
ing position should the above primary seal failure occur.
The SRM has never been tested to evaluate the above fail-
ure condition, nor has credibility of such a failure been of-
ficially declared, i s
In March of 1984 Thiokol had completed its SRM O-ring assem-
bly test plan, which was to confirm the O-ring erosion scenario,
provide data for heat transfer predictions and establish the effec-
'_ The Light Weight Casings, first used on STS-6, had thinner casing w_ls than the standa,_l
steel casings. Light weight casings permitted flight with heawer pa_,!oaas. _ _l_-_, r_e_
began using the High Performance Motor (HPM) which developed higher m.ternai press_r_
while using the light weight casings. The purpose of the HPM was to further increase pay oa
capacity.
Is NASA, "Evaluation of TWR-12690 CD, Test Plan for Space Shuttle SRM Lightweight Cyl-
inder Segment Joint Verification, dated June 10, 1980", EP 25 (80-70), June 16, 1980, p. 2.
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tiveness of the vacuum putty. The introduction to that plan includ-
ed the statement:
O-ring seals in rocket motors in general and the Space
Shuttle SRMs in particular, can suffer thermal degrada-
tion because of exposure to the high temperature motor
chamber gases. Although none of the SRM primary O-
rings to date have failed to perform their design function,
there is some concern because of isolated events which
show localized erosion as high as 0.053 inches. The postu-
lated scenario for this thermal degradation effect is a
short-time duration impingement of a high energy jet
which is induced during ignition pressurization by a com-
bination of voids in the protective vacuum putty and the
filling of available free volumes created by the tolerances
of mating parts and the O-ring slots. Unfortunately, the
overall assembly and the vacuum putty layup does not
lend itself to a well-defined geometry for predicting the hot
gas flow and associated heat transfer to the O-rings. 19
A subsequent report, dated May 7, 1984, contained a statement:
Symptom of failure: a vaccum putty exhibited gas paths
located at 319 deg., 338 deg., and 347 deg. Erosion of the
primary O-ring occurred at 319 deg. only. The damaged
region was approximately 5.6 inches long with a .034 inch
maximum depth and involved 136 deg. of the O-ring cross
section diameter, s°
In a memo from Larry Mulloy to Bob Lindstrom, Director, MSFC
Shuttle Projects Office, in November of 1984 it was noted:
• . . it was determined that shims could be used to make
the case joint sufficiently concentric to consistantly
achieve a 7.54 percent minimum O-ring squeeze. Therefore
the 7.54 percent has been established as the minimum ac-
ceptable requirement for both case and nozzle O-ring joints
and verified by subscale testing and full scale experi-
ence. 21
On a 0.280 inch diameter O-ring a 7.54 percent squeeze would be
equal to a compression distance of 0.021 inches. _z
On July 17, 1985, Irv Davids, Manager of the Solid Rocket Boost-
er Program at NASA Headquarters, sent a memo to the Associate
Administrator for Space Flight, the subject of which was case-to-
i o Thiokol, Philip Shadleeky, "Performance Characteristics of the SRM O-ring Azsembly Test
Plan", TWR-14336, dated March 1984, p. 1.
1984, pp. 1-2.
sl O-ring squeeze is the distance, in fractious of an inch, that an O-ring is compressed from its
normally round shape. This dimension can also be expreesed as a percentage of the total diame-
ter before cempreesmn. In 1984 NASA. was ,using .a te.rm ".minimum O-rin_ squeeze.'.' Dur_ an
SRM dee_n analysis of the case and noo.Je v- .ring joints It was concluded that .the 14o m.cn
diameter cese cylinders would n.ot meet the dee_m standard ._. 15 percent minimum O- .nng
squeeze at _ero pre_ure. The various problems that prevented this included flaws m the O-ring
groove_ and sealing surfaces and differences in the spacing between tang and clevis on various
Ica_sl _SA, Larry Mulloy, "ECP SRM 1197, Nozzle Nose Inlet Housing O-ring Squeeze," SA 42-
562-84, November 20, 1984, p. 1.
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case and nozzle-to-case O-ring seal erosion problems. 23 Davids sent
copies to Messrs. Weeks, Hamby, Herrington and Winterhalter. TM
In the memo it was noted that there has been twelve instances of
primary O-ring erosion during Shuttle flights. In addition, in one
specific case there had also been erosion of the secondary O-ring
seal. There were also two primary O-ring seals that were heat af-
fected without erosion and two cases in which soot blewby the pri-
mary seals. In this memo it was noted that the prime suspect for
the cause of erosion on the primary O-ring seals was the type of
putty being used. It was Thiokol's position that during assembly
leak check, or ignition, a hole could be formed through the putty
which then initiated O-ring erosion due to a "jetting effect." It was
even mentioned in this memo that Thiokol was seriously consider-
ing the deletion of putty on the QM-5 nozzle/case joint since they
believed the putty was the prime cause of the erosion. Davids, how-
ever, had reservations about deleting the putty because he recog-
nized the significance of the QM-5 firing in qualifying the FWC
(Filament Wound Case) for flight.
In the matter of case-to-case O-ring erosion the memo noted that
there had been five occurrences during flight where there was pri-
mary field joint O-ring erosion. There was also one case where the
secondary O-ring was heat damaged with no erosion. The memo
stated:
The erosion with the field joint primary O-ring is consid-
ered by some to be more critical than the nozzle joint due
to the fact that during the pressure build up on the pri-
mary O-ring the unpressurized field joint secondary seal
unseats due to joint rotation. 24
The memo continued:
The problem with the unseating of the secondary O-ring
during joint rotation has been known for quite some time.
In order to eliminate this problem on the FWC field joints
a capture feature was designed which prevents the second-
ary seal from lifting off. 25
Lastly the memo noted:
The present consensus is that if the primary O-ring seats
during ignition, and subsequently fails, the unseated sec-
ondary O-ring will not serve its intended purpose as a re-
dundant seal. However, redundancy does exist during the
ignition cycle, which is the most critical time. 2e (See Ap-
pendices VII-B and VII-C.)
On August 2, 1985, Larry Wear, MSFC's SRM Element Manager,
sent a letter to Joseph Kilminster, Thiokol's Vice President for
Space Booster Programs, on the subject of SRM field joint second-
as NASA, Irving Davids, "Case to Case and Nozzle to Case "0' Ring Seal Erosion Problems,"
July 11, 1985.
z3, Mr Weeks Dep Assoc. Administrator for Space Flight (Technical); Mr. Hamby, Dep. Dir,
STS Program In_-,gration; Mr. Herringtqn: De2: Dir. of Launch & Landing Operations; and Mr.
Winterhalter, Acting Dir., Shuttle Propulsion LnV.
24 Ibid., p. 2.
25 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
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ary O-ring lift-off during pressurization. The letter concerned the
situation wherein one O-ring might not seal subsequent to joint ro-
tation. The letter stated:
Because of recent experiences of flight and ground test
motors having increasing incidences of putty blow-holes
and the associated burning of primary O-ring, it would
seem prudent for us to attempt to assure that the second-
ary O-ring is capable of sealing during the entire SRM
burn. 27
The letter requested an assessment of the possibility of lift-off of
the secondary O-ring.
In August of 1985 Jim Thomas, MSFC's Deputy SRM Element
Manager, wrote a memo for Mr. Mulloy to Mr. Hamby at NASA
Headquarters, which was apparently never signed or sent. The sub-
ject of the memo was SRM Joint/O-ring Erosion. The memo stated:
On July 11, 1985, you and Irv Davids were briefed by
Jim Thomas of my office on the history of the effort under-
way to resolve the issues and concerns of the above sub-
ject.
The memo than went on to discuss a number of questions.
1. What would happen if the secondary seal lifted off the mating
surface during motor pressurization, and, also, how long it would
take for the seal to return to a position where contact was made?
The answer to that question stated that bench test data indicated
that the O-ring resiliency, that is, its capability to fill the gap be-
tween the tang and the clevis, was a function of temperature and
the rate at which the gap opened.
The memo stated, "at 100 deg. F the O-ring maintained contact.
At 75 deg. F the O-ring lost contact for 2.4 seconds. At 50 deg. F
the O-ring did not reestablish contact in 10 minutes at which time
the test was terminated." The memo then stated, "the conclusion is
that secondary sealing capability in the SRM field joint cannot be
guaranteed." 2s
2. Another question concerned whether or not the secondary O-
ring would seal in sufficient time to prevent joint leakage if the
primary O-ring had not sealed. The answer to that question was as
follows:
MTI has no reason to suspect that the primary seal
would ever fail after pressure equilibrium is reached, i.e.,
after the ignition transient. If the primary O-ring were to
fail from 0 to 170 milliseconds, there is a very high proba-
bility that the secondary O-ring would hold pressure since
the case has not expanded appreciable at this point. If the
primary seal were to fail from 170 to 330 milliseconds, the
probability of the secondary seal holding is reduced. From
330 to 600 milliseconds the chance of the secondary seal
27 NASA, Larry Wear, "SRM Field Joint Secondary O-ring Lift-Off During Pressurization,"
SA 41-326-85, August 2, 1985.
2s Engineering consultants to the Committee have serious questions as to how this test relates
to actual O-ring performance in flight hardware.
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holding is small. This is direct result of the O-ring's slow
response compared to the metal-case segments as the joint
rotates.
3. The third question indicated that NASA Headquarters was not
aware that the secondary O-ring may not seat due to joint rotation,
and they wanted to know when this data was incorporated into the
FMEA/CIL? The answer noted that Thiokol had submitted a TWR-
13520 to MSFC in December of 1982. This was approved by NASA
Level III on January 21, 1983. NASA Level II authorized a change
request March 2, 1983 and Level II issued a PRCBD to implement
approved Level I change request on May 2, 1983. 29
Thiokol completed their engineering study of O-ring compression
set and dated the report October 2, 1985. 30 (Compression set relates
to the ability of a material, in this case, O-rings, to rebound to its
original dimensions after having being subjected to compression for
various periods of time and or at various temperatures.) That
report contained the following information. There was a concern of
the ability of the O-ring to rebound to or near its original dimen-
sions after having been subjected to compression for various peri-
ods of time and at various temperatures. The Parker Seal Company
of Culver City, California, tested several O-rings to determine the
properties of the material. Two compression set tests in accordance
with ASTM (American Society for Testing and Materials) D-395
method B were performed. 31 The first test was conducted at a con-
stant temperature of 75 deg. and the time that the ring was in
compression was varied. In the second test the temperature was
varied and the compression was held constant. A small O-ring of
0.139 inch diameter was used for test purposes. The test showed
that the percentage of compression increased with an increase of
temperature. However, these tests were not conducted at low tem-
peratures. Rather, they were conducted at temperatures of 212 deg.
F and above and therefore, they have little relevance to ambient
conditions.
A status report from Thiokol's SRM O-ring Task Force, present-
ed on November 20, 1985, recommended that a slightly larger
Viton O-ring of 0.292 inch diameter, along with thicker shims, be
used as a short-term solution. The current O-rings were 0.280
inches. Thiokol pointed out that there would be more erosion
margin due to greater material thickness at the sealing surface.
They noted that the thicker shims would reduce the initialand ab-
solute final gap opening dimension, resulting in more O-ring
"squeeze" initially.Thiokol stated that the greater initialsqueeze
would be better for compression set and resiliency,and would give
a higher probability of maintaining a secondary seal longer into
the ignition transient. Thiokol also noted that various tests were
conducted on the Randolph putty using hot five-inch char
motors,s2 Two tests were conducted, which determined that the
2, NASA Larry Mulloy, "SRM Joint/O-ring Erosion " SA 42-349-85, August 1985, pp. 1-2.
so Thiokol, B.L. Orme, "Enginering Study of O-ring Compression Set," TWR-15218, October 2,
1985.
s l Refer to Appendix VII-A for ASTM specification.
8SSmali scale test motors.
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putty erosion could take place at a rate between 5.5 and 13.0 mils
per second. Two other tests noted that the erosion on GS-43 33
putty was ten times higher than that on the Randolph. s4
Primary concerns drawn from the charts provided by Thiokol on
January 27, 1986, centered around the following items. During the
ignition transient, 0 to 170 milliseconds, there is a high probability
of a reliable secondary seal. Between 170 and 330 milliseconds
there is a reduced probability of a reliable secondary seal and be-
tween 330 and 600 milliseconds there is a high probability of no
secondary seal capability. Under steady state conditions, between
600 milliseconds and two minutes, the notes states "if erosion pene-
trates primary O-ring seal--high probability of no secondary seal
capability." 35
A. Bench testing showed O-ring not capable of maintaining con-
tact with metal parts gap opening rate to MEOP.
B. Bench testing showed capability to maintain O-ring contact
during initial phase (0 to 170 ms) of transient, s8
What follows is taken from Chart 2-2:
1. A temperature lower than current data base results in
changing primary O-ring sealing timing function.
2. SRM 15-A 80 deg. arc black grease between O-rings. SRM
15-B 110 deg. arc black grease between O-rings.
3. Lower O-ring squeeze due to lower temperature.
4. Higher O-ring Shore hardness.
5. Thicker grease viscosity.
6. Higher O-ring pressure activation time.
7. Activation time increases, threshold of secondary seal
pressurization capability is approached.
8. If threshold is reached then secondary seal may not be ca-
pable of being pressurized. 3,
The presentation went on to included the following blow-by
history:
SRM 15 worst blow-by.
A. Two case joints (80 deg.), (110 deg.) arc.
B. Much worse visually than SRM 22. SRM blow-by. 3s
The presentation then included a chart titled "O-ring (Viton)
Shore Hardness vs. Temperature." 39
Degree F Shore Hardness
70 degrees 77 hardness
60 degrees 81 hardness
50 degrees 84 hardness
40 degrees 88 hardness
30 degrees 92 hardness
20 degrees 94 hardness
10 degrees 96 hardness
ss A type of putty made by another company that also was considered for use in the SRM.
s4 Thiokol, "SRMO-ring Task Force Status and QM-5 Recommendations," TWR-15349, No-
vember 20, 1985.
s5 Thiokol, "Temperature Concern on SRM Joints," January 27, 1986, chart 2-1.
sa Ibid.
s, Ibid., Chart 2 2.
_a Ibid., Chart 3-1.
s_ Ibid., Chart 4-1.
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The term Shore Hardness refers to a method of identifying the
hardness of materials, and a higher number means a harder mate-
rial. Regardless, though, it is seen from the above table that the
hardness increases as the temperature decreases. Engineers pre-
sented a chart titled Secondary O-ring Resiliency, listing the fol-
lowing temperatures. 4°
Temperature degree F
50 degree
75 degree
100 degree
Time to recover (seconds)
600 recover
2.4 recover
*did not separate
The conclusions presented at the end of the teleconference were:
1. Temperature of O-ring is not only parameter controlling
blow-by. SRM 15 with blow-by at an O-ring temperature at 53
deg. F. SRM 22 with blow-by at an O-ring temperature at 75
deg. F. Four development motors with no blow-by were tested
at O-ring temperature of 47 deg. to 52 deg. F. Development
motors had putty packing which resulted in better perform-
ante,
2. At about 50 deg. F blow-by could be experienced in case
joints.
3. Temperature for SRM 25 on 1/28/86 will be 29 deg. F 9:00
a.m., 32 deg. F. 2:00 p.m.
4. Have no data that would indicate SRM 25 is different
than SRM 15 other than temperature. 41
Recommendations
1. O-ring temperature must be greater than or equal to 53
deg. F at launch. Development motors at 47 deg. to 52 deg. F
with putty packing had no blow-by. SRM 15 (the best simula-
tion) worked at 53 deg. F.
2. Project ambient conditons (temperature and wind) to de-
termine launch time. 42
The effect of Thiokol's recommendations would be that the Shut-
tle should not be launched unless the O-ring seal temperature was
at least 53°F.
(e) Loads Acting on the Joint
There are other loads on the joint in addition to those caused by
the pressures of the burning propellant. The following table identi-
fies those loads relative to time. 43
Time _trvity Sourceof[oacl S]atJcordynamic Impaclon_int
Daysbeforelaunch.......... Matingof casing..............Weightof up_}ercasing
c_nlactinglower
casing.
Static plusimpact........ Physicalcontact
betweentang and
clevis.
4o Ibid, Chart 4-2.
41 Ibid., Chart "Conclusions."
4_ Ibid., Chart "Recommendations."
43 Thi_ Chart was prepared by the Committee and is based on information obtained by Com-
mittee staff during meetings at MSFC on June 30, 1986.
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rmle Activity Sourceof load Staticordynamic Imi_acton_nt
Daysbeforelaunch.......... Solidrocketmotor Weightof SRB Static............................Compressive;shearon
assembly(Stacking) components, pinsat faces
at KSC. betweentangand
eachclevisleg.
Daysbeforelaunch.......... Joiningof the external Additionalweightof tank Static............................Compressive;addit_al
tank,andorbiterto andorbiter, shearonpinswhich
SRB's. connectangto
clevis.
Daysbeforelaunch.......... Transportto padon Movementof Transporter..,Staticanddynamic....... Compressive;slight
crawler, shearchangeson
pins.
Daysbeforelaunch.......... Additionof payloads........ Addedweight.....................Static............................Additionalcompressive
and shearloads.
Within24 hoursof Loadingof fuel................Weightof liquidhydrogenStatic............................Additionalcompressive
launch, andliquidoxygen, andshearloads,
Within24 hoursof Loadingof fuel................ Externaltankcontractsin Static............................Lateraltensileforce
launch, diameterdueto appliedby aft
reductionin attachmentstructure
temperature, betweenexternal
tankandsolidrocket
motorcasing.
6 sec_dsto launch........ Firingof mainengines Thrustof engines............... Staticanddynamic....... Furthermoments
(SSME's). compressiveand
vibratory(25 to 30
Hz).
Atstartof launch............ Solidrocketmotor Combustionpressures......... Basicallystatic............. Bending(Jointrotation)
ignitionbeforelift..oft, lateralforces
perpendicularto
casingwalls.
Atstart of launch............ Solidrocketmotor Enginethrust.....................Static anddynamic....... Instantloadreversal
ignitionbeforelittoff, from compressiveto
tensitein joints and
instantshearreversal
in pins.
Atstart of launch............ Releaseof holddown Instantreleaseof lateral Dynamic........................Instantchangein
bolts, forceat aft External stress,vibratoryat 3
Tankattachment Hz.
structure.
At littoff...........................Launchmaneuvering........ Thrust,p_usnozzlevector Staticanddynamic....... Combination:Vibration,
forces, tensile,shear,lateral
(viaattachment
structure).
Launchphase...................In-flightmaneuvering....... Thrustplusgimbaling, Staticanddynamic....... Combinationvibration,
Launchphase...................Turbuleune--windgust
loads.
Launchphase...................Reductionof main
enginepowerand
SolidRocketMotor
thrustat Maxq
(maximumdynamic
pressure).
Launchphase...................Increasesin thrust
thrustof main
enginesandselid
rocketmotors.
Separat_ phase.............. Burningoutof solid
propellantsand
explosiveforcesat
attachmentpeints.
appliedloadsat tensikLshear,lateral.
attachments.
Impact,thrustnozzle Staticanddynamic....... Impactloads
gimbaling(changesin transmittedto joints.
appliedloads).
Decreaseinthrust..............Staticanddynamic....... Changesin bendingand
stressinjoint,
changesinfrequency
of vibration.
increasein thrust............... Staticanddynamic....... Changesin bendingand
stressinjointandin
vibcation.
Releaseofthrust,impact Staticanddynamic....... Reductionof tensile
forcesat attachment forcesandshearon
points, pins.
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Time ActNdy Sourceof load Stalk:ordynamic Impactonjoint
Oceanimpactand WeightofSRB
retrieval, impactingoceanat
about60 mph
(vertical)25 mph
(horizontal).
Impactonjoint.................. Dynamic........................Variationinstressesat
ioints.
How these loads are accommodated by the joint is critical to the
seal. In Thiokol's analytical evaluation report (TWR-12019, dated
October 6, 1978), S. Stein of the Structures Section included the
statement, "except in local area of pin, all stress levels are consid-
erably below yield." 43a As a result of this information, the Com-
mittee will explore this condition as part of its normal oversight
work to determine the long-term effect on structural integrity of
the casings. 44 Stein also wrote, "at MEOP [maximum expected op-
erating pressure] the primary 'O' ring gap increases 0.052 and the
secondary 0.038"." _5 It should be noted however, the analysis was
made for no thrust, i.e. internal pressure only. 4e As noted on the
forgoing chart, loads on the joint do work in combination and so
the analysis should also provide for the combined effect of all loads
at the time they occur.
On page 55 of the Rogers Commission Report there is a chart
which shows a series of curves which relate maximum aerodynam-
ic force to Mach Number. As a result of a discussion with Dr. Rich-
ard Feynman, Department of Physics, California Institute of Tech-
nology, and a member of the Rogers Commission, the Committee
will review these curves after the completion of this report in an
effort to ascertain their validity. There is reason to suspect that the
"flight envelope" as repressented in the chart is inaccurate. 47
As stated previously, the proper choice of materials is critical to
attaining performance objectives. The steel casings are designed to
withstand the propellant pressures and loads incurred in flight.
Secondly, they must accommodate these forces over and over as the
casings are reused. Consequently, the choices of the type of steel
selected was important.
The steel used to make the casings and the joint is a D-6A. D-6A
is a low-alloy steel for aircraft and missile structural applications.
It is designed primarily for use at room-temperature tensile
strengths of 260 to 290 ksi. 4s D-6A maintains a very high ratio of
yield structure to tensile strength up to a tensile strength of 280
ksi, combined with good ductility.
Typical mechanical properties of D-6A steel: 49
4_ Thiokol, S. Stein, "Analytical Evaluation of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor Tang/
Clevis Joint Behavior", TWR-12019, October 6, 1978, p. 1.
44 Thiokol, S. Stein, "Analytical Evaluation of Space Shuttle SRM Tang/Clevis Joint Behav-
ior", TWR-12019, October 6, 1978.
45 Ibid.
4e Ibid.
47 Discussion with Dr. Richard Feynman, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Cali-
fornia, September 3, 1986.
48 1000 pounds per square inch equals 1 ksi.
49 American Society for Metals, Handbook Edited by H.E. Boyer and T.L. Gall, November,
1984.
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[Iongat_o,iin 50 Reductioni area, V=notch impact
Temperingtemperature Tensilestrength Yieldslrength ksi rnm or 2 in., percent energyif.lh
"C °F ksi percent
150 300 299 211 8.5 19.0 lO
205 400 290 235 B.9 25.7 11
315 600 267 247 8.1 30.0 12
425 800 236 228 9.6 36.8 12
540 1,000 210 204 13.0 45.5 19
650 1,200 150 141 18.4 60.8 30
Normalize,'Jat 900"C (1650"F) and temperedat varies lemperatures
In addition to the steel, other principal materials in the joint
design that were to seal in the propellant gases were the zinc chro-
mate putty and the O-rings.
On April 12, 1984, John Miller, Chief of the Solid Motor Branch
of NASA, wrote a memo to Mr. Horton, Chief Engineer, SRB Engi-
neering Office, MSFC which referred to concerns with putty made
by Randolph. The Randolph putty was selected on the basis that it
had several desirable performance characteristics. The change in
putty was made after Fuller-O'Brien discontinued making putty be-
cause their product contained asbestos. Mr. Miller noted, "Stacking
difficulties and observed O-ring anomalies appear to be more fre-
quent with Randolph putty than with the previously used Fuller-
O'Brien putty." 50 Miller requested that Thiokol expedite develop-
ment and qualification of a putty with properties similar to those
of Fuller-O'Brien.
On June 18, 1984, Miller wrote Horton again, mentioning ero-
sion/heat exposure O-ring experience on QM-4, STS-2, STS-6,
STS-11, and STS-13 and citing Deficiency Reports which violated
specifications. 51
By June 29, 1984, 5 inch motor tests has been completed. These
tests substantiated the concept of hot gas jet impingement against
O-rings. Interestingly, a simulation of "no putty"yielded no O-ring
damage. This information was conveyed to NASA via telecon from
Thiokol, which also stated that there was no second source for the
Randolph putty. Thiokol had abandoned their program to mix the
putty themselves. Measures taken to correct the putty problems in-
cluded changes in the putty layup to reduce air entrapment, use of
a porous sacrificial heat barrier such as carborundum fiberfrax or
removing the putty and reducing joint gaps were introduced. 52
A new joint design was forwarded to NASA by Thiokol on July
19, 1984, which included a fill capture feature. This feature looked
similar to the "capture feature" proposed for future Shuttle flights.
The fill capture feature, however, was to be filled with grease. A
thermal analysis had shown that "severe heat effects would result
if the cavity were not filled."
As stated previously, the putty was to insulate the O-ring seals
from the hot propellant gases. It was also to remain flexible
enough to move outward under the pressure of the burning propel-
lant, thereby compressing the gas in the joint which, in turn, was
5o NASA, John Miller, "Concerns with Randolph Vacuum Putty," EP-25 (84-35), April 12,
1984.
5] NASA, John Miller, "Zinc Chromate Putty Installation in Nozzle to Case Joint Discrepan-
cy," EP-25 (84-53), June 18, 1984.
52 Thiokol, "Vacuum Putty Telecon," June 29, 1984.
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to seat the primary O-ring. O-rings require some pressure from the
working fluid, in the case of the SRM, this was gas, in order to seat
properly and provide a effective seal. In practice, this design philos-
ophy did not prove to be correct because the putty frequently held
the pressure off of the O-rings, or if it did not, the putty had blow-
holes in it. It was then postulated that these holes might actually
benefit the seating of the O-ring by allowing more pressure to
reach it sooner. It was even suggested that holes might be deliber-
ately made through the putty. However, it was then learned that
blowholes served to concentrate propellant gas on small segments
of the primary O-ring and caused the ring to erode.
The unacceptable heat erosion damage to both primary and sec-
ondary O-rings on SRM-16A resulted in an evaluation of the putty
produced by Randolph Products. In July 1985, L. Thompson of
MSFC made a presentation which noted that five different types of
putty from four companies were under study in an effort to solve
the putty performance problem. As late as 1985 twelve different
types of tests had been performed and six more were in progress.
The only putty to survive the water tests was General Sealants No.
43, which was a non-asbestos formulation. The Randolph putty had
disintegrated in all three water tests. However, in comparing dy-
namic viscosity to temperature, the General Sealants product, at
25,000 poise, 53 was not viscous above 125 deg C. It was slightly
better than the Randolph product and another product made by
Inmont. The previously used Fuller-O'Brien product, however, in-
creased in dynamic viscosity with an increase in temperature. It
was 100,000 poise at 250 deg C, while it was less than 50,000 at 50
deg C. 54 Consequently, no product met all the design requirements
as well as the Fuller-O'Brien did.
The Randolph putty is hydroscopic and its behavior is unsuited
to use in the dry climate of Utah, as well as the humid climate of
the Florida coast. In one case the putty was too stiff and in the
other, too sticky. Since both factory and field joints required the
use of the putty, a product with consistent performance in both cli-
mates was required.
The materials used in the manufacture of the O-rings was also
critical to the safe operation of the Shuttle system. The O-rings had
to be serviceable at the high temperatures in the joint which would
result from heat transfer from the rocket combustion chamber.
However, the use of NBR insulation around the propellant, and the
use of putty, was to protect the steel casings and the O-rings from
the direct heat of the propellant gases. This protection was not
always successful when blowholes in the putty occurred, however,
and the O-rings would frequently be damaged by heat. The lower
temperatures that occur in Florida during the winter months was
not covered by NASA's specifications. While elastomers are known
to become brittle at low temperatures, a product specification sheet
on Viton Fluroelastomer claimed, "Cold-VITON is generally serv-
iceable in dynamic applications down to -18 to -23 deg C (0 to 10
deg F). ''55 The sheet added: "The brittle point of Viton at a thick-
5s Poise is a measure of viscosity or resistance to flow.
_4 NASA, L.M. Thompson, "SRM/SRB Putty Evaluation," July, 1985.
55 3M-Chemical Division, "Viton Fluoroelastomer," Undated, p. 1.
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ness of 0.075 inches is in the neighborhood of 50 deg F. Yet, as with
other elastomers, thickness has a marked effect upon low tempera-
ture flexibility. Thinner cross-sections are more flexible than thick-
er ones at every temperature." The thickness of the O-rings on the
Shuttle is 0.280 inches, thicker than the 0.075 inch article with a
brittle point of 50 deg F noted above. 5e Consequently, the brittle
point of Viton was misleading since the O-rings were much larger
the the test specimen.
Military Specification MIL-R-83248A, 17 Feb. 84, "Rubber, Fluo-
rocarben Elastomer, High Temperature, Fluid, and Compression
Set Resistant" set the specification for the O-rings that Thiokol had
to meet. 5_ They included:
Type I-O-rings and compression seals Class 1-75 +/-5 Hard-
ness 5s
This specification then included other specifications issued by the
Society of Automotive Engineers and the American Society for
Testing Materials. One of the ASTM Specifications listed was
ASTM 1329, "Evaluating Rubber Property, Retraction at Low Tem-
peratures. ''59 It was these referenced specifications which defined
the significant characteristics required.
On February 6, 1979, Mr. William Ray of NASA's Marshall
Space Flight Center, sent a memo to Messrs Hardy, Rice, Eudy,
and McCool (See Appendix V-I). That memo was essentially a trip
report of Mr. Ray's visits to the Precision Rubber Products Compa-
ny and the Parker Seal Company, in search of information on the
performance of O-rings. Some of the points covered in the memo
were:
The purpose of the visits was to present the O-ring seal
manufacturers with data concerning the large O-ring ex-
trusion gaps being experienced on the Space Shuttle Solid
Rocket Motor clevis joints and to seek opinions regarding
the potential risks involved, e°
With regard to the visit with company officials at Preci-
sion Rubber Products, "they voiced concern for the design,
stating that the SRM O-ring extrusion gap was larger than
that covered by their experience." el
In response to the data presented to Parker Seal Compa-
ny officials by Mr. Ray, Parker officials "also expressed
surprise that the seal had performed so well in the present
application." e2
Regarding the visit with the Parker officials, the memo
stated, "their first thought was the O-ring was being asked
to perform beyond its intended design and that a different
type of seal should be considered." ea
se Ibid.
5T rDepartment of Defense, "Military Specification: Rubber, Fluorocarbon Elastome , High
Temperature, Flmd, and Compression Set Resistant", MIL-R-83248A, February 17, 1984.
as Ibid, p. 1.
sD Ibid., p. 3.
so NASA memorandum, William Ray, "Visit to Precision Rubber Products Corporation and
Parker Seal Company", EP 25 (19-23), February 6, 1979, p. 1.
s i Ibid.
u Ibid., p. 2.
s_ Ibid.
2O5
The need for additional testing of the present design was
also discussed and it was agreed that tests which more
closely simulate actual conditions should be done. 84
As a result of the foregoing data, the Committee has arrived at
the specific Findings and Recommendations contained in Chapter
V.
e4 Ibid.

VIII. LAUNCH OPERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this section is to document the series of decisions
that culminated in the launch of STS 51-L on January 28, 1986. In
Section A, the discussion details the Flight Readiness Reviews used
to assess the mission's readiness, and also describes the teleconfer-
ence on the night of January 27 when Thiokol engineers attempted
to delay the launch. Also discussed are the circumstances sur-
rounding the uncertainty represented by ice covering the launch
pad's gantry.
Section B describes a specific example where the launch crew in
the Firing Room waived a launch commit criterion. The discussions
that took place on the subject indicate that the alternate procedure
used as a justification for the waiver should not have been allowed,
since the environmental conditions on the morning of January 28
were outside the limits specified for the alternate procedure.
A. THE STS 51-L LAUNCH DECISION
Discussion
Before each flight of the Space Shuttle, the ground support team
carries out a series of meetings that are collectively known as the
Flight Readiness Review. Policy guidance for this procedure is sup-
plied by NASA Program Directive 710.5A, which states:
It is the policy of the Associate Administrator for Space
Flight (AA-SF) to make an assessment of mission readi-
ness prior to each flight. This will be accomplished by a
consolidated Flight Readiness Review (FRR) of all activi-
ties/elements necessary for safe and successful conduct of
the launch, flight, and post-landing operations .... The
FRR will be preceded by detailed readiness reviews (pre-
FRR's) on individual elements, including cargo, under the
cognizance of the responsible Managers. 1
The FRR policy directive offers the following guidance to project
and program managers regarding the expected content of their
presentations:
The Project/Element Managers will conduct pre-FRR's
to develop their readiness assessment and are responsible
for the FRR briefing content in their particular area. 2
As for the agenda at these reviews, the directive has this to say:
'James Abrahamson, NASA, Headquarters, "Space Shuttle Flight Readiness Reviews," SFO-
PD 710.5A, September 26, 1983, p. 1. See Appendix VIII-A.
2 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
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The presentation of agenda items will normally include
a brief status summary with appropriate supporting detail
on significant items and conclude with a readiness assess-
ment. The presentation topics and scope should be devel-
oped from the pre-FRR's and should:
(1) be that required to provide the AA-SF with the in-
formation needed to make a judgment as to flight readi-
ness;
(2) review recent significant resolved problems and prior
flight anomalies when necessary to establish confidence;
(3) cover all problems, open items and constraints re-
maining to be resolved before the mission;
(4) establish the mission baseline configuration in terms
of all significant changes since the last STS mission
(changes to be considered include hardware, software, vehi-
cle servicing/checkout, launch commit criteria, flight
plans, flight rules and crew procedures);
Within the above guidelines, the scope of the review
should cover status and issues in areas such as: vehicle
checkout, shortages and open work, unexplained anoma-
lies, hardware failures, prior flight anomalies, certifica-
tion/verification, as-built hardware configuration versus
certified hardware list, Critical Items List (CIL), develop-
ment, qualification and reliability testing, waviers and de-
viations, limited life components, launch critical spares,
sneak circuits, system safety/hazards and flight mar-
gins .... a
In the case of STS 51-L, no deviation from normal procedure ap-
parently occurred. This means that the Solid Rocket Motor, con-
taining the seal that apparently failed, proceeded through the
usual eight levels of review at Thiokol's Wasatch Division, Mar-
shall Space Flight Center, the STS Program Office at Johnson
Space Flight Center, and the Associate Administrator's review at
NASA Headquarters. 4
The Flight Readiness Review process for STS 51-L began on De-
cember 11, 1985, at Thiokol's Utah plant. No information is pre-
sented in the briefing charts used that day regarding the continu-
ing failure of the SRM joint seals. The chart entitled "STS-61C
(STS-32) (SRM-24) Performance "has only one entry: "TBD [to be
determined]." s
Post-flight disassembly of STS 61-(] SRB hardware following its
launch on January 12 revealed that erosion of the primary O-ring
had occurred in the aft field joint of the left motor. Hot gas had
also bypassed the primary seal in the left nozzle joint. Erosion of
the primary seal had also Occurred in the nozzle joint of the right
motor. B
Under the terms of the FRR Policy Directive, such damage
would appear to require discussion: "the scope of the review should
s Ibid., pp. 2-3.
4 Table I (page 44) indicates the date and scoj_e_ for each of the_e, eight re.vi.'ews. - . ,,
5 Thiokol, "STS-51L (STS-33) Solid Rocket Motor (SRM-25) Flight Readiness r,evaew, TWR-
15380, December 11, 1985, chart 1-1. See Appendix VIII-B.
6 Rogers Commission Report, Volume II, p. H-3.
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cover status and issues in areas such as . . . prior flight anoma-
lies .... ,, 7
However, according to Mr. McDonald and Mr. Kennedy, Thiokol
normally took about one week to prepare a discussion of problems
noted in the initial inspection following SRB hardware disassem-
bly. s
It would seem logical, when faced with the lack of data from the
previous hardware set, to expand the search to other previously-
flown hardware. On 61-A, hot gas had bypassed the primary seals
in both the center and aft field joints of the left motor. 9
The right motor suffered erosion of the primary O-ring in the
nozzle joint. 1o
The SRBs from 61-B suffered erosion of the seals in both nozzle
joints, with gas bypassing the primary seal of the left nozzle. 11
The Associate Administrator's policy directive is not alone in
stressing that any available information capable of assisting with
an assessment of flight readiness should be presented at a readi-
ness review. Marshall's Shuttle Projects Office policy guidance uses
virtually identical language. Under "Shuttle Policy Guidance," it
states, "Review Concept: The Shuttle Projects FRR will employ a
delta review concept from prior reviews and previous STS mis-
sions." 12
In his letter announcing the STS 51-L Marshall Center FRR, Dr.
Lucas wrote:
Each project manager must certify the flight readiness
of his hardware and present supporting rationale and data
so the Board can independently assess the flight readiness
• . . Emphasis will be placed on safety of flight and mis-
sion success, including potential impact of prior flight
anomalies. 1a
Apparent in the STS 51-L process, however, is that the continu,
ing SRM seal problem did not receive such treatment. The "delta
review concept" referred to above, according to Mr. McDonald,
meant that the contractor was obligated to step back only to the
previous mission for comparison. _4
For 51-L, there was no previous mission to compare data with,
since 61-C had not yet flown. Anomalies on STS 61-A and 61-B
were not discussed, Mr. McDonald said, because they had already
been dispositioned in the FRR's for 61-B and 61-C. _5
The Marshall Space Flight Center FRR conducted by Dr. Lucas
occurred only one day after the 61-C launch. Mulloy's presentation
7 SFO-PD 710.5A, p. 3.
s Discussions with Allan McDonald and Carver Kennedy, Thiokol (Wasatch Operations),
Brigham City, Utah, September 4, 1986.
9 Rogers Commission Report,/oc. cir.
_o Ibid.
L Ibid.
_2 Robert Lindstrom, NASA, Marshall Space Flight Center, "Shuttle Project Flight Readiness
Review," SOP 8000.1, December 29, 1983, p. 2. SeeAppendix VIII-C.
19 William Lucas, NASA, Marshall Space Flight Center, "MSFC Flight Readine_ Review
(FRR) Board for MSFC Elements for Mission 51-L," January 7, 1986, pp. 1-2. See Appendix
VIII-D.
_4 Discussion with Mr. McDonald, September 4, 1986.
s Ibid.
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under STS 61-C performance noted that "all SRB systems func-
tioned normally." 18
Under "ascent," the chart shows "no anomalies." 17
There is no indication in the documentation for this FRR that
the continuing problem with the SRM seals was raised. The para-
chute recovery system was discussed at some length. Much of the
presentation appears to be drawn from the booster assembly pres-
entation made at Mulloy's Level III FRR on January 3. The only
relevant item that might refer to the O-rings appears under Cert -
• " • " rficatlon/Verlficahon Status, where Mulloy stated that there we e
"no findings from continuing analyses that changes previously es-
tablished rationale for flight." is
Mr. Mulloy's presentation at the January 15, 1986, Level 1 FRR
does not indicate any serious problems with the SRB's. Documenta-
tion under "Problems/Anomalies" lists "[n]o 61-C flight anoma-
lies." x9
Again, the focus of his presentation involved the changes made
in the parachute recovery system. The SRM booster nozzle on STS
51-L would be separated at the apogee of the SRB flight path (fol-
lowing separation of the boosters from the Shuttle vehicle) to pro-
tect the drogue parachute from debris, and the main parachutes
were to be separated at water impact to reduce risks to the divers
that assisted with recovery. 2o
Mulloy's presentation to the Associate Administrator was not no-
ticeably different from the presentation be made to Mr. Aldrich,
the Shuttle Program Manager, at the Level II readiness review the
day before. In fact, the briefing charts are identical.21
SRM seal erosion was ultimately raised during the S_q_S-51L
Flight Readiness Review cycle. Mr. McDonald stated that at the
L-1 FRR Mr. Mulloy informed the Mission Management Team of the
erosion damage seen on STS 61-C, characterizing it as "within the
experience base." 22
This evaluation of the seal erosion problem does not indicate the
seriousness of the issue, and would not lead senior managers to a
conclusion that the seal problem was a threat to the safety of the
Shuttle. Given the historical treatment of the SRM seal problem in
this process, however, it is not surprising that the STS 51-L re-
views did not raise any new concerns about the integrity of the
joint.
This point is readily apparent in the Commission's report. There
is no implication that a serious problem exists, if Mr. Mulloy's
presentations are examined. The presentation made to Level 1
during the STS 41-C FRR indicated that erosion was "acceptable,"
and offered a rationale for accepting the possibility that the phe-
nomenon would recur. 23
16 Larry Mulloy NASA, Marshall Space Fight Center, "Center Board: STS-51L Flight Readi-
ness Review Solic] Rocket Booster, January 13, 1986, Chart SRB-3.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid, Chart SRB-28.
IQLarry Mulloy, NASA, Marshall Space Flight Center, "STS-51L Level I Flight Readiness
Review," January 15,1986,Chart SRB-3. See Appendix VIII-E.
2oIbid.,Chart SRB-4.
21Larry Mulloy, NASA, Marshall Space FlightCenter, "STS-51L Level IIFlight Readiness
Review," January 14,1986.See Appendix VIII-F.
22 Discussionwith Allan McDonald, September 4,1986.
23 Rogers Commission Report,Volume II.See Chart 15 (p.H-10) and Chart 19 (p.H-12).
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Indeed, Level 1 displayed more concern about the problem than
did Marshall, since Dr. Hans Mark, then Deputy Administrator, di-
rected Marshall to prepare a review of the seal erosion problems. 24
For mission 41-G, Mulloy argued that "test shows maximum ero-
sion possible less than erosion allowable." 25
In his presentation to the STS 51-E Level 1 FRR, Mulloy is seen
on a videotape stating that:
The rationale that was developed after observing this
erosion on STS-11 [41-B] was that it was a limited dura-
tion that was self-limiting in that as soon as the pressure
in the cavity between the putty and the primary O-ring
after the primary O-ring seats, or the pressure between
the primary and the secondary O-ring equals the motor
pressure, the flow stops and the erosion stops. The maxi-
mum erosion that we have seen previously is 53 thou-
sandths [of an inch]--that was back on STS-2. The erosion
that we saw on 51-C was 10 thousandths of an inch on one
O-ring and 38 thousandths on the other, so we believe that
because of the limited exposure and the fact that the leak
check assures that the secondary O-ring is properly sealing
against motor pressure and the fact that the duration is
limited, and that we can take 95 thousandths erosion on a
primary O-ring and seal against 3,000 psi which is three
times the motor pressure, that this represents an accepta-
ble risk.2 s
Mulloy's confidence that the SRM seal could take "95 thou-
sandths erosion on a primary O-ring and seal against 3,000 psi
which is three times the motor pressure, . . ." is based on comput-
er modelling of the joint performance. Dr. Feynman's analysis of
the model, however, questions its use as the basis for declaring the
seal problem "an acceptable risk."
• . . This was a model based not on physical understand-
ing but on empirical curve fitting. To be more detailed, it
was supposed a stream of hot gas impinged on the O-ring
material, and the heat was determind at the point of stag-
nation (so far, with reasonable physical thermodynamic
laws). But to determine how much rubber eroded it was as-
sumed this depended only on this heat by a formula sug-
gested by data on a similar material. A logarithmic plot
suggested a straight line, so it was supposed that the ero-
sion varied as the .58 power of the heat, the .58 being de-
termined by a nearest fit. At any rate, adjusting some
other numbers, it was determined that the model agreed
with erosion (to depth of one-third the radius of the ring).
There is nothing much so wrong with this as believing the
answer! Uncertainties appear everywhere. How strong the
gas stream might be was unpredictable, it depended on
holes formed in the putty. Blow-by showed that the ring
might fail even though not, or only partially eroded
24 Ibid., p. H-13.
25 Ibid., Chart 30 (p. H-18).
_6 Ibid., p. H-42.
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through. The empirical formula was known to be uncer-
tain,for itdid not go directlythrough the very data points
by which itwas determined. There were a cloud of points
some twice above, and some twice below the fittedcurve,
so erosions twice predicted were reasonable from that
cause alone. Similar uncertainties surrounded the other
constants in the formula, etc.,etc. When using a mathe-
matical model careful attention must be given to uncer-
taintiesin the model. 27
Mr. Mulloy's analysis of erosion also notes that itwas a "self-lim-
iting" phenomenon, assuming that the damage ceased after the
pressure built up against the seal.His analysis demonstrates _hat
either the primary or the secondary seal would serve the purpose.
On December 17, 1982, an amended version of the SRB Critical
Items List was approved. It stated, "Leakage of the primary O-ring
seal is classified as a single failure point due to possibility of loss of
sealing at the secondary O-ring because of joint rotation after
• • " :" 28
motorpressunzat_on. [emphasm added]
In the "Rationale for Retention," the document states, "Full re-
dundancy exists at the moment of initial pressurization." 29
Mr. Mulloy read this to indicate that during the ignition tran-
sient, the seal was a Critically 1R system, a redundant seal existed,
and the secondary O-ring could be relied upon. After completion of
the ignition transient (approximately 600 milliseconds), the joint
became a Critically 1 system. 3o
Congressman Roe, however, said,
We don't buy the point of view, do we measure other
criticality _]_oints in degrees? My father taught me . . [i]t
is or it isn t... you took it from a R1 position and made
it a number one position. You didn't qualify that, there is
nothing in the record that qualifies it as half an R1 or
three-quarters of an R1 in terms of temperature .... We
didn't say we put them in there in number of degrees. We
either did or we didn't. 31
Implied in the presentation by Mr. Mulloy is that the Marshall
and Thiokol engineers understood the joint's performance during
the ignition transient. But, as Congressman Volkmer noted,
Mr. VOLKMZR. "... Mr. Mulloy, it says on page 148 [of
the Commission's report] that prior to the accident neither
NASA or Thiokol clearly understood the mechanism by
which the joint sealing took place. Do you agree or dis-
agree with that?"
Mr. MULLOY. "I totally agree, sir." 32
Also notable by its absence in Mulloy's presentation is the fact
that STS 51-L had demonstrated an extreme example of blowby in
the nozzle joint. It was this case that led Thiokol engineers to the
_7 Rogers Commission Report, Volume II, p. F-2.
28 NASA, "SRB Critical Items List," Page A-6A, December 17, 1982, Sheet 1.
29 Ibid.
so Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, p. 834.
3_ Crate HgB., Transcript, June 17, 1986, p. 185.
32 Ibid., p. 291.
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conclusion that temperature was a contributing factor to joint
damage. Mr. Boisjoly explained to General Kutyna that, based on
photographs of the joints on 51-C (launched at a seal temperature
of 53°F) and 61-A (launched at a seal temperature of 75°F), he
"concluded, and so presented on the night before the launch . . .
that it was telling us that temperature was indeed a discriminator
" 33
• "l_he appearance of the material that had bypassed the joint, ac-
cording to Boisjoly, was significantly worse for 51C in appearance
and extent.
For mission 51-F, even after the failure of the primary seal in
the 51-B nozzle joint, Mulloy's presentation to Level 1 listed the
problem as "closed. TM
Chairman Roe, questioning witnesses from NASA on 17 June,
learned that managers at Johnson and at Headquarters had not
necessarily perceived the seriousness of the situation represented
by the seal problem.
Mr. ROE. "I would like to get Mr. Mulloy to answer the
question--would you repeat the nine flights and tell the
Committee at what level the O-ring problem was discussed
and who was at that level?... You mentioned again, you
listed the whole nine, and tell the Committee at what level
the O-ring problem was discussed. We have been going on
this for seven years and then who was at that meeting?"
Mr. MULLOY. "Yes sir. I can answer part of your ques-
tion .... I am reading from what was provided to me. It
looks like it fits within the erosion. STS-11 [41-]3], 41-C,
41-G, 51-E .... 51-F .... 51-I, 51-J, 61-A..., and 61
Bravo."
Mr. ROE. "These were a problem with the O-rings and
they were discussed at Level 1?"
Mr. MULLOY. "Level 1 and Level 2."
Mr. ROE. "Therefore it is inconceivable that Level 1,
which is top management, would not have understood the
issue?"
Mr. MULLOY. "That is right, and I believe that has been
acknowledged .... "
Dr. GRAHAM. "We are in fact, reviewing the records to
see who was at the various Flight Readiness Reviews that
occurred when the O-ring data was mentioned, and we
have not yet been able to pull that together .... "
Mr. ROE. "So what you are basically saying is that
Washington level knew of part of the problems; is that a
fair comment?"
Dr. GRAHAM. "There are two pieces to this: one, what
was transmitted; and what was understood. I believe what
Mr. Mulloy and Dr. Lucas are addressing is what was
transmitted. I don't know that they are the most appropri-
ate people to express what was understood. That was a
Headquarters issue and, in some cases, a Johnson Space
3s Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, p. 784.
a, Ibid., Chart 130 (p. H-66).
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Center issue. It is clear the issue was not perceived at the
seriousness with which it actually affected the system.
However, the information was transmitted to these agen-
cies." 3s
Dr. Graham's statement is important when discussing the
August 19, 1985, briefing on the joint seal problem. Thiokol and
Marshall personnel did not communicate that the situation re-
quired a halt in operations until the problem of seal erosion had
been solved. It should also be noted that Mr. Moore was then occu-
pied with the failure of the SSME temperature sensors (a failure
which had led to premature shutdown of a main engine on flight
STS 51-F and caused the first abort-to-orbit in the program's histo-
ry), and so the briefing was attended by Mr. L. Michael Weeks,
Deputy Associate Administrator (Technical) for Space Flight. A
more complete analysis of his descripton of the situation to Mr.
Moore is discussed in the section on Technical Expertise. 36
Mr. Aldrich was not made aware of the briefing at all, removing
Level 2 from the information flow. 37
Levels 1 and 2 were not alone in their misapprehensions, the
lack of understanding of the seal problem also appears in the pres-
entations to Dr. Lucas and Mr. Reinartz at Marshall made by Mr.
Mulloy. In the STS 61-C FRR cycle, immediately preceding 51-L,
Mr. Mulloy was given an extensive discussion of the information
obtained from STS 61-B, describing the damage to the seals, at the
Level 3 SRB Project Office briefing he chaired. 3s
Mulloy's presentation to the Shuttle Proj.ects Board then noted
"SRM joint O-ring performance within expermnce base. ''3_
In his presentation to the Level 1 FRR, however, Mulloy stated
there were "no 61-B flight anomalies. ''4°
In hindsight, a fundamental error that pervades the history of
the seal erosion problem is this reliance on the "experience base"
argument. Unwarranted confidence existed in the analysis of the
joint seal erosion problem developed by Thiokol engineers and
agreed to by Marshall's program office. There is a vital lesson to be
learned in this episode, and it is best expressed by Henry Petroski,
from the School of Engineering at Duke University.
Dismissing the single structural failure as an anomaly is
never a wise course (emphasis added). The failure of any
engineering structure is cause for concern, for a single in-
cident can indicate a material flaw or design error that
renders myriad structural successes irrelevant .... In en-
as Cmte Hgs, Transcript, June 17, 1986, pp. 203-206.
ss Section VI.B.I.c. of this report.
s7 "The second breakdown in communications... ," Mr. Aldrich testified before the Commis-
sion, "is the situation of the variety of reviews that were conducted last summer between the
NASA Headquarters Organization and the Marshall Org_an.'.l_,tion on th.e [jo'mt seal. problem)
and the fact that that was not brought througn my .om.ce m rather mrec_lon--mat m, l_ was not
worked through by the NASA Headquarters Or_,anz_ation nor when the .b_..hall .Org.anLzation
brought thase concerns to be reported were we mvoivea. _ma 1 eeueve that m a crmca_ vreaK-
down in process and I think it !s also against .the d_ument_, reporting c14h_.eis that the pro-
gram is supposed to operate to." Rej_rs Commlsslon llepor_,, volumev, p. -- : _RM 24 "STS
ss Larry Wear, NASA, Marshall Space Flight _enter, "r_]_G.mmmness Itevlew _ -61--C)," December 2, 1985, Charts 3-2; 3-2B. See Appendix
:: ibRi_iers Commission Report, Volume II, p. H-3.
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gineering, numbers are means, not ends, and it ought
rightly to have taken only the failure of a single bridge to
bring into question the integrity of every other span ....
The common expectation of the engineer and the layman
is that the road will not lead to bridges that collapse.* 1
Clearly evident is the fact that the Flight Readiness Review pro-
cedure cannot compensate for poor engineering analysis. The FRR
is similar to a checklist and will not necessarily discover problems
not on the list. The technical rationale presented by Level 3 man-
agers is assumed to reflect the best engineering judgment avail-
able. Relying on this expertise, managers in more senior positions
at NASA were misinformed regarding the severity of the problem
of seal erosion and its critical importance to flight safety.
The Committee is also concerned about the so-called "launch con-
straint" imposed on the Shuttle system following STS 51-B, and
the role this constraint was expected to play in the Flight Readi-
ness Review process. The term "launch constraint" would seem to
indicate that the Shuttle should not be launched until the problem
giving rise to the constraint was solved. This is apparently not the
case, according to Mr. Mulloy:
The problem assessment system is in place at the Mar-
shall Center as a tool to assure--it is a tool used by our
quality and a reliability assurance organization to assure
that problems that occur in flights and in ground test, in
development, our qualification motor tests that would have
a bearing on the flight or the upcoming flights, that that is
documented and tracked. That problem assessment system
shows in the case of the O-ring erosion, it shows essential-
ly the same information, in many cases identical informa-
tion to what is in the Flight Readiness Reviews. It is the
basis for continuing to fly given the observations we are
seeing.42
Testifyingbefore the Commission, Mulloy had also made this
distinction.
Chairman RoGzRs. "Let'sgo back justa bit,because I
think itishelpfulto me ifyou--you use words that I un-
derstand a littlebit.What caused the constrainttobe put
on inthe firstplace?"
Mr. MULLOY. "The constraintwas put on afterwe saw
the secondaryO-ringerosionon the nozzle,Ibelieve."
Chairman ROGZRS. "Who decidedthat?"
Mr. MtJLLOY. "I decided that,that that [thejointseal
erosion]would be addressed,untilthat problem was re-
solved,itwould be considereda launch constraint,and ad-
dressed at Flight Readiness Reviews to assure that we
were stayingwithinour flightexperiencebase.... "
Dr. RmE. "Why didn'tyou put a launch constrainton
the fieldjointatthe same time?"
41 Henry Petroski, To Engineer is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New
York: St. Ma-_n's Press, 1985), pp. 69-73.
4s Crate Hgs, Transcript, June 17, 1986, p. 205.
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Mr. MULLOY. "I think at that point . . . the logic was
that we had been discussing the field joint, the field and
nozzle joint primary O-ring erosion. This erosion of [STS
51-B's] secondary O-ring was a new and significant event,
very new and significant event that we certainly did not
understand. Everything up to that point had been that the
primary O-ring, even though it does experience some ero-
sion, does seal. What we had evidence of was that here was
a case where the primary O-ring was violated and the sec-
ondary O-ring was eroded, and that was considered to be a
more serious observation than previously observed." 4s
The Marshall Space Flight System Problem Assessment System
(PAS) was tracking the problem of nozzle joint primary O-ring ero-
sion in Record A09288, "O-Ring Erosion in the Case to Nozzle
Joint. ''44 The record was apparently opened on July 10, 1985, some
two months following the launch of STS 51-B on April 29, 1985.
The last entry in this record is dated January 23, 1986, and begins
"Resolution." It continues with a rationale for closing out the
tracking record. Part of the rationale is quoted here:
Analytical studies based on both impingement erosion
and blowby erosion show that this phenomenon has an ac-
ceptable ceiling since implementing the above changes [in
performance of the seal leak check and in stacking proce-
dures]. Recent experience has been within the program
data base. The seal improvement program plan willcontin-
ue until the problem has been isolated and damage elimi-
nated to the SRM seals.45
An identical entry appears in PAS Record A07934, "Segment
Joint Primary O-ring Charred." Though tracking problems with
the fieldjoint seals,work on the nozzle joint problem was included
"as they are the same generic problem." 4s
The iogic behind this "resolution" of the O-ring problem is not
readily apparent. As the field joint tracking report notes, "The O-
rings in the SRM segment ass[emblly joints are designed as
press[ure] seals & are not intended to be exposed to hot gases." 47
Yet, in the rationale for closing out these tracking reports, it is
stated that "[p]rimary O-ring erosion is expected to continue since
no corrective action has been established that will prevent hot
gases from reaching the primary O-ring cavity." 4s
The rationale ad described also appears to violate the directive,
issued in 1980, that addresses the question of launch constraints.
"All open problems coded criticality, 1, 1R, 2 or 2R," it stated:
will be considered launch constraints until resolved (recur-
rence control established and its implementation effecti-
vity determined) or sufficient rationale, i.e., different con-
4sRogers Commission Report,Volume V, _,.1510. _ ........
44NASA, Marshall Space Flight Center, 'O-Ring _rosion in _ne _ to r_ozme Joinz,"Prob-
lem Assessment System Record Number A09288, February 26, 1986.See Appendix VHI-H.
46Ibid.,p.2.
46NASA Marshall Space FlightCenter, "Segment Joint Primary O-ring Charred," Problem
Assessment System Record Number A07934, March 7, 1986, p. 4. See Appendix VIII-I.
4 _ Ibid., p. 1.
4s Ibid., p. 5.
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figuration, etc., exists to conclude that this problem will
not occur on the flight vehicle during prelaunch, launch or
flight. _9
The Committee attributes this situation to the concept of "ac-
ceptable erosion," which is more fully discussed in Chapter VII of
this report.
According to testimony before the Commission, these tracking
records for O-ring erosion were closed out upon receipt of a letter
from Mr. McDonald dated December 10, 1985. 51
This was apparently a mistake. As Mr. Mulloy and Mr. Wear ex-
plained to the Commission,
Mr. MULLOV. "... NOW, the entry that is shown in there
that the problem was closed prior to 51-L is in error. What
happened there was, one of your documents here which we
did not discuss is the letter from Mr. McDonald to Mr.
Wear which proposed that this problem be dropped from
the problem assessment system and no longer be trapped
[tracked] for the reasons stated in Mr. McDonald's letter.
That letter was in the review cycle .... After Mr. Wear
brought this letter to my attention, my reaction was, 'we
are not going to drop this from the problem assessment
system because the problem is not resolved and it has to
be dealt with on a flight-by-flight basis.' Since that was
going through the review cycle, the people who run this
problem assessment system erroneously entered a closure
for the problem on the basis of this submittal from Thio-
kol. Having done that, then for the 51-L review, this did
not come up in the Flight Readiness Review as an open
launch constraint, so you won't find a project signature be-
cause the PAS system showed the problem was closed, and
that was an error."
Chairman ROGERS. "Who made the error? Do you
know?"
Mr. MULLOY. "The people who do the problem assess-
ment system."
Mr. WEAR. "Mr. Fletcher, and he reports within our
quality organization at the Flight Readiness Review, at the
incremental Flight Readiness Reviews .... At my review
and at Larry's review, there is a heads up given to the
quality representative at that board for what problems the
system has open, and they cross-check to make sure that
we address that problem in the readiness review. On this
particular occasion, there was no heads up given because
their PAS system considered that action closed. That is un-
fortunate." 62
Mr. Mulloy's discussion with Chairman Roe, and his description
provided to the Commission, indicate that the NASA Safety, Reli-
ability and Quality Assurance (SR&QA) organization should play a
49 Robert Lindstrom, NASA, Marshall Space Flight Center, "Assigning Launch Constraints on
Open Problems Submitted to MSFC PAS," September 15, 1980, p. 1. See Appendix VIII-J.
sl Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, p. 1509.
s s Ibid.
64-420 0 - 86 - 8
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significant role in the Flight Readiness Review process. The infor-
mation available on this topic suggests that this was not the case.
The Committee is concerned by the invisibility of SR&QA in this
area. 53
First, the number of people operating in the SR&QA organiza-
tion has apparently been declining since the Apollo program. The
decline at Marshallis among the most severe, according to NASA's
internal estimate, s4
The obvious conclusion is that SR&QA has fewer people to over-
see the myriad details involved in preparing for Flight Readiness
Reviews, in addition to their other duties.
Second, there is nothing to show what evaluation SR&QA person-
nel had made of the joint seal erosion problem. The recurring
nature of this problem, and the Criticality-1 status of the joint,
argue that SR&QA should have paid close attention to this situa-
tion, including the execution of an independent test program and
presentations of their evaluation at Level 3 Flight Readiness Re-
views.
Third, though management of the PAS system is apparently the
responsibility of the SR&QA organization, they appear to exercise
little control. The system is operated under contract by Rockwell,
data is entered by hardware manufacturers, and the only technical
analysis that appears in the reports on joint seal erosion was devel-
oped by Mr. Wear or his deputy, James Thomas, in the SRM pro-
gram office. There is no input, either concurrence or dispute, regis-
tered by SR&QA personnel. Even more important, as illustrated by
Mr. Mulloy's testimony, problem reports can too easily be removed
from the system.
Fourth, the PAS tracking records do not support the testimony of
Mr. Mulloy and Mr. Wear before the Commission. The entry enti-
tled "Resolution" is dated January 23, 1986, while the FRR in Mr.
Wear's SRM Project Office occurred on December 17, 1985, and the
FRR in Mr. Mulloy's SRB Project Office took place on January 3,
1986. It is also interesting to note that the PASRecord, dated Feb-
ruary 26, 1986, shows "Status Open." 55
If Mr. Mulloy's and Mr. Wear's testimony is accurate, SR&QA
should still have raised the issue of seal erosion as a concern at
their reviews. No evidence exists that this occurred.
The Committee, however, is concerned not only about the
SR&QA organization at Marshall. The Commission noted in its
report that "It]he Problem Reporting and Corrective Action docu-
ment (JSC 08126A, paragraph 3.2d) requires project offices to
inform Level II of launch constraints. That requirement was not
met. Neither Level II nor Level I was informed." _8
Testifying before the Committee, however, Mr. Mulloy argued
that both levels were informed.
Mr. VOLKMZR. "Even though . . . you continued to see
erosion of the O-ring, you continued to waive the launch
constraint?"
.a See also "Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance," Section VI.B.2.c(2) of this report.
54 This is documented in Section VI.B.2.c(1) of this report.
esPAS Record A09288, p. 1.
.6 Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, p. 159.
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Mr. MULLOY. "That is correct, sir, on the basis of the ra-
tionale or the explanation as to why that was an accepta-
ble risk that was presented to me by Morton Thiokol, re-
viewed and approved by my management .... "
Mr. VOLKMER. "Was JSC [the Johnson Space Center] in-
formed of the problem?"
Mr. MULLOY. "Through the Flight Readiness Review and
through the submission of this problem to the problem
tracking system at JSC. I do not know what distribution
was made at JSC when it goes down there. The report also
goes to the Chief Engineer's office at Headquarters."
Mr. VOLKMER. "It is my understanding that we had
some testimony earlier from Mr. Aldrich that he wasn't
knowledgeable that there was a launch constraint."
Mr. MULLOY. "That is entirely possible, sir, I don't know
what distribution was made, and I have testified, and I
think--I have testified that it wasn't briefed in the Levels
2 and the Level 1. When I went--"
Mr. VOLKMER. "That is right."
Mr. MULLOY. "--that 'we have a problem, the concern is
flight safety, the rationale for continuing to fly is this.'
That was not briefed in the context of 'this is a launch
constraint in the problem assessment system,' and it is en-
tirely possible that if that report, whatever distribution is
made of that report at Houston, that he might not have
seen that. ''57
It is quite likely that neither Mr. Moore nor Mr. Aldrich was
made aware of the launch constraint on the SRM. SR&QA person-
nel at Johnson and at NASA Headquarters should have received
these reports described by Mr. Mulloy and tracked them as they
did similar launch constraints on other Shuttle hardware. What
steps they took to assure that these constraints were raised at the
Flight Readiness Review for these management levels is less clear.
The Committee's review of the FRR's for the six missions subject to
the launch constraint on SRM nozzle joint seals does not indicate a
greater level of discussion took place because the constraint was in
force, except for the STS 51-F FRR where an explanation of the
51-B failure was required.
The rationale for closing out these problems on the problem as-
sessment system stated that "status will continue to be provided in
the Flight Readiness Reviews and in formal technical reviews at
Thiokol and MSFC." ss
Without a change in the prevailing technical evaluation of the
problem, however, it is unlikely that proper action to correct the
overall problem would have been undertaken.
On the eve of the launch, Thiokol engineers attempted to change
this prevailing technical evaluation. In a teleconference on the
night of January 27, they presented data demonstrating that the
low temperatures in the area would impair the function of the O-
ring seals inside the joint. After NASA managers expressed con-
s_ Crate I-Igs Transcript, June 17, 1986, pp. 284-85.
_s PAS Record A09288, p. 3.
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cern about the delay such constraints would have on the flight
schedules, Thiokol's management withdrew and met with their en-
gineers again; only this time, the managers would not listen to fur-
ther argument about aborting the flight• Thiokol then recommend-
ed that the launch be allowed to proceed.
Launch operations were terminated at 12:36 p.m. Eastern Stand-
ard Time (EST) on January 27 because of high crosswinds at the
launch site. At 2:00 p.m. EST, the Mission Management Team met
and decided to attempt a launch at 9:38 a.m. EST January 28. The
weather was expected to be clear but cold with temperatures in the
low twenties. There were concerns about the facilities and various
water drains but no concerns were expressed about the O-ring and
the Solid Rocket Boosters. All members of the team were asked to
review the situation and call if any problems arose.
At Thiokol's Wasatch Division in Utah, Mr. Robert Ebeling 59
met with Mr. Boisjoly at about 2:30 p.m. Mountain Standard Time
(MST) on the afternoon of January 27. They were joind by other
Thiokol engineers. Mr. Eboling was concerned about predicted cold
temperatures at the Kennedy Space Center. When he was ques-
tioned by the Rogers Commission he responded:
• . . The meeting lasted one hour, but the conclusion of
that meeting was engineering, epecially Arnie [Thompson],
Roger Boisjoly, Brian Russell, myself, Jerry Burns, they
come to mind, were very adamant about their concerns on
this lower temperature, because we were way below our
data base and we were way below what we qualified for. 6°
Later Mr. Ebeling called Mr. McDonald at the Kennedy Space
Center• Mr. McDonald remembered the call, saying:
He called me and said they had just received some word
earlier that the weatherman was projecting temperatures
as low as 18 degrees F [Fahrenheit] sometime in the early
morning hours of the 28th and that they had some meet-
ing with some of the engineering people and had some con-
cerns about the O-rings getting to those kinds of tempera-
tures.e'
Mr. Ebeling wanted Mr. McDonald to get some accurate predict-
ed temperatures for the Cape so he could make some calculations
to determine what could be expected of the O-rings. McDonald told
him he would get the temperature data for him and call him back.
Mr. Carver Kennedy, Vice President of Space Services for Thiokol,
working at the Kennedy Space Center, obtained the information.
Mr. McDonald then relayed the information to Mr. Ebeling in
Utah. The information indicated that the temperature was to get
as low as 22" in the early morning hours, probably around 6:00
a.m., and that they were predicting a temperature of about 26° at
the intended time of launch, 9:38 a.m. on the 28th. 6_-
s, Solid Rocket Motor Igniter and Final Assembly Manager, Thiokol.
eo Thiokol, Robert Ebeh"ng, Interview before the Presidential Commission on the Space Shut -_
tie Challenger Accident, March 19, 1986, p. 13.
61 Rogers Commission Report, Volume IV, p. 715.
62 Ibid.
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Mr. McDonald then called Mr. Cecil Houston, the Resident Man-
ager for the Marshall office at Kennedy Space Center, and told him
of Thiokors concerns with the low temperature and potential prob-
lems with the O-rings. Mr. Houston said he would set up a telecon-
ference including Marshall and personnel at Thiokol in Utah. 82°
e2° Table H list_ the principal participants in the teleconference on January 27, 1986.
Th lokol
Thlokol
MSFC
MSFC
MSFC
MSFC
Thlokol
Th I okol
Th i okol
Thlokol
Th Iokol
Tht okol
Th Iokol
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T.'qBLE II
PRIHCIPAL PAWrlCIPANTS IM THE I'IELECOIIFEREN(_
ON JANUARY 27, 1986
Allan McDonald
Jack Buchanan
Lawrence Mull oy
Stanley Relnartz
Judson Lovlngood
Director, Solid Rocket Motor Program
Offlce
Manager, KSC Resldent Office
Manager, Solid Rocket Booster Project
Office
Manager, Shuttle ProJects Office
Deputy Manager, Shuttle ProJects Office
__t _=r_ _ LLL_ Center, /_
George Hardy Deputy Director for Sclence and
Engineering
_tThJokol Wasatch Ooeratlons. U_ah
Jerald Mason
C.G, Wiggins
Robert Lund
Joseph Kllminster
Roger BolsJoly
Robert Ebellng
Arnold Thompson
Senior Vice President, Wasatch
Operations
Vice President and General Manager,
Space D1vlslon
Vice President for Engineering
Vice President, Space Booster Programs
Staff Engineer, Applied Mechanics
Manager, SRM Ignition System, Final
Assembly, Special ProJects and Test
Supervisor, Structures Design
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Mr. Houston then called Dr. Judson Lovingood, Deputy Shuttle
Project Manager at Marshall, to inform him of the concerns about
the O-rings. Mr. Houston asked Dr. Lovingood to set up a telecon-
ference with senior project management personnel, including Mr.
George Hardy, Deputy Director of Science and Engineering at Mar-
shall, and with Thiokol personnel. Dr. Lovingood called Mr. Stan-
ley Reinartz, Marshall's Shuttle Project Office Manager, a few min-
utes later and informed him of the planned teleconference.
The first phase of the teleconference began at 5:54 p.m. EST and
included Messrs. Reinartz, Lovingood, Hardy, and others at Kenne-
dy, Marshall and Thiokol's Wasatch plant. Concerns about the
effect of low temperature of the O-rings and the joint seal were
presented by Thiokol personnel, along with an opinion that launch
should be delayed.
A recommendation was also made that Arnold Aldrich, the
Space Transportation System Program Manager, be told of the up-
coming telecon and that the fact that Thiokol had expressed some
concerns. Mr. Reinartz testified before the Commission that "we
did not have a full understanding of the situation as I understood
it at that time, and felt that it was appropriate to do before we in-
volved the Level II into the system." 8_
Testifying before the Rogers Commission, Dr. Lovingood was
asked whether the possibility of a launch delay had been men-
tioned in this telcon on January 27. Dr. Lovingood replied:
That is the way I heard it, and they were talking about
the 51-C experience and the fact that they had experi-
enced the worst case blow-by as far as arc and the soot and
so forth. And also, they talked about the resiliency data
that they had.
So it appeared to me--and we didn't have all the people
there. That was another aspect of this. It appeared to me
we had better sit down and get the data so that we could
understand exactly what they were talking about and
assess that data.
And that is why I suggested that we go ahead and have
a telecon within the center, so that we can review that. 64
Dr. Keel, the Staff Director for the Rogers Commission, asked,
Dr. KEEL. "So as early as after that first afternoon con-
ference at 5:45, it appeared that Thiokol was basically
saying delay. Is that right?"
Dr. LOVlNGOOD. "That is the way it came across to me. I
don't know how other people perceive it, but that's the
way it came across to me."
Dr. KEEL. "Mr. Reinartz, how did you perceive it?"
Mr. REINARTZ. "I did not perceive it that way. I per-
ceived that they were raising some questions and issues
which required looking into by all the parties, but I did
not perceive it as a recommendation to delay."
Dr. KV.EL. "Some prospect for delay?"
6a Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, p. 919.
64 Ibid., p. 923.
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Mr. REINARTZ. "Yes, sir, that possibility is always
there."
Dr. KEEL. "Did you convey that to Mr. MuUoy and Mr.
Hardy before the 8:15 teleconference?"
Mr. RFANARTZ. "Yes I did. And as a matter of fact, we
had a discussion. Mr. Mulloy was just out of communica-
tion for about an hour, and then after that I got in contact
with him, and we both had a short discussion relating to
the general nature of the concerns with Dr. Lucas and Mr.
Kingsbury at the motel before we both departed for the te-
lecon that we had set up out at the Cape. ''65
At approximately 8:45 p.m. EST, the second phase of the telecon-
ference commenced, Thiokol's charts and written data having ar-
rived at the Kennedy Space Center by telefax. The charts present-
ed a history of the O-ring erosion and blow-by in the Solid Rocket
Booster joints of previous flights, presented the results of subscale
testing at Thiokol and the results of static tests of Solid Rocket
Motors.
Mr. Boisjoly testified:
I expressed deep concern about launching at low temper-
ature. I presented Chart 2-1 with emphasis--now, 2-1, if
you want to see it, ! have it, but basically that was the
chart that summarized the primary concerns, and that
was the chart that I pulled right out of the [August 19]
Washington presentation without changing one word of it
because it was still applicable, and it addresses the highest
concern of the field joint in both the ignition transient con-
dition and the steady state condition, and it really sets
down the rationale for why we were continuing to fly. Ba-
sically, if erosion penetrates the primary O-ring seal, there
is a higher probability of no secondary seal capability in
the steady state condition. And I had two sub-bullets under
that which stated bench testing showed O-ring not capable
of maintaining contact with metal parts gap opening rate
to maximum operating pressure. I had another bullet
which stated bench testing showed capability to maintain
O-ring contact during initial phase (O to 170 milliseconds
of transient). That was my comfort basis of continuing to
fly under normal circumstances, normal being within the
data base we had.
I emphasized, when I presented that chart about the
changing of the timing function of the O-ring as it at-
tempted to seal. I was concerned that we may go from that
first beginning region into that intermediate region, from
0 to 170 being the first region, and 170 to 330 being the
intermediate region where we didn't have a high probabili-
ty of sealing or seating, e8
6_ Ibid.
e6 Ibid., Volume IV, p. 790.
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Mr. Boisjoly then presented Chart 2-2 with his added concerns
related to the timing function. He mentioned in his testimony to
the Rogers Commission:
We would have low O-ring squeeze due to low tempera-
ture which I calculated earlier in the day. We should have
higher O-ring Shore hardness .... Now, that would be
harder. And what that material really is, it would be lik-
ened to trying to shove a brick into a crack versus a
sponge. That is a good analogy for purposes of this discus-
sion. I also mentioned that thicker grease, as a result of
lower temperatures, would have higher viscosity. It
wouldn't be as slick and slippery as it would be at room
temperature. And so it would be a little bit more difficult
to move across it.
We would have higher O-ring pressure actuation time,
in my opinion, and that is what I presented .... These
are the sum and substance of what I just presented. If
action time increases, then the threshold of secondary seal
pressurization capability is approached. That was my fear.
If the threshold is reached, then secondary seal may not be
capable of being pressurized, and that was the bottom line
of everything that had been presented up to that point.67
Asked by Chairman Rogers, "Did anybody take issue with you?."
Mr. Boisjoly responded:
Well, I am coming to that. I also showed a chart of the
joint with an exaggerated cross section to show the seal
lifted off, which has been shown to everybody. I was asked,
yes, at that point in time I was asked to quantify my con-
cerns, and I said I couldn't. I couldn't quantify it. I had no
data to quantify it, but I did say I knew that it was away
from goodness in the current data base. Someone on the
net commented that we had soot blow-by on SRM-22
[Flight 61-A, October, 1985] which was launched at 75 de-
grees, I don't remember who made the comment, but that
is where the first comment came in about the disparity be-
tween my conclusion and the observed data because SRM-
22 had blow-by at essentially a room temperature launch.
I then said that SRM-15 [Flight 51-C, January, 1985]
had much more blow-by indication and that is was indeed
telling use that lower temperature was a factor. This was
supported by inspection of flown hardware by myself. I
was asked again for data to support my claim, and I said I
have none other than what is being presented, and I had
been trying to get resilience data, Arnie [Thompson] and I
both, since last October, and that statement was men-
tioned on the net. 68
This second phasse of the telecon on the evening of January 27
concluded with statements from Robert Lund, Thiokol's Vice Presi-
dent of Engineering. His conclusion at that time was that the Shut-
87 Ibid., p. 791.
68 Ibid.
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tie should not fly outside Thiokol's database; that, is, that the O-
ring seals should be above 53 degrees Fahrenheit before lift-off.
NASA participants in the telecon were not pleased with these
conclusions and recommendations, according to Mr. Boisjoly and
Mr. McDonald. Mr. Hardy, when asked what he thought about
Thiokol's recommendation, was quoted to the effect that he was
"appalled" at Mr. Lund's decision. 69
Boisjoly also testified that Mr. Hardy said, "No, not if the con-
tractor recommended not launching, he would not go against the
contractor and launch. ''7°
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Joseph Kilminster, Thiokol's Vice Presi-
dent for Space Booster Programs, was asked by NASA if he would
launch and "he said no because the engineering recommendation
was not to launch.''_I
Then, according, to Mr. Boisjoly,someone in Thiokol manage-
ment asked for a five-minute caucus, and at that point Thiokol cut
their speakerphone off.
Chairman ROGZRS. "Mr. Boisjoly,at the time that you
made the--that Thiokol made the recommendation not to
launch, was that the unanimous recommendation as far as
you knew?"
Mr. BomJOLY. "Yes. I have to make something clear. I
have been distressed by the things that have been appear-
ing in the paper and things that have been said in general,
and there was never one positive,pro-launch statement
ever made by anybody. There have been some feelings
since then that folks have expressed that they would sup-
port the decision,but there was not one positivestatement
for launch ever made in that room. ''w
Asked for his recollectionof these incidents,Mr. McDonald com-
mented,
... And the bottom line was that the engineering
people would not recommend a launch below 53 degrees F.
The basis for that recommendation was primarily our con-
cern with the launch that had occurred about a year earli-
er, in January of 1985, I believe itwas 51-C.vs
Mr. Mulloy testified:
The bottom line of that, though, initiallywas that Thio-
kol engineering, Bob Lund, who isthe Vice President and
Director of Engineering, who is here today, recommended
that 51-L not be launched ifthe O-ring temperature pre-
dicted at launch time would be lower than any previous
launch, and that was 53 degrees.... 7_
At 10:30 p.m. EST, the teleconference between NASA and Thio-
kol was recessed.The off-netcaucus of Thiokol personnel lastedap-
69 Ibid.
7o Ibid.
7 _ Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., Volume IV, p. 717.
_4 Ibid., Volume IV, p. 604.
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proximately thirty minutes at the Wasatch office. Jerald Mason,
Senior Vice President for Wasatch Operations, remembered that
the conversation during the caucus centered around O-rings and
the history of eroosion of the O-rings. Mr. Mason testified:
Now, in the caucus we revisited all of our previous dis-
cussions, and the important things that came out of that
was, as we had recognized, we did have the possibility that
the primary O-ring might be slower to move into the seat-
ing position and that was our concern, and that is what we
had focused on originally .... The fact that we couldn't
show direct correlation with the O-ring temperature was
discussed, but we still felt that there was some concern
about it being colder. _s
Ten engineers participated in the caucus, along with Mr. Mason,
Mr. Kilminster, Mr. Lund and Mr. C.G. Wiggins (Vice President
and General Manager for Thiokol's Space Division). Arnold Thomp-
son 76 and Mr. Boisjoly voiced very strong objections to launch, and
the suggestion in thieir testimony was that Lund was also reluc-
tant to launch.
Mr. Boisjoly, in testifying before the Rogers Commission, stated:
Okay, the caucus was started by Mr. Mason stating that
a management decision was necessary. Those of us who op-
posed the launch continued to speak out, and I am specifi-
cally speaking of Mr. Thompson and myself because in my
recollection he and I were the only ones that vigorously
continued to oppose the launch. And we were attempting
to go back and rereview and try to make clear what we
were trying to get across, and we couldn't understand why
it was going to be reversed. So we spoke out and tried to
explain once again the effects of low temperature. Arnie
actually got up from his position which was down the
table, and walked up the table and put a quarter pad down
in front of the table, in front of management folks, and
tried to sketch out once again what his concern was with
the joint, and when he realized he wasn't getting through,
he just stopped.
I tried one more time with the photos. I grabbed the
photos, and [ went up and discussed the photos once again
and tried to make the point that it was my opinion from
actual observation that temperature was indeed a discrimi-
nator and we should not ignore the physical evidence that
we had observed.
And again, I brought up the point that SRM-15 [Flight
51-C, January, 1985] had a 110 degree arc of black grease
while SRM-22 [Flight 61-A, October, 1985] had a relatively
different amount, which was less and wasn't quite as
black. I also stopped when it was apparent that I couldn't
get anybody to listen. 77
75 Ibid., p. 759.
7 e Supervisor of Structures Design, Thiokol.
77 Rogers Commission Report, Volume IV, pp. 792-93.
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Commissioner Walker asked, "At this point did anyone else
speak up in favor of the launch?" Mr. Boisjoly replied:
No, sir. No one said anything, in my recollection, nobody
said a word. It was then being discussed amongst the man-
agement folks. After Arnie and I had our last say, Mr.
Mason said we have to make a management decision. He
turned to Bub Lund and asked him to take off his engi-
neering hat and put on his management hat. From this
point on, management formulated the points to base their
decision on. There was never one comment in favor, as I
have said, of launching by any engineer or other nonman-
agement person in the room before or after the caucus. I
was not even asked to participate in giving any input to
the final decision charts.
I went back on the net with the final charts or final
chart, which was the rationale for launching, and that was
presented by Mr. Kilminster. It was hand written on a
note pad, and he read from the notepad. ! did not agree
with some of the statements that were being made to sup-
port the decision. I was never asked or polled, and it was
clearly a management decision from that point ....
I left the room feeling badly defeated, but I felt I really
did all I could to step the launch. 7s
In testimony before the Committee on June 18, 1986, concerning
the caucus and the decision to overrule engineering recommenda-
tions, Boisjoly said:
When we went off the line and caucused--one of the
first statements that was made was that we would have to
make a management decision by management people. And
we continued very strongly to oppose that and we argued
as vigorously as we could argue, and when you look up
into people's eyes you know you have gone about as far as
you can go.
And so both Mr. Thompson and I just plain frankly
backed off. You had to be there and you had to see the
looks and feel the experience that it didn't really make
any difference what further you were going to say, you
were just not going to be heard. 79
At approximately 11 p.m. EST, the Thiokol/NASA teleconference
resumed, with Mr. Kilminster stating that they had reassessed the
problem, that the temperature effects were a concern, but that the
data were admittedly inconclusive. He read the rationale recom-
mending launch and stated that to be Thiokol's recommendation.
Mr. Hardy of NASA requested that it be sent in writing by telefax
both to Kennedy and to Marshall, and it was. s°
7 s Ibid.
7g Cmte Hgs, Transcript, June 18, 1986, p. 85.
so The Committee has learned that (apparently due to an error in duplicating the relevant
chart) the copy of this telefax that was sent to the Rogers Commission did not contain the stand-
ard caveat that was printed below the company logo on the original telefax. The caveat reads,
"Information on this page was prepared to support an oral presentation and cannot be consid-
ered complete without the oral discussion." At the Committee hearings on June 18, 1986, Mr. U.
Continued
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Having heard the debate and this decision, Mr. Reinartz accepted
the conclusion and ended the teleconference. He asked whether
anyone had any further concerns. None were expressed. Commis-
sioners then asked what steps he had taken after the decision was
made.
Chairman ROGSRS. "I guess the question that still lin-
gers in my mind is, in the Navy we used to have an ex-
pression about going by the book, and I gather you were
going by the book. But doesn't the process require some
judgment? Don't you have to use common sense? Wouldn't
common sense require that you tell the decisionmakers
about this serious problem that was different from any-
thing in the past?
Mr. REINARTZ. "In looking at that one, Mr. Chairman,
together with Mr. Mulloy when we looked at were there
any launch commits, any Level II, as I perceived during
the telecon, I got no disagreement concerning the Thiokol
launch between any of the Level III elements, the contrac-
tor, with Mr. McDonald there. I felt that the Thiokol and
Marshall people had fully examined that concern, and that
ithad been satisfactorilydispositioned based upon the evi-
dence and the data that was supplied to that decision proc-
ess on that evening, from that material, and not extrane-
ous to what else may have been going on within Thiokol
that I had no knowledge of."
Chairman ROGZas. "Okay. Thank you. I'm sorry for the
long interruption."
Mr. REINARTZ. "Based upon--and as we skipped over it
is only a point to illustrate, Mr. Chairman, that in our dis-
cussion about the parachute with KSC and Mr. Aldrich,
was to indicate that there was a clear area there where we
had a very direct responsibility to inform them of the situ-
ation, which Mr. Mulloy did. And after a discussion of that
issue, Mr. Aldrich concluded that the launch should pro-
ceed in that nature. Based on the results of the meeting
and the conclusions out of the meeting, Mr. Mulloy and I
informed the Director of Marshall, Dr. Lucas, and the Di-
rector of Science and Engineering, Mr. Kingsbury, on the
28th of January--about 5:00--of the initial Thiokol con-
cerns and engineering recommendations, the final Thiokol
launch recommendation, that I felt had led to a successful
resolution of this concern."
General KUTYNA. "Could I interrupt for a minute? You
informed Dr. Lucas. He is not in the reporting chain?"
Mr. REINARTZ. "No, sir."
General KUTYNA. "If I could use an analogy, if you want
to report a fire you don't go to the mayor. In his position
as center director, Dr. Lucas was cut out of the reporting
chain, much like a mayor. If it was important enough to
Edwin Garrison, President of the Aerospace Group at Thiokol, testified that the caveat at the
bottom of the paper in no way".., insinuates.., that the document doesn't mean what it
says." (Crate Hgs, Transcript, Jane 18, 1986, p. 43.) After further investigation of this deletion,
the Committee has concluded that it was not significant.
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report to him, why didn't you go through the fire depart-
ment and go up your decision chain?"
Mr. REmARTZ. "That, General Kutyna, is a normal
course of our operating mode within the center, that I
keep Dr. Lucas informed of my activities, be they this type
of thing or other."
General KUTYNA. "But you did that at 5 o'clock in the
morning. That's kind of early. It would seem that's impor-
tant. Why didn't you go up the chain?"
Mr. REINARTZ. "No, sir. That is the time when we go in,
basically go into the launch, and so it was not waking him
up to tell him that information. It was when we go into
the launch in the morning. And based upon my assess-
ment of the situation as dispositioned that evening, for
better or worse, I did not perceive and clear requirement
for interaction with Level II, as the concern was worked
any dispositioned with full agreement among all reasona-
ble parties as to that agreement."
Chairman ROGERS."Did I understand what you just said,
that you told Dr. Lucas that all the engineers at Thiokol
were in accord?
Mr. REINARTZ. "No, sir. What I told him was of the ini-
tial Thiokol concerns that we had and the initial recom-
mendation and the final Thiokol recommendation and the
rationale associated with that recommendation, and the
fact that we had the full support of the senior Marshall
engineering s l and, as George has testified, to the exten-
siveness of the group of people we had involved in that te-
lecon with the various disciplines, that those three ele-
ments made up the final recommendation."
Mr. HoTz. "Mr. Reinartz, are you telling us that you in
fact are the person who made the decision not to escalate
this to a Level II item?"
Mr. REINARTZ."That is correct, sir." 82
According to NASA's Program Directive SFO-PD 710.5A, Mr.
Reinartz may have been required to report the matter to the Asso-
ciate Administrator for Space Flight. A portion of that directive
reads as follows:
Significant items occurring subsequent to the FRR will
also be reported to the AA-SF. Actions that can be easily
accomplished without safety, mission, or launch impact
and do not violate flight vehicle or launch complex config-
uration integrity or cause basic changes to launch commit
criteria, flight rules, flight plan, or abort and alternate
mission plans, need not be reported. 8s
Was this telecon, and the decision reached, "significant?"
NASA's request that the Thiokol decision be put in writing indi-
81 Staff review of teleconference materials used by Marshall engineers Wilbur Riehl (Chief,
Nonmetallic Materials Division) and John Miller (Technical Assistant to the SRM Manager) in-
dicates that some of the Marshall engineering staff shared the concerns expressed by Thiokol
erlgineers.
s2 Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, pp. 917-18.
ss SFO-PD 710.5A, p. 3.
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cates that MSFC personnel felt the situation was significant, since
in effect Thiokol was reconfirming the flight readiness of the SRM.
It is also interesting to note, in light of the directive, that Mr.
McDonald testified before the Commission to the effect that Mr.
Mulloy had made some "fairly strong comments . . . about trying
to institute new launch commit criteria." s4
Mr. Mulloy responded to this by explaining what he had at-
tempted to say.
Mr. MULLOY. "The total context, I think, in which those
words may have been used is, there are currently no
Launch Commit Criteria for joint temperature. What you
are proposing to do is to generate a new Launch Commit
Criteria on the eve of launch, after we have successfully
flown with the existing Launch Commit Criteria 24 previ-
ous times. With this LCC, i.e., do not launch with a tem-
perature greater than [sic] 53 degrees, we may not be able
to launch until next April. We need to consider this care-
fully before we jump to any conclusions. It is all in the
context, again, with challenging your interpretation of the
data, what does it mean and is it logical, is it truly logical
that we really have a system that has to be 53 degrees to
fly?..."
General KUTYNA. "Mr. Mulloy, if in fact the criteria
were 53 degrees, it would have an impact not only on this
launch, but on the shuttle program .... It is a fairly im-
portant decision to say you can't launch below 53 degrees,
isn't it?
Mr. MuI_oY. "Yes, sir, I agree with that. I cannot de-
scribe the impacts, but, as I say, based upon our previous
experience and our actions in flying subsequent vehicles
after 51C, I found that to be a surprising conclusion .... "
Mr. SUTT_.R. "... [I]nstead of saying you have to wait
until next April to launch, the thing that you do is you go
and there were three different levels of improvements that
were discussed. The thing to do then was to put those im-
provements in the program, not infer that these engineers
are saying, we're throwing a ringer at you that says don't
launch until next April. I think that is putting those engi-
neers into a little bit of a hot seat. And if they're trying to
do their job and say, hey, we ought to do something about
this, there ought to have been more attention paid. ''s5
The Rogers Commission report included the statement, "It is
clear that crucial information about the O-ring damage in prior
flights and about the Thiokol engineers' arguments with the NASA
telecon participants never reached Jesse Moore or Arnold Aldrich,
the Level I and II program officials, or J. A. Thomas, the Launch
Director for 51-L." s6
Based on the available evidence, the Committee is unable to con-
clude whether or not Mr. Moore or Mr. Aldrich, with the informa-
s4 Rogers Commission Report, Volume IV. p. 721.
s5 Ibid., Volume V. pp. 843-45.
8e Ibid., Volume I, p. 101.
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tion available to them that day, would have reached a decision to
stop the launch had they been informed of this meeting. It does
appear, however, that a three-hour telecon, in which arguments
are raised about launch commit criteria and the contractor is
asked to reconfirm the flight readiness of his hardware fall under
the definition of the policy directive. At the very least, the STS
Program Manager should have been presented the new declaration
of flight readiness with an explanation of why it had been devel-
oped. This should have been a necessary addition to the Certificate
of Flight Readiness prepared after the Flight Readiness Review.
The Committee also reviewed tapes and transcripts of conversa-
tions that took place in the Firing Room on January 28th involving
discussions of the threat posed by ice on the Fixed Service Struc-
ture. Kennedy Space Center managers, in response to the predicted
low temperatures that would be seen in the hours before the
launch of STS-51L, took action to protect Launch Complex 39B and
the Shuttle from freezing and ice buildup. This involved imple-
menting the "freeze protection plan" for launch pad facilities.Ac-
cording to a post-accident report:
Two actions within the PLAN were intended to limit the
ICE DEBRIS which potentiallycould cause damage to the
Shuttle Vehicle during launch. The firstaction involved
adding approximately fourteen hundred gallons of anti-
freeze into the overpressure water troughs. The water
troughs in both SRB exhaust holes have a totalcapacity of
6,580 gallons. The resultant antifreeze to water ratio was
calculated to be 21.3%. According to the manufacturer's
specifications,solution protected against freezing down to
an ambient temperature of 16 degrees F. The second
action involved the draining, where practical,of all water
systems. Several systems, such as Firex [fireextinguish-
ing], Deluge, and emergency shower and eyewash, were
not drained. These systems were opened slightly and al-
lowed to trickleinto drains.The tricklingwater was found
to cause drain overflows. High wind gusts then spread the
water over large areas and itthen froze,s7
Soon after the call-to-stationson 28 January, at approximately
midnight, cameras on the pad allowed engineers in the Firing
Room to see that the gantry was heavily encrusted with ice.Over
the Engineering Support Room communications loops,the follow-
ing conversation took place:ss
sT NASA, Kennedy Space Center, "STS-33 (51-L) Ice/Frost Team Evaluation Report: ESS/
RSS/MLP Deck/Pad Apron Icing," January 30, 1986,p. 1.
s6 Conversations were recorded from the Kennedy Space Center Operational Intercommunica-
tion System (OIS), which permits members of the launch crew to discuss problems that occur
during the countdown, and permits them to contact various mission support facilities around
the country. The transcripts provided to the Committee do not indicate the exact times at which
the referenced conversations occurred, and so the flow of conversations has been reconstructed
in an attempt to provide logical consistency.
Most of the transcripts in this section are drawn from OIS Channel 245, identified as the co-
ordination channel for JSC/MSFC/KSC Engineering personnel in the Engineering Support Area
at Kennedy Space Center. Conversations among Rockwell International personnel were obtained
from OIS Channel 216, described as the coordination channel for JSC personnel at Johnson and
Kennedy centers and Rockwell engineers in Downey, California. Transcript page numbers are
those supplied by NASA.
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BL. This is Bob on 245.
DIRECTOR. GO ahead, Bob.
BL. Did you ever find out any more about that water?
DIRECTOR. No, no I haven't, s9
BL. Okay, I guess the thing, they don't know yet where that water's coming from
and the NTD's [NASA Test Director] got some folks looking into it. I guess the thing
you guys need to do is see if you can get certain cameras to look at the vehicle and
to determine if there's any water getting on the vehicle that might freeze and cause
problems.
DmzcToa. I think what we need to do, Bob, we need to decide do we feel comforta-
ble enough to let it keep running and forming ice up there, or we ought to stop and
send somebody in there and try to shut it off.
BL. Yeah, okay.
Dmgcroa. Do you guys think we could form enough ice there to cause us any
problem on liftoff or anything?
BL. I think you've already done that, Horace.
DIaECTOR. Well, then, we ought to step and go out there and get the water shut
off.
BL. Yeah, we're worried about an icicle up high--well, see, camera 108's on the
155 foot ....
ITL. 155? Yeah. So you're already getting high up, you know. And if the wind's
going to be out of the north-northwest ....
DIRECTOa. All right, let's stop them and send the people out there and see if they
can shut the water off.
ITL. I think what it is, is the fire hose--if you look right over, if you go to 108 and
go like you're going to the elevator, you'll see a fire hose, looks like a fire hose
draped across there...
DIRECTOR. Yeah.
ITL .... And I think they take the fire hose and carry it over to the shower, the
eye shower. And evidently the drains that they're draining into is frozen off, or
either the hose has fallen off the drain, one or the other.
DmEC-ron. Okay, we gotta work this in. We're going to tell them to go out there
and shut the water off.
ITL. OkayY °
The ice/frost team was dispatched to the pad and arrived at ap-
proximately 1:45 a.m. What they found during their inspection of
the Fixed Service Structure was not very encouraging to the team
leader. He reported back to the Firing Room:
ITL. Horace, this is Charlie on 245.
BL. Hello, this is Bob. I think he may still be in that HIM (Hardware Interface
Module] meeting [on the fire detector problem]. What do you see out there?
ITL. Okay, starting on about the 235 foot level where the top hose is, the fire hose
that was draining into the shower, the hose is not really, the drain is in the shower,
the hose is not really draining into the little bowl on the shower and it was spilling
over. So we have a lot of hard solid ice from the 235 feet down to 195 feet where I
am now. Most of it's on the west side and the north side, and about halfway in-
between, the floor is one solid sheet of ice about an inch and a half thick. And down
on 195 foot level, the water's on the pipe and plumbing and structure and beams all
the way over to the Orbiter Access Arm [OAA]. That's as far down as we got so far.
BL. Copy.
ITL. We have some icicles about 18 inches long. 9_
The Ice Team leader later reported that ice was covering part of
the floor on the 195 foot platform where the crew would enter the
Orbiter. Part of this discussion follows:
Significant participants in these conversations include:
DIRECTOR: Director of Engineering, Kennedy Space Center.
BL: Chief, Mechanical Systems Division, Shuttle Engineering Directorate.
LD: Launch Director, STS 51-L.
ITL: Ice Team Leader.
s90IS Channel 245, p. 570.
9o Ibid., pp. 570-72.
91 Ibid., p. 573.
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BL. Charlie, isthat ice going to be any kind of impediment to the crew?
ITL. Uh, not to the crew. I don't see any out here where the crew walks.
BL. How 'bout to the baskets [the emergency escape system]?.
ITL .... Up to the what?
BL. If they had to go to the baskets for any reason, do they have a clear path
through that ice?
ITL. Oh, no. When you get over that way, we got ice.
BL. So they had to get out in a hurry in order to get to the baskets, they've got to
go over a sheet of ice.
ITL. Oh, yeah. On the north side,that's all one hard sheet of ice.Now, they could
get to the two baskets on the south side, probably three baskets on the south side.
Hold on just a minute, I'llgo take a look .... 92
ITL.Okay, Bob, I'm back.
BL. Okay. What's itlook like over there?
ITL. Okay--some right at the elevator, right where the camera is, going back
toward the baskets, we got ice on the floor.And the ice goes all the way across the
west side of the facility,all the way over to the north corner on the floor. So it is
slippery. Once you get past the west-most part of the FSS, the ice on the floor
ceases, and you got a clear walkway, so all five baskets are, uh, six baskets do have
a clear walkway right around the baskets. But to get between the elevator and the
camera where you're looking at, there's some ice on the floor.
BL. Okay.
ITL. And including the handrails that they would be holding on to. But out here
from the Orbiter Access Arm over to the camera is clear.
BL. _t's your Safety guy there think about that? You got a Safety guy with
you, don t you?
ITL. Yes, he's concerned. Matter of fact,there's some ice right under my feet now
that I look.
BL. Charlie, Horace is back with us now. Why don't you start up your review
from the 235 foot level on down again.
ITL. Okay. From the 235 foot level is where we had these litle Firex systems--the
hose, the rubber hose which we ran over to the shower back on the northwest
corner of the FSS, so we ran it on to the eyewash shower the level below, the 235
foot level, and it was running out of the drain, you know, the little basin--it was
overflowing the little basin. So we have over in that area, down to the 195 foot level
on the north side of the FSS, icicles that are about 18 inches or so long, about one
inch in diameter or more at their maximum diameter. This floor, the grating, over
on the north side paralleling the showerway and the elevator in some places are
frozen solid about two inches thick. You know, the area is like 10 [by] 10 or more.
DIRrL'_R. On the floor, which floors, Charlie?
ITL: The floor of the grating, on like the 215 and there's a level between 215 and
right under, between 215 and 195; there's a half-level that you go out to the hatch
on the north side.
DIRECTOR. Okay,.
ITL. And there s a lot of icicleshanging, you know, under the floor.As far as the
east side goes, on the 195 foot level where we are now, we have about one-quarter
inch or one-half inch ice.On the beam structures themselves, they go all the way
over to the--right at the hinge where the Orbiter Access Arm goes out. I don't see
any on the Orbiter Access Arm itself,but there is some here where I'm standing
and a littlebit on the floor.Just before you came on, we were talking about the
slidewire---the baskets. The floor from the Orbiter Access Arm over to, back where
the camera is,is fairly clean. And from the camera back to the west side, is some
ice on the floor to the west edge of the FSS.
DIRECTOR. Okay.
ITL. SO the crew would have to walk across one slick spot. Around the baskets
themselves, it'sfairly clean. But to the northwest corner of the FSS where the bas-
kets are, there's heavy concentration of ice on the floor.93
The discussionconcluded:
DIREC'rOR. Do you see anything out there that makes itunsafe for the crew?
ITL. At this time, I'd say from the elevator to the Orbiter Access Arm would be
fairly good; the floor'sin good shape. The elevator's got a littlebit of--the doors are
real hard to work but everything seems to work in that neighborhood. Ifthey had to
9_ Ibid., p. 574.
93 Ibid, pp. 574-76.
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go to the slidewire, it'd be very slippery from the camera that you're looking at to
the slidewire itself. There's an area about ten feet long where the handrails have ice
on them, as well as the floor, g4
This discussion is of concern to the Committee. The slidewire re-
ferred to is the means by which the Shuttle crew would evacuate
the launch pad if an emergency were to occur that required a rapid
exit from the pad area. Crew safety concerns should dictate that
the ice situation described by the Ice Team leader is unacceptable,
and that some effort to remove the ice from the floor and handrails
should be made. There is no indication that this was done. If the
ice could not be removed, the mission should have been delayed
until the danger represented by the ice could be eliminated.
This situation, admittedly, had nothing to do with the accident
that destroyed STS-51-L. However, had this been the one time that
use of the pad escape system was required, the crew would very
likely have been impeded in their attempt to reach the escape bas-
kets, and the lost time might have proven fatal. This system must
be operated with the expectation that it will be used, and the
countdown procedure should require that no barriers to its use be
present before launch.
As the Ice Team continued its inspection, the discussion in the
Firing Room involved the possible threat posed by the ice problem.
BL. We're just going to ask your opinion on the debris concern. If Charlie thinks
we have a concern with debris, and I guess I would find it hard to believe that we'd
be concerned about it from the FSS, but if we do have a concern, can we go out
there and try to clean it up a little bit?
DmECTOR. Yeah, I think we could. I think when he gets through here, if we think
there's some areas that we need to clean up a little bit, we probably could.
BL. I think Safety would probably have to make a call, myself, on the floor if they
think it's, that's a concern, but ....
DmECTOR. Okay, he's [IT[,] on 108 now.
BL. I see him on camera 108, next to the 155 foot level.
LD. Hey, what kind of debris are you guys talking about?
BL. The icicles on the FSS.
LD. Yeah, and how is that going to hurt you?
BL. Well, that's what I'm saying. I don't think it--personally, I don't think it
would, but I just wanted to ....
DIReCtOR. [garbled] by there, you're not gonna hit the Orbiter, but Charlie's wor-
ried about it, Gene--the acoustics releasing it and it being free when the Orbiter
comes by.
LD. Boy, he's really stretching it.
DIRECTOR. Oh no, I don't know whether that's stretching it too much or not.
LD. Well, I mean if we can ignore it, we need to feel comfortable about it.
P. All right, Gene, remember the wind is coming from the northwest.
LD. We need to all know if we don't get back into tanking as soon as possible, we
could possibly blow it just for that.
DmECTOR. Yeah, we understand, Gene .... 9s
The Ice Team leader'snext reportwas no more encouraging.
Water had spilledover the platform as the drainswere unable to
cope with the volume of water they were asked to manage. Icicles
were found on the platform handrailsthat couldeasilybe knocked
off. 96
94 Ibid., p. 576.
95 Ibid., pp. 577-78.
9e Ibid., p. 578.
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As the team leader was explaining that the water could not be
completely cut off for fear of making the situation worse.° 7 the fol-
lowing conversations occurred:
LD: Hey, we gotta come out of there when you guys tellingus you're prettysure
that water system's gonna work.
_n. Yeah, you feel comforts, ble with what you see out there, Charlie, now?
ITL. We have a lot of ice, if that s what you mean. I don t feel comfortable with
what's on the leSS.
Dm_cm. Then what choiceswe got?
ITL.Well, I'dsay that only choiceyou got today isnot to go.We're justtaking a
chance ofhittingthe vehicle.
LD. You see that much ice?
ITL.Well, the problem we have iswe hve a lotof icicleshanging, you know, even
on the west,side of the leSS here, which is only 60 feet or more from the Orbiter
wing. And I m sure that stuff is going to fall off as soon _ the acoustics get to it.
And-you got a northwest wind, so you .know, .some.body. wil"l have to make that as-
sessment. If we're worried about that httle bit ox ice that comes off zne nyorogen
vent arm, and the GOX [gaseous oxygen] vent arm, what we have over here is con-
siderably more than that, you know,it's a hundre_i:fol.d.. ....
Direst'foR. You _ot enough ice that's over there umt's, bi_eno.ugn ana _ot enougn
density to it that if it hits the Orbiter It could do some s_nmcanz aamage.
ITL. Yes, we do .... It's on the east side of the leSS. On the northeast corner of
the FSS, which puts you about 65 feet or so from the vehicle. But it comes right to
about where this camera is, it's right on the center thin line of the FSS, it comes
that far over.
BL. Charlie, I would doubt the wind could blow that over. Are you concerned
about during--after engine start, t.hat things .sl_ould kinda blow ar.ound?
ITL. Uh, yes.And the problem m its so hlgh,too.You know, its way upto the
top.If itwere allthe way down here to the bottom, itprovamy woulan tve any
problem.
BL. Can we go along the eastsidehandrailsand knock itoffnow? Isn'tthatthe
biggestconcern--theeastside?
ITL. Well, it'son the handrailsand itson the floorunderneath, too.You know, I
guess itcould probably be done but it'dbe a job.
BL. Itwould take a longtime,wouldn't it?
ITL. All the FACS pipes,and all the conduit and allthe cable trays and then
hanging down underneath the floor,you know, everywhere, on allthe piecesofgrat-
ing,you got littleicicleshanging down.
DIRECTOR. Who do you have out therewith you?
ITL. B.K.,as faras my group goes.
DIRECTOR. Okay, why don'tyou guys go ahead and walk eve.rythingoown and
quick as you get--come on back, let'sget with Gene and we IIsltaown ana talk
about what we got.9s
LD. Okay, why, don t you do hke Horace saxd,come on back and we IIgo ahead
and tank and we IIhave you look at itwhen you go back.
ITL. Okay, and I think--you know, the Rockwell people have a program which
says itprobably would be allright,so contactthem and letthem put itin the ma-
chine and see what they get.99
As the Ice Team returned from its initial inspection, the launch
director spoke to KSC's Director of Engineering about the ice situa-
tion:
LD. Yeah, we reallyneed to do some head scratchingon thisicething and what
we gonna do once we get back in.We've justabout used allour hold.
DIRECTOR:Okay.
LD. What we're gonna do--we're not gonna opt to have a hold,we'llletthe ice
team go in _ustlikenormal, but we gonna keep counting the clock,and ifwe have
toget ourselvesintoeatingsome of our launch window, we'lldo itlate.
DIRECTOR.Okay. We can do the iceinspectionparallelwith counting.
LD. Okay, but we need to have Rockwell in there where we need to ready to talk.
DIRECTOR.We can get Don in and we'lldo that.
97 Ibid.
9s Ibid. pp. 579-81.
99 Ibid., pp. 581-82.
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LD. I don't see how in the world--we need to worry about that ice. I don't know
what's going to knock it off. It's going to freeze and stay there.
Dm_rroa: I don't think it will hit the Orbiter, Gene. It'll probably come off just
from the acoustics, but ....
LD. Yeah, as you go by, I would think . . . I would think after we start the en-
gines, if it starts breaking loose then, ! don't know how it would travel that far
until, you know, the six seconds or so we are on the ground.
Dim_c-roa. Yeah. We'll get everybody here; we'll talking before---while we're tank-
ing before they go out, then we'll be ready to help make an assessment, loo
The Ice/Frost Team returned to the launch pad during the
scheduled countdown hold at T-3 hours. The crew was somewhat
larger than usual, since their primary objective was to clear ice
from the water troughs on the launch pad. The team would also be
making a follow-up assessment of ice on the FSS.
According to the post-accident report, "the team arrived at Pad
B at 0654 hours and departed at 0844." A summary of their activity
during this time stated:
Ice in the troughs had thickened and was found to be
solid. All secondary troughs except the northern most one
in each hole now had ice. The two inboard primary hole
troughs were also forming ice .... The "shrimp net" was
employed to break up the ice and remove it. Approximate-
ly 95% of the ice was removed. The ice and unfrozen anti-
freeze solution was measured using an infra-red pyrometer
and found to have a temperature between 8 and 10°F ....
The pyrometer measured the MLP deck surface tempera-
ture as 12°F. On the FSS the quantity of ice had increased
but the overall extent of icing was generally the same. In
most cases, sheet ice was firmly adhered to the structure.
Icicles could very easily be "snapped" off. Water continued
to trickle down the facility--including the RSS [Rotating
Service Structure]. 1o
NASA launch team members were continuing their debate over
the risk represented by the ice at this time.
LD. What do you think about the ice now?
DIRECTOR. Well, I don't know, Gene. I keep thinking there isan answer ifwe can
find it,but we got people out talking it and I think we can make a decision on the
SRB things [troughs]. I think we have the data there that we can make the right
decision on that. The tower is what's going to be the one that is going to be hard to
come to a decision on.
LD. But do we have any data that shows a mechanism for moving that ice across
there?
DIRECTOR. That's what we're trying to see ifwe can come up with some kind of
rationale why it won't. Charlie says we've got some data that we have moved some
pieces across from basically the tower to the vehicle but we're--[Marty Ciofoletti,
Vice President for Space Transportation System Integration, Rockwell Internation-
al] and the guys are working with Downey to see how they feel ifthey come up with
anything on the acoustics and things like that.
LD. Okay. io2
KSC's EngineeringDirectorthen calledthe Rockwell liaison.Io2a
1oo Ibid.,pp. 583-84.
1o_ "Ice/Frost Team Evaluation Report," p. 4.
lo20IS Channel 245, p. 595.
1o2_ Rockwell personnel appearing in House transcripts are identified as follows:
RI: Kennedy Space Center liaison.
RTI: DirectorofTechnical Integration.
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DIRZC'rOR. John, on 245.
RI. Go ahead, Horace.
I_RZZTOR. You guys stilltalking to Downey?
RI. Yeah, we haven't go anything new since I last talked to you. Larry Williams
just called in. He wants to talk to Bill Hovath [?]so they are getting ready to make
a callto his now.
DIRECTOR. Okay.
RI. But we haven't got anybody. You know Jack McTimmons [McClymonds]---I
talked to him and all he had to offer was his old program data of how far ice would
go at various wind speeds, you know, from the FSS that's not our primary concern,
obviously, right now.
I_RZCTOR.No,that'sright,t°s
In the Mission Support Room in Downey, California,Rockwell
support personnel were expressing the same concerns as the Ice
Team Leader, and were not confident their computer model could
remove the uncertainty presented by the ice.Rockwell's Kennedy
Space Center liaisonwas asked for information.
RTI. KSC, MSR [Mission Support Room]
RI. Go.
RTI. Good morning, John. Uh...
RI. It'sbeen a busy morning!
RTI. I bet--looks bad, eh?
RI. Ice does look bad, yeah. The situation we've got right now is that they're
working the bags in the SRB hole; they reported slush in those bags and we were
watching on TV and some of that slush was pretty big and pretty heavy. But I think
we can take care of that part--I think they're gonna get that cleared up. There s a
crew out there working on those right now. One of the concerns [Richard] Colonna
[Orbiter Project Manager JSC] had was reflected pressure wave problems if there
was a film of ice across those bags, but it looks like they're breaking that up. The
big concern is gonna be the mass of ice that is on the FSS, from the 235 foot level
all the way down to the MLP [mobile !auncher platform]. Every platform had had
water running on it all night and they re just a--some of the closeups of the stair-
wells looks like,uh, something out of Dr. Zhivago. There's sheets of icicleshanging
everywhere. We've had reports, back on the northwest corner, of ice,icicles--this is
a couple hours ago, the crew are up there walking it down right now, so we'll prob-
ably get some updates here shortl_,--but the initialwalkdown said iciclesup to two
feet long by an inch in diameter. On the northwest corner, kind of graduating down
to about three inches by one-quarter inch diameter on the east side, with periodic
one-foot icicleson the east side on some of the cross beams.
RTI. Sounds grim.
RI. The big concern is that nobody knows what the hell is going to happen when
that thing lights off and all that ice gets shook loose and come tumbling down and--
what does it do then? Does itricochet, does itget into some turbulent condition that
throws it against the vehicle? Our general input to date has been basically that
there's vehicle jeopardy that we've not prepared to sign up to.
RTI. Okay. We didn't see this when we had icing conditions l_efore?
RI. No, and they didn't run the showers all damn night before. They ran the
showers this time and ran'era, pretty heavily by the look of it,the drains froze up
and they all overflowed.
RTI. Oh ....
12/. And I guess nobody watched it all night or, if they did, they didn't say any-
thing. But, uh--is John [Peller, Rockwell Vice President for Engineering] in yet?
RTI. No.
RI. Okay. We need to--you know, somebody at his level needs to get in and try to
et up to speed as fast as they can. They're going to be looking for a final position
m Rockwell here very shortly. We got--Bill Frohoff is right now talking to Larry
Williams of JSC. I've got Colonna and Bobola sitting here with Al Martin and
myself and we're probably going to be the forcing factor on this decision. Until
RSD: SiteDirectorforLaunch Support Operations.
RTP: Thermal ProtectionProjectManager.
RDE: Vice-Presidentfor Engineering.
RVI_. Vice Presidentand Program Manager for OrbiterOperations Support.
RSR: Senior Representative,Mission Evaluation Room, Johnson Space Center.
tos Ibid., pp. 596-97.
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somebody can come up and tell us that the potential flow path is to the objects on
the FSS at liftoff--you know, we're going to have to assume the worst case--but I
don't think anybody is going to have that sort of data.
RTI. This is going to be a tough one. _°4
The Ice Team Leader reported that efforts to clear out the water
troughs under the SRBs were meeting with success, and that the
team was managing to clear the ice that had formed on the left
SRB aft skirt. 1°5
As this occurred, Rockwell's Site Director for Launch Support
Operations was reporting from KSC to Downey. He said,
RSD .... IT]he situation here is that--very quickly--when Charlie gives his
report, then they are gonna want to reconvene a top level management meeting
here, so whatever we want to say in that meeting we're gonna have to come up with
it here and now in order to be ready to say it and I guess the situation is that there
are icicles all over the stand, that's the fixed service structure, all up and down it,
various levels--some of the icicles are two feet long, an inch or two at the base,
there are lots of small icicles hanging all over the place. What they say is that when
they touch them gently that they break off and for that reason I don't think there is
any doubt about the fact in my mind that when we start the SSMEs a lot of these
icicles are going to break off and they're going to--and when they do break off, then
what's going to happen is that they're gonna come tumbling down, they can ricochet
off of the service structure and they can--then some of them wind up on top of the
MLP.IO8
The discussion was interrupted at this point by another report
from the ice team, indicating that the lower levels of the FSS had
ice coverage equal to the levels already discussed. The decision was
made to bring the team leader back for a report to managers, in
order to decide whether the threat was sufficient to stop the
launch. 1o7
The discussion at Rockwell then resumed:
RSD: Okay. He was just reporting on one of the levels. As he, as Charlie Steven-
son, of NASA, moves up and down with the ice toam, they're reporting on each level
and on that particular level he was reporting a signficant amount of ice as the
result of the overflow from the shower. You know, they left the water running in
order to keep the pipes from freezing and then, I guess, some of the drains have
frozen so then the water's overflowing and that's what's creating a lot of the big
icicles. But at any rate, what I was getting around to, it just appears to me that
when these icicles break off when they start the SSMEs some of them are very
likely--in fact, I'll tell you, almost for sure--are gonna wind up on top of the MLP
and then when we launch it seems to me it would be very difficult for anybody to
predict where that debris would go and it appears to me that there would be a possi-
bility of some of that debris impacting the Orbiter tiles and I don't know how our
aeredynamists or analysts or anybody you know could really say that that wouldn't
happen. They can predict what happens when you drop a piece of ice in the wind.
They can also predict what happens due to aspiration when you start the Solid
Rocket Motors and SSMEs. The real question is how do you predict what happens to
ice chunks that are on top of the MLP at launch and where they go. So, at any rate,
that's how we see it here at launch.
RTI. Well, one thing I guess we can see, from the view that we have, is ice on top
of the MLP right now.
RSD. Yes, there is ice on top of the MLP right now.
RTI. That's unacceptable. Anything in the trough is una¢cepatable and any ice
that would impact the vehicle during ascent is unacceptable and we can't predict
what's going to happen to all that massive ice on the towers, so I think we're in a
critical situation ....
1o40IS Channel 216, pp. 340-41.
los OIS Channel 245, pp. 600-601.
_oe OIS Channel 216, p. 345.
_o7 OIS Channel 245, pp. 603-604.
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RTP. Most of the ice on the tower is going to end up on an MLP, probably right
before SRB ignition anyway--right, AI? You think?
RTI. Well, it's going to end up looking like snow, though, isn't it?
RTP. No, this is hard ice.
RTI. Once it hits that tower it's not going to be hard ice. What we're worried
about is the aspiration effects of the motion of the ice into the vehicle.
RTP. You're stillgoing to have large chunks of ice, ice cubes. Like an ice cube.
RTI. That's unacc . . . question is, how high is, is the highest elevation of ice,
what was the ....
RTP. I think they're saying it'sall the way to the top of the tower, like the 235
foot level has iciclesforming and all the way down from there.
RTL Okay.
RSD. Bob, would you say again what you were saying about the ice on the tower
and the concern about that?
RTI. We really don't have a data base to know what's going to happen to the ice.
We do have some information that we can get horizontal movement of the ice into
the vehicle. Obviously, since it's very tenuous, it's going to be bouncing all over the
place. It'll be bouncing off the J-boxes and everything else. So you're going to have
some horizontal velocity of ice.
RTP. Hey, Bob, you're breaking up again.
RTI. Okay. Let me try once more. Our data base does not allow us to scientifically
toll you what's going to happen to the ice. Therefore, we feel we re in a no-go situa-
tion right now.
RSD. Okay. That, Bob, is a consensus down here, too--that there's no way, that is
for Rockwell, the consensus down here for Bill Frohoff and ourselves, that there's
no way to predict what's going to happen, and I think that when we get into this
next meeting, we need to stato that as Rockwelrs position and I think that's going
to come up fairly soon, here. Now, I have told Dick Colonna that I s,uspect that's
f oing to be the Rockwe,!l position, I haven't told them off2ciaily. ]ve also told
Horace that, but I haven t told him that officially, and I guess, or, uh, do you think
we're ready now to, uh, for Rockwell to state that position and do you want to go
back to the MER with that or how do you want to handle it?
RTI. Well, what I would like to do is get ahold of [BOb] Glaysher--we're not sup-
posed to overrule him--and talk to him about it.Is he there?
RSD. We woke him up at 4:00 this morning. He called in about an hour ago. We
understood he was on the way and he's not here yet.
RTI. Okay, I'd like to stonewall it until he gets here.I°s
At about this time, Mr. Bill Fleming, the senior representative of
Rockwell International, reported from the Mission Evaluation
Room at JSC that "ice on MLP, tower and trough not acceptable to
MSR [Rockwell's Downey facilityJ." ios
Just prior to attending the meeting called by Arnold Aldrich, the
Vice President and Program Manager for Orbiter Operations Sup-
port at Rockwell held the following teleconference with their Chief
Engineer at Downey.
RDE. Hey, we've gone over this a_ain. Colonna called me and wanted to see if
there is a way we could give ita go. But, when all the experts have looked at it,we
stillhave concerns with three mechanisms. One, direct transport of falling ice into
the vehicle at SSME ignition and the wind is adequate to make that happen. The
ten-knot wind can move it laterally like twenty feet and a fifteen-knot gust could
take it laterally forty feet.So even though you might be able to placard it,it'svery
close with the wind you've got. Secondly, you've got a rebound mechanism, where
ice fallsdown into the lower part of the platform and goes out. Some pretty sizeable
chunks and sometimes all it does is break an iciclein two, that's clearly enough to
cause significant tiledamage. And, finally, the ice ends up on the MLP and in the
trough is all potential debris sources at SRB ignition and liftoffand the trajectory
those things take are highly unpredictable and we just note in fiin_s tended to go in
different directions. So we are not in the position to, uh .... So we've been through
the three mechanisms, none of which we can completely clear. Dr. Petrone's here;
we've discussed it with him. We still are of the position that it's still a bit of Rus-
1o80IS Channel 216,pp. 345-48.
lo_ NASA, Johnson Space Flight Center, "Presidential Commission Action Item (A-301) Re-
sponse," DDATF-86-36, April 7, 1986, p. 1.
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sian roulette; you'll probably make it. Five out of six times you do playing Russian
roulette. But, there's a lot of debris. They could hit direct, they could be kicked up
later by the SRBs, and we just don't know how to clear that.
RVP. Okay. Our position fundamentally hasn't changed. We'll just go in now, we
got a 9:00, we'll go in and express it. I'll let you know what happens.
RDE. And obviously, uh, you know, it's their vehicle and they can take the risk,
but our position is as stated.
RVP. Okay, you got it. 11 o
No recording exists of the meeting at 9:00 a.m. on January 28. In
testimony before the Commission, Mr. Robert Glaysher stated that
he told Mr. Aldrich that "Rockwell cannot assure that it is safe to
fly.,, 111
Mr. A1 Martin testified that:
I also added that we do not have the data base from
which to draw any conclusions for this particular situation
with the icicles on the tower, and also, we had no real ana-
lytical techniques to predict where the icicles might go at
lift-off. The other thing that I did was review the fact that
prior to each launch there is great care taken to assure
that there is no debris out on the launch pad. A day or two
before launch a crew goes out and they walk down the
entire tower and walk down the mobile launcher surface,
and also the concrete apron around the launch pad for the
purpose of removing any debris such as nuts, belts, rocks
or anything else that might be there .... So I was drawing
a corollary between the care that is normally taken for
debris and painting a picture that the icicles appeared to
me to be in that same category. 112
Mr. Marty Cioffoletti testified that "I felt that by telling them
we did not have a sufficient data base and could not analyze the
trajectory of the ice, I felt he understood that Rockwell was not
giving a positive indication that we were for the launch." 1_3
Mr. Aldrich, conversely, told the Commission that:
Glaysher's statement to me as best as I can reconstruct
it to report it to you at this time was that, while he did not
disagree with the analysis that JSC and KSC had reported,
that they would not give an unqualified go for launch as
ice on the launch complex was a condition which had not
previously been experienced, and thus posed a small addi-
tional, though unquantifiable, risk. 114
Aldrich concluded the meeting by deciding to recommend that
the countdown continue until the ice team could return to the pad
just prior to launch and make a final assessment. Aldrich testified
that he told Jesse Moore about Rockwell's reservations, explained
his decision, and recommended that the launch proceed unless the
ice team discovered that the situation had badly deteriorated. _15
1o OIS Channel 216, p. 353.
_ Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, p. 1013.
12 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 1014.
14 Ibid., p. 1025.
s Ibid.
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The results of the meeting were reported back to Rockwell over
the communications system:
RSR: MSR, this is MER.
UKN: Go ahead.
RSR: We just got a report in from Arnie and they're going to go ahead and go into
the count. They're going to go out, sweep down the pad as best they can and remove
as much ice as they can and go for the launch today.
UKN. We copied that. ' _8
In their final report, the Ice Team found that ice on the MLP in
direct sunlight had begun melting. They also found that icicles had
begun to fall from the upper FSS levels. Ice cube sized pieces of
these icicles were found within 10 feet of the left-hand SRB hole.
The west MLP deck was swept clean of ice/icicles. The water
troughs were checked and found to be forming ice, which was again
removed using the "shrimp net." 117
In analyzing launch films after the accident, NASA found that,
contrary to expectations and analysis, ice from the Fixed Service
Structure did reach and impact the Shuttle vehicle during liftoff.
The report stated:
Numerous launch films were viewed regarding FSS and
RSS ice debris. A film (E-43) [Engineering Camera 43]
looking directly in at the vehicle and FSS shows some ice
falling straight down in the period between SSME ignition
and vehicle ascent through approximately 20 feet. It shows
that very many particles fell at approximately a 45 ° ang.le
during the vehicle rise through 20 to 40 feet. This ice in-
cluded sheet ice particles up to 6 in. x 6 in. and flowed
down into the plumes at a point directly below the engine
nozzles. Some of this struck the LH SRB. One downward
looking camera (E-36) on the FSS clearly showed that a
small amount of FSS ice debris reached the area of the LH
SRB exhaust hole. Particles numbered 50-100 and were
approximately ice-cube size. None of these or any other
debris was observed to be ejected upward toward the Orbit-
er. Another film (E-18) looks upward from the SSME pit.
This shows that after a vehicle rise of 10 ft. hundreds of
ice particles flowed in below the main engine at a 45 °
angle. No Orbiter impacts are observed. Camera E-26 . . .
reveals many small pieces of falling ice striking the LH2
TSM [liquid hydrogen tail service mast] in the period be-
tween SSME ignition and vehicle rise through approxi-
mately 25 feet. Due to aspiration, 50-100 small ice parti-
cles flowed into the LH SRB plume directly below the SRB
nozzle as the vehicle rose through 4 to 25 ft. These films
and others show fairly clearly that there was little or no
debris damage to the oribiter [sic] during liftoff due to
FSS/RSS icing for the conditions observed. __s
In the summary and conclusions section of this report, the fol-
lowing statements appear:
118 OIS Channel 216,p. 355.
1_ ,,ice/l_rost Team Evaluation Report," p. 5.
_s NASA, "Hazard to Orbiter Tiles Posed by the Vertical Structure Ice: Mission 51-L," Janu-
ary 30, 1986, p. 3.
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On STS-33 (51L) the actual FSS/RSS ice movement, as
proven by the photographic documentation did not con-
form to the predictions in two important respects:
1. The ice generally did not release until after SSME ig-
nition.
2. The ice translated several times farther toward the
vehicle than predicted.
To do meaningful predictions of ice movement, the ef-
fects of aspiration must be considered. Similarly, the re-
lease time of the ice must be known.
Until the above capability is available, it should be as-
sumed that FSS/RSS ice would be released early and
pulled by aspiration into contact with the vehicle. FSS/
RSS ice thereby could be judged as a potential high risk to
flight safety. 119
The Committee has proceeded at some length to develop the con-
versations regarding ice that occurred on the morning of 28 Janu-
ary because they illuminate tendencies that are at variance with
the careful attention to safety the Nation has come to expect from
NASA. It is the Committee's view that the information developed
by the discussions between members of the ice team and those that
took place between Rockwell personnel on this subject should have
led to the conclusion that "FSS/RSS ice.., could be judged a po-
tential high risk to flight safety."
The Committee also notes that, in his presentation to the STS
Program Manager at the 9:00 a.m. Mission Management Team
meeting, the ice team leader apparently did not inform Mr. Aldrich
that he had earlier recommended that the launch be held due to
the ice in the pad area. There is no indication in testimony to the
Commission that Mr. Aldrich knew of the team leader's comment,
"Well, I'd say the only choice you got today is not to go." Had it
been presented to him in those terms, the later reluctance of Rock-
well to recommend a launch might have been sufficient to cause
Mr. Aldrich to recommend a launch scrub. In any event, the uncer-
tainly present in connection with this discussion should have been
sufficient to cause a delay in the lauch until the ice melted off the
gantry. The unknown risk represented by the ice would then have
been removed.
These conversations also indicate that the launch director was
not operating in a manner the Committee would expect. Given his
position as the senior official responsible for the preparation of the
Shuttle for launch, the Committee would expect a healthy skepti-
cism to underlie discussions he had with members of the launch
crew. In contrast to these expectations these tapes demonstrate
that the director was often reminding the engineering team about
time, and spent much time questioning the ice team leader's analy-
sis of the ice on the pad. There is also no indication that he took
steps to see that the pad escape system was ready for use by the
flight crew, if necessary.
t_. Ibid., p. 4.
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Finally,Congressman Ron Packard discussedwith witnessesat
the Committee's hearings on July 25, 1986,ways to improve con-
tractorparticipationinpreparingthe Shuttleforlaunch.
Mr. PACKARD. "Mr. Davis,you spoke regardingthe com-
panies having a voice in the decisionmaking,I presume,
afterthe FRRs--that two week interim between launch
and the readinessreview system.Do you believethat the
companies shouldhave more voice,lessvoice,or have they
had any voicein whether itsa go or no-go?"
Mr. DAVlS.I_° "Well,I can tellyou how itruns now. Up
to and includingthe L-minus-one day review,there'sno
doubt thatevery company has a very strongvoice;and,as
a matter of fact,at the L-minus-one rewew, they are re-
quiredtostand up and commit theirhardware as go or no-
go. And those are very uneq.uivocalcommitments, also.
After that time,then the rewews are more mission man-
agement meetings thatare held,and as you get down into
the countdown, itturns intomore ofa realtime pollingof
the people that are actuallycontrollingthe launch. In
thoselattermeetings,we are not,Iwould say,formallyin-
volved in those unless there is some problem with the
hardware itself,the External Tank hardware. We are in
FiringRoom 2 ina very significantpresence;we are aware
of what is happening in some of the consoles.We sit
behind them; we do not operate them. We are polledby
the Directorof Engineering prior to the launch actually
proceeding,so we are sort of polled in an informal
manner. We are not asked at any time afterthe L-minus-
one fora formalgo or no-go.Ibelieveitwould probablybe
appropriate,in terms of the Commission's desires,that
indeedwe be more formally involvedin the mission man-
agement meetings,and that at some appropriatelatetime
in the launch count--and I would leavethat to NASA to
decide--thatindeed the companies be asked to declarego
or no-go."
Mr. PACKARD. "A quick answer, Mr. Murphy. Do you
agree?"
Mr. MURPHY. 121"Yes,I agreewith what Rick has said.I
think thatwe have found out thatwe commit ourselves,I
guess,at 20 minutes and 9 minutes by the peoplewho are
manning the consoles,but itdoes not riseto the manage-
ment levelwhich itshould,in accordance with what Mr.
Davis has stated.We would likethatopportunityalso."
Mr. DAVIS."I'dliketomake one othercomment on that.
Ihave never feltthatifI needed tostopa launch,I could
not stopit.While I have not been asked fora positivego
or no-go,the abilityisalways there ifI decideno, to stop
the launch."
Mr. PACKARD. "Mr. Jeffs,do you feelthe same?"
12o Mr. Richard Davis, President, Martin Marietta Michoud Aerospace.
lZl Mr. George Murphy, Executive Vice President and General Manager, United Technologies
Booster Production Company.
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Mr. dEFIeS. 122 "Yes, I think the system should be formal-
ized more. We have great visibility as to the problems and
real times, being on the net and having CRTs [console dis-
plays] and people that are involved in depth, both at
Downey and at Houston, who support it, even though it's
at the Cape. But especially, when you have holds or delays
and what have you, it needs to be--again--upgraded in
real time with, I believe, the contractor's participation
with NASA management right up to the launch decision
point, and a little more formal process involved in the poll-
ing of the contractors."
Mr. PACKARD. "Mr. Murphy, if you'd had that system set
up prior to the accident, would the flight--would it have
still gone?"
Mr. MURPHY. "It would not have influenced our position
at all. Our hardware--we had stipulations on what we re-
quired on the hardware during the whole period. They
were met, and so we were in a 'go' posture as far as we
were concerned. It would not have affected our posi-
tion."123
The Committee believes that had the hardware contractors been
required by NASA to formally declare their flight readiness, it
would have removed the ambiguity in Rockwell's recommendations
involving the ice on the Fixed Service Structure.
B. LAUNCH REDLINES
Section VI.B.I.b. of this report describes the rationale for devel-
opment of certain criteria that serve to indicate when the Shuttle
system is experiencing problems during the countdown. On the
morning of January 27 and 28, during the countdown for STS 51-L,
the launch crew in the Firing Room wrote waivers to certain of
these criteria in order to permit launch of the Shuttle. Tapes and
transcripts from the Operational Intercommunication System dem-
onstrate that, at least in one instance, the technical analysis au-
thorizing the use of a backup procedure did not account for ambi-
ent temperatures below the limits specified for this procedure.
Thus, a waiver should not have been granted.
Revision C, Amendment 18 of the Launch Commit Criteria speci-
fied 45 degrees Fahrenheit as the minimum rodline temperature
for the External Tank nose cone. 124
But the ambient temperatures during the countdown were well
below that. On January 27, while the Shuttle waited for liftoff, con-
versations indicated that the nose cone heaters were not able to
maintain proper temperatures. Excepts from the transcript of this
discussion follow.
CF. Okay, go ahead, Fred.
FH. Okay, we may have a problem with propellant temperatures at that low
level. We're about three degrees away from red line and losing ground right now.
CF. Because of the amount of heat that the ground system's able to put in there?
_22 Mr. George Jeffs, President, North American Space Operations, Rockwell International.
Crate. H_., Transcript, July 25, 1986, pp. 71-74.
124NASA, 'Launch Commit Criteria and Background," Revision C, Amendment 18, JSC-
16007, December 1, 1982, p. 5.1-4. See Appendix VIII-K.
246
FH. That's right, they're giving us all they can right now .... 125
Dimzc-roR .... What do you guys feel about all the temperatures we saw today,
like nose cone, and all those? Think about that so we can talk about that a littlebit.
M. Yeah, that's another thing we're not happy about. We think we could probably
stillget by with it,but we're marginal.
UKN. You know, nose cone temp. Horace, is probably gonna be down in the low
20's,maybe even below 20.
M. I think the intertank we ought to be able to keep it up high enough .... 128
DIRECTOR .... Okay. You guys think that nose cone heater is putting out all we
gonna be able to get out of it?
UKN. Yep. You got it full blast. You're gonna be down 18-20" tomorrow on the
nose cone. And the waiver we wrote today said we're only good down to 28. That
was today's....
UKN. And Horace, the [intertank] heater was running full bore for quite awhile.
And we were running at least 10" below the set point temperature.
DxsJzc'roR.What about Fred Heinrich? He on 245?
FH. I'm here, Horace.
DIRIZCI_R. Fred, what do you think about the flow rate, I mean the RCS temps?
FH. Okay, Grady said they can crank that thing up locally and get outside the
OMRSD [Operations Maintenance Requirements and Specifications document] limit,
which may be enough, but we need to get started as soon as we get in there. Other-
wise, we can't get the tank warm enough. We're going to lose ground all throughut
the cryo load.
DmEc'roR. Okay.
FH. We're about 3" away from red line right now. We lost some during this cryo
load with full bore on the heaters.
DIRECTOR. Okay.
R. Horace, this is Robinson, We'll have to check with JSC about the upper limit
on this temperature.
Dmzc'ron. What do you mean?
R. --right now OMRSD isnot in--it may be something else other than Fred Hein-
rich'stemperatures.
DIRECTOR. Okay. Then you don't have no problem picking it up, though, that's the
only requirement we got, right?
R. That's affirmative.127
The waiver referred to in this conversation offered the following
technical rationale:"No visibleice buildup on the nose cap fairing
exitarea. Temperature is12 deg F below redline.''Iss
The waiver also read, "For STS-33 [51-L] Min LCC acceptable is
28 deg F (was 45 deg F). Ullage transducers are acceptable down to
28 deg F (was 40 deg F).Refer Note A, LCC 5.1-4."129
Note A read:
"The following purge temps are backup measurements.
GLOT 4104A PRI Nose Cone Heated Purge Temp.
GLOT 4604A SEC Nose Cone Heated Purge Temp." 1so
These refer to telemetry data channels. As the temperatures are
received via telemetry, they are to be interpreted by means of a
curve shown on page 5.1-4B. 131
It is important to note that Note A applies only if the ambient
temperature is between 40 and 99 degrees F. Otherwise, the redun-
dant procedure is invalid.
As for the effect of exceeding this redline, the launch commit cri-
teria reads:
,_50IS Channel 245, p. 217.
'26 Ibid., p. 218.
l z, OIS Channel 245, pp. 219-20.
izsSee Appendix VIII-L.
_9 Ibid.
so "Launch Commit Criteria and Background," p. 5.1-4.
L31 Ibid., p. 5.1-4B. See Appendix VIII-K.
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"The minimum redline was established for two reasons.
A. L02 ullage pressure transducers calibrated to 40 deg
F.
B. Avoid ice buildup at nose cone fairing exit."
"Consequences of exceeding redline;
1. Ice build up and possible impact to Orbiter.
2. Inaccurate ullage pressure readings." 132
Engineering support communications continued with the follow-
ing:
M. Horace, 245.
D_P_CrOR. Yeah, go ahead.
M. Okay, one other thing's been brought to my attention. The, the IX)X, the LOX
ullage pressure transducers are calibrated to a minimum of 40 degrees and maxi-
mum of 140, which is what sets our minimum in the nose cone. Below that, we may
get some variations in reading.
FH. No, that's not true, Mark.
M. Well, okay.
FH. (garbled) see I got some measure readings here from Mark was ....
M. That's what's on the LCAJ backup page.
UKN. Read the LCC backup page on the lower limit.
M. It says 40 degrees.
FH. It says for reasons of ice and frost at that the exit on the fairing.
M. Yeah.
MAC. Test on 245. (garbled)... 245.
DIRECTOR. Go ahead, Mac.
MAC. Hey, are you guys reading this L(_ that the consequences of exceeding the
nose cone temp redline? The sheet we have over here says that we will get inaccu-
rate ullage pressure readings.
Dm_roR. Okay, Mac, we understand, thank you.133
On the morning of January 28, the following discussions between
engineering support personnel were also directed toward waiving
the launch commit criteria on the External Tank nose cone.
UKN. Dave, they were, of course, expecting to violate those ET nose cone purge
temps _ again. It's 20 degrees colder today than it was yesterday.
D. Well, I guess we'll be going down the line producing a waiver to the same
effect that we produced yesterday.
UKN. How did we just define it yesterday for 51L? Or for this attempt for 51L?
D. Copy your whole question. Say again?
UNK. I thought we _ust annotated it yesterday as for 51L only.
D. That may be it, I iI check the waiver log ....
UNK. Dave? 161.
D. Go ahead.
UNK. Yeah, it is effectively 51L, I think we are in good shape.
D. OK. TM
Later on the morning of the 28th, the following discussion oc-
curred:
D. FR[Firing Room] 2, this is FR[Firing Room] 1.
UKN. Yeah Chris.
D. This is Dan. We need to send a waiver over for signatures. We're right now
showing nose cone gas temps that we were discussing yesterday are down in the 12-
16 degree range and the waiver that we wrote yesterday for 51L only gives us allow-
ance down to 28 degrees F.
UKN. Yeah, we'll have to rewrite that waiver.
D. OK. You don't think we'll have any trouble getting that signed?
UKN. No, as long as our pressure transducers are OK.
1as Ibid., p. 5.1-4.
13a OIS Channel 245, pp. 220-21.
za4OIS Channel 161, p. 289. Channel 161 is identified as an Engineering channel used for
troubleshooting and systems integration.
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D. OK. What number would you like to use on that Horace? is_
Shortly after this conversation concludes, the discussion on pre-
paring the ET nose cone temperature waiver continued. Told
"[W]e're right now sitting at 10 [degrees]" KSC's Director of Engi-
neering said:
DIRzc'roR. Let's hold on a minute and then we'll write the waiver, we'll probably
wanna go below 10.
UKN. Yeah, we may just want to say no low and put a note on there that based
on the pressure transducers.
Director. OK, so you want us to stand by and wait on that?
UNK. Yeah.
DIREC'roR. OK. We'll be waiting. _38
If engineers intended to apply the same rationale for waivers as
that used on Janury 27, the rationale is invalid. Ambient tempera-
tures were well below the 40 degree limit necessary for a valid
backup procedure. Therefore, the backup procedure should not
have been employed.
Later, in a discussion between the Launch Director and the Di-
rector of Engineering regarding countdown problems, the following
discussion about the temperature waiver took place.
LD. OK. I understand we're in the process of writing a new waiver with a lower
limit of 10?
DIRI_C'rOR.We're stilllooking. We'll give you a low limit.
LD. What are they running today?
DIRECTOR. It'sbeen down as low as 10 basically.
LD. Wow! 137
It was in a subsequent discussion between the same principals
that the new limit was established. Their conversation, however,
does not reflect that the limit was chosen by rigorous technical
analysis.
LD. We have nothing else, Horace, not unless you guys are working something.
DIRZC'rOR. No, just the ice.
LD. OK. The only outstanding item we have right now is the one waiver on the
cone temps.
DiR_c'roe. OK. It looks like we probably could say about 10" and be OK on that
one.
LD. OK. We'll use 10 ° then.
DIRF,Cq_R. OK. Ias
Completing preparations of the waiver, the Director had the fol-
lowing conversation with one of the technicians.
DIRECTOR. OK, Jackie, in writing this waiver for nose cone temps we want to put
the words on here saying that we can use the ullage transducer as an alternative
way of determine redline, but we believe that yesterday Warren Wiley was saying
that they had looked at those and they're good down to approximately 11 degrees
and we wanted to verify that.
J. I think they did to 10 degrees.
DIRECTOR. 10?
J. Yeah.
Dmzc'roR. The ullage transducers.
J. OK. Thank you, Horace. ls_
_sa Ibid., p. 296.
ss Ibid., p. 297.
as7 Ibid., p. 299.
tssIbid., p. 302.
_s, Ibid., p. 305.
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There is no documentation to describe the method by which the
ullage pressure transducers were qualified to "10 degrees." No al-
ternative analysis is described on the launch commit criteria to
sup.port use of this low temperature as a rationale for approving a
waiver.
This example indicates that NASA personnel do not necessarily
employ a sufficiently rigorous engineering analysis to the waiver of
launch commit criteria during countdown. There also appears to
have been some confusion as to the effect of exceeding the redline
temperature. Ullage pressure readings may be critical parameters
if fed to the Main Engine controllers during flight. According to
NASA:
Following engine ignition at about T-4 seconds, the
ullage pressure is supplemented using propellant gases va-
porized in the engine heat exchangers and routed to the
two ET propellant tanks. The tank pressure is maintained
based on data inputs from ullage pressure sensors in each
tank to control valves in the Orbiter. A combination of
ullage and propellant pressure provides the necessary net
positive suction pressure to start the engines. The net posi-
tive suction is the pressure needed at the main engine
pump inlets to cause the pumps to work properly. The
pumps, in turn, supply high-pressure liquid oxygen and
liquid hydrogen to the thrust chamber. Acceleration pres-
sure is added for operation. Fuel is forced to the engines
primarily by tank pressures and, to a lesser degree, by
gravity. 14o
Inaccurate readings from these sensors might cause the engines
to operate improperly.
Also, according to the launch commit criteria, violations of
launch redlines may also have occurred on the Auxiliary Power
Unit (APU) gearbox lube oil (minimum redline temperature 42 deg
F), and the fuel test lines (minimum temperature 41 deg F), if in
fact the actual temperature were lower than minimum. 14_
There was also no mention of the 34.2 deg F minimum redline
temperature for the SRB recovery batteries or what the tempera-
ture of the batteries was at launch. 142
Under "Remarks," this criterion states, "Violation of this redline
shall require an assessment to determine if a hazard exists which
jeopardizes the Shuttle .... ,, :4s
Mr. Mulloy testified before the Commission that:
Mr. MULLOY. "I had a discussion on my SRB loop with
the SRB people dealing with the question of a 24-hour
turnaround to attempt to launch again at 9:38 on the 28th
and the effect that the predicted cold temperatures for the
night of the 27th might have on that.
The input was received back both to Mr. Reinartz and
myself that we were looking at the Launch Commit Crite-
_4o NASA, "Space Shuttle News Reference," 1981, p. 2-40.
14_ "Lauch Commit Criteria and Background," Amendment 20, p. G-23.
_,2 Ibid., p. G-1
14s Ibid.
54-420 0 - 86 - 9
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ria relativeto temperatures.Itwas feltthere was a need
to look at the recoverybatterytemperatures that are in
the forward skirtof the SRB and the fuelservicemodule
temperaturesthat are in the fuelservicemodules forthe
thrustvectorcontrolsystem in the aftskirtof the solid
rocket booster.
The input received back by me was that they did not
feel that would be of any concern. They were going to con-
tinue to look at it, and if any concern arose they would let
me know.
I went to the 2:00 Mission Management Team and re-
ported that there were no constraints to the solid rocket
booster for a 24-hour turnaround, that we had taken a look
at the recovery battery temperatures and the fuel service
module. We did not feel at this time that there would be
any Launch Commit Criteria for the low temperature
limits that were established for those systems, but that we
were continuing to assess that; should anything change in
that regard, I would so report that."
Chairman ROGERS. "You referred to the Launch Commit
Criteria. What were they as far as you knew in terms of
weather conditions?Any?"
Mr. MULLOY. "In terms ofweather conditions,yes,sir,I'm
aware that there is a Launch Commit Criteriafor the
system forweather.There are a number offactorsin that
Launch Commit Criteria.One of them is the ambient
temperature,which isestablishedat 31 degrees.
Another isthe sea stateand winds in the SRB recovery
area.Another isthe croes-windsat the return to landing
siterunway at Kennedy Space Center. Another is the
trans-Atlanticlandingsiteweather, and another issevere
weather, which isrelatedto lightningand thunderstorms
inthe area."
Chairman ROG_.ms."And when you say there were no
constraintsin the 2:00meeting,does thatmean thatas far
as you could see there were no problems in thoseareas?"
Mr. MULLOY. "No, sir,I did not evaluatethoseareas of
the Launch Commit Criteria.What I was lookingat was
the specificLaunch Commit Criteriaitems thatare on the
solidrocketboosterand the effectthat the low tempera-
tureswould have on that.
I would expect Mr. Aldrich would normally make the
judgements on, and his people at the Johnson Space
Center, would make the judgements on crosswinds and
transAtlanticweather and the general ambient environ-
ment forlaunch."144
While there is no reason to believe that these waivers directly
contributed to the cause of the accident, the low temperatures
during the night of the 27th and morning of the 28th most prob-
ably did.Committee stafflearned in discussionswith Thiokol per-
,.4 Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, pp. 827-28.
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sonne1145 that liquid hydrogen apparently remained in the Exter-
nal Tank throughout the night of January 27. This most likely
played a role in the joint seal failure, since it permitted heat trans-
fer through the ET/SRB aft attachment strut throughout the
night. Of equal interest, however, is the fact that ET requires an
eight-hour recovery period between tanking cycles, measured from
the time the hydrogen tank low-level sensors are dry. _4s
If the hydrogen tank was never emptied during the turnaround
procedure, this would represent a violation of those criteria. Had
the criteria been observed, STS-51L would have required an after-
noon window on January 28, or it might have been necessary to at-
tempt the launch on January 29. This has not been independently
confirmed, however.
,4. _ with Carv_ Kennedy, Thiekol Wmateh Operatice_ Brigham City, Utah, Sep-
tember 4, 1986. Genend Kutyna also noted this in the C_mmisslon's hem.ing on February 14.
1986 (I_ Commission Report, Volume IV, p. 660).
14, OIS Channel 245, p. 218.

IX. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS
AA-SF--Associate Administrator for Space Flight.
AFPRO--Air Force Plant Representative Office.
APU--Auxiliary Power Unit.
BOC--Base Operations Contractor.
BTU--British Thermal Unit.
CAR--Configuration Acceptance Review.
CDR--Commander.
CDR--Critical Design Review.
CIL--Critical Items List.
CoFR--Certification of Flight Readiness.
CPIF--Cost-plus, Incentive-fee.
CTS--C_dl-to-stations.
DAR--Deviation Approval Request.
DCAS--Defense Contract Administration Service.
DCR--Design Certification Review.
DFRF--Dryden Flight Research Facility.
DR--Discrepancy Report.
EG&O--Edgerton, Germeshausen and Grier.
ESMC--Eastern Space and Missile Center.
EST--Eastern Standard Time.
ET--External Tank.
FEAT--Flight Element Assignment Table.
FIX)--Flight Dynamics Officer.
FMEA_Failure Modes and Effects Analyses.
FRR--Flight Readiness Review.
FSS--Fixed Service Structure.
COX--Gaseous oxygen.
GSE--Ground Support Equipment.
HA_He_rd Analyses.
HDP--Holddown Posts.
I_Impact Limit Line.
IPR_Interim Problem Report.
IR--Infra-red.
IUS--Inertial Upper Stage.
JSC--Johnson Space Center.
KSC--Kennedy Space Center.
ksi--thousands of pounds per square inch.
_Launch Control Center.
LFC--Left Forward Center.
L/H--Left Hand.
LOS--Loss of signal.
IX)X--Liquid oxygen.
LPS--Launch Processing System.
LRU--Line Replaceable Unit.
MEOP--Maximum Expected Operating Pressure.
MER--Mission Evaluation Room.
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MLP--Mobile Launch Platform.
MMT--Mission Management Team.
MRB--Material Review Board.
ms--millisecond.
MSFC--Marshall Space Flight Center.
MST--Mountain Standard Time.
NASA--National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
NRC--National Research Council.
NRP--National Resource Protection.
NSTS--National Space Transportation System.
NTD--NASA Test Director.
OASCB--Orbiter Avionics Software Control Board.
OIS--Operational Intercom System.
OM--Operations Manual.
OMI--Operations Maintenance Instruction.
OMP--Operations and Maintenance Plan.
OMRSD--Operations Maintenance Requirements Specification
Document.
OMS--Orbiter Maneuvering System.
OPF--Orbiter Processing Facility.
PAC--Problem Assessment Center.
PAS--Problem Assessment System.
PDR--Preliminary Design Review.
PGHM--Payload Ground Handling Mechanism.
PR--Problem Report.
PRCBD--Program Requirement Change Board Directive.
psig--pounds per square inch gage.
PSP--Processing Support Plan.
QC-Quality Control.
RCS--Reaction Control System.
R.F.--Radio Frequency.
RPSF--Rotation, Processing and Surge Facility.
RSO--Range Safety Officer.
RSS--Range Safety System.
RSS--Rotating Service Structure.
RTLS--Return to Launch Site.
SCA--Shuttle Carrier Aircraft.
SPC--Shuttle Processing Contractor.
SRB--Solid Rocket Booster.
SRM--Solid Rocket Motor.
SR&QA--Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance.
SSME--Space Shuttle Main Engine.
STS--Space Transportation System.
TBD--to be determined.
TDRS--Tracking and Data Relay Satellite.
TM--Telemetry.
TSR--Technical Status Review.
TVC--Thrust Vector Control.
VAB--Vehicle Assembly Building.
VPF--Vertical Processing Facility.
WAD--Work Authorization Document.
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THIOKOL CHEMICAL CORPORATION
kol presented an approach to the SRM Program which
r!y focused on maximum utilization of existing facilities
low early year funding. In-house production effort .
d be accomplished in the Wasatch Division, .Utah facially.
Increment 71 _, production would be accomplished by acquisiti_
of portion of the adjacent Air Force Plant 78 as Air Force
re_,,irements phased out. AP requirements would be met by
increasing the capability of existin_ facilities in nearby
Henderson, Nevada. Use of an existing, skilled, stable work
force in a low labor rate area would minim/ze new hires and
provide low labor costs. Thioko1's decision to fabricate
nozzles in-house provided cost savings and good control over
this extremely critical component: however, the Board con-
cluded that this introduced same early risk because of lack
of experience in fabricating nozzles of this size. Facility
location resulted in high transportation cost of the SRM's:
however, these costs were more than offset by low facility
investments. The Thiokol proposal received the second
highest overall Mission Suitability score by _he SEB, being
tied with UTC. The SEB ranked Thiokol fourth under the
Desiqn, Development and Verification Factor, second um.der the
Manufact_%ring, Refurbishment and Product Sup_port Factor and
first under the Management Factor.
Desiqn, Development and verification
The Thiokol case desig_ met the general SRM requirements"
however, the cylindrical segment was close to the upper limits
of size capability of the case fabricanor. The nozzle design
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included ablative materials not currently developed or
characterized. This offered potential savings in program.
cost, but with attendant technical and program risk. An
expanded characterization and development program would be
required. The thickness of the nozzle material was insufficient
to meet required safety factors and thus degraded reliability.
The amount of material required to correct the deficiency was ....
substauntial and the deficiency Could require a redesign of
the metal portions as well as the ablative portions. The
design was complex and wotlld contribute to diffic,_Ity in
manufacturing. The Thiokol motor case joints utilized dual
O-rings and test ports between seals, enabling a simple
leak check without pressurizing the entire motor. This inno-
vative design feature increased reliability and decreased
operations at the launch site, indicating good attention to
low cost DDT&E and production. The thickness of the internal
insulation in the case aft dome was marginal and created a
technical risk.
Thiokol provided cumprehensive test plans and development
verification objectives: however, they proposed to verify
propellant burning characteristics by testing four to six
full scale mixes which was excessive, and could be reduced
by establishing correlations with smaller mix size data during
DDT&E. Also, Thiokol proposed to hydroburst two motor case
assembly specimens, whereas one test would be sufficient.
Manufacturinqf Refurbishment and Product Support
Thiokol had extensive processing experience with their proposed
propellant formulation, having processed over 150 million
pounds of this general type of propellant. Thiokol's major
weakness in this area of evaluation was in the area of case
fabrication. The segment fabricator would be unable to
fabricate the case segments strengthened with stiffening rings
as proposed by Thiokol for alternate water ent.-y load
conditions, if required. This would probably require a case
and grain redesign. _niokol's manufacturing approach provided
a good mechanized method of installing insulation, coupled
with an innovative method of preparing the insulation surface
for the liner by peeling off a dacron cloth from the inner
surface of the insulation. A minor weakness in the manu-
facturing approach was the decision to fabricate nozzles
in-housedue to Thiokol's lack of experience in fabricating
nozzles of this "size.
Thiokziproposed uc utilize existing facilities which, wi_h
_.incr modifications, were totally adequate for all three
incr_-ments. The one exception to this was a failure to meet
Quantity Distance safety requirements between casting pits
for Increment ____!, however, there are ways to adequately
cure _his problem. _"_iokoi maximized the refurbishment cf
components and t_he poten_ia! cost savings provided by_ ref'/rbish- -
mont. Another leas significant strengt-h was the enhanc_nent
of segraent assembly provided by three alignment pins thereby.
reducing _ne assembly hours on the launch pad. Thiokol
failed to provide enough new cases and nozzles to meet the
launch schedule. Eight additional cases and nozzles would be
recfaired to provide assurance that launch dates could be met.
Manac_ment
Thickcl structured _ne development program so that all major
costs were deferred to the latest practicable date. This
resulted in low early year funding, which is a key program
cbjec-ive. The availability of an operating plant, with
ample experienced personnel and a proven organization which
could be phased to the SRM effort with minimum modification
added considerable maturity and confidence and proved to be
cost effective. The Board considered this to be a major
strength for all t_hree increments. A strong matrix manage-
ment was evident and key line organization supervisors were
experienced and had worked together as a team on many
successful development and production programs such as
Minute__an and Poseidon. Strong management participation and
visibility in variance analysis was another strong feature
as was the approach to corrective actions and their effect on
estimate-to-complete. Procurement Management was thoro_h
and well planned. $RM commodity purchases would be consoli-
dated wizln t_hat of other programs at Wasatc_h, which should
result in lower cost. The Procurement of major items was
well matched to overall SRM schedule recfairements. Thiokol
proposed a strong Configuration Management System which
included thorough identification and traceability during
DDT&E, production and refu/bishment. The tentative decision
to make the molded and tape wrapped nozzle in-house was
considered a strength in this area. It would contribute
to the low cost-per-flight goal by using available resources,
avoiding subcontract fees, lowering overhead rates, and taking
advantage of lower cost labor. The inherent risk management
aspects also were considered.
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--..T°the area of Key. Personnel, the proposed Program. _ir___._=__
was c3nsidered exceptionally strong and had successfui!,:-
perfo._ned as a Projec_ Manager on other ma3cr progr_.s. He
is widely .known for his excellent performance. The proposed
Deputy Program Director would also be the Chief Projecu
Engineer. He had important and successful engineering
management roles in previous major motor prmgrams and has
--an ex_ellen_ rep_tat-ion in the trade. -..........
A!_hough adequately qualified for their proposed assi.._Tunents,
the proposed Functional Managers and their Team Members in
the Project Organization did not reflect the depth of experi-
ence available in the Functional Departments of the -"_..iokol
matrix type organization and had not previously performed
as a team. This was not considered a significant we_ness
_¢ _--he Board because of the strong exp_erienced matrix
organization at Thiokol.
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There have been incidents on SIN flLsht and static test asters
vhsre a prLuary o-rio 8 has been sliJhtly charred by hot 8soon which
penetrated thronsb the vacuum putty harrier. Notate Jr!anted thus far
ere STS-2A eft field Joint, _ hassle Joint, STS-IIA forvard field
Joint, STS-21B noszle Joint, and STS-13A hassle Joint. Th4s projrum
plan v111 result Ln de!thin 8 the solution to this o-tinS char.
2.00SJ][CYZVE
The prolren obJectiven ors to systematically isolate the problem
and to ella/nets dam_e to S_ seals.
3.0 APPROACH
The proJrms spproech vLll consist of an'tlysls, 8ubecole (hot)
taste, full-scale Joint tests, and final verification in motor static
test ins.
The analysis vSl/ ottesqpt to identify the cause of o-tinS erosion,
its acceptability, and Justification. It vilI identify specific dastsu
or process chanson vhlch rill eliminate further s-fLu8 cherries.
Studies rill be per!stood shov£n 8 the effects of emturtol variation
characteristics, putty letup coal/Burst/arts, and trash aster/ale versus
environmentally ezposed putty. In conjunction vLth these anaZysen, a
thoronsh study rill be per!stied on entert41 from altot_tte sources.
TootLe| rill include laboretot 7 notarial characterisation, snail
astor bet tests sisnlet!n S effects on cavity volm variations, flog
patterns, exposure of o-rio 8 sod lubrication effects. The bern t 4,.- of
s_t12 hot asters rill be in the ran|e of 3 - 30 seconds depeadLn 8 ou the
results o_ previous small scale smear test results. Hottom Thiekol also
rscoumauds that actual full-scale seSment Joint tests be used to
evaluate pressurization effects on putty layup arransements sad flay
chooses due to final sssembl? of the Joints. It Is further suJSosted
that • 8roup of experienced people free HSFC and NT! be enlectud to
vttnass the entire Joint preparation, assembly, leek tootleS, and
poet!its teerdmm it ES¢ and NTI/Claerftsld facilities. This team vLll
also rsvlev all analyses, leberstory tests, subscale hot tests odd
Support team ravLevs.
aCYHDIOW
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3. ! Annlyeis
The follovin 8 tests shell be perforued on the vacuul putty 8s •
minima. Zf fur'_hor tootin$ Is required, Lt ahall be purfonmd end
docmJented. Some of the tests ore curremtly heLq perfot_od oa the
exiotin 8 putty, bat oru listed to aenuru that presently JvoilabXe data
ere ummotimed in the enaui_ report. Thus taste vill hove to be
repeated ou say _ttmtioI _ putty. (See sectioa 3.1.5)
3.1. l Chemical Cou_sitioa
/m msalysio viii he purfot_td on the putt 7 to determine solids
content, onbestos fiber (or other filler) couteatj chromite coatemt,
binder umkeup, and oU other applicable toots described in STI_-2847,
Putty, Vacuum Sea1.
3. I. 2 Physical Proportion
Tents ah_Tl be devolopud and coeducte4 to determine adhesive
screasth of the putty (tack/aces), attain capubility, comprouibiltty,
I_d resistance to heat, erosion, mad pressure sho_k (at 8101 tlniticm).
3.1.2.1 tnvir_tol F.ffOCtl
The putty viii be ccmditioned in controlled tespucaturo end
hmttdity ensvirouennts, i_ludin8 smbieut conditJm at Utah and Florida,
tbou tooted for all pbTolrAl properties mad sppruprLoto cbem_c_l
properties ouch on non-volAtile co_tomt and sorer 8olubilitT.
3.1.3 _ttu8
An osin 8 pruBrsn viii be conducted ms putty In Utah end /loride.
The prosrsu should m for five years with particular eUl_to duriu 8
the first year ot 3, 6, 9, mad 12 no, the. Chemical and physical toots
shall be performed dt each 8tqe of esiq. The putty viii oleo be
checked fur ahrtn_tp end silicone utsrotion frmn the papur beckln8 used
ss • separator in the roll form.
3. l.h CoapetihlXity of Putty Vlth Other Hateriolo
The putty 1rill be tooted to dotormiuo effects of toe -dltin8 with
C_mo¢o HD-2 8reuse0 cured RBE rubber, end beth freah end ooI_ter. Xf
the --retOols ruoct, properties of the ruo_ltsnt utoriol viii be
catobliohed. Tests shell o18o deteusino vhether the reenltout ooterial
10 corrosive to the _ coos.
,,
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3.1.5 Second Semi,co for Putty
k second (or third) source of pert7 18 desirable to l_revout further
supply problems, _hlch could seriously/_psct the Space Shuttle prosrsm.
A develop-ant prosrms _11 be implmsented to test 81terutu putty
csedid•tes per the precodin 8 requireuente as a minims, kbsea18 ftrll8
tests shall use the sltsrutu petty to establish coufidouc8 to IMtell
the new putty tu IeWC-SIM static firth 8 IM-6 for putty quallficatiou.
There ere three alternate source cmsdid•tse at this t/am: Plastic
Sealer 579.6 free Imnont Corporation of GeorJutM, 0uturio, vLth
asbestos end Plastic Seals.- $79.6 fro.. Im_nt Curl)oration, St. Louis,
vtthout ubestos General Sselsmts is developln 8 a hlsh temper•Cure
putty that rill •18o be screened.
3.1.6 Vitou Characteristics
To •Ld the accuracy of the hot ins Jut analysis, tests vL11 he run
to determine the trosiou rate of Vires. These data, aloe 8 _th result8
from other tests described in this plan, rill be used vhen the 8ulTsis
is redone.
3.2 Sobsc•le Firing Tests
3.2.1 Flve Inch CP Notor
To verlfy that hot 888 Jets throush the putty openieq_e is correct,
tests rill be conducted v_tch 1educe a Is• Jet Lmptns_c on 8n o-rln 8
using five Inch CF aurora •s test bode. Under ti,htly controlled
conditions (environmental and umchentcal), this d•t8 vtll ha assessed to
sore fully understand vhat ls hsppenln 8 in the SI_ application.
If a sesnin8ful sub'tale Joint test can be devised vith putty in
it, it rill also be perfot_sed usln| the five Inch CP 8s the hot 888
source.
3.2.2 40 Lb. Char Hotor
Depending on the results of the five inch CP hot test/ha, it may ha
desirable to include larger scale Cost motors h•vtn, putty installed.
Horto_ Thlokol is lnvnstllstin8 the 40 lb. char motors. If requited.
such tests shall be perforued to further verify the cheese in petty
lsyup, type, and/or other filler --teri•le.
3.3 Full-Scale Joint Tests
Tests shell be performed usin 8 • full-scale SI_4 field Joint to
verify the subscsle results of the candidate putty 18yup coufiJurstions
as affected by the actual Joist essmsbly and leak test procedures. The
"short stack" hardvere ls preferred for use instead of SI_ case onSaoets
for ease of ssseubly and inspection. The fonoviq questions shall be
snevered as mTnim,]._ requlresents of this test sequence:
- 1nay ,s leiq NO T Lm IA _r_/1 ¥OL
4
pom_ v¢ No. _
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a. What is post assembly preeaure In the cavity b,t_ten the
putty and the primary o-ring?
b. Whet £8 the atoimmpreesure required to blow through the
putty?
c. What is the uaxlmumaccepteble leakage rate at 200 pslgvhich
meets the SO pat8 leak test criterion?
d. Roy is o-ring seating affected by pressur* and t4--?
e. What is the proper amount of HD-2 |rease to be applied to
the Joint metal curface8 tontniuise the free volumebet_een
the vacuum putty and the prtmez_ o-ring?
f. What is the effect of cue eccentricity durln8 eeKment umtiu8
on the flov of vacuum putty in the Joint?
g. Whet dimenaioa and vaisht controlm are required to assure
the vacuum putty layup is consistent and adequate?
Potential fixes viii be investigated such 8a £nducin$ paths throqh
the vacuum putty at regular circumferential intervals to prevent
localised o-rinK damage caused by smell, 8uperaouic Sam Jets. The
concept of 8 soft rubber barrier be_en the putty sod primary o-ring
viii also be investigated. In addition, leak check procedures,
particularly those employing the use of a flow water, will be ex4mined
vith acceptable and non-acceptable (leaking) o-rings. In all instances
the behavior of the putty shell be closely monitored.
Results of the above described tests will be extrapolated to the
nozzle to case Joint and tests using a f_ll-ecale noazle fixed housing
Imd eft dome will be conducted, if necessary, to verify the adequacy of
any change resulting from the field Joint tests.
A plan, Tk'R-13983, has been prepared to check the putty
configuration of the igniter to came Joint. These tests vllI also be
conducted and the results rill be s'mariaed in the final report.
3.h Full-Scale Static Test
All potential design changes rill be adequately teated on the
subscale level and shall be incorporated into the S_-FMC static firing
I_-6 for qualification. A critical poatfire inspection will be
performed on the new configuration an veil as the baeelinsd portlomm of
the DH-6 Joints.
An analysis viii be performed to assess the results of the Fat-SaM
field Joints as they compare to the HPN-SRN field Joint. The field
Joints ere 8hmm In figures i and 2 for HPN-SI_ and FMC-SRM,
respectively.
_-14359
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3.5 lavLev nd Wetness Team
A te_isv and vttuees team abe11 be established coaslstinj of
experienced njinesre from Norton Thiokol ald Ik_ to iuspect sad assess
aU test results, Anmmlous conditions af Joints from flmm motors
shall be critically imq_etod Ir7 usmbore of this tin. The tolm viii
determine tNo course of 8ctiou to be talum as intermediate and final
results boc_s available.
4.0
The attached schoduls reflKts the tin available to complete the
testis 8 and qualification of the pracedlaj itmus.
5.0
• comprehensive report shall he preJMJrod by EnSiaeerln8 documtiuj
the testa and results. Yea otisisMsl droll be released otter the
develop_m¢ testins, but prior to me-6. A rovlalAm shall he released
sitar _ and s second .and final revision shall be puhltshed after the
ssin8 prosram.
_VJJlON m NO. qmLIB ILttt |
_C J PAN
PO4nM Y¢ ms. _0
aI'
_.°
267
I
\El
m
OD
e_
mii.
I '0
II, ..,
I,i
IL "
Z _
|
E
II
268
!
!
;ii
J
!
ii
I
269
f
II
i
2'71
272
_bl_Nl_/WA JL4FCNOhqlO_
4 m OPwmMmcomm_
DISTRIIDUTIG/I
.Am
J. C. EilnLnster
A. J. _ld
1. t. Iboltn8
L. G. II_Lley
H. B. Nclmtosh
J. I. IDvoll
|. G. Ib_sell
3. I. Jailor
7. C. Srssfield
|. C. |r/_ton
P, C. Petty
It. H. ktsJoly
S. B. Pmldleto.
D. J. Ilam_
L. 18. hyer
K. |. kkbardt
|. C, kuker
I[. n. Mollemhaupt
G. G. GOZlMn
P. $. Shadleokey
A. It. Ttwqpeon
E. D. lm
D. I. Devto
e. C. luuell
P. II. kTee
S. II. Card811
W. |. Johnson
D. H, 1%11met
J, M. Galbtllth
D. H. Puskedta
A. J. |urke
J. Trenkle
W. Coiner
7. W. Call
x. |. Parker
D. H. Ilarper
V. L, tlmskl_
G. H. Schiek
lllV lJ lilM
.._OJUI'_'t"T
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
I
I
1
1
1
1
i
1
1
I
l
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
25
1
1
1
1
NAIL ST(It
ZOO
ZOO
|ll
Eli
I03
ZI2
Ill
El2
I11
250
250
250
281
280
281
281
281
281
281
281
287
243
243
2_D
240
24_
$74
$76
9131
913|
168
168
168
El4
221
221
_. Tqllt-1635| Ivm.
tmw I_ ?
293
V-C
5_lace AOm,r'+st'at,or
Oeoqle ¢+ m,ll_ W l=141m ¢=_
Marsl_alq S_ice l:I_r+t Ce_t(_' A£at_+'_ll
358+2
RUkRA
• EP2S (84-49) Nay 23. 1984
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
EEl 1/Mr. PIoPton
EP25/Nr. Hiller
Evaluation of 1"WR-14359_ "Prolram Plan, Protection of Space
Shuttle S_ Primary _tor Seals"
The subject Program Plan has been evaluated as requested and the followin K
comlents are Sutlaltted for your c_lsideration:
a. PIKe 3, ParaKraph 3.1.2, Phlraloel I'1_llertlel- This ProKram Plan
mentions compressibility testln K Of the zinc chromite putty, hOwever no
laboratory tests are proposed which will determine the extrusion
characteristics (disPlacement in a free volume under compression load) of
various candidates. This should be accomplished to provide a better
understanding as to why various types of putty exhibit unlike extrusion
patterns with identical layups.
b. Page _, Paragraph 3.1.5, Seeolwl _Jroe for Putty - A second source
for zinc chromate putty is desired and needed, but due to the poor
performance of the Randolph putty, a more immediate need exists for
development of a replacement for the present Randolph potty. Recommendatlc_
to this effect was made in Memorandum EP2_ (8_-35)-
c. Page _, ParaKraph 3.2.2, #_0-_ _ _to¢ - The _O-pound char
motor ShOuld be made a definite part of the Test ProKram. It is vital that
the test article be capable of simulating the total joint configuration as
close as possible, which includes zinc chromate potty. Provisi_ns for the
instal! _tion of the putty toKlther with extended burn time and increased
vo'.ume._ -,pat!lilies are achievable with the lar|er motor and should be
included in the total pro6ram.
d. FaKe 5, Paralraph 3-3, Full-Scale Joint Tests, Reference: first
paraKrlph fol]owln$ "G". Please explain how potential fixes such as
inducln| piths throuth the putty at reKular circumferential intervals and
use of a soft rubber barrier between the putty and primary O-tin 8 will be
verified by hot firir_ prior to installation on [_q-6.
e. Pa4e 5, ParaKraph 3-3, 1_ll-3oale Joist Tilts, Reference: Second
paragraph following "i". Tee Test Plan should spotty a hrd requirement to
verify all potential nozzle/aft does Joint ohanles on t_Jll-scale hardware.
The case joint and nozzle joint confl&uratlon differences warrant separate
full-scale nozzle/aft seKment asl4mbly tests.
2S
0
N
2?4
r. C_meg'al - Design ehanles to the insulation interfaces whi_'h will
prevent delredatlOn or the therma2 barrier due to joint roundin_ under
pressure sl_ould be lnvestl(atqK_ as a part of this effort. The present
deSll_n of the case _(11nt and nozzle Interfaces where the zinc chromate putty
is installed are oriented such that the JOint lape can vary t'ron minimum to
maximum dimensions aro_m the oireumt'erence durin I Ismbly due to out of
tO, heSS and eccentricity. 11_is oof_Jltlon wl_ich 1$ preset to some delree
durln 6 every Joint assen51y operation, luarantses that SOwe, or a]alost all
of the zinc chromate putty in certain areas will be wip_ orr when the
matin 6 surfaces move parallel to each other durin6 metini. 11_1s results in
open Insulation laps with insutticient zinc chromate putty durin i motor
operation because the joints tend to become round and concentric when the
ease is presssurlzed lnteroally.
Questions _oncernin 8 this memorandum should be referred to _a-. William L.
Ray, 3-3809.
, John Q. Hiller
._itf, Solid It>tor Branch
v - C_:
EA01/it'. Hardy
EEOt/[_'. Llttles
5A41/Hr. Nulloy
5A_2/Hr. tier
Sa_./llr. I_Intosh
rf3 l/It'. Co4tes
rrll/Mr. ,k:mes
EPO1/Hr. MoCool
1_21/1_. MoCart y
EP25/Pt-. Povers
[P25/lt". Ray
n
0
N
P
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*'_'_ EP2S (83-119) Oecmb_ 6, 1M3
TO:
Fl_M:
SUBJ(CT:
EESI/Nr. Morton
(P2S/Mr. ml 1 er
Request for Tests by the Contrector to Obtain Spice Shuttle Sm
Clevis Joint, Fixed Housing/Aft Segment Joint and Igniter Mopterl
For_rd Segment Joint Lesk Check OIto
It ts requested that j_u take _resl action to assure thot the follwtng tests
ire performed in s timely nmnMr by the contractor, Norton/Thtokol, on S_
Halrdvarl:
s. Case Clevis Joint Ouoi O-Ring Sesl Lik Oetnctton - I_rfom tests v|th
t'ull scale clevts Joint hardware (short Joints) to obtain the @011eYing data "
as • mlnlmum:
(1) Post assembly pressure In the zinc chromate sealant covtty.
(2) Minimum end esxtmum volume of the zinc chr_nato silent cavity,
post essmbly.
(3) Mtntmum pressure required to effect zinc chromate silent blov
through.
(4) 81Hdback capabtlSty of the primary sesl (from silent cavity to
cavity between the primary and secondary silo) it i variety of pressure values
rangtng from 10 pslg up to e value vhlch MS been detomlned to effect silent
blovthroug_. Various types of primary sea! llkage conditions st predetermined
leuk4oe rates shovld he s|mlited.
(S) 0etemlne esxtmm acceptable leslulge rates it 200 Pals vhtch mrs
the SO pslg 1Nk test criteria.
(6) _mtafllne mtnim_m pressure snd time required to position O-rialS
for SO pSlg lik check.
(7) 0ere•ins the volume of the cavity hetveen the primary and sncoaMery
O-rtngs by analysis and flow test prior to end followln 9 the 200 pst 0-rtng (_
positioning cycle.
0
(8) KSC and NT| aS[ volumes should be simulated end the required two- m
Sure range should he duplicated ms close is possible. Type I! ztnc ch_itO O)
sealant should be used for ill tests.
g
,1_ ,ml
276
Z
b. bule FIxM Ilouslng/Aft Segm_t Iless Joint . Perfora tests with full
scale harImre to ecco_11sh the objectives tn ltme. shove. The test designed,
to detinlne 0-rtq bleedlleck rite need not be relmsted.
c. Ign|ter Mepter/CAse FM_Srd SIIg_nt Iloss Joint - Perform tests u|th
fv11 scale .uarduere to i¢c4_llsh the objectives in ttm I. ll_e. Tests to
determine pressure value required to Nsttlon the see1 is not rmtred.
It Is highly destribte to complete these tests prior to stKklng of STS-12.
Quest|Ins concerning thts memorandum should be referred to !_. Leon Ray, 3-3809.
! Id Motor Ilrench
CC:
SA42/I_. Wear
SM2/Mr. 0Ntis
rEll/nr. Coates
EP01/nr. n:Ceol
EPZS/Nr. Powers
EPZS/Nr. Ilmy
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£PO1 (85-;8) Harch 7, 1985
NASA
T0:
THBUs
R_0Mt
SUgJECTs
$Aq l/lit. Mulloy_
EE11/Nr. Her ton _
EPO 1/Nr. NcCool
9oquost for Initiation of Testinl to Provide Data For 8osolvin_
the B_rnad O-nin t Seal Problem on the Space Shuttle $1_4
Letter £P2S (83-119), _r_m _d,. Niller (EP2S) to Mr. Bort<m (ev11), subJeeti
"goqunet For Teats by the C_tracter to Obtain Space Shuttle $1M Clevis
Joint, Field HouslnK/Aft SeSmmt Joint end IEaition Adepter/Formrd $eEnent
Joint Leek Cheek Data" is referenced.
On Docmher 6, 1983, this office requested via the referenced letter that
the oontrsoter obtain available full scale dlmter, short stsok hardua_
end oonduot tests to provide data on sine' ohromlte putty 1_4h4vlor as r_lated
to effect on Joint leak chocks. Fourteen aonthe hsve elapsed and Io visible
action has beqm taken to obtain and equip the short steak hardlmre elthoq_h
nKrsoment _ made to perfom the test at the time of request. The only
positive response by the omltraotor was the subaittel of TWN-l_359 on Nay _,
1983, which contained a prosrmt plan folloved by 5-ineh C_ storm, tests,
which were not desisned to provide a solution to the burned O-rln8 problon.
The acquisition of Joint putty layqp end leak chock date on a hlSh priority
basis has be_:ee very haportant in view of the need to resolve the bm-ned O-
rink problem; s_ordintly, it Is requested that you take the neeessary
action to dlreot that the following tasks be expeditiously perforaed by the
contracts- s
s. _bsoele and full sonic tests to detomine effects of asbestos
filled, eotten and talc filled, and non-Filled sino ohrasste putty on O-rink
sealink lntesrity.
b. Full ocale tos_ss
:1 ) P_tty lsyup tests usink currmlt ISyUp desi/n.
(_) F_tty layup tests usink the ett_._ned fl_ro I lay_ onneept.
(3) Putty lnyvp tests _slnk the sttached fls_re 2 lay_p concept.
25
n
0
;I
P
#
278
,,_ _epeat tests {I) and (2) except with vent slots lo_ated at _2_-
degree interval around the circumfe rence as shown by attached fi@_.-es 3
and _. The slots are desl_ned to prevent air entrapment and resultln_
volcanoes. Evaluation of layup efTectlvena_s should be perfo-med with :low
se_,rJ to determine oavity volumes.
The above tasks are intended to c_plement TWR-I_359 feather than replace the
tests defined therein. We w111 be happy to assist the contractor in working
out the datlils for the above proposals.
A.I. MeCool
Director
Str_tures and Propulsion Laboratory
En_losures:
As stated
oo I
SAq2/14ossr s. HolntoahlDenton
EEl I/Mr. Coates
al 1/1_. JGa_el
EP21A4r. N_rty
EIP_/Hoser s. HlllerlPowerslRay
EIEOI/Dr. Lit ties
n
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February 22. 198_
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
EEll/Hr. Horton
EP25/hr. Hiller
Inspection of Fired SRH Pressure Joint DurinK Disassembly
Please take the necessary action to reinstate detail pest flight end pest
static ftrl_i inspection o[ specific pressure Joints on the SaR uhich lrmor-
porat_ the thermal barrier and O-tin i seal desl&n eonee_. _ inspection
must be conducted at the time or disassembly to preclude destruction of
detJ. _ task should be performed by experienced, qualified enltneertni
personnel and should be continued until the burned O-rtnl proble= Is unde¢- -
stood and resolved.
The tnctdence of heat demaKed O-rinKs on STS-2, QH-8 end on the recent
fli&ht o£ _3-11 warrants close surveillance o£ these areas to ensure that
susbeeted itto=a].ias are detected and properly r_or(itd for asKes_t pur-
poses° Recent discovery that the new type 11 zinc chromate _ealast (tharaal
barrier material) would not adhere to the nozzle surface to which it was
beinl applied, has opened up several unasswred questions, t_e _ost impor-
tarot beint adhesion life or the sealant after installation on the SaN.
II zinc chromate sealant was inst_lled on all 5RMt$ bqinntnE uLth STY8.
Areas of" concern uhich warrant inspection are:
a. S,qM case field Joints.
b. SI_I case nozzle boss to nozzle £ixed bousin& Joint,
c, 5_ liniter to SRH case igniter boss.
d. RO_le field splice joint.
,_lef, "Solid Rotor Branch
0
)
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CC :
(E01/Hr. Hardy
SAIII/HI-. 14Jlloy
SA_/Hr. Wear
SA_I2/Hr. HcInt, osh
EP01/Hr. HoCool
EP21/Hr. HcCarty
EP25/Hr. Powers
EP_-_/Hr. Ray
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MOKTON TfflOKOL INC. t_
WasatchDivision
Interoffice Memo
1 October 1985
E150/RVE-86-47
TO:
FR(_:
CC:
SUBJECT:
A. O. I_aid, _irector
Soltd Rocket Rotor Project
Manaeer, SRN Ignition System, Final Assmbly, Special
Projects and Ground Test
8. HcOouga11, 8. Russet], J. McC1uskey, O. Cooper,
J. Ktlutnster, 8. 8rtnton, T. O'Gredy, 8. Me;Seth,
J. Sutton, J. E1we11, 1. Adams, F. Ca]t, J. Laaere,
P. Ross, O. Fullmr, E. 8atley, O. Satth, L. htley,
B. Kuchek, Q. Eskelsen, P. Petty, O. RoCa11
Weekly Activity Report
I October 1985
EXECUT"I"/ESUMMARY
HELP! The sea] task force ts constant]y being de]a_KI by every posstble
means. People are quottng poltcy and syste_ vtt_ut, work*around. MSFC
Is correct tn slating that we do not knme hov to run a development
program.
GRC.'._IP TEST
l. The two (2) GTM center segments were received at T-24 last week.
Optical neasureg_nts are being taken. Significant work has to be done
to clean up the joints. It should be noted that when necessary SICBM
takes priority.
2. The DR-6 test report ]ess composite section was released last week.
ELECTRICAL
As a result of the latest engineering analysis of the V-1 case tt
appears that htgh "stress risers to the case are created by the pbenolic
OF1 housings and fatrtngs. As tt presently stands, these wt11 probably
have to be mod|fted or removed and if Mmoved wtll have to be replaced.
This couTd have an impact on the launch schedule.
e_J
28?
A. J. HcOonald, Director
I October 1985
E!SO/RVE46-47
Pa_e 2
FINAL ASSEMBLY
One SRM 25 and two SRN 26 segments along with two SRM 24 exit cones were
completed during this period. Only three segments are presently in
work. Availability of igniter components, nozzles and systems tunnel
tooling are the present constraining factors in the final assembly area.
IGNITION SYSTEM
1. Engineering is currently rewriting igniter 9ask-o-seal coating
requirements to allow minor flaws and scratches. Bare metal areas will
be coated with a thin ftlM of 1t9-2 grease. Approval is expected within
the week.
2. Safe and Am Device component deliveries is beginning to cause
concern. There are ftve S&A's at r,5c on the shelf. Procurement,
Program Office representatives vtsttod Consolidated Controls to discuss
accelerating scheduled deliveries. CCC has promised 10 A41/q'Sand 30
B-B's no later than 31 October 1985.
O-RINGS AND PUTTY
1. The short stack ftnally went together after repeated attempts, but
one of the o-rings was cut. Efforts to separate the Joint were stopped
because some do not think the_ w|ll work. Engineering |s designing
tools to separate the pteces. The prints should be released tomorrow.
2. The inert segments are at T-24 and are undergoing inspection.
3. The hot flow test rtq is tn design, which is proving to be
dtfficu|t. Engineering _s planntng release of these prints gednesday or
Thursday.
4. Various potential filler materials are on order such as carbon,
graphite, quartz, and silica fiber braids; and different I_uttfes. They
will all be tried in hot flow tests and full scale assembly tests.
5. The allegiance to the o-ring investigation task force is very
limlted to a group of engineers numbering 8-10. Our assigned people in
manufacturing and quality have the desire, but are encumbered wtth other
significant work. Others in mnufacturlng, quality, procurement who are
not involved direct|y, but whose help we need, are generating plenty of
resistance. Ne are creating rare InstT_Jctlonal paper than engineering ,
data. Ne wish we could get action by verba! request but such is not the
case. This is a red flag.
R. V. Ebeli,ig
4"1
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n SA
Rel_ ee_ at EP2S (79-23) February 6, 1979
TO:
FIDe:
SUBJECT:
Distribution
EPZSY_lt_ •
Vistt to Prtcls|oa Ruiner Products Corporat|on and
I_*kerSeel Company ,
The purpose of thts memorandum Is to document the results of a vtstt
to Precision Rubber Products Corporation, Lebanon, TN, by Mr. Eudy, EESI and
Hr. Ray, EPZS, on February 1. 1979 and also to tnfomyou of the vtstt
made to Parker Seal Company, Lexington, KY on Februsry 2, 1979 by Its. Ray.'
The purpose of the visits was to present the O-rtng seal mnuf,cturers
with dsto concerning the large O-rtng ext_rusto_ gaps betng experienced on
the SpI_ Shuttle So114 Rocket Notor clevis Joints and to seek oplntons,
regsrdtn9 pOtonttal risks tnvolv_.
The vlslt oa FMll_g4. ry 1, 1979, /;oPrtclslon Rubber Products Corporat|on
by Hr. (udy and Mr. Ray was very wel_ recetvecl. Company officials, Mr.
Homrd GtllettR, Vice President for Technics] Direction, Mr. John Hoover,
V|ce President for Engineering,and Mr. Gene Hale, Oestgn Engtneer
Ittonded the maettng and were presented wtth t_l Sl_q clevts _otnt see1
test data by Hr. Eudy and Hr. Ray. After considerable discussion.
r._lpany relPresentattves decllnod to make tnmedtate recomendattons because
of the need form ore ttme to study the data. They dtd; however, voice
concern for the design, stating that the SI_I O-rtnf extrus|on gap was
1Seller thee that covered by tbetrexpertence. They also stated thee more
tests sh_ld be performed wtth the present design. Mr. Hoover p_
t_ conL_c_ I_FC for further discussions wtthtn a few dlLys. Hr. Gtllette
provtde4 Mr. Eudy and Hr. RILy wtth the maws of two consultants v_o may
be able to belp. tie ar_ Indebted to the Precision Rubber Products
Corporettno for the ttee and effort betng'expended by their people tn
support of this problem, eslm.-1ally stnce they have no conoecttcm wtth
tJwproJe:t. ,
_vlslt to the PaMmrSeal Company on February Z, 1979, byMr. Ray, "
EP2S, ms alsowell received; Parker $4al Company suppltes the O-rings
tn the Slqq clevts Joint design. Parker representatives, Mr. 8111
Collins, Vtoe President for Sales, Hr. V. 8. Green, Manager for Technical
Services, Hr. O. M. Kosty, Chief Devolopment Engtnaer for R&D, Mr.
O. P. Thelalan, Territory Manager and Hr. O_Jtch Haddock, Techntcsl
S4rvtces, met with Mr. Ray. EPZ5. and were provided with the Identical
289
SI_t clevts joint data as was presented to the Precision Rubber Products
Company on February 1, 1979. Reaction to the data by Parker officials
ms essentially the sam as that by Precision; the SRM O-rtn 9 extrusion
gap is larger than they have previously experienced. They also expressed
surpl'tse that the see1 h_d performed so well tn the present application.
Parker experts would make no offlctal statements concerning rellabtllt_y
and potanttal rtsk factors associated with the present design; however.
their first thought Ms that the O-rtn 9 Ms being asked to perfom beyond
tts intended design and that a different type of seal should be considered.
The need for addttfonal testfn_ of the present desfgn _es also dfsc,ssed
Ind tt was agreed that tests which more closely s|mulate actual conditions
should he done. Parker officials wtll study the data tn more detetl wtth
other Company experts and contact MSFC for further discussions tn
approxtwt_ly one week. Parker Seal has shown a serious interest in
assisting MSFC w_h this problem and thetr efforts are very much appreciated.
/ /
itllltim L. Ray*"
Solid Motor Branch, EPZS
Distribution:
SA41/Itmssrs. Hardy/Rice
EES1/Mr. £udy
EPOl_qr. McCool
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shell mot exceed 005 ps15J sez£nem at a tnLI-4_j[ rata a_ 2°9
1b/sac. The ii m vest sjste8 shill mot £atec£s¢e uttb the Orbiter
bee shall west disarm17 to 8tnoal;ka[s IS flSgkt. In edditLos ta
_rowldlag IT roller Fcnte.=t£es, the wane wtlwsj ak411 be raffle
el being sctu&teA olms, I_IoI_ to l&snch# bj gsona4 ©omits4. The
electoral1 coanssd Sad |;nevut£e su,cl_l J sL11 be I;rowidsd _J GSl.
Cnpab/litl ih_LI be provided to scsitcl_ the I.tls _:oJ_slsics Lllt
n]r8tol J_rISSIEi lha8 veJL£cla or grcum4 I;eue: 18 sot ll_Jied to
t_e flight la8tEusonts.
3.2.;01.16 LC. CaaoatJLhllltw. lit/ mateJ[_L81 8and lsts_neJlj In
eke llgn_L4 el1_Qm 8jltei at kke Sisera Iklttll 11|item saln
]propulsion 8ubsjltOS8 Jl_Jll be coe_etLbln ee determined _j ill|
0060° I.
3.20 ;. 1. I"/ ]_naimn lalj.I;giJJMdi-
3.2.3.1.17.1 Jlatunral Jiaulconmmnt. |eli Jhettle J_Lgbt Vehicle
desAgn shall 8atJLa_tbe lateral eJIwlXOJNat 408190 ragu£k-eneeta
ape©l_lmd 18 Appendix 10.10.
3.20201.|702 _JJJ_JJJJ[_g_JmJJSo te_h element o£ the shottle
tL ll_5_lt t Vetk:LcLe skILL 84 ¢alHUILe Of, uitkstendJSJ t_l LSdUCaA
eavtreuu4stJI Ls_084d d_l:lag tZansiaztstl@s, grenad operations,
handling and t11gkt opeut£aea as de21sed Ls &pJ_eOdls ;0.11.
lank lnter£sce between eloMet.8 ski 11 be danigse4 to vttkstan4
the induced eavAzoaneat8 de£ined is the epElir.&_ls XC_.
3.2.;.1.17.2.1 ascent Bantlna _UIaL_j. IIII general, eli
elamaeta 0£ the alsace |khakis Slates seeJ.J_ so daaAg_d to
glthetand 111'JLtAsg £sdn¢ad ascent nerndjnamAc and plume teat/me
oaw£roeeeata_ on¢otpe_sleg LLZ I_naoLLa4 ra£e_oJca missions. _he
trainer veklcla _cr gklck 1Lilt ascent 48rodjna81¢ batting
aavicensesta cosI_LoA eit_ tease c_LteLL8 eee.L4 resnlt in
causez.gulun"c'xaau_' ::_:k: ,d ca,t ,,,,lf.lan, ,h,JLI , d,s_Lgn,d to ,..tc ©ouldosJ_9 the *zegeeacl o_ c,=curance o_ the
ancona kemtLe_l environments resulting free ststAnt'LciJ trastmoat
c_ the _HILn8 re£elrea,_e 8Lm_Lsu ud sk411 be sheen tc have
8_g2e-m_a aui[wlvabl_Lttj t_r Ltllt lJ¢tJt aer_jliliC heatLag
cnss emcouatarsd os 4sJ uLNa;Los dnEta9 the 11retina a_ ¢ka
vau£cla. The aESllcehla elVJJ:@lHStl Ire de_/ned In Sl;_eediz
10.11.
3.2.2.1.17.3 ]_]eJ.&baarntlan. 111 S|S material sad Lexta11481ce
4_s_gs sks].L s_sLsLIr_ aJsm_E;tLes ssd ant;8_llest o_ I£_IL_dS _£
s,.lc ,.r,or.,.. orZ _ xka12 not regslre draLeiag,
4_lng 0£ 4mj dedtcatad purge syntee zoo| £e_urtLnkmant t&_oug_
14unch.
(_3.20_.1.10 _lov Znduced VL_rat_cj. 111 kcaam hadLlezi_le
hal;sea shall _m do_Lgnnd to ezclude cr uinin_na _low Lad_ced
later to the _owtat/on/gniwer Sage Ln _rcnt ©t tam document.
3-_0
_7
8.0 BZ2ECBG,Do 2me ©pete oauL_u ,mesa &e ueosvu?..v.._ 6...-
• 0.95 F[oLeb_lt7 of no poaetratl©a 4_:Leg the .z_eue to._ t_ee
fo_ 500 missions _e o_bltj es£ag the .teozoid eodeA defamed An
Suction 2.5.1 o_ 281-6e6270
8.1 IIS|CIOID ZID&C_. Spice Shuttle am©on:old to,act
:ega_Eeeente Ski11 be O DeCIJ_Iod below:
!
,. .,,¢,,.0..,°..° "F_otecte4 1_01
Eesult _e Fcesu_e 1ol8 ekes suh_ected to the no©enfold
:Inn node1 as de£Laed L| _11-6ii21.
_. _uncSJ_Ij£L.j_jjI_. 5he Space Shuttle shall Gravide
Fro©me©Los 8ga£est joss o2 £uuctloeal cspabllLtl of
_lected cr£t£cal Lee m- ekes 8ebJe©te4 to the eetoe:oL°
flux lOdel Am 402111° £1 T11-6_627. the F:mbahilLt7 ©2
no F_uet=et£on abel1 be eneeesed on each item deEemdeat
u_oe fmuct£ou el:it.Leslie1.
9.0 ISIlCD_lillC CCiS:IISS. _ht ViLli! gLVll 11 $ecticel 1.6
and 2.? c_ _BX-6Q627 shell _e enid.
10.0 IflI_BAL.
10.1 G_CON_ TliIRIL IIVIIClllI_. ;_t _nund the:nil
env£_©neent_ £mc_udla9 a£_ teoGocetuEe_ 801a£ z&d_atice_ and lh7
teeFecetuce L£LLtI, ace 8po_£_ied In _ab_e 10.1ol and llgm_e 10-
1. l_eo, lee Sect£oss 2.5 tad 2.6 o_ T|I-6eTST.
10. 1.1 Jpn£eat Itene_etere _o_ SlD iEo;e21aet Te|_JL_J_IJ_|
_£L_L_I. T_e aFpcopcLl_e IS¢ aid Ill| eo_th_y mean and
eztceev el_Leet teepecatu_e_ listed _e_ou shell _e •.d to
eat_bl£sh Sl8 F:O_tll_t temperature© and thrust _er_eraemce.
_he low and high extreme© _ro the 2.5 and gToS Fe£cest£Le ©nonage
eoethl_ tllFe£ltl£_l.
10.10-_ (_
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2.6. 1 Air Tu_wruwr_ Nuar _ _rr_
llurhtcu air tomlwraturu uxkrumu8(maximum, minimum, andthu 9.5
imroentll_va|uu•)Md l_uuxtrumu minimum uky nuliaUun (uqunl to thuout-
goingradla_)'anu givuoin TnJdu8.6 for various Nu_graldli_tl aruax. Max-
lmum ud minimum lumlmruLuruvalumlshouldbwo_t_d to last only n fuw
hoursduringa tinily porlod, Gumraily. UmmaximumWmlmraluru is r_w_hud
strUTLI i aad buforu 5 p. m., wldlu _u minimum tumlmraWruis ruaclx,I Just
tmforo sunrlsa. Tablo LTA showsIhu m_imum Md minimum air tomlmratur_s
wh_ Imm oem'md m ea_ Imw si Iramed7 Wane Cemr, I_ nat nooessaJt/y
oa the sum cky, sJllmMbtime cnmmsmpres_t • ocddandbatotrome day.
The mnilwd d smmpU_ Um dsv (trmmmy d cmem'rsmeof dmrvsmms) writ
remdi la the mine mamM.Ihms U lie ires periid of I/me Ira. I*.e da*_ Is
used, I_ the M pel.sestlle Takse will Im dlBstl_ llour_, daUy, sad
mosthlydMs NklmU8 poriods. 8olooUoeo( tho mkmno@m_l d0pemlaon
,qKlnser_ _ Tsldo LTB _ mo_ mesu tOml_mWz_s, s_dard
_.=a |Ai _J m_ of _lm of tomponmro for Kamsdy
L !'_ *U U Ik diIp _lue d ,runs, ,/r tn_Krli_
(U,mud iodO us,
(1) AsJmz_ssofalrtmnperamt_of 10"C (lrT) _4ms
sUnu/nlms Ismmus of sehw _ (m as s senud smqsos) tz.om
0. 60 g-4ud m "| m "1 (110 _ fi-8 lur-t) to 1. 88 8-o81 m "! ml_ "! (410 BTU
_'t _a) _ oaam._. a I_ _ _, lira rmmrse dmallSof the
(IU A I_l.ham. cdm_lSms), oemwwUk I Urn.ram o( Irr. ?" c
(so*F) Is aJa.msq, ws_ m s S-he_ l_._l, t_la_d by • Imrs d o_-
sumt s/z"_mpersSs_, lhmam of S't.Y'C (SO*/') Wa S-_suurpsrlml.
fo_lov,,d by tO _dls_rSmn_
b. hr. lr_ts_ Tm l_s_s ( Ksms_ m _sWsr 1, *_- us. J
petmm_o Idz tSmlNn'll_ dm•_s m u fdlmm:
J_ (1) AltfmrmumofldrtempmsMmmofLMC(ll'F}wl*J,s
s_i _ue of solar rmUaUm (meuur_ m a'smrmalIrfsoe) from
O.SO1[-4al om"t m,.'t (110 BTU ft"t In.") to 1. llO|_.d us "8 mJa-t
($M B'ru _*l h_r'l), m. • _ dahr tSmllm,/m_ d 9.4*C (l'/*F) v4th
• stmultusou deoreue d sdar mlUmm frem 1. SO8-481 om"t nda"t
(3S4 BTU ft"l hr"l ) to O.60 |-rAI om "t ndst"! (I lOBTU ft-t hr"t) may oecur._
in • !..hour period.
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2.0 aPPLXCABL| EOCBE|2S. The baler SLated documents :oft i
part of tkAs appeadLz to the ezteut alecZ:Aed kezeAu. _kese
docuteuts abuZZ _e Aadi_ZduaZA! e_|_©ved .as _ese_Aae
ceguAreuemtJ. The aCuzeat Xssue- e: each document saj be
determiued Urea 4SC 00102, Space Shuttle Bregraa Level IX
taaelAae bes c_iptAos sad Statu iepezt.
_pntractoz OendbeOkS
SD73-$I-G069-T
(Cur:eat Zssue)
Structures Oexign Loads Data took,
aaxeZAue VekicZe sad XissAcaa
let. Farm. 3.3, J.3.1, TaSte 10.11.1
5_73-SN-0069-_
ICU[:ent Issue)
Grbiter Stzuctnral_exiga Loads Cats
Book
te_. IPar4. 3.3. 3.3.2e 'ZaJsAe 10.11.1
SDT3-SD-O069-3
ICurrant Issue)
Strnctural DexLga Lauds Data |ook,
lzteraaZ lank
De:. Pars. 3.3. 3.J-3o Ta_Ae 10.11.1
SD73-Su-OO69-e
(Current Issue)
StruCtural DesAgm Loads Beta Seek,
$oIAd Docket Boasters St:uctuEaZ
Load:
kef. Pace. 3.3, 3.3._, _abAe 10.11.1
SD73-SB-0181-1
(Current X_ue)
AeredjuasAc Beating Data Duet,
O:_Ate: - isceat l|eoas X. ZI sad XXXJ
Bet. Pace. 3.1, 3.1.1, 2able 10.11.1
5_73-Si-©181-2
ICurreut Xxsae)
Ae_odFmauAc HeatAsg Oat4 Book
lzteraal auk - atceat (Beaks Z and XX)
Def. Pars. 3.1. 3.1.1. hbAe 10.11.1
$C73-£i-G181-3
(Cu=zeot Zsxua}
AerodTaauic leatZu9 Data Dock.
ShuttXe VehAcXn Dccste£ - ascent
|DookJ I aid Xl)
/
io£. _8ra. 3.1, 3.1._1, TabAe 10.11.1
10.11-6 Q
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S_13-$1-0181-4
(¢a[_eat Zssue)
SD73-SI1-0101-5
|Cutest ::line|
SD73-SE-O Ilil-7
ICurtelt Imlle)
(¢uzzeJt Zssse|
$DT_-$m-OIq_
|Ca[[eat 1sale)
BeL. P414. 3.1, 3.1.1, t4J_o I0.11.1
ie:o4:J_lel¢ |oatAng Det8 ioote
Skittle Lauck Ee¢_I2t_
BeL. J_8. J. le 3.1.1, T&Ji_Le 10.11.1
fiecodya4s_c moat_89 _at4 Book,
UghtuelgbL |ltlXJ81 16nk-J_:eat
JeL. D4Ca. 3.1 "-
AcoimtLr_l and Shock Dat4 lookw
Spsce Skutt_e $:stes
lie£. Pa[8. 3._, 3.Sw Table !0.11.1
2kecul Zate[£aces Design Dit4 gCaLL I
Jet. Par8. 3.2, lak_e 10o11.1
10.11-7 (_)
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SD 74-SH-O144D
SPACESHLITTIF PROGRAM
THERMALINTERFACESDESIGN DATABOOK
Dece._ee 1977 SDMBASELINE
Conc:sct L_q9-14000
ZID _o. SE-699T2
I,'BS 2.2.1
?reps.reci by
eL,_Leor C.A. I,sren
RCC and ?eneL'_st:Lcm8 An_t.y't_o ICC and, paer, r_c4ous Aualys:Ls
Approved by
M.F. bY_t6, DJ.reccor
_l_ermL1. 1_J.ye_.e Shucl:le ._tro Scinces
_lb_ Rock w oil I_am.mtlorud
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#_ RockwelJ Jnterymtlo_Ji
Seem_
1.0 Ir_mOgCTlON
1.1 SCO_E
ColeaJjuNJ haro_Ln ire the ¢he151_. dem£en d& ea _equ_Lrod to ¢ouplete the
thorse_ _J_terf&co dd_.n4tlxJluJ for the follmrls_ 4_tezface coBtrol doctaneDtj
(I(_'s):
ZCD 2-12001 Orbt_oz Veh$_lc/htadrltaJ.
ZCD 2-16001 Orb_r.ez Vehlele/helU heekat Joester
I_ 2-2t001 _zterecl Tsnk/JolLd Socket Ibecct_r
Z_ Z.3N-LS000 Speee Shettle 0zt_r_r Veb_oleP_tn Faalec
1.2 L.UTLZCABLX DOCW_ITJ
The muszuzLL emr_qmm_r_ that hs_ aa effect ms the therms_ des/drn ere
defined £n the follmttn$ doctm_to_
JOe 07700. Space Shuttle r/Jcht end Ground Systems JpecLf£cst£ou. 4
Vol,me Z. Appcmd/z 10.10. u-c_r81 Ikn_roun_t Dec/Cn Itsq_trecento.
I(_A TH X.66795. D/_t,r/Jmt/_m of IL_ht Heeecroloa£cel VarC-blec st 8
Cape Ydmecd7. rlecsda, rout vmutm_ar8 ktr Force a--e. c_orn_;
Karshe_l space rL/_hc Ccmr.er (dated November 19, 1973).
The 4"diucmd mzvLroumem_ ipp$LcabLe ".o the Shuttle r_s_em clio| par-
formJ_8 is I_t of the 4"teercced flJ4ht vehLcle ire dd£Md 4. rJse fol_av£q
data b_k_:
SD 73-SR-0181-_, Spece Shuttle _,l_t)3ta_Lc II_tt/_ll _te Jenk-OtbLcor
_cmst, VoluN Z (dated Pobrusry 1975)
SD 73-S11-0181-2, Space Shuttle 1_rodyuan_ lut!ns _sce Jook-Excez_sal
Tank _ceuC. Vol -m_ IX (d_ed Jm_e 1976).
SD 73-SR-0183-3, Space Shuttle &erodymm:Lc Heat£n8 _ce Book-Shuctlo
Voh/c!e Joostquc AJ_Cmst, Volw_ ZZZ (dAtod Septmer 1976).
SD 73-5H-0181-_. Space Shuttle _ro43rnam_c llect£n8 Dace Jook-Sp&ce
Shuttle 1CoLa EnSL_e Amccet, On-Orbtc m_t IntrT, Volune 1_ (dsced
Septenbar 1977)
Those books form par_ of _hc Space Shuctlo lrlLeht end Ground SyStem8 Spoc£f_.-
cactou, JSC 07700, Volume X, A.ppaad 4" 10.11, Zuduced Env/.renmmt Des/Co
Requl:emenl:s. The £uduced envtxomencs de_t are ava:Lllbloott uae_otlc cape
_ecOrdl el spacLf/ed _n I_erence i for the orbitor. Reference 2 for the
excor_l c_nk, lud Ihtference 3 I_o1: the Shu_:l:le vehlclo booster.
®
1.-1
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A
lone Tf_soemmee System _Jl& ROCkw•ll
ImeiFiIiim &Ollwlmees D_e_t lP'si_k_ Intlrnlt_Onll
lean Ipmml Om,l
2. _" SUllT_CE TL_FEIA,'_ILE ILES?ONS_S
Suz_sc, temperature responses are pTovS.ded co elcablLsh oh* rsd£anC lO_rcti
snd slnkJ for the Shuttle vehicle from ptel_uach chro_h •cent. These d&ca
are _oc co be ¢cmJL_ued u m&ter'.sl I:esporstu_-e ltm_cs. They Ire lnceudect u
cherish, luterfict dlcl requJ.zsd for extant ¢hsraal dullps ulysls.
2.4.1 _
The Inre.14mcb, post*ELL/, I_fsce ¢_mcmril blstoz_u s=e prumst_!
hereSn for the hot / ¢o],d ds7 _ts nec_ _ the S_e _:tla
Fllsht lad Grmm4 Syotl |pecJ_t_st_lt, JSC 07700, Volm_ Z. &ppeadlz 10.10.
_,._,,2 I[avtzomaa= Deslls _es. Th* tSch I_Z_em:lle day for _T_y
8: Cape _7 usa _ fmr the e_-rm hoc day _'oun_t, /or the
ezt:reme cold d47 euvS.-oanmt, th4 5t:h psurcnt:_L¢ day foz Jmnuur7 st: VaSuberl
_.r Fo_=e ]ia_e tins ued. I_t:ez=u_L t:eak f_L1 _J ummed st 1100 hou:s for
c_.lJi¢ •
2_.1.10=b_.cer Veh:Lr.Le
The prelsunch eav_roummt:81 t:e=perscmm_ for the L_Jtl.sSe 2mmr ezters_sl
s_rfacu (Zomls 01 r_=ow;b 05. [rll_r¢ 2.1-2) 8_e pres'mtsd ta F_.lmrU 2._.1.1-1
chrou•h 2.&,l.l-&. For t:ha v_n8 les41nl ed88 (Zoneo 06 tb=_uSh 09, FLS_rO
2.1-1), t:he sz_sz_ll sm:fsce t:muperst:ure h_.st:or_.es for pre_s-n_ sre llv_i
FLIr_:u 2.h.1.1-5 _d 2.&.1.1-6. The t:eupers_ vt:lst_.ou for r._t vl_l lov, r
*xcIZ'_I sur_&¢¢s (Z_J8 010 chrou•h 012. F:LI_rl 2.1_1) 4tlz'l_ pr_atmr.b sre
pro_._ed £n lrllp_e 2.h.1.1-7 t:bro_lh 2.h.1.1-9.
Z._*.1.2 t,,tewu.1 Tuk (r/)
FLS_ 2.&.i.2-1 r_x_qh 2.&.1.2-3 prav'.de t:be t:anl_ers_e respoue of
the ez=ez_z_l rdu_Ts 8_f_e_ de_laod 1_ F44ru_e 2.1-2 vhen 8ub]octod to • hoc dsy
prulsuach _r_. The eo_ 487 pr-_-_ _t c_•_ure vsr_-
clou for oh• atezasl r.snk eu=fs_•¢ (YJsru:e 2.1-2) are pruaced In FtS-
_:e• 2.&.1.2-_ ¢h=ou_h 2.4.1.2-4, TI_ c_erat:_el Co be will for t:he ET
crossbeam su=f_:el (718v=e 2.1-3) _ur• 98*7 for hot d_7 sad 29"Y for cold day
p=•3"unch e_J_om_r.8.
2.4.1.3 So114 Iock4t Ioostl_ (SlLll)
Tell_•r•tl_ll prof_._e8 for t:b• SU Ixt:llrlll_, IlU_f•cil dl_f_14d fal Ftlruro 2J.-_
_re proy_ecL _z Fissure 2.&.1.3-1 for oh• hot d•y prulauncls m_J_o_mmt
F_i_:e 2._.i.3-2 for the co2d 487 pr•lsmzch envlroume_t:.
• 2,4.1,h Sp_c,m Shuc¢le x,,:lm En81u (SS_)
Kot: d_y prel_unch etrrJ_oumenr.81 t:em_•r•=ure hls_oz_Lml for tb• Sp6¢e
Sh_cc!• uaJ.n en81_• l_t:erf_c• envelope, d•flud _ F_lrur• 2.&:i._-_, a=*
presented In F_iur• 2.&.l.&-l. The SS._ c{mp•r_.'_,lnl: lurfi¢• cs=persc-_=lls tel
.q_'_ Ln Figure 2,&4._-2 for • cold day pte_.•_ im'v1_l_mlmc.
SO 74-5_[-01_,4_ ®
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p4_ i:to,ck'vvell Intm'mm_al
aleeoen0v_,_
.1.2,3 So_.4 lockal: Joosl:e:
Tmll_re_e nlcz_lnee for the S]UJ 8_de of chQ fo2Z_ couduct_Lon
_.Iterfaces:
I"ZlSl.il fos'wd, sc-,.a_m_c (l'f.8_e 3,1,2o3)
lrZlm .._t acculao., (lrl4ur, 3.,1..2=,6)
8:e preKn=e4 _Ln Table 3.2.3ol for hm: 48y (umcLmm) u4 cold day (-_-_.,,-).
o- .
Table 3.2.3-1. SolW lo_et Jooe¢mr/l_ez3uiJ. T_k Coud._Ecc_.ou
Zacerfscs Teupe:ac_ru---l_re_u_b End.foment
Loc_r.Lon
Fol-vs_d &l:r.actmmsc, LocatJ_t F|
Foruszd 8ccochmsnc. Locsc£an Lr
,IJc stoic, t_stS_s _1, _. and t_l
Teuperacure (415 F)
89
90
96
39
26
2: .,el,i--
3.2.6 Sn_:e Slmtr.2e HLLU IbzJdJ_
Tmqser&c_e ]d_usrLu for the SIRE s_Le o_ r.he fo].2o_n4 _ncez_ues:
f2me* (r_wra 3.%.%-3)
tt_mlJe ¢Yt4_re 3.Z._.-_)
a_a_.L vesztas (rs4p=e 3._,1-s)
Base s_4Jd s_r.ar.hmm¢ (Y_e 3,1.1-4)
2"VC _utacor 8_ (1_J4_ 3.].._07)
8re Inr_encod Ln /34paze8 3.2._-]. rJuroush 3.2,605.
3.2..5 Hobt.l.e _ I_r.fo_qt
unper_qnr_ fmr the _ s_Lde of _h_ foL3.mr/.n8 cond£cLou
:iLu_:er_H:
ere proeenced J_z TJJ_Le 3.2._-2
@
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Speoifiea_Loll No. ¢NI-JJO0
PRZdlr: e_I,IUZPd_IIT ¢_ItTItACT END LT_H
DETA ZL. SPECZF ZCATZOR
PART Z OF _I0 PARTS
I_ P[RWOR4AliCF., DI[S|GN AND Vl(.m_rLcATIOII REQUIIIrJIuTS
SPACE SHU'_'TLR HZGtt PRRFOANAIICEt SOL,ZD
ROCUT MOTOR L,TGHTdlrZGHT
¢ i'd 1-33OO -
FOR °'-
SPACE SHUTTi.i[ $OLZD
SOCKET MQTOR PROJECT
OPERATZORAL, W].ZGNT
(STS-ii, 12 & _uOl)
!
17 FeOruary IgO4
P£IIDIliG nASA Al'l'd_a_m L
DR NO. 2-2
PREPARED FUI
NATZOllAI, AEROIIAUTZCS AIID _PACE AOH][IIISTRAT_[OII
GEORGE C. HA_SHALJ, SPACI_ FUGIIT CENTER
.4AItSHAIJ, SPACE FL,.[GHT CEiITEl, ALAIIAHA 3S81a
81
;4orl_on Tnxom]L, Zno.
d,_eh O_LvJLn_Lon
P.L). Box ._2_i, tk'_Llinlla CLr, y, Ut, ln IIl130_ 801/16]-3§11
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SPecxrLcat_on ks. CPdl-33_0
Date: 1? Feoruary 1984
Pale 1- 33
maintenance and refurOls_aent operations.
3.2.6.3 Personnel _fety. Provisions Car personnel eatery snell
oe Ln accordance with the followinG:
a. Safety Devices. Knovn nawsrda union cannot oe
ellJlnated tnrOUdh deslin selection shall he
red used to an acceptable Level through the use oC
• approprlate safety devices as part ot the systea,
suOaystea, _r equipment.
o. darnlni Devices. driers It La ngt possible to
preclude the exlstenoe or scour reave of a xnovn
hazard, devleea snell he e_pLoyed for the tamely
detection of the condition and the seneratlon of an
adequ,ste wernlni CA|hal. Warnln| ala_ale and theAr
epplloatlon shall be deal|ned to alnlmLse the
proOahlLLty of _rons sllnaLn or of lmproper
personnel reaotlon to the alsnaL.
_.2.6._ [x ploalve and/or Ordnanoe Safety. The propellents for
tno HPHL and the l|nltor shall moot the requirements of hazard
classification 2 as defined In the Aray gaterleL Comnend
Re|ulatlon _;4fety _nuaL ANCR 385-100, or DaD Contractor, s Safety
Hansel for Aamunttlon e Explosives, and NeLated Danierous
HaterLaLs, DoD _1_5.26. 111e HIML aelaanta and linltlon syatee
L_as lnltlatora shall nave a DoT expLosLve elasslf_omtlon of
CLass D.
___. 2.7 £nv lron.en_
J.2.7.1 Natural I_nvlronment. The HIML snail uLtns_end tne•
natural environments deC;ned xn JSC 07100, Volume X, AppenOlx
10.10 and the aLr and sea teaperature environments an4 salinity
3.2.7.2 Induced EnvXronaent. 1"he HPML shaLL vlthstand the 9
Lads cad environmental conditions as saline4 Ln tile fo_lovln4
_OCL'SOntS:
Tnerlal
Base ;teatLn6 - $D73-SH-Ot81-3
, Launch & Ascent - SD7J-SH-0181-3
_a-entry - 5£-019-0S3-2H
Interfaoe - SD74-ZH-Olqq, ICD 3-4q003
Load a •
Vibration, AcouatLc & _no:x $(-019-O_g-2H
and 5£-019-067-2H _as cnansud hy approve4
_evlatlon RDd-OOI2Rq) _n case or ¢onf_Lc_, S£-019-0_9-2H
snell take precedence c_a_ _£-019-C67-2_.
PreLaunch through _r_ratlon - $£-019-0_7-2d, BOOK 1 /_
64-420 0 - 86 - I l
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TABLE V
e eat _.e._etaeemeeeeeee_eeJa_''_oa'_uuD_Je._.._._m._e o._ee _e._e eeeie.e
I VERT_rICATIOII CROSS I CN1-3300
| ll_rtREll¢[ IIIDEX _ Dated 17 February 1981
| i Peso I-g2
I|QU|IIEMruTs IrOll VtllZlrICATIOII
a _ o_JiU _UJi_ ueneen.o_uee.aaiteeuu_eeeeneeeu_eaale.aaeaueeae_eeJee_ _eOe
¥iNUZCAT|OII HETHOD: VillxlrICiTIOll PHASr:
1. Slnllur_ty A. f_velolmenr.
2. MaLyeta O. GuallFtoa_lon
3, Z_apeo_ion C. Aueep_enoe
II. r-uous_.ret.ton D. PreFlt4hk
5, Teat [. _LIIhr,
ll/i - Nor, Mpllaablo
e _ee--ueaam_eaeea .eea_e.eeu ee_n_u _an_u_eaueaa_au_.uu_uenuu_ ._..u_
SoaLLon 3.0 I I SeolLLolJ II.O
PavformMao/ | Vor_f'_Leu_.Loa MotJmds | ¥orlfiaaLlon
DesllJn Ilequlrmtnt | 8 lloqulrmoaL
Iotoreneo | ........................... I m'roreuee
filial A I | I C l D I [ l In' I
t e .._o...._........._ | ._o
3.2.6.3 Par sonne_
SaFety
3.2.6,1 Ix ploeLva
mnd/or Or dnanaa
SaL'er,y
3.2.7 [nv irormear, ]l
3.2.?. ! INs_ur el
runvLron8 IB_
3.2.7.2 1nduou4
F_nv_ron_eet
3.2,8
TrenepcrT.eb_ _tyl
TranaporcaLXon
3.2.9 Storage X
3.2.9.1 I_s_
&a8opY_e_o
lie qut r _ qm_',aj
3.2.9.2 $r.oralle/
' Ago Contro_
5 5
2 2
2 )
1 I
3 3
i t t
---,---l---l---,---l---, ......................
2 2 II.2.1.2, q.2.2.2
q.2.1.5, 4.2.2.5
li.2.1.2, II.2.2.2,-a-.'--_
I
;
_.2.1.2, _. 2.2 o2_--.-.I--_
I;,2, I. 1, q,2.2.1,
_.2.3._
II. _. I. 3, el. 2.2.3,
I_ _.2.5, 3
I
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I;,.m.t _ INTEGRATED |L|M ENTS
VERIFICATION COMPLETION NOTdCE
( Y17/r_0T )
• _" - D4"I'E:ev_ "nTL.E: 1ASl_.ZtrE FASSZOW C_kll"t, IT7, .__.
CONSTRAIN'r- '
S_C_'| OF _LN
,'be ]ase_.._ne Y.£mI:LoIs ¢81pm_:Lll_r Z!_JI_ 81 8ppl|ci_loe to &hLs VGll, _olrifle8 Usose mctiq_tL,
L_4 i_r.e=*.e_&::LouhLpo r.bst iFP17 to FHOF coDJtl"gt=r.l. STS-_ n:Ltbl: pe_feTr_nce bsJ
_ee= eval,t_ed b 7 ttajtctor? 8isutst_ou vl:_l_mLn| p:opu_'lLon _88 tduel and 8pecL!£¢d
5?3 peT_o:li&:_ce. T_ll 8d/L_Lell _0 _JLLsht pelr_oz_Jsct testz_em 8=d iutsc_ 8_0_1:, yn
s_ee:_._4, L_scrc_on 1_0£nc untseT, ![1' dLsponl ,nd L_Liht psrsnn,1 lord8 bs_e been
ev&l_&l:ed lind _[01mlJ sat:LJfJ_to_r tJJt r_s-1 J[_LLtht. (See ¢OlJl_L4m8t_Ol_ Jbttt)
JS_ -- 07"_00 VOi. X VERIFJ_6.TION R|C_IREIdliN_ _OMPI.I[TED
3.2.1.1.2 3.2.1.1.3.4 3.2.1.1.17
3.2.1.1.3 3.2.1.1.4 3.2.1.2.14
3.2.1.1.3.1 3.2.1.1.4.1 3.2.2.1.17.2
3.2.1.1.3.2 3.2.1.1 .S 3.2.2.1.17.2.1
3.2.1.1.3.3.1 3.2.1 .i .6 3.3.1.2.2.1
3.2.1.1.3.3.2 3.2.1.1 .'11 3.3.1.3.3.1 0
3.3.1.2.5.1
ISlE TNII IOA_mKJi_O(JOP _418 JMEET _ IINGC_LI[TII VlJiliIWlGi_Ti0_ OI Ir_81J_ol_
I
APPMOVAI_
ROCKWELl. NASA
_/-_/._,_._.,.,w; ;_J;, G _r_-_
////j./_/ , -r. .
_-i ;-a /-
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_ Rockwea Intemat_nld SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM NASA
Srm_ a,evp INT|GRATED ELEMENTS
VERIFICATION COMPLETION NOTICE
:VLN tK).: 17 " VCN NO.: 12AZ1
IVLN TITLE: IAS'ELINE MISSIOt "CAPABILITY Cuklnm:._JL_.__
OOPB_rRAINT_ OPS
STOP| OF IVU;_
Th_$ _tselSne KtSS_O_CINb414_Y [YEN 5de_?._f4es tJle tc_4vlt4eS s_l _nterrtlltto_sMps
occurtng durtn9 the Orblt41 Flfght Test phise of the prog_qul Ipplecible to vtrtytng the
cap4611|ty of the vehtcle to perfom the besellne itsstons specified In the tpplf¢lble
pir|grlphs of 0SC-07700-10. The verfftcstlon ectlvtttes Iccomlp11shed pr|or to the Y_rst
fl_gh_ are team&tYPed In VaN No. lEA11. (See con_t_ttoe tl_mt) .
JSC -- 07?00 VOL, X VlJRIFICATtO(q RIQUlitIIMIJN11 COMi_D
3.2,1 ._ .? 3.|.1.1.3.4 3.|.1 .I .17
3.2.1.1.3 3.2.1.1.4 3.2.1.|.14
3.2.1.1.3. _, 3.2.1.1.4.1 3.2.2.1.17.2 •
3.2.1.1.3.2 3.Z.I.l.S 3.2.E.1.17.2.1
3,2.1.1.3,3,.1 3.2.1,1 .E 3.3.1 .Z,_,l
3.2.1.1.3.3.Z 3+Z.1.1.11 3.3.1.3.3.10
't88 'rN8 8J_.lCmolJ OF .7_4ut8Nls'r poN INCOMPLST8¥1_ll;_AlrlJg OR ExcIPtlouM
_OV&UI
ROCKWELL NASA
!R.H.Lissen _OUStlC_ 11-4-82 I J. tAv4n_ 1Z-6-87R.H.Lissen Flutter 11-4-1_
u_ ;0.11. Odnm 12.11.B_ I_ R. H. Grly 11-5o82i K.A. Ti_it&lHlr _rlT.lig. 11oa[.,Jl_
l i R.A.Ilur w ,PS 11-5-.03 IL.8. _ullo.v lZ-8_1 i ,I w.T.Schl,t_h IKIVt.r 11.lA.M _ Iq.K. Cr019 _ll) 11-3-i1_ : X.J. COx GPGC 11-3-82
_lV.T.Schletch SeE 11-1S-B2 _; l.I. KONrl_S _41p li*3-R I H.d. Erisselux HPS 12-14-;
d,_._ney _eror_emo 11-22-82 _ ,1.6. _dros Aer_ 11-1(_11_ N.;, F_ndv A_n., 11._.R_jH.R._ch_n AScFlt Perf.11-15-8_ J.&. Hnnd_ h, ;I G. Strcmhtl Ther_ 11-15-
_1 (.O.Schlesstngor Them 11-22-82 Flt Perf_ 11-1_-I_
_" !_.L eo..... _n 11-24-_, _; x._,. nackey _x, L4S II-,:IIZ
R.(. Gitto £xt Ids 1Z-l-lIE _ I.|. Lee Ther_ 11-21-821
"s_gnatures on ftle _ :.T. Hodlln Flutter 11-2_-i12
,_ 9. A. _tr*zner _ @PROGRAM MANAGEMENT: tn PROGRAM MANAGEMENT: SIGNATURE/DATE
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VI-B
SOLID ROCKET MOTOR TEAM OVERVIEH COMMITTEE
ALLAN NORTON, CHAIRMAN, MARTIN MARIETTA/ORLANDO
VICE PRESIDENT, ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS DIVISION
MICHAEL CARD, NASA LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER
CHIEF, STRUCTURES AND DYNAMICS DIVISION
AARON COHEN, NASA JOHNSON SPACE CENTER
DIRECTOR, RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
MAXIM[ FAGET, NASA JOHNSON SPACE CENTER (RETIRED)
-SPACE INDUSTRIES
CHARLES FELTZ, ROCKHELL INTERNATIONAL (RETIRED)
LEONARD HARRIS, NASA HEADQUARTERS
DIRECTOR FOR SPACE
HORACE LAMBERTH, NASA KENNEDY SPACE CENTER
DIRECTOR, SHUTTLE ENGINEERING
ADRIAN O'NEAL, MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP., HUNTSVILLE
DOMINIC SANCHINI , ROCKMELL INTERNATIONAL
SAMUEL TENNANT, AEROSPACE CORPORATION
DAVID L. WIXTERHALTER, NASA HEADQUARTERS
ACTING DIRECTOR, PROPULSION DIVISION
JOHN YOUNG, NASA JOHNSON SPACE CENTER
CHIEF, ASTRONAUT OFFICE
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NATIONAL RZSZARCR COUflCIL
COMMISSION ON ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SYSTZMS
Committee on NASA Scientific and Technolosical Program Reviews
PAHEL ON TEC_qICkL EVALUATION OF I_ASA'S PROPOSED RZDRSIGN
OF THE SPACE SH'0TTLE f_)LID ROCI_T BOOSTER
Dr. H. Cuyford Stever, CHAIPJOJ_
NAg Foreign Secretary
National Academy of Engineering
2101Conetltutlon Avenue, N.W (NAS 307)
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Mr. Laurence 3. Adams
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Kartln Harlett8 Corporation)
13401Besll Creek Court
Potomac, HD 20854
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Professor of Polymer Physics
The Institute of Polymer Science
University of Akron
Auburn Science Building, Room 325
Akron, Ohio 44325
Mr. Dean K. Hanlnk
(Retired Manager of Engineering
Operations, Detroit Diesel)
145 Maple CreaC Drive
Carmel, IN 46032
Dr. David Altman
(Retired Manager of Engineering
United Technologies Company)
1670 Oak Avenue
Menlo Park, CA 94025
Mr. Robert C. Anderson
(Retired Vice President,
TRW Energy Development Croup,
Electronics & Defense Sector)
Engineering and Management Consultant
840 55th Avenue, N.W.
Salem, Oregon 9?304
Dr. Jack L. Blumenthal
Chief Engineer
TRW
Materials and Chemistry Applica_ions
1 Space Park, Building 01, Room 2010
Redondo Beach, CA 90278
NAE Dr. James W. M_r
Jerome C. Hunsaker Professor of
Aerospace Educatlon
Dept. of AeronAutics & Astronautics
HalaachusetCe Institute of Technology
One Surf Way, Apt. 119
Monterey, CA 93940
_, HIT Office:
Professor Edward W. Price
Regents' Professor
School Of Aerospace Engineering
Ceorgia Institute of Technology
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Mr. Robert D. Watt
(Retired Croup Leader,
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center)
11117 Palos Verde Drive
Cupertino, CA 95014
Dr. Robert C. Forney
Executive Vice President
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc.
Admin_straClon Department
DuPont 5uilding, Room 9000
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Washington, DC 20418
Dr. Robert H. Korkegi (Co-Director)
Dr. Myron F. Uman (Co-Director)
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VI-C
IMqI_MATI_ p.E_JIREMENT _IPTIC_
Title: I Type INO. IOa_e Rev.
I I I
Fa/lu:e YoCe Effects Analysis I 2 I RA-26T-=__ I
Sucml_ai S_ecule:
audit u_dates at 6._:nt_ interva/s wit_ submittal linkeC tm nearest sc_.e_ule CIL
r_R submittal.
C_nr.;ac: SGW Reference:
Exhibit A, 3.3.3 - ___,clneecino Succcrt
Use:
To ibentlfy crlCical tatlurem_ces to Ce useO as a basis for suoDort or: (l)
AO_i_onal Design Action; (2) Safety Analysis; a_O (3) Mission C_ntingency Pl=nning.
i
j Scc_e-ConEenus-rormaE._alfltenanc=-GoveIr_en_ Fuznisneo Gala:
1. Sccoe/Ccmtsnts - Failure n_oe effects analysis will _e precar_O for eacn
Crmx_er venicte S,,hsyst_, inclu_ _e following:
a. System/Su_systsm/Assem_ly/It_ - ICentlfloa_icn of Item for .nlcn t_e F_E_
is being ccncucted.
b. P=e_a_eolAPproveO ay - Identification of analys_ .no _erformeO _e F_EA _nO
inblvicuals responsible for overall F_ effor:.
c. Revision - Oat_ inolvi_ual ;ages are ;eviseO.
O. Item Identification:
(i) Name
(2) iCentificatlcn NumOer- Drawing numoer by which ".he Ccntractoz
i_entlfies ano Cesc_i_es eaon component or mccule.
(3) Drawing Reference Cesignaticn - Icentifics_Icn of _e c_n_onent or
mocule on the schematic.
(a) Quantity - Total numcer of i_ems Ln t_e subsystem.
e. F_A NumCer - A n_er t_at uniquely _Centifles _ne subsystem, c_onent,
and failur_ mcce.
f. gu_,cticn - Concise s_atement of the funcui=n _erfczmeo.
.. Page I of
;63(l_7_a/CO76a ) STS81-060_8
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_._.-: _Cacs Ray. I"
Failure- _cce Eff_-c.ts_alysis
I I
I RA-2_ I
2." .%-tee/Contents
g.
(Con _J_ue_)
Fctlu=_ _ce ar_ Cause - _den_tlcatlcn of _e sCec!t!c tallur-, mo:e attar
¢¢r_ICer__ng tY.e tcu= basic taJ_,,-_,ccn_t_:
(i) Pc_maCur= cceraC.'cn.
(2) F _a_- to c_erat_ at a D.--jc=i_.ed ti_e.
, (3) F'a.tJ.u_J t= c-..¢se cCe.-m_!on ac a I=:-._._e¢l time.
(_) Failure ¢u¢ir_ oCe.-_cZcn.
F_¢ ea¢_ _oL!_s fcL!u¢_, mete, _sc,!_e _e m_Joc c_use(s) _'.u_Ir_
ccera_,onal aria envL--_-_t_l _._'J5 t_cc=rs, !f knc-_n.
n. Mts._lo'VF_,ase - _asa of _sicn in wnic_ ?a!lur.- oc.--_s, .-.g., _:-.la'_cn:
c_,ec_cut, ccun_ccwn; F!!glt: _J_cst p_ase, esr'__ or=£t, esc.
i. raJ_ _tfect on - ._u_syst_, Lnt_.'.,',ac_J',gsucsyst-_m,m_ss!cn/c:_w, e!em,ent
_no/o.c vehicle as ..-_¢ul:.-_.
J. FaJ.luz-aOeC--c=Icn Me_.o_ - A :.esc=L_cicn ot _ ._et.ncc:s _y ._±c_ ,"..'a
K. -C:r:,ec_..,.Lrt_Ac*..._ - An tCenCZflc3tlcn of c: -r:_c--_-_'g acrid, aut=macic c:
_ruai, wn1,1_ _oulo "=e taken t3 cl.-_..-_enttze ,_llu--_-._r,cluce stzt_ent
of alt_IT_aca means a? c_erxclcn _a _,,aunct_cy avai!_cls aft."rfa/!ur.-.
1. Fai!urs, ,v_o_eCrlt_-calltyC_t_o.-'/ Cesi_atlcn - Cat--_c:_-:- " _._e fa/!ur-- ._cce
¢.:Itlc_LLIw in _.!aci._ to c:-__safe_l _,a mlssicn sffec:. _cluCa an
i_emt.ifica_-'cJ1Of all _.tz_srat me.-ci_ :'..'%_.canc7:s_ui:'-_encsCuring
Imtact _:ur=s.
.=_uiom_t Ott,e.T t_,anc:Itlcal-'t7! &_al! _-etu-'5_',er evaJ.uac-_J in acc_r=_mcs
'.it_t_e _¢_ncancy narcs.aDs,sc:'.ensCesc:.!_e_3ai.-'_.A notac!cn _I!i _e
:race lCe_tifyL_ ea_"l sc=e,_ Lna na.-C;,are Cc.'s _oc pass.
(1) The i_..-_Jndanc e!_-_ents a=e not cac_o!e of c=..-ckcuc Cur___.g_-e _or_
mlssicn tum'a/cue_ s_Cu-..nc--,, cr
(2) t.css of a ...-,sc_,ca_: .-!-_c if r,cc :-,a_y _e-..-c:_cla _.y _e f!:;n:
Cl'_.W, OI /_
(3) All :-.c_nCanCs!_-mentsC'--n_'e !cs: :y _ si_i__ ::-.ot:l.-:aus._ _." _.,,enc
suc_ as c=ntzminacicn :: explosion.
m. Gr:.un,o _u!.-s_nG Assucc_!cn - 5t:_ment cf all ;::ur_ .-ui_-s-:nc_ssumc_!=t_.s
fo!!cwe_ curing :ze p.-rfc.-_.,ac,cs f r-_£&.
•P_e 2 :t 3
I_' (167_a/CO7Sa) sl"sal.-o_cca
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I_TICN RE_JJI_NT OE_-_!P'FICN
Ti_-_e: INd. I_ac_ Rev.
I I
Failur_ MOCe Effects AnalYsis I _A-267(B I
2. _ccoe/Ccntents (CcntinueO) ....
n. Re_azt<s/Hazaz_s - Statement of any remarks, r--cc_endatl_ns, and potential
hazazas as cec_c'_.
o. Ve_icle Effectivity - ICentlf!catlon of _e vehicle effectivity for _e
faJ_uze mode ident!fle_.
3. _ormat - To _e prepazed in C_nt:actor's foz_at.
_. Maintenanc_ - To be maintalned by page revision/total reissuance, as aDollceble. I
5. Government P,JZ_Is_eO Oata- Not a¢plic3Ole.
P_c_e 3 of 3
I_
(16_a/GO76a) ST_.al-C_3C3
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,°
T£_.e: lI"ype {Na. t_e Rev.
I I I
failure _ Effects _nalysis I 2 I RA-2_-_3 I
"_cm.t;_ 5_nsauJ.8:
Su_t u_tes at _ontJ_ _te_a_s wit_ s-_!t=al _ to nearest sr_e_e CIL
F-_R su_Ltt-I.
C_n_-act _W Reference:
Exhibit A+ 3.3.3 - En,(:!neectna _.u_cort
use:
To i_tify c_it!c _1 ?_zemo_es to te use_ as a _isis for su_Do_t of: (1)
Ae_t_._t_ona.L OesIgn Px;t_on; (2) Safety Ane.lysls; ancl (3) Mlsslon C_nt_e_cy P1_nnlng.
I _c_e-_c_tencs.-_o,D_nsc_a..1._T_'lanc_-.*_ver_ent Fu2nk_nea Oata=
L _ccoe/Cont_nts - Failure _ce effects analysis w_ll be p=eoarea for eac_
Cro_= Vehicle $_system, L_cl_nq _n,e ?al!c_knq:
a. Syst_/$_system/Ass_ly/It_ - ICentifl=3t_on of _t_ _or =nicn the
is _e_ ccnCucte_.
b. PreCa_eo/A_provea By - I_entlflcation of _nalyst who Cerfomea the F?__A aria
InOlvlauals r_sponslble for ovez_ll F_E_ error=.
c. Revision - Dat_ inaivi_al pages ar_ :evise_.
_. Item Identification:
(l)
(3)
(4)
e°
?.
Name
ldentific_tlcn _a_er - O_wir_ numOe_ _y ,nicn _J_e Ccnt=_cto_
i_entlfles aria _esc_i_es each component or _ccule.
Ora_in_ Refezenc-. Designation - £centlf_.c_t±cn of the oc_:onent or
mocule on t_e scr.ematic.
Ouantity - Total numce: of !_.ams in Lhe su_sys=.=_..
F'_EA Nu_er - A n_er it.at uniquely iCent!fies _ne suosystam, o=_ccn--nt,
ana failu:a moce.
Funcclcn - Cccclse s_at_ment of tree f_c_Icn pe:fc:meo.
.. Page I of }
I
J_3 (l_7_a/OO76a) _81-06008
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I I I
j F_kilUr =.Mcce ._ffec-_-*s.An_lyeis I _-2_ I
I
2." -%_=ce/C:ntmnts (con_tinuea)
_. F_J.u_e _._:e and C@use - _dent_J!cati:n of _e scec!f!c f_Llu=e mcde a;_e=
ccn_iCe_.ng the four _ic ?zilu=_=ccnCl_'_r_:
(1) Pc=Jatu¢__ cce._at!on.
(2) F_L!uzm_ to ct:e=at_ at a __sc:i=__ t_e.
• (3) FaJJ_- to c=-._e cce:3tlon at a _:esc.-_--_e:t time.
(_) F_e curlng ol:e._Con.
For e_ a_o_ic_le F_LIuz_- mcCe, aesc.-i=e We maJo= ca,,_e(s) _c!u_L_g
c_e=_t_r_L _ envL-crJ_mt_L su:'.5_ tac:3rs, i,_ _ncwn.
_. Miss_cn/_hase - Phase of ..'LLs3ioni .,niL_ Failure oc_=:s, e.g., F=ela_unc_:
cgec_cut, _t_,tccwn; F_-i_t: _ccst p_ase, eel-.9 oz'=!t, etc.
i. FaJ.l_Lte E_?ect on - Su_sys:__m, int__.-fac_J_ suCsystem, miss!on/cz-°_, e!ement
_na/o= ventc!e as =_.CuizeC.
j. Fa.Lik¢."Cetec=_cn .4et_c_- A cesc:i:t!on of t_e _etJ=ccs _y _nic._ _he
failure c.'-J/_e c:et_c:eo.
k. C:=:ec=L_ Ac_Icn - .'n iCentlflc3Cicn of cc:.-ec:L-,gac:_-on, aut=mat!c :=
manual, wnion ._aula=e tzxen :3 ci__umvent treefail'.'.-e_.Ir,cluce statement
Of _Ite=nate means of c_erat!cn aria_eaunCzncy ava.Ll=-leaf_-== fziluz_-.
I. F_L!u_e _ode C:it_'c_!!_yC3t_;c.-/Cesi_mati:n - Cat-_c:'-:e _he fzi!u=e _cce
c_it!c_li_,/in re!at!=n to ¢-__wsafe.-'/_a _isslcn ef?ec:, l_cluce an
iCenti_Icaticn of all it--msnot mee_!_g :eCun,csncy :ecu.iz_ments _.u=!_g
intact ac_s.
£Cu_ent o_-_,e_n c.-±_:zll=y ! snail _.e fu==_e= ev_LLuate_Lm accc:=z_ce
._it_t._e:e_unc_cy har=_a:_,sc,-_ensCesc-!_ed :elc'_. A notation _i'.!=e
mace iCentifyi_9 eaon sc:een _e na:c:_a:e Cces not pass.
(I) The r=CunC_nt e!_ments a:e not c_cso!e of _m.=ckcu_ _u:_ _.e nO_Ll
mI$51C_ t_-_a_C_O Ss"_uer.ce,C=
(2) LcsS of a ..__',c_n:.=!._mentif nct :es¢i!y Cetec-.._cl._ Cy L_.e fll;n:
(3) All :ecuncant elements c---n :s !:s_ =y _ Si._ie =:eci=le :_-us_ :: __,,e._t
suc_ as ccntamin, at:cn _: .-xc!cs±cn.
m. Gz:uno Rules -ca _se_mct±:n - 5_-t_mect cf _.i! ;=:urC .-_-es -:_c 3ss_mc_'3:rs
fo!!c_ea cu=i'._:_e po_:fc.-=.a_ce? F___.
P_ge 2 :? 3
/G_ (!STDa/CO7Sa) 5T$al-O_r_._a
326
S_¢CRHATICN RE._JI_ENT DEC_IPTICN
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2. _cce/Cc.ntents (Cr..ntinue_) " "
n. Re_arks_azaz_s . Statement of any :'.marks, :eccmmenCat!ons, and potentla/
hazar_ as re_tre_.
o. Ve_icle Effectivity - ICentlflcatlcn of t_e ve_icle effectivity for t_e
failure, moc_e iCentlfied.
_. _orma......__t- To _e _r_ar_ in C:nt:act:r's format.
_. Nalnte_ancs - To 6e malnta_ed _y page :'.vision/total _iss_ance, as appllc_le, l
5. Ccve:mment F,d_'nis_ O_ta - ,'cot=cpllc_le.
(167_alGO76a) 57E_I _.C4_
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RELIABILITY
DESK IHSTAUCTION
No. I00-26
FLIGHT HARDWAAE
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS (F'MEA)
&
C_ITICAL ITEMS LIST (ClL)
Date: Jatmmry 31, 1984
Page 1 of 34
Approved :___
Y.P. Ostrender,
_r., Rellabll $_
Space Shuttle P_ogrem
hfe_r|ces: (1) I()! 70 l-5.1.1.1
70 24.3.I
(2) ReliabliiW Desk Instruction NO. I00-I - Reliability
[valuation
(3) Reliability Desk In_r_tlon No. lO0-12 - Shuttle
Element Interface
: IMTROOUCTIOX
Reliability of the design ts the ulttmate responsibility of Design. However,"
it is t_cumbent on other Engtneerin 9 fuectlons, Including Reliability, to support
the design engineer in discharging his responsibilities. The Failure Mode Effect
Anaiysls (FI_) Is pvtmary reliability technique for providing design and program
support and constltotes a decunented record of the design s1'_tus and coordinated
dect stons.
|. 0 PURPO_
This desk instruction defines the procedures For generating, docummnttng and
maintaining Failure 14ode Effects Analyses (F14EA) and Critical Items Lists (CZL) for
the Space Shuttle Orbiter" subsystems in order to verify design adequacy wtth
respect to lnherent reliability.
2.0 DEFINITIONS
I. Failure - is the inability of a system, subsystem, c_Inent, or part to
Im_O_ its required function within specified ll_its u_er specified
conditions for a specified duration.
024_/1
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2. Failure Mode - a description of the manner in which an ttem can fail.
0246j/2
3. Hazard - is the presence of a potential risk situation caused by an
unsafe act or condition.
4.
" B°
6.
Reduedancy (depth of) - desc_bes Ule available (number of) ways of
perfomtng a function.
Backup Mode of Operation - desc_bes the available ways of perfuming a
functton uti]tzin9 "]ike" (Identical) hardware.
Alternate Mode of Operation - descF]bes any additional ways of
perfuming a functton utillzing "unlike" hardware.
7. Crtttcaltt_ - ts the categnrtzatlon of a hardware 1tam by the worst case
potential divot effect of fa|lure of 1:hat item. In assigning havre
criticality, _he availability of redundancy (backup or alternate) modes
of operation ts considered. Asstgement of functlona| criticality,
however, ass_es the loss nf all redundant (backup or alternate]
hardware _tements. The definition of c_ticallty is shown tn Table 2.0.
Table 2.0 - Criticality Oeftnitton
C.RITIr.ALITY PgTEKTIAL EFFECT OF FAILURE
1 Loss of 11re or vehicle.
t
2 Loss of mtsstOno
3 A11 others.
1R Redundant hardware element, all of
which tf fatled, could cause loss
nf life or vehicle.
2R Redundant hardware element, a11 of
whlch if failed, could cause loss
of mtsston.
ROTE: See Appendix B, paragraph 3.1.1,
Grnund Rules, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2.
8. Stn91e Failure Point (SFP) - ts a single ttem of hardware, the failure
of which would lead directly to loss of life, vehtcle, br mission.
Where safety considerations dtctate that abo_ be initiated when a
redundant item fatls, that ttem ts also considered a single failure
point.
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g. Functional Mode - identifies each function to be performed by the item
being analyzed.
10. Multtple Order Failure - describes the failure due to a stngle cause or
event of all units which perfom a necessar_ (critical) function.
ll. Crittcal Item - a stngle failure point and/or a redundant elemnt in a
itfe or mission-essential application where:
a. Redundant elements are not capable of checkout during the normal
ground turnaround sequence.
b. Loss of a redundant element is not reedlly detectable -in flight.
c. All redundant elements can be lost by a single credible cause or
event such as contamination or explosion.
12. Kit - For the purposes of _his desk Instruction, a ktt is defined as a
temporary addition or modtffcation to the Orbiter or its subsystems to
satisfy unique requirements for a specific mission.
13. Post Landin_ Safin9 Operations - For the purposes of this desk instruc:
tion, post landing safing operations are defined as those activities
performed after landing to prepare the Orbiter for hangar operations.
This includes the deservtce and draining of all hazardous fluids, safing
of unused ordnance, application of ground power and cooling, removal of
potentially hazardous components, pods and payloads, purging end venting
of gases and the installation of protective covers.
14. Prelaunch Operations - Prelaunch operations for propulsion subsystems is
defined as beginning with propellant loading for each specific
subsystem. For all other subsystems prelaunch operations commence with
start of main engine conditioning.
3.0 FMEA/CIL PREPARATION
FMEA's will be prepared Jointly by the responsible designer and the assigned
Reliability Subsystem Analyst (RSA) in accordance with the attached format.
Appendix D (Ground Rules and Criteria) and as shown In FIGURE I. Safety_ other
engineering disciplines, and technical support functions (see [OM Oirective
0246j/3
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70 2-6.3.1) wtll provide support as required. Where the F14£A devtates from the
Instructions a_ ground rules contain_ herein, epprop_al_ notation _11 be
]nclud_J within the "Ground Rules and Crff_e_e" of the F)4EA preface.
3.1 SCHrnU_
ReltabtltW, tn coordination _th Oestgn, vill define the schedule and depth
of detail for each FHEA to be prepared for the Orbiter In support of oontrectual
requirements, and issue an F_ schedule.
3.2 CONTENT
Each subsystem FI4_/CIL shall be prefaced by the following tnfomatton,
sequenced as tndtcated:_ .
1.0 IWll_ODUCTZOW
2.0 QUALITATIVE RELLABILI_f SIJI4t4ARY
• 2.1 SUBSYS1TH OF._CR.IPTION_ EFFECTIVE D/LIE
Z.2 SIGNIFICANT UNO_IXED O(SZGN AREAS
2.3 CRITICAL ITEHS SUN4ARY
3.0 GROUNDRULES AND CRITERIA
4.0 DISPI._YS AND CONTROLS INOEX
S.O LI3"T OF REFERENCE DOCIJHENTS T.
5.0 SC_gD4ATZCS
The beckup tnformtton, including rationale and anaLylses involved in assessing
fatlure modes end thetr effects, generally Is not tncludnd ]n the ftnal FH(A and
CIL package. Mhere such 4nforutton exi's_ 4n the form of notes, calcul&t4ons,
ZL's, references and other slmilar material, 'Itvrlll be retatnnd by the responsible
RSA. Should the RSA be reassigned, he will turn over the materffal to his
supervt sot.
3.3 ANALYSIS REOUIR_]4EHTS
1. FHEA's wall1 be pe_omed for each functional _ of a subsystem or
functional ktt. Electrical FHEA's _11 be conducted to the "bleck box"
level and wtthtn the "black box" to pursue functions which have single
failure point potential effect on the orbtter safety or mtssion
success. The level of detail requtred tn mechanical FI4EA'S below the
c_onent level in pursuit of crtttcal failure modes _11 vary.
Standard destgn, such as check valves, relief valves. Ssolatton valves,
etC.. require only common types of failure causes to be listed.
OZ_/4
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EXAMPLE: Failure Mode - fnternal/external leakage.
Cause - poppet/seat damage, contemtnatton,
structural failure.
Men a component Is a non-standard type of deslgn or Is unique In
appllcatlon or contalns unusual/unique failure modes of a c_tlcal
nature, a more deUlled analysls Is requlred. P1_e pans and their
fallure modes and effects that could result In component critical
fallure modes must be Identlfled and Included In the "CAUSE" section of
the component _EJ_ for each component failure mode of concern.
EXAMPLE: Spring - fracture, structural failure - poppet
falIs to seat.
2. _'s for mechanlcal systems and avlonlcs _11 interface at the
connector. (See section 4.3.4, Hechanlcal_lect_cal Interface.)
3. All identified fatlure modes wtll be assigned two crittcaltttes
(functional and hardware} based on the definitions tn section 2.0,
Definitions, and procedures contained in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2,
Hard_mre and Functional Criticality Determinatlon.
4. The c_tlcallty assigned to pressure carriers (pressure lines and
vessels) shall reflect the worst case failure effect. These include
potential shrapnel damage to the vehlcle/subsystems resulting frem
rupl_re of non-fllament wound'l_nks, potential overpressurlzation caused
by releasing substantial quantities of fluids from ruptured lines or
tanks, or depletion of consumables. Mere released fluids are flammable
or oxidizers and the possibility of an ignition source exists,
appropriate notation _ll be entered Under "_ROS" for Safety action.
(See Appendix B, paragraph 3.l.l, Ground Rules, subparagraphs 13, 14,
and 15.)
5. Failures which could occur during all mission phases frum prelaunch
through deactlvlatlon (Including safing & purging) of subsystems
subsequent to landing and during ferry flights shall be:consldered,
regardless of occurrence probability. Documentation of prelaunch
analysis Is required only for items classified as criticality l_.
oz46j/s
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6. All ordnance/pyru_echntc items rill be lts:ed in the CIL _cordtn9 to
the most severe effect. (criticality 1 or 2) of s prlmlture operation.
7. Each hard.lira or function crlttcal Item summary rill tnclude• count of
the total nmnber of c_lttcal fatlure modes per Item, by criticality,
c| asstft ed etther sl;ructural or func21 one 1 ( see paragraph 4.1.11 ).
8.
9.
Crlttcsl 1tin smnarlee for kits rill be txluded, but Identified
separetely '
FIf.k'svlli not be requtred on structures, vlre harnesses, cables and
electrtca] connectors. For all c_lt_cal c'ircut"cs where ,I sber_ between
ad,_acenl; connector cortices could reslu_; In loss of crew (HSC O&P
Standard Ha. 32), the destgn schematics shall be reviewed to vertfy that
thts condition does not extst. The _ncorporetton of a svltch on the
ground stde that precludes an adjacent contnct shor_ to result tn crew
loss _s considered acceptable for meeting the HSC D&P Standard Mo. 32
r_lut _men_..
10.
For all other cflttca| circuits, separation of redundant, functions will
be verlf_ed by selectlve revlew of design schemtlcs to Insure that the
_qutrements for Separetton have been Incorporated and complted with.
Log'lc dta91"ms (ref. Desk Instruction lO0-1, Reliability Evalu-'t]on)
v111 be developed only where requtred to provtde proper correlation
between schematics and F_F_A's.
ll. Those components that are cr_ittcalIty 3 (func_tunal and hardware) tn the
elect_cal ¢trc_JttS by "black box" criticality may be ltsted on one FTIEA
for for that clrcuit. Those components that are hardware c_it_calt_y 1
or 2 wtll have tndtvtduaT F]IEA's. Those components that are crttlca]tty
1R or 2P., and appear tn the CIL, wtll have Individual FMEA's.
4.0 I)IPLEHEgTAT ]ON
A program has been develope_l to provide computer prtn1".out of F_F._ &rid _I].
data. Format exa=ples of these printouts are shown tn FIGURES Z and 3. The
follovlng section contatns Instructions for dc_umenttng the F/4EA. Data entry
0246J/6
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sheets (FIGURES 4 and S) _11 be coa_leted by the RSA as tnfomatton becomes
available. The information will be entered into the computer and the RSA wtll
receive a copy of the resultant data prtntout (FIGURES 6 and 7) whtch wtll comprise
a worktng docmsent of the information scored in the computer and a baseline for
nddtttonal inputs or revisions.
4.1 DATA ELEMENTS
The follo_dng procedure describes the information to be filled out on Data
Sheets 1 and 2 (FIGURES 4 and 5). Each data descriptor is preceded by the entry
code for Chat ttem (e.g., LV1, Subsystem ID). These codes also are shown on the
examples of the FFF.A and CIL formats, FIGURES 2 and 3, for Information.
DATA SHEET NO. I
4.1.1 (DI r LV1, LV2) DATA IDENTIFIER: This line untquely identifies the component
being analyzod and the "update" information to be taken.
a. Circle "A=, "R" or "O" to tndicate appropriate action --
A - Add a new record (component or assembly).
It - Review an existing record by addtng, deleting, or
revising an element(s) of that record.
D - Delete an entire record and all information tn that
record.
b. SUBSYSTEH I0 (LVl): Enter the last two digits of the applicable
designator and dash number. (See TABLE 4.0).
c. COMPONENTIO (LV2): Enter a nmnber which uniquely identifies the
particular component being available. If an existing schematic
identifier is available, tt may be used. For computer pHntout
purposes, the first dtgtt(s) of the nmnber shall be selected to indicate
the asse_oly. The use of spectal characters such as peHods or dashes
_11 be avoided.
4.1.2 (C1) ASSEHBLY NAME: Enter the name of the assembly.
4.1.3 (C1 r J1) ITEH NOMENCLATURE: Enter the nomenclature for the Component. In
the first block (C2), give the basic identifying noun. Enter any additional
modifiers or description on the J1 llne. A typical example Is "Valve,
Solenoid', where "valve" is the basic identifier.
0246,1/7
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Table 4.0 - IDENTIFIERS & SUBSYSTEH MM4E$
01-5 PURGE, VEHT & ORAIN
02-1 LAtiOING OEC£LERATION
Q2-Z DOCXZNGHECHANISH
02-3 SEPARATION _ONANISH
ACTUATION HECHANISH$
02-4 DOORS
ET Umt] door
Star Tracker
A|r Data Sensor
02-4A HATCHES
02-48 PAYLOADBAY DOORS
02-5
02-6
03-1
03-Z
02-4C RUDOER/_PEEOBRAKE,
BODY FlAP
PAYLOADRETENTION/_EPLOYHENT
NEONAUISHS
HYORAULI CS
MAIN PROPULSION
REACTION CONTROL
03-2A AFT
03-3 ORBITAL MANEUVER
04-1 ELECTRICAL POWER- CY_O
04-1A ELECTRICAL POWER- FUEL CELL
04-Z AUXILIARY POWER(APU|
05-I GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION & CONTROL
_UNICATIONS & TRACKING
05-ZA AUDIO
05-29 UHF
05-2C TACAN
• 05-20 ALTOIETER
05-2F RICRO_AVE SCAN BEJZ_!LAND_IG (145BLS)
05-2G S-BAND
05-20 PAYLOAO IwrI[RRAGATOR
05-2Z CLOSED CIRCUIT "P/ (TV}
05-2A KU-BAND CON4 _ RADAR
05-3 DISPLAYS ,t CONTROLS
05-4 INSTRUNENTATION
05-5 DATA PROCESSING & _RE
& C_4PUTERS
*05-6 ELECTRICAL POWERDISTRIBUTION
& CONll_OL
05-8 BACKUP FLI_IT CONTROL ,
05-1 Al140SPHERI C REVITALIZATION
(ARS, ARPC5, A1rlock)
06-2 LIFE SUPPORT
05-3 ACTIYE THEPJ4ALCONTROL&
WATER SPRAY BOILER
07-1 CRSM PROVISIONS, ACCON4ODATIONS
& E]4ERGENCYEr=qESS
07-Z CREWESCAPE - 102 PRE-AN40D ONLY
07-3 TUNNEL ADAPTLr_
*See TABLE S.O for EPO&C/INTERFACING SUBSYSTE]4IDENTIFIERS
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ELECTRICAL
05-6AA
05-6AB
05-6B
OS-6BA
O5-6BB
OS-6BC
05-6C
05-60
OS-60A
05-6EA
O5-6EB
OS-6EC
05-6E0
O5-6EE
O5-6EF •
OS-6EG
O5-6EH
05-6F
05-6G
05-6IA
05-61B
05-6I C
05-6ID
OS-6IE
OS-6J
05-610,
O5.-6KF
05-6L
05-6LA
05 -6MA
OS-6MB
05-6N
DI No. IO0-ZG
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Table 5.0 - EPD&C/ZHTERFAClMG SUBSYSTEM IDENTIFIERS
INTERFACE HECHAMICAL SUBSYSTEMS
01-S Purge, Vent & Drain
Ol-S Vent Doors
02-1 Landing Deceleration
02-1 Landing Gear Control
02-I Brake & Anti-Skld
02-I Nosewheel Steering
02-2 DooklngMechanlm
02-3 Separation
02-3 CarTffer A/C Separation
ACTUATION MECHANISMS SUBSYSTEMS
02-4A
02-4B
02-4C
02-4
02-4
: 02-4
..... 02-4 ....
02--4
02-5
02-6
02-5
02-5
02-5
02-5
02-5
03-I
03-_k
03-_
03-3
03-3
04-1A
04-I
04-2
Hatches
Payload Bay Door
Rudder/Speedbrake, Body Flap
ET Umbilical Doors
ADP Deploy & Htr
Star Tracker Doors
Freon Radiator Deploy
Rendezvous Radar & Comm. Antenna Deploy
Payload Retention, Manipulator
Positioning
Hydraulics
Remote Manipulator Arm
Manipulator Deploy Control
Manipulator Latch Control
Manipulator Am Shoulder Jettison &
Retentl on Am Jettison
OAC Camera-PLB OPS
PROPULSION SUBSYSTEMS
Main Propul ston
Reaction Control-Aft
Reaction Control-Fwd
Orbital Maneuvering
OMS Auxiliary Kit
POWERGENERATION SUBSYST_S
Electrical Power Generation - Fuel Cell
Electrical Power Generation - Cyro
Auxiliary Power Unit '
o24ej/9
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05-60
05-SPA
05-6PB
06-SPC
05-61_
OS-SPF
05-6PG
05-SPd
05-6W,
05-SPH
05-6PR
05-6Q
05-6R
•05-65
05-6T
05-6
05-6U
05-6UA
06-6Y
O$-_A
05-6V8
O5-6YC
05-61/0
06-6W
06-6Y
05-6Z
INTERFACE
05-1
05-2A
05-21_
05-2C
05-29
OS-ZF
06-ZG
06-24
05-2X
06-2R
05-3
06-4
06-5
05.-8
05-6
06-1
06-1
06-Z
06-1
06-2
06-2
06-2
06-3
07-1
07-2
OI No. IOG-ZG
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Table 5.0 - (Cont'd.)
AVIONICS SUBSY_S
Guidance, Navigation A Control
Communications & Tracklng:
Audio
UHF
TACAN
Altimeter
Hicrowave Scan Beam Landing (H5BLS)
5-Band
Payload Interraga_r
Closed Ci_ult _ {I_I}
Ground Comaand Interface Logic (GCIL)
Ku-Sand Comm. & Radar
Dtsplays _i C_ntreIs
Instr_eentatton
Data Precesstn9 & Software
Backup Fligh¢ Control
Electrlcal power Distribution & Control
[_S SUBSYS_
A1_ospherlc Revltallzatln - ARS, ARP_
Alrlock Envlrementa] C_ntrel
Smoke Detection, Ftre Suppression
AAPCS
Galley
Waste Management
Water Manage_nt
Active Thermal Co_rel
Crew Station & Equlpeent
Crew Escape
oz_j_o
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4.1.4 (JIO) FUNCTION: Describe the function performed by the component. Also,
enter the component destgnal:or(s) as identified on the design schematic.
4.1.5 (E4, C5, C6) QUANTITY: Enter the total n_ber of items having Identical part
nmabers perfoming the same function in the subsystem. The E4field w111
reflect the total quantity in Arabic numerals. The CS and C5 flelds will
reflect written quantities.
4.1.6 (C7_ C8) PART NUMBER:
a. C7) ROCKWELLPART HUHBER: Enter the appropriate Rockwell part number in
accordance with the following DRM/SRH example, starting at the most
1eft-hand-post tt on -
(1) VO70-XXXXXX (Airborne, In-House}
(2) _XXX-XXXX (SC_)
(3) RCXXX-XXXX ( Procurement Spec)
Note: Dash numbers to basic part numbers are required when the basic
part n_ber has dash n_nbers having differences in the failure mode and
effects.
b. (C8) SUPPLIER PART HL]HBER& SUPPLIER NAHE: Enter suppller part number
and supplier name (abbreviate if required) when available for HE and MC
part numbers.
4.1.7 (Cl1-14) REFERENCE DOCUMENTS: Enter the referenced schematic diagram first,
followed by the related block diagrams, logic diagrams, etc.
4.1.8 (C9, C10) FHEA PREPAREDBY: Enter the initials and last nme of the
ReItabil it_j Subsystem Analyst and Design Engineer who prepared the subsystem
F'HEA.
=_ DATA SHEET HO. 2
4.1.9 (Ol, LVI, LYI) DATA IDENTIFIERS: Indicate appropriate action and specify the
subsystem and component IO as described for Data Sheet No. l_
4.1.10 (LV3) FAILURE MODE SEQUENCE: Assign different sequence numbers (e.g.,
I, 2 - 5) for various failure modes of the specifled component.
Do not use leading zero's.
Example: (LV3) 1, NOT (LV3) 0 9 _ _-
338
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4.1.11 (C311 J130 e C32) FAILURE MODE: Enter first the bestc fatlure mode
(keyverd) (C31}, then any addttlonel modifiers (J130) neclss4ry to fully descrdbe
the specific failure mode - the exact wanner tn whlch the 1tom fatls. Fatlure
mode keyword Identifiers are lts1:ed below. Selection should tnclude but not be
11wlt_l to those 11sted.
FAILURE MODE KEYWORn IDENTIFTER$
" sTRUcTORN. FAILURE (RUPTURE)
• PHYSICAL BINOING/_UU_4IMG
• FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLUSF.O
• FAILS Hm-TRAI_EL
• FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE
• IHTEUIAL/_L LF_
• FAILS OUT OF TOLE_NC£
• INADVERTENT OPERATION " PREMATURE OPERATION
• INTEP3411TEMT OPERATIOM • DI_YED OPERATION
• ERRATIC OPERATION * ERRO_OU$ OUTPUT
" ERRONEOUS IMDICATZON " LOSS OF OR PARTIAL oUTPUT
• RESTRICTED FLOW * SHORTED
• PAILS TO START/STOP " OPEN {ELECTRICAL)
• FAILS TO SMITON " LF.AX_r-r (ELECTRICAL)
Appendtx B, paragraph 3.1.1, sub-paragraph 13, reflects the ground rule to be
used for external leakage. For 0Y-102 pre-AA rood only, those failure ,lodes which
result tn I criticality classification of 1 and 2, or 1R and 2R, and appear in
the CIL (11_m 4.1.22) shall be classified further as structural or functional
failures by ctrcllng "S" or "F" in the C32 field. The following guidelines apply:
STRUCTURAL (S) - A fatlure mode tnvolvtn 9 structural fatlure of a pressure
vessel, component hou'stng, fluid 11nes, attach fittings, or lo4d-cc_-jing
members such as cranks or rods.
FUNCTIONAL (F) - A fatlure Bode, generally wtthtn a component, Mltch negates
the deathbed component function. This type of fatlure mould tnclude
btndlng, leakage, fatlure to open or close, or loss of output. The fatlure
cause could be improper |nstalla1:ton of pans or sl_ruc_urel fatlure of power
_-ansat_tng par_s such as gear teeth, shafts or springs; however, tn such
Instances the mode ts sat111 classified &s func1:lonal. Elect:rice1 and
elec1:ronlc camponen1: fallures would normally fall ]n thls category.
OZ46J/1 Z
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4.1.12 O¥-lOZ PRE-AJk HQO ONLY:
(C62-66) APPLICABLE HISSIONS: Enter an "X" tn the block of the mission to
which the F14EAapplies.
Horizontal Fltght Test C$2
Vertical F11ghtTest C63
Fer_jFllght C64
Operational Flights CB5
Specific Orbital Mission C56
Not___ee:"Operational Flights" and "Specific Orbttal Mission" are no ttto be
used for the duration of 0Y-101 and 0Y-102 flight test programs.
OPERATIONAL YEHICLE(S):
(C83 - (_6) _HICL[ EFFECTIVITY:
which the FHEA appplJes.
Enter an "X" in the appropriate block(s) to
Orbiter Vehicle 10Z C83
Orbiter Yehicle 099 C84
Orbiter Vehicle 103 CB5
Orbiter Vehlcle 104 & SUBS C86
4.1.13 (C33-37) MISSION PHASE(S): Enter an "X" in appropriate box(es) to indicate
when the specified effects would be manifested. If the failure occurs at
discrete points in ttme wJ_tn a given mission phase, and different effects
may be observed, tt may be necessary to define the subphase or event under
"EFFECTS'.
4.1.14 (C38, CS8) ABORT CRITICAL COMPONENTS:
a. For l_ose items whose criticality is increased to 1/1 during an abort
resulting fr_ unrelated failures, enter the word "Abort" (C38 - six
spaces only), followed by the appropriate acron_n=(s); i.e.,
(C58) RTLS- Return to Landing Site
(C58) AO__A- Abort Once Around
(C58) ATO - Abort to Orbit
b. For non-redundant modes where normal mission effect is criticality 3 but
are hardware criticality 1 unlque to intact abort, classify these modes
0246j/13
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as hardware criticality 1 and functional crtttca]ttN 1. Add tn J10
[FIlNCT]0N) the notation, "Untque to Intact Abort'. Add "appropr't ate
tnl_ct abar_c notation tn a. -have.
Additional tnfometton must also be entered under J240, EFFECT(S| - see
paragraph 4.1.16. NOTE: For SSHE _nduced aborte, maxtmum two englne burn
time Is approxtmel:e]y twe]ve minutes. If "TIHE TO EFFECT" ts equal ¢o or
,. greater than 'ewe;re mtnutes, the_e ts no change tn cr'il".tcal_'cy.
4.1.15 (J380) CAUSE(S): Enter causes Including but not 1trotted to those l_sted
below and amplify as necessary. See paragraph 4.4.Z for instructions on
supplier furnished ptece par_:s.
CAUSES
• CONTAHINATION * TEHPEP_TURE (HIGH/LO_)
• HECHA_IICAL SHOCK " THERMAL St_C_
• VACOUH * PRESSURE (HIGH/I.0U)
" ACOUSTICS * %OHIZIHG RADIATI0hl
• 0VERLOA0 * ACCELERATION
• 14ISHAI4OLIHGOR AEUSE * ELECTROHAG)4ETICFIELDS
* I)IADVERTENT OPEPJ_TION/ACTIYATION
• VIBRATION
" PROCFJ)URALERROR
• CHEHICAL REACTION
• LOSS 0F/g4PROPER INPUT
• PIEC_oPAAT STRUCTURAL FA%LURE '
4.1.16 (J240) EFFECT(S): Enter the letters (A), (B), (C) or (O) as defined fn the
headings of Appendtx A, together wtth the words under each haadtng descHbtn9
the effects on the subsystem, Interfaces, mtsston, and Crew/vehicle,
respectively, and explatn. %f tile _dentt f_ed effect _s not listed, describe
brtet'ly. Where the affect |s the same for two or more of the above,
consolidate entries. Specify tf there ts no affect on a spectftc category or
categories and provtde a brief explanation. In those instances when tt=e to
abort _qu_res auto.tic operation or _,_aed_ate dependence on a parallel
subsystem and such |s provided, the affect on mission t5 "None" wfth
explanation for each mtsston phase as appropriate. See sectt'on 4.1.Z1d. for
screening of functtona] crtt_calfty 3 faflure modes. For those _te_s
_den¢]fted as abort critical (see paragraph ¢._.14) enter, subsequent to the
(A}, (S), (C) and (O) entr_es, the crtttcalfty and effects per the followtn9
example:
O'Z4_i/_4
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"Crtt 1 for RTLS - Loss lOf additional engine-vehicle loss"
or
"Crtt 1 for RTL$ - Incomplete propellant dump, stability problem,
probable vehlcle loss."
Where functional criticality ts 1R or 2R per paragraph 4.3.2 and
hardware cHticallty ts 3, the appropriate entry for "FIJHCTIONAL"
effects should be included. The "_NCT0_IAL" effects e_ relatlve to
the loss of a11 functlonal redundancy _11 be entered per the following
example:
(E) FUHCTIOHAL CRITICALITY EFFECT:
Possible less of crew/vehicle (specify) or probable loss of crew/
vehicle (describe) or loss of crew/vehicle.
4.1.17 (C39) TIME TO EFFECT:
Iwmedtate - less than 1 second
Seconds - I to 50 seconds
Minutes - 50 seconds to 50 minutes
Hours 50 minutes to 20 hours
Days 20 hours to mtsslon completion
Enter the descriptor which indicates shortest credible ttme or ttme range
available to correct the situation before the effect ts manifested.
)
4.1.18 (C40-45] FAILURE OETECTABLE: Enter "YES" or "riO" tn the block follo_ring "IN
FLIGHT" and "GROUNDTUPJ_AROUND". If either answer ts "YES', indicate how it
can be detectable -- symptoms, instrumentation, etc. Include masurement
number from HML (Master Heasurements List) where appltcible and available.
(See section 4.3.5, Znstrementatton FMEA's.) Development fllght fnstrt=nen-
ration (DFI} measurements wtll not be used as a means of detectability.
4.1.19 (J4gO} CORRECTING ACTION: Describe any action, automatic or manual, which
may be taken to circumvent the specified failure. Also tden_tfy any
alternate means (utilizing "unlike" hardware) of accomplishing the functton
performed by the ttem or its assembly. If none, so indicate.' For
instruments (sensors, transducers, etc.) that provtde measurements assessed
o246J/I5
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as crttfcal to vehtclelcrew safety or mtsston continuation, the FMEA shall
tdenttfy the redundant or alternate measurements by Heasureee.nt List
identtffcatton number.
4.1.20 (C77) NUMBEROF SUCCESS PATHS REMAINING AFTER FIP,3"T FAILURE: Wtth respect
to the ttem being evaluated, tndlcate the nm_ber of ways remaining to perform
the functton after the flret failure. You _ leave the block blank for
non-critical functions.
4.1.21 (C53, C55-S7} REDUNDANCYSCREEN: For all criticality 1R, 2 and 2R failure
modes (see FIGURE 8 and paragraphs 4.3.1 and 4.3.2} circle "P" (PASS}, "F"
(FAIL}, or "_b_" (NOT APPLICABLE} for each of the follovlng tests:
a. Redundant elemnts are capable of checkout during normal ground
turnaround _th no vehicle design modification. Where a subsystem ts
characterized by redundant strffngs and the sUtus of each strtng can be
verlfJed during ground turnaround, no individual c_onent(s) in any one
sl=-ing should be shown as fatling thts screen.
HO.___: This screen is no_t applicable under the following conditions:
(1) _rotechntc devices, excluding electrical control circuit..
( Z] llon-redundant t tee.
b. Loss of a redundant elemant is read|ly detectable durtng flight. Where
a subsystem is charactortzed by redundant strtngs and the s_atus of each
strtng can be vertfted tn _|ght, no Individual c_onent(s) tn any one
strtng should be shown as fatlln 9 this screen.
MOTE: Thts screen is not applicable under the follc_¢ing conditions:
(1} Standby redundancy (redundant paths ware only one path ts
operational at any gtven ttme).
(2} All functtona| paths of any subsystem which ts inoperative (during
such Inoperative periods). This groundrole does not apply if the
_redundant eleeents are operative during any normal mtsston phase;
i.e., the screen is constderod applicable if the ele_nt is
operettve dertng any normal mission phase.
(3} Pyrotechnic devices.
(4} Mechanical ltnkage.
(5) Non-redundant t tom.
(6} Subtter level redundant functional path(s) (power/control circuits,
etc., failures where the prtm_ functional path (LRU, etc.) ts
o=,4r_j_q6
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Criticality 1R3 or 2R3 and the primary redundancy would not be
degraded (i.e., loss of two of the subtter functtooal paths would
not result tn an abort decision).
Failure of an element to pass this screen should be In direct relation
to the noted failure mode under nomally expected envtrenmontal
conditions. Consideration of envtroementel extremes as caused which
could induce "multiple order failure" is 1trotted to abnormol conditions
generally resulting from some other failure. Where multiple fatlures
must first occur to result tn envtromental extremes, such events may be
considered non-credible. As a ground rule, tt may be assumed that
hardware items wtll be qualified and properly Installed to wlthstend the
"design-to" envtrenmentel envelope. The follmetng are typtcal questions
to be answered in this phase of the analysts:
(1) Contamination:
(a) Are the ttoms betn 9 evaluatod susceptible to contamination?
(b) Is contamination a credible event or does the design
(including ftltere) result tn this failure mode being
categorized as non-credible?
(2) Explosion:
(a) Is there a credible source?
(b) Hust other _Itlple failures occur first to result in the
exploston)
(c) Is the explosion catastrophic to crew or vehicle?
(d) Is the container frenglble?
(e) Are the Itms being considered susceptlble to this type of
damage In vlew of their physlcal charecterlstics and location;
t.e., shielding?
3. Temperature:
(a) Are components susceptible to damage or failure from high
_ temperature?
(b) Other than as a result of multiple failures, is such exposure
credible? This tmplies temperature peaks or sustained levels
sufficient to cause catastrophic effects on the component in a
short time. For example, temperature increases to certain
levels merely increase electronic parts failure rates - the
actual failure and time of occurrence are still
probabt 1 t sit c.
344
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d°
(4) Vibration, Shock, Acceleration, Acoustics, etc.:
(a) AssBoing that components are qualified and properly installed
to _thstand design environments, can a crodible cause be
identified which would cause these levels to be exceeded?
(b) Are vibration/shock/acceleration-sensitive redundant units
physically ortented or separated to reduce the chance of
multiple failure from the same cause(s) and is there
sufficient analysis and test data to verify the faflure as
non-credi ble?
(5) Fire:
Do not consider fire as one of the stngle events or causes in
failing screen "C'. NA_ has edicted that ftre not be considered
one of the events (NB/83-L 216).
If none of the redundancy screens are applicable, enter "NA" in the C53
field and br_efl_ explain reason for RD_RKS/1L_ZARDS.
Screening of Functional Crltlcallty 3 Failure Modes
(I) Where the failure modes have been tden¢tfted as non_:ritlcal for
loss of all redundancy (Criticality 3), enter "NA" in the C53
field. Enter under "REMARKS" the notation, "Criticality 3 failure
mode - loss of all redundancy would have no effect on'the mtsston
or crew/vehicle safety'. In such cases, mtnim,- entHes on Data
Sheet No. 2 consist of DI, LYi, LV2, LY3, C31, C53 and J240. For
functional Criticality 3 items, J240 must contain a brief
explanation regarding the assigned criticality.
(2) Where a component has an identified fail,re mode in the Criticality
1 of 2 category, and additional functional Criticality 3 failure
modes are identified, these Criticality 3 modes wtll be treated as
-_descrtbed in para. (1) above.
4.1.22 CRZTICALFTY:
a. (C54 - HARDMARE) - Enter 1, 2 or 3 based on the deftntl:Jons in section
2.0 and the 9round rules contained tn section 4.3.1 and Appendix B,
paragraph 3.1.1, sub-paragraph 1.
b. (C67 - FUNCTZONAL) - Enter 1, 2, 1R, 2I[ or 3 based on the definitions tn
section 2.0 and the ground rules contained tn section 4.3.2 and Appendix
B, paragraph 3.1.1, sub-paragraph 1.
_OA/_4 /'q ¢1
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4.1.23 (JSOO} REMARKS/HAZARDS: Identify potential hazards resulting from the
specified fatlure. Enter the words "Hazard Potential" followed by
appreprtate explanation and any other comments or recmmendattons that might
prove useful in evaluating the system. Indicate requtre_nts for additional
|nstroemntatton, and any other special consideration.
4.1.24 (O600) DISPOSITION ANO RATIONALE: For c_tJcalJty I and Z i1_s, a_/or IR,
2R Item that fatl a redundancy screen and/or hardware criticality 2 items
vhere the screen is NA, in all of the fono_ng categories 1:o descrtbe the
retention criteria. Each category must reflect a description of rettonele
for retefltton of the item:
a. Oestgn - Identification of design features which mtntmtze the occurrence
of the failure mode and causes.
b. Test - identification of spectftc tests eccompltshed to detec_ failure
mode and causes during acceptance tests, certification tests, and
checkou_ tests.
c. Inspection - Statement that spectfic Inspection points are included to
determine that spectftc failure mode causes are not Inadvertently
manufactured 1nta the hardware.
d. Failure History o Provide an Indication that the hardware or similar
hardware has been used successfully and that a history of generffc
failures does not exist. If the hardware ts new to thts progrem, so
state.
4.1.25 (C9. CIO) APPROVAL: Responsible Rellabtlt_ and Design approval signatures
as full _s:
a. Subsystem F_EA package: Oest gn_tet lahtlt ty Manager
b. Figure 2 (F'HEA) - PREPAII£D BY: Design Responsible
_ Reltabtl try Analyst' s Name
APPROVED BY: Destgn . Signature
Reliability (Anal)f st } Signature
C. Figure 3 (CIL) - APPROV[D BY: Design (Supervisor) : Signature
Reliability (Supervisor) Signature
NOTE: The tn_ttel issue of a CXL sheet _11 be signed by the Reliability
Supervisor. Signatures _ll not be requtred on subsequent issues
unless the CIL sheet is revised.
I_@AR¢ 71 O
64-420 0 - 86 - 12
4.2
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REVISIONS & SUBMITTALS
1. Revisions to the R4EA wtll be made as follows:
a. New Oate:
bo
(:.
(1)
(2)
To identify new c_onents or failure wxles, use the date
entry sheets and follow the instruction glven tn sectton 4.1.
To add information to a component or fatlure mode record,
etther a blank data sheet or the appropriate page of the data
printout working copy may be used.
(a) Data Entry Sheets - Using a blank data sheet, circle "R"
(Revise) on the "Date Identifier" line (DI, FIGURE 4 or
5) and enter the correct subsysl_n/component/(fatlure
mode) ID number to identify the record to whtch the
Information is to be added. Fill tn comlete blocks of
tnformtton to be added (e.g., Disposition block), and
submtt for keypuncht rig.
(b) Data Prtntout- Circle "R" (Revise) on the "Da_a
Identifier" line (DI. FIGURES 6 and 7) of the record to
which new tnfomatton is to be added. Using e colored
pen or pencil, en_r _he tnformtton in the approp_ate
blocks and submit for keypunch.
Data Entry Change:
Circle the "R" (Revise) on the "Onto Identfter" ltne (OI, FIGURE 4
or 5) and etther "_d-ltne" the appropriate sheet of the data
• printout or re-enter the data as tt shouId appear, using the
approprdate data entrj sheet as desc_bed tn section 4.2, paragraph
(a) Date (nt_ Sheets. To clear the "J" field of any remaining
unwanted tnfomatton, aster"lsk (*) the blank lines wtthtn the
block on the master record and supporting record work sheets.
Oata Deletion:
(1) To delete data, clrcle the "R" on the "Data Z_enttfter" ltne
(DI, FIGURE 6 or 7) of the appropriate data prdntout sheet,
cross out the entry to be deletod wtth a colored pen or penctl
024_J/20
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and submtt for keypunching. If a blank data sheet ts used,
enter an as_rtsk (*) in the block whtch cor_sponds to the
entt_ to be deleted.
(2) To delete the enttre record (i.e., all data pertaining to a
particular fa|lure mode or component) and ail relat_l entrtes,
circle the "D" (Delete} on the appropriate sheets of the data
prtnlmut. Again, ftll_ng out the data tdenttf|er 11ne of a
blank data sheet v111 acc_11sh the sme purpose. A11
_nfomat_on pe_tntng to a particular cmzponent or faflure
mode wt 11 be deleted.
d. Data Identifier Change:
TO change a data Identifier (LY1, 2 or 3), |t ts necessary to
delete the entire record under the old nw,ber and re-entrer (add)
under a new nw_ber. The sggg/revtston data on computer repots _s
aut_almd and prints the date of the latest update or re_is_on.
eQ Identification of Revtstons/Chan_es:
Identtfy each ltne changed _th a yerttcal black bar on the left-
hand margtn of the page.
2. R4F.A/CIL Sul_tttal
a.
(1)
(2)
Crlttcal Items Ltst (CIL)
Updates _ill tnclude the following:
Any new CZL |tems
Updates to existtng _tems havtng technical changes affecting
the follo_ng sections:
(a) functton
(b) failure mode
(C) failure effects
(d| crtttcal|ty
(e} abor_ crtUcal components
(f} fatlure detectability (redundancy screen) ""
Other changes _rlll be tn¢orporatod when pages are sul_ttted
for the above reasons.
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b, FMEA'S
Updates of the FMEA's rill be at stx uowr_ tntorvals 11nked to
nearest scheduled OIL FRIt publication. Only those changes related
to the CXL submittals (a_.above) and other t_cbetcal changes vtll ha
su_ttted.
4.3 tJ_IMJEt_TATIONSROUN9 RUL[S (See also Ap_endlx S - Ground Rules and Crltet_s)
4.3.1 HQJtOW_ C_ITTCAL_ OETEPJNINAT_ON
Hardware criticality u411 be detot_ne_ by ?.he catogorlzat.ton of the singular
effect of the Identified failure mode on the subsys'cem/vehtcle (See FIGURI[
10), FIGURE 8 Illustrates the analytical logtc for c_ttcalt_ detomtnatton
of all fuoctlonal hardware.
1° Reltablltw (ngtnee_ng Identifies ba_ware Mlere tf redundancy falls
the effect would be critical.
Zo Reliability and Design Engineering jotntly tdenttfy those equipments
vith (single point) criticality 1 or 2 fatlure modes. Those equtl_ents
that are not crltlca11_y I because they incorporate redundancy are then
screened further, as described tn paragraph 4.I.21, and appropriate
ent_tes made tn the F/4EA data' sheet.
3.
024_1/22
NOTE: The criticality of instrumentation and test por_s w111 be
assessed according to their function. Test ports, vhen capped, shall be
t_eated as a stru¢_ral pa_- of the component and not be considered
further. _/here tns_men?.atlon (e,g., pressure trsnsducer) penetrates
the wall of a component or llne and structural fsilure of the Joint
would result in gross leakage, the fatlu_ mode shall be considered as a
re/lure of the component or _tne. The c_'lttcal/ty of the Instrument-
ation, therefore, _ould no_c be affected tn such tnmnces.
/
The crtttcalt1:_ of those syst--ms which a_e to be used only In the event
of an emergency shall be established strtctly on the basis of direct
failure effect on crew, vehicle, or mtss/on, regardless of the n_ber of
prior fatlu_es vhtch must occur before the use of the system ts required.
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All other backup or standby equipment (e.g., reltef valves, cross-feed
valves, etC.) shall I_-asstgned crlttca|lt_ in the norm| manner.
4.3.2 _CTZONN. CRZTICALIT¥ I)ETERMXt(ATION
Functional criticality vrlll be determined by the categorization of the effect
an the subsystm/vehtcle of loss of all redundancy (ltke or unlike) for the
ldenttftnd failure mode (See FIGURE 10). F_GURE 8 t11ust_tes the analyl:tcal
'" 1ogtc for crttlcalt_¥ detemtnatton of a11 functional hardware.
1. Reltabtltt:.y [ngtneerdng tdenttfles hardware tf all 11ke or unlike
redundancy fatls the effect would be critical.
2. Reliability and Design Engineering Jotntly tdenttfy those equipments
with crtttcaltt_y 1R or ?.R fatlure modes.
4.3.3 CI1. COHT[HT CRZT_RIA
1. The follo_ng classification of fatlure modes _r111 be entered in the CIL:
a. All funct|onal/llardware criticality category 1/1's, 2/2's, and
IR2's. -,
b. Ali c_tlcallty categor,.t IR3's and 2R3's that fall one or more
redundancy screens.
c. All failure modes that become c_ttcaltty category 1/1 during
intact abort.
2. CZL Se_tton 12.0 - Crtttcal Items List orbiter modifications 1;o support
spectal _lsstons:
This sectton of the Critical Ztems Lts_ contains those critical I_ems
associated vtth Orbiter subsystems that have been added to or modified
by Orbiter Htsston Ktts to suppor_ spectal missions. These CIL items
_11 only apply to specific vehicle mtsstons as noted lh this spectftc
CZL subsection.
This CZL section contains the single fatlure points and criticality 1R
and 2R CIL ttms identified by the Failure Mode Effects Analysis (F_)
conducted on the Orbt_:er subsystems that have been added to or =odtfied
0246,1/23
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1:o support spectal m/sston application. These vehtcle changes are
tdenttfled by tndlvtdual Kiss/on gtts whtch are Installed spectf/ca)ly
for these spectal ntss|ons and would be removed when th_ etsston
objectives have been achieved. Each veh/cle change ts |danttfted by a
Mas_er Change Record (HCA) and ts referenced /n the applicable FMEA.
Each crlttcal fatlure uncle Identified tn the vehtcle mod/ftcat/on
sect/on ts categorized on a separate Crttlcal Items LJst for_ which
includes the fatlure causes, effects, and rat.Inhale for retention. CIL
dtsposfttons and rettonale are con'ca/ned on |ndtvtdual CZL sheets and
those that are generally applicable to ali components are conts/ned tn
Sectton 3.0.
A cr/ttcal 1terns 1/st smeary ts _ncluded for each major vehtcle
madtf/catton. Addtttans v111 be made to th/s CZL sect/on to ma|ntatn
thls docment cu_ent vdth the vehtcle flight configuration. CZL page
revisions are tndtcal_d by revision date.
NOTE: Prtor to each CZL subcntttal, nottf)" the CZL coordinator of any |nput to
CIL Sectton 12.0.
4.3.4
h.
0246J/24
MECHANI CAL/ELECTRI CAL IHTERFACZ
For mechan|cal componen_.s havtng an electrical Interface, the mechan|cal FHEA
rill consfder on1¥ the effects of "black box" funct/onal fatlure {e.g., loss
of output, premature stgnal, etc.). Where It becomes necessary to conduct an
FHEA vlthtn the "bleck box" because ot' the asstgned criticality (1 or 2), the
R4EA v111 be conducted by Avtontcs Rellab/1tty who w111 be provtded with the
follovlng fnfomatton fn the machantcal I=HEA _<ja_ltn9 the fatlure effects on
the mechanical system:
a. Enter under "CAUSE" (J380), each applicable failure mode of the electro-
machantcal device reflecttng the avtontcs malfunction caustng the
failure mode; i.e., loss of elect_cal power, premature;electrical
st gnal, e_.
t
Zdenttf), under "REFERENC_ DOCt_MENT$"(C11-14), the spectftc mechanical/
av_ontcs _ntertrace.
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The electrical interface FHEA will be included in the appropriate section of
the avtontcs FI_.A. For criticality 1. 1R. 2 or 2R failure modes, the
mechanical FH£A, which considers the effect of "black box" loss of function,
will indicate in the "R]D_ARKS" sec_lon the avtottcs _ number of the "black
box". The avionics F14EAof _'.e "black box" will contain a similar reference
to the appropriate mechanical F74£A. At the earllest point tn time when the
mechanical analyst can ascertain that the "black box" is criticality 1, 1R, 2
"or 2R, it shall he his responsibility to convey to the Avionics Rellabilt_
group copies of his worksheets to facilitate initiation of detailed avionics
analysts effort.
4.3.5 I_ISTRUI_HTATIOH FHF__'S
Instrumentation (e.g., sensors, signal conditioners, etc.) may be provided by
either Avionics Inst_=entatton or by a specific Oestgn group. Zn either
case. instrumentation F74_'s will be included in the FHF.A for the using
subsys_=. Criticality 3 tnstr_nt.ltion may be listed on one FI_, fore by
f_lly or type. _'s for criticality 1 or 2 and criticality lltand 2R
Inst.-umentatlon that fail a redundancy screen or the screen is "HA', Nll be
completed In their entirety and included in the using subsystem CIL.
Avionics Reliability will provide support as required to identify failure
modes, retention rationale, etc.
A copy of each Instr_uentatlon _E_ completed by a Hechanlcal Reliability
group will be provided to Avionics Reliability.
4.4 SUPPI.IER FHU UTILIZATION
4.4.1 nrHERAL
In many instances, depending on the cost, cm_lexlty, and state of
development of the design, suppliers will be required to develop and submit
FH_'s reflecting their area of design responsibility. The submissions will
precede the Joint suppller_ockwell _R or _R. (See the applicable PORD for
content requlremennts and submittal schedules.) FIr_URE 9 sh_ws the overall
supplier _ flow as related to the in-house effort.
0246J/25
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4.4. Z FMEA U'TILFZATION
Upon receipt of a suppl|er FHEA, the responsible RSA w]ll compare the
Identified fallure modes with those called out on his corresponding subsystem
FM_ andupdate hls FMEA as requtred (see sectton 4.2) to include any fatlure
nodes not already identified relating to subsysl_em effect. Supplier FMEA's
will be reviewed for stngle fatlure points below the black box level by
"Rnck_11 and analyzed for corrective action directly with the supplier as
pare of thetr design review. Where Rnckwe11 does not concur with portions of
the supplier analysis, telephone contact with the supplier Reliability
Engineer normally should suffice to resolve any differences. If not, the
mat"Cer shall be resolved through normal Rockwell data handling procedures.
Supplier black boxes will be identified in the subsystem FHEA based on the
supplier schematic or drawing part identification number. For criticality 1
or 2 and 1R or 2R (CIL only) electronic black boxes, the piece parts (or if
all or many circuits, so state) identified by the supplier FHEA which are
single point failures that have a dtrect critical effect on the vehicle will
be described with reference to the suppller FMEA tn the "CAUSE" section of
the applicable failure mode identified at the subsystem level. Pares will be
listed only in Pose cases where less than five parts are involved.
4.5 ELEHEbIT CO_TRACTORF14EACORRELATIO_i
Requirements and procedures for conducting interfacing analyses and for
element integration tasks are contained tn Reliability Desk Instruction lO0-12
(Shuttle Element Interface).
4.6 GFE
For ttees identified as GFE hardware, ItASA wfll identify those which require
FHEA's and will perform F'HEA's on the hardware identified to the level defined by
their ground rules. Upon completion of the F'W.A, tlASA will provide Rockwell with a
copy. In addition to the completed copy, a preliminary copy may b_ transmitted.
Upon receipt of the GFE FHEA, Rockwell wtll evaluate the interface effects on the
Orbiter defined by the'GTE FHEA.
oz46j lZ6
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Appropriate c_maents shall be tncluded to insure that thts area is correct
and ccx_plete. Rock_ll _11 conduct Ft_.JCs for all interfaces be_-deen (:rE and
(grE. Tile Rockwell F_IEA wtll consider all failure modes constslmnt'_dth thts desk
Instruction. The analysis ts to consider as a "CAUSE" any failure mode Identified
by the GFE FFF.A whtch could produce a fatlure in the CFE interface. Where GFE
fatlures are identified as a "CAUSE', the appropriate GlrE FMEA and docuaent number
shall be identified as a part of the "CAUSE" section. In addition, those vehtcle
failures _tch could cause FFF.J_failure modes wall1 be identified to HA_ in the
comenl_ to the GFE FMEA. Where structural failures are identified, appropriate
hazards analyses shall be included in available.
The accountability of ClL items for _E will be NASA. nose ClL items
resulting fro_ interface failure modes will be a part of the Rockwell Cli.
[xceptlons to this instruction will be identified and concurred In Jointly by
Rockwell and _ and documented as a part of letters of agreMent.
0246J/27
314
---- "} ooo0oo 1,-, • " L.=._
t_==, \ _-" ) I----:===I I
I_ \_i__._ j • i • -" . .< . { . J
,I.==I _. :
@li
I-'_=_L I - - I=-_'!,
l_e_l"--'-- _ \ I_-_i.I
: _ 1•I_ZT_II
DI No. IO0_."F '
_a_,_" _/
355
01 NO. 100-2G
Page 29 of 34
il_ p_ i i _II illll - ill
ISlmlLl | It Ill -+ • :I:
l+,.Jl¢l fill 4Wl
._.:,,.": _ _:,_,::_,%,._.. _._. -
o ¢1
s el latll otall eAIII_slII_r/
• Ui_ i l=.OiS _ ¢-III
lllll¢lli,Jl, m l_li.llhCW • IIIII II IPlqllll Ol
IlUPIIII lltll ¢m
' II$
141 fl"
l_a
_l_|s
Ftgure Z. FHEA
¢14
.Ns
Im ivlmm i
o
eJ
i
4ii
lh_lli qW+ICIt._I, llllm UlT o mm_
• • 41=,(11 _ C..O+/
356
toni.rue _lmmml pil,i, 8_wA am i,r _ o
eu_qel a _ o,a,w - _ qmm,.icdu noao
D] No. 100-2G
Page 30 of 34
_J,na_mJeJ.D oa.mJJ .. __lawlo
m
a ,,, .... - .................
enm
m
mmm
!
°. •
JB_. M'''" ............
m ................ , ..... ,i,
m
cu .........................
oa ............... _ .........
......... j
Figure 4.
m
Data Sheet NO. 1
_eA dnmHm, m _.e,el
tlUIUI_ cm
I
Jan
umw_r_l _J_rg_t_ll AUguStA mU81U_ |
_ lUU_a0 _IA. 6_ _ _ aaOug_-r
mmmlul ....:... memm
tJZJUmb Noumma aamw_ue emm nmmm,_ _
.ml
m
_m
Jm
_nmul me_m
wao m
m ...... _1_ wmmmm_* lel_
m ...... _n _ w,R_ mmmmem_"J
mmmmww m_
m .... . __l ° .
am
m,
_4 m
m .....
m
mm_,,_mmmmmm • _ m
a._( e.,'AI
_w I'i . e.. - e.
Data Sheet No. 2
a Dv
Figure 5.
357
OI No. IO_2F
Page 31 of 34
N I • , • D WiJ_|_ *•tl| I_wll*it u, liJ •
|
L
r
mmi4c_am _Q
a I, Imm_.sb
_pcdm,(.l _(,,
..... t-.l
(ilI
(ill
I
m,.w_1m
(mT
l.t._*..l_t.,*n.m,mm
ilIIIImD ¢Jlll
Figure 6. Data Prlntout, C_on_t-Related Data
Figure 7. Data Printout, Failure H_de*Related Data
358
DI No. 700-21 r
Page 32 of' 34__
• ° , o
1
0 _0_
_n
!
359
01 No. lO0-2F
Page 33-of 34
\
I
360
CRITICALITY CATEGORY
CROSS REFERENCE TABLE
DI No. 100-2F
Page 34 of 34
LEVEL OF
FUNCTION ./ REDUNDANCY
LIFE OR / •
VEHICLE /AE NOESSENTIAL DUNDANCY
HISSION / ltO
ESSENTIAL/REDUNDANCY
LIFE OR /VEHICLE DUAL
ESSENTIAL/ REDUNDANCY
LIFE OR /
VEHICLE / "TRIPLE
ESSENTIAL/ REDUNDANCY
ALL
ALL NON- /LEVELS OF
E$$ENTIAL/ REDUNDANCY,
BLOCK
DIAGRM4
i
-L-El-- -
CRITICALITY
•CATEGORY
FUNCTIONAL
DEFINITIONS
I
(CIL)
Z
(CIL)
IR
(CIL)
.PASSED I FAILEDSCREEN SCREEN
•2R 2R
(CIL)
IR IR
(CiL)
2R 2R
(CIL)
HARDWARE
DEFINITIONS
l
(CZL)
2
(CIL)
2
(CIL)
FIGURE 10
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"FAILURE EFFECTS
(A) ON FUNCTION OR SUBSYSTEM:
NO _ttect
• Loss of Redundancy
• Functional Degradation
• Subsystem Oegradation
• Loss of Function
• Loss of Subsystem
(B) ON INTERFACE FUNCTIONS OR SUBSYSTEMS:
" No Effect
• Loss of Interface Redundancy
• Degradation of Interface Function
• Degradation of Interface Subsystem
• Loss of Interface Function
• Loss of Subsystem
(C) ON MISSION:
NO Lffect
• See Note Below for Criticality 2 Modes
•Mtssion Modlflcatlon
• Loss of Entry Capability - Rescue
(0) ON CREW/VEHICLE:
• No Lrtect
• Possible Loss of Crew/Vehicle (Specify)
• Probable Loss of Crew/Vehicle (Conditions)
• Loss of Crew/Vehicle
NOTE: The following instruction is intended to clartfy what should be entered in
the FMEA/CIL under "EFFECTS ON MISSION" (item C under entry J240) for identified
criticality Z failure modes.
Criticality 2 failure (modes) are defined as: (1) stngIe failures which would
cause "loss of mission", and (2) failures wherein the next associated failure would
cause loss of crew/vehicle (Appendix B, Section 3.1.1, Ground Rules, subparagraph
1).
The following chart (Mission Effects - Criticality 2 Failure Modes) is included as
a guideline for entries under "EFFECTS ON MIsSInN". The term "abort decision"
should only be used where there really is a decision.
0246j/28
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3.0 GROUXDRULES ANO CRITERIA ..
The following ground rules and crtte_a are of a general category for
guldance, as appIlcable, In conducting and interpreting an FM_. The appllcable
greu,d rules and cHterfla will be a part of the information which prefaces each
FLEA. (See section 3.2, FMEA Content.)
3.1 G£NERAL GROUNORULES AND CRITERIA
3.1.1 GROUNURULES
1, Criticality definitions are those delineated in NHB 5300.4 (10-1), as
Illustrated in FIGURE 10 (Criticality Category Cross Reference Table}.
For the purpose of this analysts, hardware crffttcallty 2 is further
defined; i.e., dual redundancy where:
a. The first failure would result tn loss of mission.
b. The next related failure would result in loss of life/vehicle.
2. Criticality 1R and 2R assumes failure of all like and unlike redundancy:
A backup item, tf when tt is called upon to work, performs a function
different from the item it is backing up, it should be classified based
upon the effect tf it. does not work when operated. If the backup item
performs the same function as the item it ts backing up, the backup
should be classified as an unlike redundant item,
3. Loss of mission is defined as follows:
a. Operation payload interface hardware failure as it would result tn
loss of payload primary performance.
b. " Orbiter subsystem failure as it would result in unplanned mission
termination for non-safety of flight reasons.
4,
5,
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Categorization of a hardware item by the worst case potential effect of
fallure of that item will define criticality.
Failure modes that could propagate to interfacing subsystems or
experiments will be identified.
6.
7e
8.
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When deftntng FMEA's/CIL for a particular subsys_, Interfacing
subsyslmms wtll be considered to be operating vlthtn thetr specified
talerances.
GFI[ _ data rill be uttllzed tn evaluating the GFl[/Rockw11
Tntarnattonal |ntarfaces for the vehtcle FMEA and CZL.
FaJlure det_ctabtl|l;y assumes the avatlab11_j of talemetry or a cretan
responding to monitored displays. FaJ1ure detectabJlt_y also assumes
other lans of faJlure detactlon, where feasible, such as a crew
response to physical sttmol|; t.e., me11, sound, etc.
9. Spectftc FMEA c_terda and assumptions w111 be deftnecl for each
subsystem.
.10_. Tdentical cc_ponenl:s used for different functions _111 be treated
separately |n the FMF._.
11. Simultaneous fatlure of redundant components ts tdenttftnd where the
fatlure cause encompasses both componenl_.
12. Subsystem analysts _11 tnclude an evaluation of the effects of
lnstrumentatlon failure upon/w_thtn the subsystem.
13. External Leakage:
a. The external leakage =ode =f functional hardware items from any
source (except mating of t_o surfaces by weldtng, braztng, or
pemaswage) vill be considered. If thts mode raises the
crtttcaltl_y of the 1terns in question, tt wtll be docu=ented and the
potential leak source identified under "CAUSE{S)'.' Otherwise, the
external leakage wtll be treated generically by medta. However, tn
those instances where external leakage results tn _ hardware
crtttcal|ty 1 effec_c, the fatlure =ode wtll be docu=ented
regardless of the bastc criticality of the tlmm being considered.
iJhere appHcable, seal fatlure should be listed as a cause and
werst case (co,_lete seal failure) shall be ass,_ed, considering
365
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also any restrictive protection provided by bar_e( design, where
such data are available from Oestgn. Hazards assoctatad with the
loss of /quid In excess of requirements wtll be docmuentad and
covered by Hazard Analysts, but v!11 not affect criticality (see
section 3.3, paragraph 4.)
bo The tn_ernal leak mode of functional hardware items will be
considered. In those Instances where internal leakage could result
in a hardware criticality 1 or 2 failure mode effect (fat1 open or
fail closed due to pressure lockup), "lntereal leakage" shall be
entered tn the "CAUSE" section of the most appropriate identified
failure mode entry in lteu of "cause" is acceptab|e.
C° Where extareal or tntarnal leak paths are pretected by static or
dynamic redundant (verifiable) seals, the leak path effect will be
reduced by one criticality level.
de Pressure carriers (lines, pressure vessels) _rlll be classified by
worst case mode including extarnal leakage. Lines will be entered
generically for each independent media. Special lines (i.e.,
mechanical bellows, flex lines, etc.] _11 be entered
individually. Tanks wtll be entered individually.
14. The fatlure of any tank containing fluid media which, due to tts
lucatton in an enclosed vehicle compar_nt, could cause comparl:aent
overpressu_zatton leading to structural failure (vehicle loss) will be
classified hardware criticality I for tank rupture mode.
15. All lineswi11 be designated the criticality applicable to the
functional loss effect resulting from loss of medium with notation in
the "REMARKS" section of the FMEA as to the potential hazard due to
comparl:nent overpressurization resulting from line rupture. The main
engine cryogenic feedltnes will be treated as fluid tanks.
0246,1/32
366
2.
o2_j/33
D% No. 100-2G
APPENOIX 8
Page 4of 6
The F14(A and CZL rill constdar fatlures beginning with prefllght/pre-
launch opersttons through post landing seftngs at Edwards Atr Force
8ase/Xennedy Space Center ((AFB/KSC).
e. Prelnunch operations at KSC/YAF8 are defined as beginning vith
propellant load|ng for each spac|ftc propulsion subsystem. For all
other subsystems, prolaunch opersttons cmmence vith start of main
engtne conditioning.
b. Post landtng seflng opersttons Include those activities performed
after landtng to prepare the orbiter for hangar operations and are
deftned as fellers:
(1) Oeservlce and dratnlng of hazardous fluids.
(2) Saftng of unused ordnance.
(3) Application of ground power and cooling.
(4) Removal of potentially hazardous components.
(5) Ruoval of pods and payloada.
(5) Purgtng and venttng of gases.
(7) %ns_:allatton of protective covers.
Redundancy is defined 'as the use of more than one means of accon_ltshtng
a given task or functton where all must fat1 before there |s an overall
fa|lure of the function.
a. Operstlonal Redundancy - redundant elements, all of whtch are fully
energized durtng the subsystem operat|ng cycle. Opersttonal
redundancy tncludes load shartng redundancy wherein redundant
elements are connected in such a manner that, upon fatlure of one
_untt, the remaining redundant elements vtll continue to perform the
subsystem function. It is not necessary to svltch'out the fatled
element nor to switch tn the redundant elment.
b. Standby Redundancy - redundant elements that are non-operative
(t.e., have no power applted) untt1 they are swt1_hed tnto the
subsystem upon fatluare of the prdmry element. In these cases, as
wall as pyrotechnic devtces, mechanical 1tnkage and Inoperative
367
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functional paths df any subsystem, redundancy screen Sis
considered not applicable and so marked. This approach is based on
the fact thatthese areas are subject to ground checkout; they are
redundant and therefore provide a degree of protection tn flight;
it ts conflmed that when called upon to operate, the inability to
operate would be detected in flight for appropriate corrective
action.
3. Where redundancy extsts tn the subsystem, the redundancy ts considered
du_ng the analysis of a failure of the c_onent.
4. "Alternate means of operation" refers to accemp]tshment of a functton
and not necessarily to redundancy or restoration of a failed function.
5e
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Mhen fire hazards resulting from shore ctrcutts or other hardware
failure modes are Identified. consideration _11 be given to the effect
of fire propagation to adjacent redundant equipment as a potential loss
of the function.
Potential safety concerns created by component failure modes wtll be
identified and handled through Hazards Analyses as required by EOH 70
1-4.2.5 and by HHB 5300.4 (1D-l}.
Reference documents In the FMEA tnclude released and controlled
engineering drawings or specifications, when available.
The following are used as aids in determining the fatlure modes and
causes of subsystem hardware failures:
a. Generic failure modes and causes.
b. Released and controlled component, assembly, and detail engtnee_ng
draftings and specifications.
c. Training aids, as available; e.g., cross section dra_ngs,
photographs, exploded dra_ngs (not referenced tn FMEA).
d. Actual hardware, if available.
e. Use experience, Including failure htsto_J and similar components.
368
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f. Controlled and re|eased operational procedures.
g. Component F14[A's prepared by component suppliers.
Fatlure of structural |tms (primary and secondary) rill not be
considered as a part of thts ananysts. (Structu_1 trims an ass_ed to
be destgned to preclude fatlure by use of adequate destgn sefet¥
fect.ors.)
g. FIa_'s of crtttca11_ 1 or 2 "black boxes" providing electrical s_gnal
|nt_r_ace to mchantcal components are tncluded tn the applicable
avtontcs F74_, package _th appropriate cr_ss-referenctng tn the
"RE--CA[ DOCI_EHT$" sectton of both the appropriate av_ontcs and
mochan|csl FNEA _port, vhere available.
10. The fatlure mode "Fails to Operate" rill not be addressed for fuses.
Use of a fuse _th a htgher currenT, capactt_ then specified (wrong stze
|ns_11ed or rattng _stdent.tf_ed) ts not considered a fuse failure
mode.
024_/3S
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Designation: D 395 - 85
AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR TESTING AND MATERIALS
1916 RSOI St., Philadelphia, Pa..19103
Reprinted from the Annull Book of AiS_M Standards. Cooyrigh! ASTM
If not lilted in the current cumbinecl index, will aPlOea( in the next edition.
Standard Test Methods for
RUBBER PROPERTYmCOMPRESSION SET 1
This standard is issued under the fixed designation D 395; the number immediately following the designation indicates the year of
original adoption or, in the case of revision, the year of _ revision. A number in parentheses indicates the year of _ reapproval.
A superscnpt cpsilon (,) indicates an editorial change ,dncc the lasl revision or reaPtl_OVal.
These method_ have been approved for use by agencies of the DepanmelU of Defense and for listing in the DoD Index Of Specifications
and Standards
1. Scope
1.1 These test methods cover the testing of
rubber intended for use in applications in which
the rubber will be subjected to compressive
stresses in air or liquid media. They are applica-
ble particularly to the rubber used in machinery
mountings, vibration dampers, and seals. Two
methods are covered as follows:
Sec-
Method lion
A---Compression Set Under Constant Force 7-10
in Air
B--Compression Set Under Constant Define- 11-14
lion in Air
1.2 The choice of method is optional, but
consideration should be given to the nature of
the service for which correlation of test results
may be sought. Unless otherwise stated in a
detailed specification, Method B shall be used.
1.3 Method B is not suitable for vulcanizates
harder than 90 IRHD.
1.4 The values stated in SI units arc to be
regarded as the standard.
1.5 This standard may involve hazardous ma-
terials, operations, and equipment. This standard
does not purport to address all of the safety prob-
lems associated with its use. It is the responsibil-
ity of whoever uses this standard to consult and
establish appropriale safety and health practices
and determine the applicability of regulatory limi-
tations prior to use,
2. Applicable Documents
2.1 ASTM "Standards.
D 1349 Practice for Rubber--Standard Tem-
peratures and Atmospheres for Testing and
Conditioning 2
D 3040 Practice for Preparing Precision State-
ments for Standards Related to Rubber and
Rubber Testing 2
D 3182 Practice for Rubber--Materials,
Equipment, and Procedures for Mixing
Standard Compounds and Preparing Stand-
ard Vulcanized Sheets 3
D 3183 Practice for Rubber--Preparation of
Pieces for Test Purposes from Products 3
D 3767 PPactice for Rubber--Measurement of
Dimensions 3
E 145 Specification for Gravity-Convection
and Forced-Ventilation Ovens 4
NOTE l--The specific dated edition of Practice
D 3040 that prevails in this document is referenced in
the Precision section.
3. Summary of Methods
3.1 A test specimen is compressed to either a
deflection or by a specified force and maintained
under this condition for a specified time and at
a specified temperature.
3.2 The residual deformation of a test speci-
men is measured 30 men after removal from a
suitable compression device in which the speci-
men had been subjected for a definite time to
compressive deformation under specified condi-
tions.
3.3 After the measurement of the residual de-
formation, the compression set as specified in the
' These lest methods are under the jurisdiction of ASTM
Committee D- t I on Rubber and are the direct responsibility of
Subcommittee D I I, l0 on Phy_cal Testing.
Current edition approved Sept. 27, 1985. Published Novem-
ber 1985_ Originally published as D 395- 34. Last p_vious
edition D 395 - 84.
z Annual Bt_Jk of ASTM Standards, Vols 09.01 and 09.02.
Annual Bt_k of ASTM Standards, Vol 09.01.
' Annual B_uJ,_ of ASTM Standards, Vol 14.02.
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appropriate method, is calculated according to
Eqs ( 1) and (2).
4. Significance and Use
4. l Compression set tests are intended to mea-
sure the ability of rubber compounds to retain
elastic properties after prolonged action of com-
pressive stresses. The actual stressing service may
involve the maintenance of a definite deflection,
the constant application of a known force, or the
rapidly repeated deformation and recovery re-
suiting from intermittent compressive forces.
Though the latter dynamic stressing, like the
others, produces compression set, its effects as a
whole are simulated more closely by compression
flexing or hystersis tests. Therefore, compression
set tests are considered to be mainly applicable
to service conditions involving static stresses.
Tests are frequently conducted at elevated tem-
peratures.
5. Test Specimens
5.1 Specimens from each sample may be
tested in duplicate (Option 1) or triplicate (Op-
tion 2). The compression set of the sample in
Option I shall be the average of the two speci-
mens, expressed as a percentage. The compres-
sion set of the sample in Option 2 shall be the
median (middle most value) of the three speci-
mens expressed as a percentage.
5.2 The standard test specimen shall be a cy-
lindrical disk cut from a laboratory prepared slab.
5.2.1 The dimensions of the standard speci-
mens shall be:
Type IA 2J
Thickness.mm(in.) 12.5+ 0.5 (0.49 6.0 ± 0.2 (0.24
± 0,02) ± o.oi)
Diameter.mm (in.) 29.0 ± 0.5 (I.14 13.0 ± 0.2 (0.51
± 0.02) ± 0.01)
Type I specimenis usedin MethodsA and B.
"ryp¢ 2 specimenis u*edin MethodB.
5.2.2 When cutting the standard specimen,
the circular die having the required inside dimen-
sions specified in 5.2.1 shall be rotated in a drill
press or similar device and lubricated by means
of a soap solution. A minimum distance of 13
mm (0.51 in.) shall be maintained between the
cutting edge of the die and the edge of the slab.
The cutting pressure shall be as light as possible
to minimize cupping of the Cut edges. The dies
shall be maintained carefully so that the cutting
edges are sharp and free of nicks.
D 395
5.3 An optional method of preparing the
standard specimen may be the direct molding of
a circular disk having the dimensions required
for the method used and specified in 5.2.1.
NOTE 2--11 should be recognized that an equal time
and temperature, if used for both the slab and molded
specimen, will not produce an equivalent state of cure
in the two types of specimen. A higher degree of cure
will be obtained in the molded specimen. Adjustments,
preferably in the time of cure. must be taken into
consideration if comparisons between the specimens
prepared by different methods are to be considered
valid.
NOTV 3--It is suggested, for the purpose of uniform-
ity and closer tolerances in the molded specimen, that
the dimensions of the mold be specified and shrinkage
compensated for therein. A two-plate mold with a
cavity 13.0 :t: 0.1 mm (0.510 + 0.004 in.) in thickness
and 29.20 + 0.05 mm (I.148 + 0.002 in.) in diameter.
with overflow grooves will provide Type I specimens
for Method A and Method B.A similar mold but having
a cavity of 6.3 + 0.3 mm (0.25 ± 0.012 in.) in thickness
and 13.2 :t:0.1 mm (0.52 + 0.004 in.) in diameter will
provide Type 2 specimens for Method B.
5.4 When the standard test specimen is to be
replaced by a specimen taken from a vulcanized
rubber part of greater thickness than the one
indicated in 5.2.1, the sample thickness shall be
reduced first by cutting transversely with a sharp
knife and then followed by buffing to the required
thickness in accordance with Practice D 3183.
5.5 An alternative method of preparing spec-
imens is by plying up cylindrical disks cut from
a standard sheet prepared in accordance with
Practice D 3182 using the specimen sizes speci-
fied in 5.2.1 and cutting as described in 5.2.2.
5.5.1 The disks shall be plied, without ce-
menting, to the thickness required. Such plies
shall be smooth, flat, of uniform thickness, and
shall not exceed seven in number for Type 1
specimens and four in number for Type 2 speci-
mens.
5.5.2 Care shall be taken during handling and
placing of the plied test specimen in the test
fixture by keeping the circular faces parallel and
at right angles to the axis of the cylinder.
5.5.3 The results obtained on plied specimens
may be different from those obtained using solid
specimens and the results may be variable, par-
ticularly if air is trapped between disks.
5.5.4 The results obtained on the specimens
prepared by one of the methods may be com-
pared only to those prepared by the same
method.
5.6 For routine or product specification test-
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ing, it is sometimes more convenient to prepare
specimens of a different size or shape, or both.
When such specimens are used, the results should
be compared only with those obtained from spec-
imens of similar size and shape and not with
those obtained with standard specimen. For such
cases, the product specification should define the
specimen as to the size and shape. If suitable
specimens cannot be prepared from the product,
the test method and allowable limits must be
agreed upon between the producer and the pur-
chaser.
6. Conditioning
6.1 Store all vulcanized test specimens or
product samples to be tested at least 24 h but not
more than 60 days. When the date of vulcaniza-
tion is not known, make tests within 60 days
after delivery by the producer of the article rep-
resented by the specimen.
6.2 Allow buffed specimens to rest at least 30
min before specimens are cut for testing.
6.3 Condition all specimens before testing for
a minimum of 3 h at 23 ± 2"C (73.4 ± 3.6"1=).
Specimens whose compression set properties are
affected by atmospheric moisture, shall be con-
ditioned for a minimum of 24 h in an atmosphere
controlled to 50 ± 5 % relative humidity.
METHOD A--COMPRESSION SET UNDER
CONSTANT FORCE IN AIR
7. Apparatus
7. I Dial Micrometer--A dial micrometer, for
measuring specimen thickness, in accordance
with Practice 3767, Method A I.
7.2 Compression Device, consisting of a force
application spring and two parallel compression
plates assembled by means of a frame or threaded
bolt in such a manner that the device shall be
portable and self-contained after the force has
been applied and that the parallelism of the plates
shall be maintained. The force may be applied in
accordance with either 7.2.1 or 7.2.2.
7.2.1 Calibrated Spring Force Application--
The required force shall be applied by a screw
mechanism for compressing a calibrated spring
the proper amount. The spring shall be of
properly heat-treated spring steel with ends
ground and perpendicular to the longitudinal
axis of the spring. A suitable compression device
is shown in Fig. 1. The spring shall conform to
the following requirements:
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7.2.1.1 The spring shall be calibrated at room
temperature 23 ± 5"C (73.4 ± 9"F) by applying
successive increments of force not exceeding 250
N (50 Ib0 and measuring the corresponding de-
flection to the nearest 0.2 mm (0.01 in.). The
curve obtained by plotting the forces against the
corresponding deflections shall have a slope of
70 ± 3.5 kN/m (400 ± 20 Ibf/in.) at 1.8 kN (400
lb0. The slope is obtained by dividing the two
forces above and below 1.8 kN by the difference
between the corresponding deflections.
7.2.1.2 \The original dimensions of the spring
shall not change due to fatigue by more than 0.3
mm (0.01 in.) after it has been mounted in the
compression device, compressed under a force of
1.8 kN (400 Ibf), and heated in the oven for one
week at 70"C ± 2"C (158 ± 3.6"F). in ordinary
use, a weekly check ofthe dimensions shall show
no greater change than this over a period of I
year.
7.2.1.3 The minimum force required to close
the spring (solid) shall be 2.4 kN (530 Ib0.
7.2.2 External Force Application--The re-
quired force shall be applied to the compression
plates and spring by external means after the test
specimen is mounted in the apparatus. Either a
calibrated compression machine or known
masses may be used for force application. Pro-
vision shall be made by the use of bolts and nuts
or other devices to prevent the specimen and
spring from losing their initial deflections when
the external force is removed. The spring shall
have essentially the same characteristics as de-
scribed in 7.2. I, but calibration is not required.
A suitable compression device is shown in Fig.
2.
7.3 Plates--The plates between which the test
specimen is compressed shall be made of steel of
sufficient thickness to withstand the compressive
stresses without bending. The surfaces against
which the specimen is held shall have a highly
polished chromium-plated finish and shall be
cleaned thoroughly and wiped dry before each
test.
7.4 Oven, conforming to the specification for
a Type lib laboratory oven given in Specification
E 145.
8. Procedure
8. I Original Thickness Measurement--Mea-
sure the original thickness of the specimen to the
nearest 0.02 mm (0.001 in.). Place the specimen
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on the anvil of the dial micrometer so that the
presser foot will indicate the thickness at the
central portion of the top and bottom faces.
8.2 Application of Compressive Force--As-
semble the specimens in the compression device,
using extreme care to place them exactly in the
center between the plates to avoid tilting. If the
calibrated spring device (Fig. 1) is used, apply the
compressive force by tightening the screw until
the deflection as read from the scale is equivalent
to that shown on the calibration curve for the
spring corresponding to a force of i.8 kN (400
lb0. With the exlcrnal loading device (Fig. 2),
apply this force to the asembly in the compres-
sion machine or by adding required masses, but
in the latter case, take care to add the mass
gradually without shock. Tighten the nuts and
bolts just sufficiently to hold the initial deflec-
tions of the specimen and spring. It is imperative
that no additional force be applied in tightening
the bolts.
8.3 Test Time and Test Temperazure--
Choose a suitable temperature and time for the
compression set, depending upon the conditions
of the expected service. In comparative tests, use
identical temperature and heating periods. It is
suggested that the test temperature be chosen
from those listed in Practice D 1349. Suggested
test periods are 22 h and 70 h. The specimen
shall be at room temperature when inserted in
the compression device. Place the assembled
compression device in the oven within 2 h after
completion of the assembly and allow it to re-
main there for the required test period in dry air
at the test temperature selected. At the end of the
test period, take the device from the oven and
remove the specimens immediately and allow it
to cool.
8.4 Cooling Period--While cooling, allow the
specimens to rest on a poor thermally conducting
surface, such as wood, for 30 min before making
the measurement of the final thickness. Conduct
the cooling period at a standard laboratory tem-
perature of 23 _+ 2"C (73.4 + 3.6"F). Specimens
whose compression set property is affected by
atmospheric moisture shall be cooled in an at-
mosphere controlled to 50 ± 5 % relative humid-
ity.
8.5 Final Thickness Measurement--After the
rest period, measure the final thickness at the
center of the specimen in accordance with 8. I.
D 305
9. Calculation
9. I Calculate the compression set as a per-
centage of the original thickness as follows:
CA = ((to - tO/t.) x I00 (I)
where:
CA = compression set (Method A) as a percent-
age of the original thickness,
to = original thickness (8.1), and
t, = final thickness (8.5).
10. Report
10.1 The report shall include the following:
10.1.1 Original dimensions of the test speci-
men, including the original thickness, to,
10.1.2 Actual compressive force on the speci-
men as determined from the calibration curve of
the spring and spring deflection reading (7.2.1)
or as applied by an external force (7.2.2),
10.1.3 Thickness of the test specimen 30 rain
after removal from the clamp, ti,
10.1.4 Type of test specimen used, together
with the time and temperature of test,
10.1.5 Compression set, expressed as a per-
centare of the original thickness,
10.1.6 Method used (Method A), and
10.1.7 Number of specimens tested.
METHOD B----COMPRESSION SET UNDER
CONSTANT DEFLECTION IN AIR
1]1. Apparatus
11.1 Dial Micrometer--A dial micrometer,
for measuring the specimen thickness, in accord-
anee with Practice D 3767, Method A I.
NOTE 4--For vulcanizates having a hardness below
35 IRHD, the force on the presser foot should be
reduced to 0.2 + 0.05 N (0.04 :l: O.01 Ibf).
l l.2 Spacer Bars, to maintain the constant
deflection required under Method B.
I 1.2. I Spacer bars for Type I samples shall
have a thickness of 9.5 ± 0.02 mm (0.375 +
0.001 in.).
11.2.2 Spacer bars for Type 2 samples shall
have a thickness of 4.50 ± 0.01 mm (0.1770 ±
0.0005 in.).
I 1.3 Compression Device, consisting oftwo or
more flat steel plates between the parallel faces
of which the specimens may be compressed as
shown in Fig. 3. Steel spacers for the required
percentage of compression given in 12.2 shall be
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placed on each side of the rubber specimens to
control their thickness while compressed. The
steel surfaces contacting the rubber specimens
shall be ground to a maximum roughness of 250
pm (10 lain.) and then chromium plated and
polished.
11.4 Oven, conforming to the specification for
a Type lIB laboratory oven given in Specification
E 145.
11.5 Plates--The plates between which the
test specimen is compressed shall be made of
steel of sufficient thickness to withstand the com-
pressive stresses without bending. The surfaces
against which the specimen is held shall have a
highly polished chromium-plated finish and shall
be cleaned thoroughly and wiped dry before each
test.
12. Procedm-e
12.1 Original Thickness Measurement--
Measure the original thickness of the specimen
to the nearest 0.02 mm (0.001 in.). Place the
specimen on the anvil of the dial micrometer so
that the presser foot will indicate the thickness at
the central portion of the top and bottom faces.
12.2 Application of Compressive Force--Place
the test specimen between the plates of the com-
pression device with the spacers on each side,
allowing sufficient clearance for the bulging of
the rubber when compressed (Fig. 3). Where a
lubricant is applied, it shall consist of a thin
coating of a lubricant having substantially no
action on the rubber. For most purposes, a silicon
or fluorosilicon fluid is suitable. Tighten the bolts
so that the plates are drawn together uniformly
until they are in contact with the spacers. The
amount of compression employed shall be ap-
proximately 25 %. A suitable mechanical or hy-
draulic device may be used to facilitate assem-
bling and disassembling the test fixture.
12.3 Test Time and Temperature--Choose a
suitable temperature and time for the compres-
sion set, depending upon the conditions of the
expected service. In comparative tests, use iden-
tical temperature and test periods, it is suggested
that the test temperature be chosen from those
listed in Recommended Practice D 1349. Sug-
gested test periods are 22 h and 70 h. The test
specimen shall be at room temperature when
inserted in the compression device. Place the
assembled compression device in the oven within
D 39S
2 h after completion of the assembly and allow
it to remain there for the required test period in
dry air at the test temperature selected. At the
end of the test period, take the device from the
oven and remove the test specimen immediately
and allow them to cool.
12.4 Cooling Period--While cooling, allow
the test specimen to rest on a poor thermally
conducting surface, such as wood, for 30 rain
before making the measurement of the final
thickness. Maintain the conditions during the
cooling period in accordance with 8.4.
12.5 Final Thickness Measurement--After
the rest period, measure the final thickness at the
center of the test specimen in accordance with
12.1.
13. Calculation
13.1 Calculate the compression set expressed
as a percentage of the original deflection as fol-
lows:
CB = I(to - O/(lo - l,)] x 100 (2)
where:
Ca = compression set (Method B) expressed as
percentage of the original deflection,
lo = original thickness ofspecimen (12.1),
t_ = final thickness of specimen (12.5), and
t. = thickness of the spacer bar used.
NOTE 5--Lubrication of the operating surfaces of
the compression device is optional while giving more
reproducible results, lubrication may somewhat alter
the compression set values.
14. Report
14.1 The report shall include the following:
14.1.1 Original dimensions of the test speci-
men including the original thickness, to,
14.1.2 Percentage compression of the speci-
men actually employed,
14.1.3 Thickness of the test specimen 30 min
after removal from the clamp, t_,
14.1.4 Type of test specimen used, together
with the time and temperature of test,
14.1.5 Whether or not the surfaces ofthe com-
pression device are lubricated. If they are, what
type lubrication was used,
14.1.6 Compression set, expressed as a per-
centage of the original deflection,
14.1.7 Method used (Method B), and
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14.1.8 Nqm_. "_imens tested.
15. Precision s g_l b.
15.1 These precision _,atements have been
prepared in accordance with Practice D 3040-81.
Please refer to this practice for terminology and
other testing and statistical concepts.
15.2 Prepared test specimens of two rubbers,
Methods A and B, were supplied to five labora-
tories. These were tested in duplicate each day
on two separate testing days. A test _sult, there-
fore, is the average of two test specimens, for
both Methods A and B.
15.3 One laboratory did not run the Method
D_
A testing, therefor the precision for Method A
is derived from four laboratories.
15.4 The precision results are given in Tables
! and 2.
15.5 Bias--In test method statistical termi-
nology, bias is the difference between an average
test value and the reference or true test property
value. Reference values do not exist for this test
method since the value or level of the test prop-
erty is exclusively defined by the test method.
Bias, therefore, cannot be determined.
5Supporting daw are available from ASTM Headquarters.
Request RR: D-I I-I 138.
TABLE I LQCPveclaiueDalaCompresmlmtS_--MethodA
Material Mean Level
Within Labi3_tori_ Among Laboratories
S CY S CV
A 1.73 (%) 0.0500 0.0277 0.190 0.1096
B 26. I 0.898 0.0336 2.37 0.0908
Average or Pooled 0.636 0.0308 1.681 0.1006
Values
Repeatability Reproducibility
Standard Deviation, (Sy' 0.636 1,743
Coefllcient o¢ Vmiadon, (CV) 0.0308 O. 103
Leasl Sipificant Dilgerence, (LSD) tc 8.8 % 29.1%
An average value, the value of S varies with mean level.
"LSD based on 95% confKlence level; two refers are considered significantly different if their difference, expressed as a
pewenlase of their avera F, exccmJs the stated percent value,
c The LSD values are relative percent, that is, a percent of the "percent" values used to measure the lested property,
TABLE 2 L(_ _ Data Cmnln'emlm S_--Mettul B
Material Mean Level
Within Laborator_ Among Laboratories
S CV S CJ /
A 13.7 (%) 0.591 0.0420 1.543 0. I 13
B 52.8 0.567 0.0110 5.924 0.112
Avera_ or Pooled 0.579 0.0307 4.329 0. I 124
Values
Repeatability Reproducibility
Standard Deviation, (Sy' 0.579 4,348
CueffK';,ent o¢ Variation, (CV) 0.0307 0,114
Lea_ Sipificant Difference, (LSD) gc 8.7 % 32.4 %
AAn nveralg value, the value of S varies with mean kveL
m/_'D bitscd on 95% confuiencc kvei; two results ave considered sqinificantly different if their difference, expressed as a
pe_centalg of their averaSe, exceeds the _,ated percent value.
c The LSD values are relative pel_cent, that is, a percent o1" the "percent" values used to nl__.._re the tested prolx'fly.
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FIG. I Device [or C..oml_s_Joe Set Test. UsImB
Calibm_d _ L_ling. Method A
FIG. 2 Dm4eeh'C_q_s_m._,tT_.,t_rq
_ammd t_MNq. Meth_ A
FIG. 3 DevlcefixrC0mprmJmlSelT_Umllm"
Com¢_ DefleOk_ Metlmd B
The Amerwan Society for Testing and Materials lakes no position respecting the validity of any patcr_ rights _ im co_ection
with any item mentioned in this standard. Users of this standard arc exlcressly advised thai dezermination of the yaJidiry of ony such
polent rights, and the risk of infringement of sLg'h righl$, are entircty their orm _ibllity.
This standard is subject to revision al any time by the responsible technical commiltee and mzt_l be reviewed rooT/five years and
ff not revised, either reapproved or withdrawn. Your comments are invited eitl_r for revision of this standard or for additiortul
standards and should be addressed to ASTM Headquarters. Your comments will receive _ consideration at a tneeting of the
responsible technical committee, which you may attend. If you feet thai your comments have rot rec_ved a fair hearing yott Mould
make your views known to the ASTM Committee on Slandards, 1916 Race SL. Phihzde/l_ia. Pa. 19103.
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WAssocioto Adaleistrstor for Specs Plight
NPS/irv Deride
Cons tn Cnen end Noszlo to Csso MOM lie| Sos1 Erosion
Prohleo|
As n result nf the prohlou belnl Incurred durin8 flldht on both
cole to cneo end nestle to cone °0" rio d erosion, Mr. Honky and I
visited NSPC on July 11, leSS, to discuss this issue utth both
project ned H| perseus1. Pollovind ere same lmpurtont factors
concern#nO tJJoss prohlons:
A. lintels to Cue uqp, rlq erosion
?bern boys boon t uelve (11) instsncoe dnrin8 fllSht wborn there
nsvo aeon _mo prlmry "0" riq erosion. In one specific cone
thorn one elan erosion of the socondory "0" rin d see1. There
nero tve (|) prllsry uC_ rio| semis tbot wro luist offocted (no
ornsion) mud kvo (|) cones In eblcb suet hlee by the prlmry
soils.
The prism suspect ee the csuon for the erosion on the prinuJry mOW
r Jn8 seals is the type of putty used. It is Thiekol's position
t lUSt d_urin 8 8seeehly, leek check, or ilnition, n bole rdm be
zeroed throu|ll the [mt.ty .which loitletos non rin8 erosion due to
J JettieS oxsect. It Is importune to note that niter STS-10o tins
une!octuror of the putty sent out of boniness nnd n use putty
aonurscturor ues controctod. The nee putty Is believed to be
---o_'asusceptible to onvlrolontsl effects _Jck 8J Nisturo vhich
8uJkse tbo putty more tacky.
oddest, No or n puttT ode by • CsJuJdiom Nonufocteror vhlck
t.ncludos oshostos, ned retinue conbiuetlon of putty end 8rouJo.
_oruel oulFlJe med/or toots ere uadervoy to OJJlJS those
options.
sThlnhol J| urleuly coneiderin|tbo dnlution of puttpon the qN-
nets|sic use Jntnt since the/ believe the petty ts the prim .
couln nf the trenton. A duel|lOll on this oriole is ploeeec t 9 ec
uJeIO this seek. l hove roeorvuttone shut doits it_consider|lL 8
tim clJOificonce of the qN-S firln8 In quelifyiq tin iq_ for
f118be, o
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It is important to note that the cause end effect of the putty
varies. There 8ro some MSFC personnel who ore not convinced that
the holes in the putty ere the source of the problem but foe1
that it my be n reverse effect in thst the hot gases mJ Foe
1caking through the seal and causing the hole track In are petty.
Considering the feet that there doesn't appear tube • validated
resolution ss to the effect of putty, I would carteinly question
the visaou zn removing it m qN-S.
B. Case to Case non RIm| |rostun
There have been five (S) occurrences during flight where there
was primary field Joint "0" ring erosion. There was one case
where the secondary "0" ring was hoot affected with no erosion.
The erosion with the field point primary "0" rinds is considered
by some to'be more critical than the hassle Joint due to the fact
that durind the pressure build up on the priory mO" ring the
unpressurized field Joint secondary seal unseats due to Joint
rotation.
The problem with the unseating of the secondary Non ring during
Joint rotation has been kaov_ for quite sane time. In order to
eliminate this problem on the FWC field Joints m capture feature
was designed which prevents the secondary seal from lifting
off. During our discussions on this issue vLthNSPC, am action
was assigned for then to identify the timing associated with the
unseating of the secondary "0" ring and the seating of the
primary _0" ring during rotation. How 1on| it takes the
secondary "0" ring to lift off during rotation nnd when in the
pressure cycle it lifts are key factors in the deterniaation of
its criticality.
The present consensus is thst if the primary "0" ring seats
during ignition, and subsequently fails, the unseated secondary
"0" ring viii not serve its intended purpose as s redundnnt
seal. However, redundancy does exist during the ignition cycle,
which la the nest critical time.
It is recounended that we strange for MSFC to provide an overall
briefing to you on the SKN "0 u rinds * including failure history,
current etatoeB and options for correcting the problems.
Irwin| Davids
ec:
N/Mr. leeks
N/Hr. Hanhy
ML/Mr, HarrJngton
MP/Nr. Winterhalter
0
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aria, Cede N_. n. man_
o
80L111CT, link gOLmt_-IL_g EcosLon
.'or _ _tEl_.._ _t_ __* efto_._ - _ IQA_,e
.. .... brLoflJg
z. _ z_ the field :Jo/at Neeedarr soal U_ts of_
tbo notal utlJsg mmrfsoo8 dur/_ll utoc prouur/mtio8,
how soo_ vLL1L At coturn to • posito8 vbo_o ooed_ot /8
ro-utabll_bod_
2e
at 100°_ tlm o-r/ag mslataA_ oe_ae_, at ?__
tl_ e-c_ Xest eutae_ _o, _.a_._
at _ khm _ kest mas te_. ....
ne eo_e_ulee Is tl_t seeee4a_ seaX_ eal_tlA_ Je
tbe nN fAeCal _e_at csnnet be g_acmtee4.
ous_nt Zg the pr/_ary oor/ag does not seal,
the g_edir7 m3L seat Ln 8uf_/elmt tLms to IPCOSemt
_o/nt leakage?
fdUIItSJ_ N_ has no ro_ue to 8uslpeot that the IPC/ner_r
8o_ you,d over fslA after prouuro oquLllbriun ,-
rosobod, i.e., 8_ter the ignitLon tcusient. Z£ tin
8n_m_e_
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pr£nar7 o-rAng gore to £aAl £roB 0 to 170 _L:]LXI-
seconds, there 18 • very high probabAXAt7 tlBt tim
seeondsr_r o-r2ng vouXd bold pressure s2nee the esse
has not expanded approelably at thai po_. If "the
pr£nmr? 8eaX yore to fail' £r_ 170 to 330 nAXai-
8eeonds, the probabLI/t7 of the 8_ondsry se8_ boldAng
Ls reduced. From 330 to 800 mA12Aseeond8 the ebanoe
of the secondary sea2 boXdLag A8 8naXl. Tb2s As •
direet resuXt of the o-fAng's 81ov response eOUlPered
to the netaX _ase Ngnents as the :50Ant rotates.
3. _,st_n, Iloadquarter8 v88 not avare that the
seeondar7 o-zing nm7 not Nat due to :5oAnt rotation, ....
vbea uu th/8 An_orporated k_.o t_-e IMBa/_L?
_KII]tS_L JtTX 8ulxdttod Tlflt-13520 eRoteat/on itatton_Le,
film 8_plez I_I" to IISIC on 12/2/82. 5rbe m CIL
_lUjL//renont _IMmge yes approved I_ Level ][ZX COB on
03. I4vel ZX autborLNd 8ubmLtl_2 02 Level Z
ehange request !122106L ms 3/2/83. On 5/2/83 Lev__ XZissued ]ltC_ 822106r, lt2 to l_p2enenl: approved x4ve_ 4i*
r_lumge request w22206_ sad 1122100l.
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VIII-C
Organizational
Issuance
GeeSe C. Marred SIx_e R_ ¢emw
Memll Soice I_tv Cenm. Ala_ 3_ t2
"'_ SOP SO00.t
A_yw_s_est_t
I:EDece'obeF 29t 1._83Shul_Je Pr_ecu Office
IkJbject: SHUTlr'L,F. PRO3ECT F3.IGHT I_.ADINF.SS R_VWlF
_ h PURPOSE
TMs procedure defines the _s_nslbilities, requirements, and procedures _ E.u_re
effective plaint for and concl_:t of the Shu,"tle Pro;cots Flisht Readiness Review.
2. sccj__!
Thls procedure is Applicable t_ _! ST$ miss_o_s.
3. poLJc....___qv
8. It b the policy of _e Manaser, Shmtle Projects to make en Issessme_t of fli|ht
reau_he_ of the Shuttte projects prio¢ to each flish'_. This will be a¢_mpfished
by s tonsorial&ted Flisht Read_ness Review (FRR) of all MSFC ShutUe Projects
Office elemenu necessary [or safe and successful conduct of the launch, fl_ht,
and ix_t-l-ncGn$ operations. The rev|ew will be L_ported by Idl MSFC
• rgenizatlons which p&rtim;'.ate in MSFC Shut"Ue Projects isctivities.
b. The Shuttle Project FRR will be p_eceded by serrate dee&lied read_ness revle_
(Ixre-FRR's) of individu_ elemenu by me prime _tr_tor's and the element
pc_jecl, offices, u_de_ the c_[,_izance of ",he responsible Ma_gerl.
Ik RESP_r,_K.ITfE S
80 The conduct of the Shuttle Pro;ects FRR is the responsibility of the Manager.
Shut_e Projects or his _es_£e,a_ecl _pres_tive.
b. The Prolv_m Plato _nd Mar.&gement Syssems Office is re_onalble for FRR
so%eduJin_ pi_r_n_[ arid requirements, coordinatin| the FRR alend& t FRR a,_'_ion
|terns _ ic'Jon item cJo_Outk and prep4tin t the resdiness &slessment
m_ntemmce of aU records azs_:ia:ed therewith. The Pmimm PLseu Imd
Mlna|ement Systems Office will be the focal point with the 3_ Le_.i 11
National Spice Tra-s_o_ation System (NSTS) ProGram Ms_utser led the Level I
FRR unde_ me cos:+_:.,*.r'.c'r c'f _*e _i_ector, Space Sh_fle Op_lt_on,_.
• -:'-. . . .-:--_- .,,;:.:..:: ,..
kll_¢ I_ ellll ¢14m. _ ttNI) ._..'" - " ._
o_
u,
388
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C- The Project Mar_|ers _'ill usJre _e etlectlvity o! a 4etal|ed p.°ime _nuactm"
pre°FJR.R.
d. The Project Mana|ers wil| conduc: F RR'I to develop their reid;hess ul_.m_eflt
and are re._ponslblc for me Shultle Projects FRR brle.Wln| content III the|r
par ticufar area.
$. PRIME CONTRACTOR FRE-FRR
Project Ml.'_gers _| assure _¢t eich I_lme contractor cor_ucts • pre-FRP
rat]m for the Project Ofiices FRR, The ¢ontrsctm's rev_.v iha11 be _ by &
Iot mAr_|ement at [east (_e level _ove the conl_act_ Project Mimalef.
_. SHUTTLE ELEMENT FRR
"a. The Pr_ect will Conduct • FRR In pre[:_.'stion tot me Shuttle Projects FRR.
The respective Prolecl M_$er of eleme_ urger revle'w wl|[ serve tS Cll_blimm.
The membership wiZl consist of re_resent=tlv_ item _e fOl|O_'in F
Shuttle Pro_ec_s O_lfi:e
S&F. D_recto, a_e
Rel;&b[litv a'_ Quallt'v Assur&_ce
ContrlCtorl
T hioko|, Rocketdy_e
Ik Esch Project Office will m_ke me necessau 7 conference 8rran_ements, _tif¥
_vlew members, designate secret_,y, prepare presentati_s, record and track
action Items, closu_'es and rettin • copy o_ me presentaticm msteri_J b the
Pro_ect O/llce record file. . •
7. SHUTI"LE DRO3ECTS FRR REQUIREMENTS
a. Revle_ Concept: ,"he Shuttle Prciects FRR wgl employ • delta review ClXnCIL.pt
irom pr_" rev=ews and previous STS m_ssians.
b. S¢l'4_lul e: The Sh._Ue Preiects F RR w;ll be held prior lID the Centar FRR.
¢. _ ";'hemajor &get_da itcmS an¢_responsi*',illt_es ires
(I) l_tr oductio_ Proirams Pt'm and Mi.'_|emmtt
Systems O_fice
(2) Systems Mae_l;er , Systems Msnasement Of_.e
U} Ewter_al Tank _._•_ger. Extermd Tank Project
Office o"
c_
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(8) Solid Rocket Booster _%r_ger, 5o'id Rocket Booster
Project Office
(S) Flight Engine Manager, Flight Engine Project
Office
(6) Action Item_'Read_ness Program Plans a:_ ,V.anazement
Poll Syste,'ns Office
Presentation Emohasi¢ The presentation of agenda items will normally ir, cJude a
br,el status summary with appropriate su_,p_.'ting detail on significant items and
cor_Jude with a readiness assessment. The F-e_en:aT-ion topics and scope should
be developed from the Prcicc: FRR's a_ s_.auld •
(I) be that required to provide _e S.',_:tie Prole_s h',ar_ager and ReviewTeam
with the inlormatior, neede¢ to make an in_eperglent judgement as to flight
readiness;
(2) review recent significant res,-Ived prob!ems anc_ prior f_ight anomalies
when necessary m eseablish confidencel
(3) o0ver all problems, technicaJ isles, open i:em% and constraints remaining
to be resolved before ch¢ flight;
(41) _tabll_ the flight baseline _n_lguration in terms o1[ all s/gnificant
changes since the last flight as_l/o¢ appli_ble STS flight.
lrithln lhe above guidelines, the scope of _e review _ould _ver status, changes
a,'_ issues In areas such as:
(!) Hardware/Software
acceptance test failures
(2) Launch Commit Criteria
(3) Flight Plans/Rules
(ll) Vehicle Checkout
(_) Shortages ara:l 0_,' l'ork
(L) Prior Flight Anomalies
17) As-built Hardware Configuration versus Cer1_,fied Hardware List
(S) Critical Item List (CIL]/Ha'ards
(_1) Develops.. ent_ Q_all flcation, &nd Reliability
(Cer t ificatiorU_eri ficat ion)
(10) qYaivers and Deviations
(11} Limite_ Life Components
(12) Laun_:h Critics/Spa_es
(1)) Sne-k Circuits
(It) Flight Margins
(1_ PAS Assessment
(16) Safety
(17) Process Changes: _..es:£-,, _nu'.._ct.:,rinlb chcckou_ and
processing
Anon.adler, Failures lnclu,_,ng development and
Testing
launch
l)
O,
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e. Shuttle Pro;_tS FRR Member_p_ The Miller. Shuttl_ Pro|eets will es_blish
review me_n_ts_ip _ Nrv¢ as Ch_rman. Membership wiU comprise
represen:ation from the hd_win8 oflLnlzetlcxnw
ProxremIPro|ect Offices
S¢ien_ & Enline_rin _ t)irectc_ete
Relieb[ll_ k _8llty A ss_rt_Ce
Contrectorl
Th]o_OI, Roche td)me
Jr. Documef_t8 ¢ion R eCllJiremen_s
(I) Presentitlons: Yu|rlphs 1rill be used for FRR presentations _ p6per
cop_es vLU be presided 1= the rev_¢_i_| off_ci-te.
(2) Sl.l_emtmt of FliRht Reeo_r_ssc $1a_emen! CA Fl_&ht Rel_liness will be
ex_te_ by eli ProJeCt k_ar_ers i_nd submitted &t the COnCI_o_ O1' She
re_'iew.
I_. F RR Act;on llem/Open Item Closeout Reportin_ Requirements
(I) Subsequent Io _e condusAon el _e Shuttle Prc_ects FRP.t • copy of
&ssisned _cti_ Items wlU be provided to eech ictiahee by the Prolr&m
Plato _ Minalement Systeml Ore[ice.
(2) The FRR sl_cretary will _'_ck _1| action items a_l prov;de status Io _e
Shuttle Pro)ec_ Manl|or.
(J) Cioseouts so FRR 8c:l_n Items will be submitted to the Prosr_n Plans
end Mer_|ement Systems OlJ[ice in wr]tin| and wiIr into f_dJy the b4_s
for cl_eout, th_t It action token, r_ults obtained, lnd determlnatJofll
med_. The Pro|rein P_r_s trod M&_l[eme_ Systems Office wUI _bm|t
_osures to me MlnaEer , ShmUe Projects cr Ms desi|neted
re_ese_tiUve for S_l_n_ture.
h. Procedures
(I) Sinl_le Points of Contact: FRR pllnnln| and procedures will be
coordir_ted ¢hroulh • s_ntle point of _ontlct in the Prolir_m Pllms
Mer_gemef, t Systems Office.
ln_vldual dement for points of contact win be desilnated by the
respo_s;bto Prelect M_,_|or end the mu_es provided to the Pro|ram
PJire and Mlu_|ement 3ystems Office. These b_dividuaJs will be
reN:_a_Ul_ble for these duties outJlned in parairaph &.b.
391
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_) GuldeHnew Approxlma:ely three weeks prior to the MSPC Shuttle Projects
_'u'_eUneS wilt be prepared by Prolram Pl4ms lind glu_lremlmt
Systems OffSet 4rod Issued by the M&u_q_r, ShutUe Projects, establishing
Pro|ects FP.R datep Shuttle Projects FRR c_to_ with 8pplicable
membership, _ _y SpecJ4d requirements not covered by this procxt4ure.
$. I[/r_CT'lYE DATI_
This procc'_re Is effective on date of Issue.
Robert E. Lindstrom
Idler, Shmtle Pricers
Ui
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SA0Z/Or. L._l_|ood
SA0 I[Mr. A sS¢¢w
SA0t/V,r. Harden
SA I ! IMr. Lomb&trio
SA3 I/Mr. Brldw_ll
SAt l/Mr. M.aloy
SA._ I/Mr. Taylor
$A7 l/Mr. Boze
$A_ I/_r. Zol|er
EAO l/Mr. Klnss_Jry
F.AOI/Dr. Th:<n soq
EEO l/Mr. Hardy
EEl ll/_'. Hor tan
EE21/Mr. Thompson
EEJ l/kir. Nichols
EE_I/Mr. Goetz
EGOl/ktr. Brooks
EGO_Mr. 5unn
EBO l/Mr. Br_lfo_d
F.HO l/.V.r. Scttvinlham er
ESOI/Dr. Des_er
EPO I/Mr. McCool
EPt )lMr. IForluncl
ELOUMt. HOlmm
IDO I/Dr. Mc_Donoullh
ETOIIMr. Taylor
PO0 |lMr. Msrsh_l
T/_ l/Mr. Odom
NA01/Mr. _u
3A0 ilMr. Downey
DA011Dr. L_
DD0 l/Mr. Let
lOgO IIMr. Belay
DR011Mr. Sneed
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TO:
FRGM:
SUBJECT:
DLatr!butlcn
DAOI/V. E. Lutes
MSFC FI_Eht Readiness Review (FRR) Board
for MSFC EleBents for _tsa]on 51°L
An HSFC FRR Board of senior KSFC BanaEe=ent parsonneZ rill
convene at 8:30 a.i. on January 1_, 1986, I. Bulldl.i 11663,
HOSC/HCR, ¢O revlew and assess the reed_nes$ status of the
KSFC _laslon 51-L elecenta for fllsht.
Thls crating ulll be held at the SECRET leveZ end all
do©umentetton v|ll be handled and presented In accordance
_lth the RASA Security relule&lons. Attendanna u111 be
restricted and all Rrc_ects are to coordinate this mctiv|ty
through the Prosram Plannlnl and Hanasament Systems OffLcep
TO= Staplesp _-G33B.
The Center Board La composed of the follovlnK:
DAO1/V. _. Lutes: Chairman
DDOI/T. J. Lee Vice Chairman
EAO1/J. E. Klnssbury
DSOI/F. 1. Spear
F.GO1/J. R. Nadole
JAO1/J. A. Douney
PAOI/W. R. Narahell
CSO?lJ. ¢. VaJkar
:A_/$. G. Herders=n: Secretariat
Each pro_ect manm£er must certtfy the fll|ht readiness of
hie barowsre and present supporting rationale and data so
&he Board ca_ independently aasea_ the flight reodiness.
The Shuttle Projects Office Beam|or IS responsible for
prepare&ion and coordLns&lon o_ abe leetl_l_ preaeatlnK a.
Overall assessment of fltsht readiness: rleordL, i of linUtll
Brig aCtiOn l&e¢_, and trackln| action items for closure by
t_e Review Board.
n
o
#
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E_pha$l_ will be _]aced on safety of flight and m_ssion
3ucces$, including potenti|1 impact of prior flight
anomalies; £round test ano_Blies; revisions to hardware,
aoftware, launch commit criteria, or redlines wh:_ have not
been flight verified; revisions to SRK recovery risks since
the previous flight; any waiver which has not been flight
verified or which requires external approval; and any
revisions to hazard or critical Ite_ lists. Issues,
concerns, and risks shoulC be clearly identified as well as
methods of closure.
In an ef£ort to Blnim_ze administrative control requlreF.ents
associated wlth the dissemination of classified data, an
effort is to be made to present classified information only
through vlewgraphs. 1£ Projects elect _o incorporate
cla3sified data within their handouts, it is the Project's
responsibility to assure that the handouts are marked and
handled in accordance with the _ASA Security regu]ations.
If any assistance is needed in this matter, please contact
the _SFC Security Division at _-_310.
A preliminary agenda ls enclosed.
"_ ¢'R. Lucia
Director
Enclosure
Dlstrlbutlon:
See Page 3
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Distribution
SAO1/M_. Linds_rom
Assigning La_n:h Constraints on 0pen Proble-us
Submitted tc M_FC F_ -
The Shuttle Projects Office has es:ab!ished a requiremen=
for identification of iaunoh constraints for problems being
reported to the P_FC Probie-_ _sess-_enz Sys_e.m (PAS) by
eie=en_ con:racccrsl[ Each e!emenz con:rector (Rocket/one,
P/_C, USBI, and Thibkol) has been directed to support this
requirement by providing launch constraint infc_ation on
each ne_ problem submitted _= the _SFC PAS. The lau_ch
constraint infD_a_ion provided by the contractor is
based upon their preii__ina.--$ technical eva!nation and %_!1
require f_na! concurrence by the responsible ale=on= prD_ect
manager.
a. The follo=ing Eu!deiines have been established to aid
in mak±ng constraint decisions on open problems and are l_tec
to recurrence control dete-_m-izazion on!y. In accordance with
practices estah!isheE on past programs, remedial actions (e.g.
re=oval and reoiaceman_ of defective hardware, etc_) for cor-
rot=in 8 discrepancies on the vehicle _o be launched are con-
sidered launch constraints and are tracked by'the KSC system.
(I) 'All open problems coded criticality i. IR, 2, or
2R _ril! be considered launch constraints until resolved
(recurrence concro! established and its implementation
effectivity de:ermined) or sufficient rationale, i.e.,
different configuration, etc., _xisus _o conclude that this
problem _!! not occur on the fligh= vehicle during pre!aunch,
launch, cr flighT.
(2) Problems coded criticality 3 will not be con-
sidered launch constraints to-.less (a) the potential _is_s of
leadimg to a crlti:ailzy i or 2 failure mode; or (b) the
failed component has =ulzi=le use on =he element and more
than one oczurrence c=u!_ ieai to a crizica!ity 2 condition; "
or (c) che failure could result in mul_iple loss of fligh=
instrumentation channels, if a criticality 3 is dece.--_ined
Co be a launch constrain:, i: _i!! be =reamed the same as a.(1)
above.
435
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b. To assure _hat each reported problem is reviewed
for cot-tee: criticality and constraimc assi_r_en: by the
appropriate M_FC personnel, the following procedure will be
fo!icwed:
(i) The responsible S&E desigT, ac:ionee and the
e!emen: project office aczionee will review each problem
UDCn receipt to assure that the orifice!icy and constrain: _./,
as_±_r=enzs mee: with their approval. Excep:ions to
crlz[ca_izy or constrain: assigT_en: will be coordinated"
wlzh the Prob!em Assessment CenTer (PAC) ac:ionee _:hin
r;o working days from receipt of _he problem report.
(2) _ne Problem Assessm-anc CenTer _i!! prepare a
weekly constraints list by e!e__en:. This list will be
subziz:ed co _he Shuz:!e R.&QA Support Office, EG03, for
input Co the Shuzz!e Projects NmzaEer, SA01. CoFias of
_he constraint list _i!l be furnishdd 6oncdrren:!y =o each
Shuttle E!emen: Pr0jec: Y2.na_er.
" (3) Launch constraints will be reviewed at each
Problem Review Board (PF_) meeting.
Th.e Problem Assessment Cancer will be responsible for
cccrdinacin_ all launch constraint ac:ivity and ass'c_rimg
:hat info.-ma:ion is Dr_ueriy doc'mmenTed in the Problem
Assess_en: System (_)'daza base and =rans=iz_ed to _FC
r_zna_e=en=.
_ober _ L_ncs m
N_nager
Shu=zie Projects Office
Distribution:
See page S
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